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You are about to view a PC Power. Point presentation. (Power. Point version 2003 or later) Some slides have a built-in timing but in most cases a slide will wait for a ‘click’ before proceeding. However, please note that you can also use Power. Point’s own navigation. At the lower left of the screen display you will see: Click on to return to the start of the previous slide. Click on to see a submenu from which you can go to next or previous slides, pause the presentation or end the show. Click on to go to the start of the next slide. Click to proceed… SLIDE 1 OF 50

THE BATTLE OF LONG TAN A dot. PPT Power. Point Animations presentation Version 01 b The Long Tan Cross (pic taken ANZAC Day 2005), at the site of the 11 Platoon action of 18 Aug 1966 Featuring Maps by Dave Sabben, Animation by dot. PPT Power. Point Animations (visit the website: www. dot. PPT. com ) and Excerpts from the book “The Battle of Long Tan as told by the Commanders to Bob Grandin” (Allen & Unwin, 2004, ISBN 1 74114 199 0) SLIDE Click to start the presentation… 2 OF 50

In 1966, Australia increased its commitment of troops in South Viet Nam to a two-Battalion “Task Force” plus appropriate support units. Prior to this, Australia had military advisors scattered throughout the South and a Battalion Group operating out of Bien Hoa with the US 173 rd Airborne Brigade (Separate). The new Task Force took over responsibility for Phuoc Tuy Province, on the coast to the south east of Saigon. Click to proceed… SLIDE 3 OF 50

35 75 40 Hat Dich N Binh Ba Nui Nghe 2 70 Nui Dat 50 55 45 In 1966, Australia increased its commitment of 75 troops in South Viet Nam to a two-Battalion “Task P H U O support units. U Y T Force” plus appropriate. C P R O V I N C Prior to this, Australia had military advisors. E scattered throughout the South and a Battalion Group 70 operating out of Bien Hoa with the US 173 rd Airborne Nui Brigade (Sep). Dat (2) The new Task Force took over responsibility for Phuoc Tuy Province, on the coast to the south east of Saigon. Long Tan 65 Hoa Long 2 The Australians set up their Logistics Base (1 ALSG) near the sea port of Vung Tau. . . … and their Operational Base (1 ATF) around a small hill (“Nui Dat”) near the centre of the 40 province… 65 Long Phuoc Scale: approx 5 Kilometre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 45 50 By mid-July, the base was fully manned, but development was slow… 1 APC Squadron and 5 RAR occupied the base site in late-May to early-June 1966 and were joined by the Task Force HQ, Artillery, supporting units and 6 RAR in June and July. Click to proceed… SLIDE 4 OF 50

35 75 50 45 40 Hat Dich P Nui Nghe H U O P Binh Ba N 55 C R O V T I U Y N C E 2 70 70 Nui Dat (2) Nui Dat Long Tan 65 Hoa Long 75 65 Long Phuoc 2 Scale: approx 5 Kilometre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 40 45 50 By mid-July, the base was fully manned, but development was kms out After first setting their perimeter… they began to clear out to a notional line 5 slow… from the base. Longarea within Alpha”area needed were whichclear but, Hoa Long and aimed. Baentered the area. The Phuoc and Line Alphavillages 5 to bedeserted… but atcould villagers often were populated. This was “Line Long Tan within kms of thethe enemy well patrolled. Binhstill not secure… By mid-August, the – the line inside kept base was first, direct but fire into the base. Click to proceed… June 1966 SLIDE 5 OF 50

The Battle Of Long Tan as told by the Commanders to Bob Grandin (Aug 2004) Page 72 - …an attack on the base was not considered a probability and therefore it was Page 62 – It wasn’t long before the VC worked out that they could take on the lone poorly defended. There was little barbed wire of note out the front of the FDLs, and no anti battalion at Nui Dat (in June). Information filtered through to the ARVN and to the -personnel minefields. It was preposterous to suggest the base might be in danger. United States intelligence networks that the VC were planning a regimental attack on Nui Dat within a few days. We believed that the local VC were not about to take on a two-battalion Task Force with its supporting artillery regiment, mortars and armour, and with US Air Force fighters and Page 72 – Information was available that two VC regiments could assemble anywhere bombers not far away… in the province in 24 to 48 hours, but the gravity of the threat was not stressed. To Long Tan Ian Mc. Neill (1993) Page 249 - “After some days (early June S E Asia conflicts 1948 -1975) (The official history of Australia’s involvement in ) the reconnoitring (of the Task Force perimeter) stopped and it seemed very likely that the enemy was finalising Page 321 - “The defences (were) incomplete. . . ” preparations to attack. ” Page 361 - “. . . physical defences at Nui Dat in the first eleven weeks were undeveloped. . . ” Page 249 - “Intelligence warning of a four-battalion attack on the base hastened plans Page 413 - “(at its establishment) The task force. . . could not even for the call-forward of 6 RAR. . . on 14 June instead of by 23 June as initially arranged. ” obtain such stores as wire and mines for its own defence. . . ” Page 309 (refer map Page 310) - “. . . the radio station ( The VC also knew the layout of the Task Force base… 275’s HQ set) started to move west towards the task force. . the radio set associated with 275 Page 361 - “The Viet Cong would have an accurate general picture Regiment (was) approaching Nui Dat at a rate of a one-kilometre grid of the layout of the base from observation from Route 2. ” ie, 14 Aug) square each day. ” “. . . two days before the mortaring ( (For example, a note 15 on Page 561 shows that the VC had estimated. . . enemy radio traffic indicated 275 Regiment (‘s radio) to have reached 5000 metres east of the base. ” 1 ATF artillery at 21 guns - actually, 24 when all were within the base) The Battle Of Long Tan Lex Mc. Aulay (April 1986) Page 16 - “Brigadier Jackson was well aware, 1 ATF was now at its weakest. Not only was Page 75 - “Intelligence had tentatively located a second regiment of VC to the north the base camp in its beginnings, but most of the soldiers and officers were inexperienced. ” of Nui Dat, possibly moving to hook round approach Nui Dat from the west. ” By mid-August, the area within 5 Kms of the base was well patrolled but still not secure… … It was even the expectation of an enemy was not to the establishment of an months… In fact – there is well documented that the base itself reaction very secure in the first few Australian base… Glossary: FDLs = Forward Defensive Lines (the perimeter) VC = Viet Cong - the Australians’ enemy in Viet Nam ARVN = Army of the Republic of Viet Nam - the Vietnamese soldiers fighting for South Viet Nam A VC Regiment had between 2500 and 3000 soldiers. Click to proceed… June and July 1966 SLIDE 6 OF 50

43 N 103 Fd Bty Artillery 1 Fd Sqn Engineers 67 66 49 48 Nui Dat 2 _____ XXXX TARGET AREA Nui Dat TASK FORCE BASE _ X____ XX__ X 2 _ __ X __XX __ X _XXX 67 RCLs _ ___X ___ XX __________XXX XXXXXXXX Suoi Da Bang _ X____ XX __ XX__ _ XX __ __X XX_ ______ X _ XXXX XX 43 69 68 Mortars X___ XX _ _ XX_ X___ XX _ X__ XX__ _ XX _ SAS & ARU Task Force HQ Song Cau __ XX_ X_ XX__ _ XX _ _ XX_ X___ XX _ 68 47 __________ _____________ X XXXX XX_ _ XXXXXXXX XXXX __XX X___ XX _ __ X X X___ _ XX _ X __ XX _ X___ XX _ X_ 69 46 45 44 Field Gun Long Tan 66 Destroyed Bridge 65 65 Long Phuoc Weir Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 44 45 46 47 48 49 Indeed, the enemy reaction came in mid-August…. . Fire. In thereturned from the Task Force and Engineer lines were hit. There were 24 Dat…. . Task Force HQ, SAS, ARU, Artillery artillery batteries and the enemy fireat Nui casualties…. . was early hours of 17 August, the VC bombarded the Australian base quickly stopped. Glossary: RCL = lightweight Recoilless Rifle that fires a heavier projectile than would be possible with a recoiling weapon HQ = Head Quarters – the command element of any unit SAS = Special Air Service – a specialist infantry unit ARU = Australian Reinforcement Unit – holding soldiers who will reinforce other units needing more troops Click to proceed… 17 Aug 1966 Pre-dawn SLIDE 7 OF 50

D 43 N __ XX_ X_ XX__ _ XX _ _ XX_ X___ XX _ 49 48 2 _____ XXXX Nui Dat TASK FORCE BASE 69 Nui Dat 2 __________ _____________ X XXXX XX_ _ XXXXXXXX XXXX __XX X___ XX _ __ X X X___ _ XX _ X 67 _ __ X __XX __ X _XXX 68 Mortars 67 RCLs _ ___X ___ XX __________XXX XXXXXXXX X___ XX _ _ XX_ X___ XX _ X__ XX__ _ XX _ 66 47 _ X____ XX__ X 68 Song Cau 46 45 44 6 RAR A __ XX _ X___ XX _ X_ 69 6 RAR B 6 RAR Suoi Da Bang _ X____ XX __ XX__ _ XX __ __X XX_ ______ X _ XXXX XX 43 Field Gun Long Tan 66 Destroyed Bridge 65 65 Long Phuoc Weir Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 44 45 46 47 48 49 th a Force HQ, hours on Artillery move west and – likely hit. There were 24 casualties…. . During the early SAS, ARU, the morning Engineer lines located the mortar baseplate positions. . . Meanwhile, August, A/6 RAR wasof the 17 th, to andof 17 th Aug and weresome of the VC withdrawing. On 17 Task. B/6 RAR patrol left re-tasked they heard noisessearch for the VC teams and their tracks. …and th they 18 th, had at noon 18 Force. Linetake Alltowards. B/6 RARenemy fire north search…. . Fire was returned out to sweep A had another exit be VC moving continue and the Dat the to bombardment, positions. batteries on As. At themovedhad been RCL Taskdown…now thought was–Long 3 -day north easttheofeast…. . they northern quickly to On D/6 RARtime of the new task, they. Company, 6 RAR, totracks the. Tan, beforebombardstopped. 2. the 16 onwas sent from the contacts… to Alpha contact on headed in to returning. Nuibase. A/6 RARs task hadtheir three & Gunth Aug artillery over fromand athe andpatrol slopesof Nui Dat 2. Glossary: “exit tracks” = the tracks left by the enemy as they left the firing position. Click to proceed… CLICK INSIDE THIS BOX TO UNDERSTAND HOW MILITARY UNITS ARE SHOWN: IN THIS PRESENTATION 17 and 18 August 1966 SLIDE 8 OF 50

View of the concert area – on the lower east slope of Nui Dat hill. The rubber plantation in the left distance (1000 metres away) was the “home” of 6 RAR in 1966 -67. The rubber plantation in the right distance (5000 metres away) is where the Battle of Long Tan was fought. D B- 6 RAR D 12 10 D 11 D 47 46 49 48 68 68 N 67 Nui Dat 2 67 Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 B and D Companies met at 1: 00 pm and discussed the situation. The follow-up task was transferred to D/6 RAR changed formation: to metres the of the Tasksplit, both still leading forward to follow the south track. As they B/6 RARthey could hear the sounds cartshook out and started Platoon eastwards… getting under way… As talked, headed back 10 base, D/6 RAR tracks north track, 11 to follow the cartand After 200 Platoon to follow the Force’s first concert tuning up tracks heading east… Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1300 -1540 hrs (1 pm-3: 40 pm) SLIDE 9 OF 50

6 RAR 10 D B- 6 RAR 12 47 46 D D 11 D 49 48 68 68 N 67 Nui Dat 2 67 Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 CONTACT When 11 Platoon (with two sections forward) reached the road, it started an obstacle crossing drill. The two leading sections crossed the road and secured the other side, then platoon HQ started to cross. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1300 -1540 hrs (1 pm-3: 40 pm) SLIDE 10 OF 50

Where 11 Platoon crossed, the track sloped slightly down hill to the north, our left, and the hill crested some 75 to 100 metres to the right. It was a gentle slope, limiting our visual distance to the south. When about ten metres from the fence I suddenly saw five or six VC, casually walking, with their heads down, along the track from the right. They had come over the rise just after the others in Platoon HQ had crossed the track and moved into the rubber. The VC had missed seeing them by a few seconds. Without hesitation, I raised my rifle and fired two quick shots at a VC. He dropped as I had hit him with both rounds. The other VC took cover. Sergeant Bob Buick - 11 Platoon, D/6 RAR Major Harry Smith - OC Delta Company, 6 RAR The 11 Platoon Commander requested permission to give hot pursuit. I agreed - there were 5 or 6 VC, at least one of whom was at least wounded - a Platoon was well able to handle that task. With 11 Platoon pushing ahead, I ordered 10 Platoon to maintain its direction and rate of advance. Company HQ and 12 Platoon would advance behind 10 Platoon. I reported the contact to 6 RAR HQ: CONTACT: 18 Aug 1540 hrs. - D Coy - Contact with 6 to 8 enemy dressed in greens at grid reference YS 478673, possibly wounding one. Remainder fled east. One AK-47 (assault rifle) retrieved. No own casualties. Glossary: OC = Officer Commanding – for a Company, usually a Major; for a Platoon, a Lieutenant (Lt) or a Second Lieutenant (2 Lt). Not to be confused with “CO” = Commanding Officer, applying to Battalions and larger units. Click to proceed… CLICK INSIDE THIS BOX TO UNDERSTAND HOW GRID REFERENCES ARE USED IN THIS PRESENTATION 18 Aug 1966 1540 hrs (3: 40 pm) SLIDE 11 OF 50

6 RAR 10 D B- 6 RAR 12 47 46 D D 11 D 49 48 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 6 67 67 Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 The enemy fled east, followed by 11 Platoon, as the Company closed up and followed at a slower pace. Clearing the hut, 11 Platoon lost sight of the enemy patrol, but kept following the blood trail eastwards… Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1540 -1600 hrs (3: 40 to 4 pm) SLIDE 12 OF 50

Until the first contact, the Company had been in an older part of the rubber plantation, but as 11 Platoon chased the small enemy force they – and the Company – moved into a younger plantation, similar to this… Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 SLIDE 13 OF 50

B- 6 RAR D 12 10 47 46 D 6 RAR 11 D D 49 48 68 68 N 67 Nui Dat 2 6 67 Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 At this stage, the Company was following the contact, so the tracks they had been following were forgotten. 11 Platoon continued the pursuit. Suddenly they were stopped by massive fire from their left-front (north east). Click to proceed… CLICK INSIDE THIS BOX TO SEE WHAT DELTA COMPANY DIDN’T KNOW – WHERE THE VC WERE: 18 Aug 1966 1600 -1610 hrs (4 – 4: 10 pm) SLIDE 14 OF 50

2 Lt Gordon Sharp, OC 11 Platoon, D/6 RAR (an excerpt from the book “The Battle Of Long Tan as told by the Commanders” to Bob Grandin”. ) Without warning, two enemy machine guns fired from the left front (north) – from the scrub and creek line at the southern base of the Nui Dat 2 feature. The left man of 4 Section was about 75 metres from the enemy. “FIRE!” Sharp immediately placed his platoon in an ‘L’ shape to bring maximum fire to bear, then called for artillery. While the fire-fight to the north was developing, a group of about 80 VC attacked from the east… 11 Platoon was suddenly in a very difficult predicament. Captain Morrie Stanley 161 Bty, RNZArtillery Attached as forward artillery observer (FO) to D/6 RAR Harry (Smith) and I had already agreed on the grid reference of our location. “LOAD!” He approved the request from Gordon Sharp for artillery fire support, which we considered might have been useful even if I directed the fire at some distance from 11 Platoon’s known position. Initially, I engaged with my own 161 Battery, but the situation deteriorated rapidly. CONTACT: 18 Aug 1610 hrs. -11 Platoon under heavy fire from grid 487674 (southern slopes of Nui Dat 2). Within minutes the first artillery shells were dropping on the slopes of the hill and being adjusted closer… Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1610 hrs (4: 10 pm) SLIDE 15 OF 50

B- MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE. . . Two choppers sat on the 1 ATF helipad waiting to take the concert party back to Vung Tau; The APCs were at the concert, on other duties or in the workshop; A/6 RAR returned to base after a 3 -day operation to the north east; 6 RAR RAAF 9 Sqn 3 Tp B- 6 RAR A 6 RAR 1 APC D 12 10 6 RAR 47 46 6 RAR D D D 11 D 49 48 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 I Weir 67 100 30 67 Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 At 1615 hrs, 11 Platoon estimate was an enemy platoon……but this was fighting an estimated VCcompany. The initial Smith advised his CO, Colonel Townsend, that 11 Platoon quickly revised to an enemy company. As the this at the Task into 11 base… B/6 RAR patrol to halt and rest of D/6, which moved 100 D/6 RAR. On VC news, fire Force Platoon… … the VC was in contact at orders to go B/6 RAR waited to north. Meanwhile, pouredthe CO ordered thewhile D/6 RAR mortared theawait. Long Tan andto reinforce metres return… Glossary: RAAF = Royal Australian Air Force – 9 Squadron flew the “huey” helicopters in Viet Nam. APC = Armoured Personnel Carrier – a lightly armoured tracked vehicle capable of transporting about twelve soldiers. CO = Commanding Officer – the officer commanding a Battalion (a Lieutenant Colonel [Lt. Col]) or a larger unit. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1610 -1620 hrs (4: 10 -4: 20 pm) SLIDE 16 OF 50

B- 6 RAR D 12 10 D 47 46 D 11 D 49 48 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 30 67 I 100 67 Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 As the enemy continued to engage 11 Platoon… … 10 Platoon was sent forward to support the withdrawal of 11. 12 Platoon took over CHQ defence. After about 300 metres, 10 Platoon hit another formation of enemy. Glossary: CHQ = Company Head Quarters Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1620 -1630 hrs (4: 20 -4: 30 pm) SLIDE 17 OF 50

2 Lt Geoff Kendall OC 10 Platoon, D/6 RAR Major Harry Smith OC D/6 RAR “At 1615 hours I’d reported 11 Platoon’s enemy as an estimated platoon. At 1626 I upped that to a company” “We went on probably another 150 metres… …the sound of the firing up front was enormous”. 103 Bty “I told the platoon to drop their packs. We started off, two-up in extended line, towards the sound of the firing…” 105 Bty “The skies opened up and rain was bucketing down” “I again asked for the B Coy patrol of about 32 men to come to us, but that was again not approved. ” “When 10 Platoon hit VC, I knew we were up against a force larger than our own. ” 161 Bty “We saw a line of troops moving across our right front in what looked like assault formation. I was a little concerned that they could be part of 11 Platoon, so kept the guys going until it was obvious they were enemy“. “Up to now we’d been supported by a single artillery battery (6 guns). I now called for the full regiment (24 guns). After a time, permission was granted and we were able to fire at different targets concurrently. ” “The closest of them would only have been twenty -odd metres away but they still hadn’t seen us. I ordered my guys to fire… …we knocked over the whole right-hand element. “ “We would also need reinforcement. The quickest way to get them to us was by chopper. My request was turned down – no choppers, no secured LZ. I was told reinforcements would be sent by APC. ” “We continued but moved only a few metres before we were hit with a hail of fire from our left front. ” “Until then, we were on our own. Time was against us – it would be dark in two and a half hours! And then the 10 Platoon radio went off the air…. . ” As the enemy continued to flank 11 Platoon… … 10 Platoon was sent forward to support the withdrawal of 11. 12 Platoon took over CHQ defence. After about 300 metres, 10 Platoon hit another formation of enemy. Click to proceed… When Regimental fire missions were approved, all three 105 mm Batteries (of 6 guns each) became available … …plus the 6 155 mm self-propelled guns of the American Battery which fired into the enemy reserve positions. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1620 -1630 hrs (4: 20 -4: 30 pm) SLIDE 18 OF 50

B- 6 RAR D 47 46 Pte Bill ‘Yank’ Akell D Company Signaller 12 48 D 10 11 D D 49 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 This photo demonstrates the “mud mist” effect. 67 This is the Long Tan cross as it was some years ago, beforexbeing developed as I shown in the title slide of this presentation. Please note the 600 staining at the lower red 30 100 I end of the cross vertical. It is mud splashed up from the bare ground during the 100 monsoon rainstorms. Once the ground below is saturated, the raindrops hit the mud 67 with such force that the splash forms a red “mist” up to twenty inches (to 50 cm) high and thick enough lower down to hide a person laying on the ground. The soldier’s uniforms were also stained red, adding to the camouflage effect. Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 At 1640 Platoon 1645 hrs, a monsoon rain storminformation – just before the 10 Platoon radio contact with. air. 10 hrs, Smith passed on the VC battalion advanced supportthe enemy they rain waswent off the At about reported machine gun fire from the hill in across of battlefield. The were in torrential. 11 D/6 signaller, estimated VC on the hill halved. Withinand reported company deliver the spare radio set. Visibility under the rubber canopy was as a alone from CHQ to 10 knee-high mud mist covered the ground. A platoon now Pte Bill ‘Ýank’ Akell, rushed battalion minutes, a Platoon to sized assaults from their east. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1630 -1645 hrs (4: 30 -4: 45 pm) SLIDE 19 OF 50

B- MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE. . . The two choppers were still at the 1 ATF helipad but the crews had moved to Task Force HQ to find out what’s happening. 3 Troop 1 APC was placed on standby and told to go to A/6 RAR; A/6 RAR was placed on standby to board the APCs for Long Tan; 6 RAR RAAF 9 Sqn 3 Tp 1 APC BA 6 RAR 2 Lt Gordon Sharp 6 RAR D OC 11 Platoon, D/6 RAR KIA Long Tan 18 Aug 1966 6 RAR 47 46 6 RAR D 12 48 D 10 11 D D 49 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 30 Weir x 600 I 67 100 67 Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 At about 1650 hrs, 11 Platoon’s Sgt Bob Buick reported that 2 Lt Gordon Sharp had been killed. Buick assumed at the Taskof 11 Platoon. It had been just an. Alpha since he’d of 6 RAR were shots of the battle. Meanwhile, command Force base, both the APCs and hour Company fired the first put on standby… Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1645 -1700 hrs (4: 45 -5 pm) SLIDE 20 OF 50

B- 6 RAR D 12 47 46 48 D 10 11 D D 49 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 30 x 600 I 67 100 Suoi Da Bang 30 47 47 48 67 Reinforcements 30 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 With prepared CHQ radio was off the air to prepareeast, towards both 10 and 11 Platoons. As they shookoff. While 10 Platoon’s and 12 Platoon to move south a Company Aid 11 Platoon’s radio had its aerial shot into Smith new artillery requests and the need – before the spare arrived -Post (CAP) for the 10 Platoon wounded, 11 Platoonof settledwere was taskedboth Platoons. whichand support. Platoon could directfrom their to their south. For restwere now receiving with to go to anda Section from the east. casualties sawwere At requests. VC was still backrestored from north retaining advised that some 100 They also to VC withdrawing. time, 12 Platoon down into of 11 Platoon Worse – neither their had man their perimeter. formation, commslost contactfire with 10 Platoon, heavyartillery falling theywithdrawal backand. CHQ. perimeter. The a CHQ within 50 metresdefence, 11 Platoon assaults of 12 Platoon tometres their artillery this stage, Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1700 -1710 hrs (5: 00 -5: 10 pm) SLIDE 21 OF 50

Major Harry Smith OC D/6 RAR IN THE RUBBER “I heard on the radio net Brig Jackson gave approval in principle only for the APC force to move, but Alpha and the APCs waited … for the executive order. ” “My anger grew with each passing delay. I recall being told the APCs were again delayed in leaving. I retorted … ‘If they don’t hurry up and get out here then they might as well not come at all’. ”. 2 Lt Geoff Kendall OC 10 Platoon, D/6 RAR “We withdrew to CHQ by a couple of backward fire and movement leaps. This got us out of the area being blanketed by enemy fire and must have been out of their sight because we were able to get back to Harry’s location without further casualties. On arrival the OC ordered me to put my platoon down in defence facing toward the 11 Platoon fire-fight area. ” 2 Lt Dave Sabben OC 12 Platoon, D/6 RAR Sergeant Bob Buick Now commanding 11 Platoon “My orders were to put two sections in front of CHQ and one behind, and to start an advance towards 11 Platoon. 10 Platoon would meet up with us en route. ” “The plan changed when Harry had to stop to form a firm base. He kept my third section and ordered me to proceed with two sections to go get 11 Platoon. ” “There were just twenty of us…”. “The platoon signaller, Vic Grice, replaced the short antenna that had been shot off the radio with the long antenna. With communications re-established, we adjusted the artillery closer. ” ”The aerials, the noise of the firing and the storm were not the only problems with the radio – the enemy began to interfere with and jam the radio frequency. ” By now, the company was divided into four groups, each with its own tasks and priorities… Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1700 -1710 hrs (5: 00 -5: 10 pm) SLIDE 22 OF 50

B- WO 2 Jack Kirby CSM, D/6 RAR Cpl Phil Dobson Medic, D/6 RAR D 9 47 46 48 12 - 6 RAR 12/D 10 D D 11 D 49 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 30 30 x 600 I 67 100 Suoi Da Bang 30 47 47 48 67 Reinforcements 30 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 As. At CHQ, thereturned to CHQ with its casualties, VC circling to. Jack of 12 Platoon Phil Dobson onthe CAP. 10 Platoon casualties watched the by the CSM, their. Kirby, to Cpl headed south to the hut… 11 Platoon, still heavily engaged, were passed the two sections south to ‘close the door’ in them. …then platoon had been east for an hour, the CAP and Company HQand was enemy out Platoon withdrawal. Theturned Platoon wastheretowards 11 Platoon, avoiding the enemyfrom therunning moving in from the east. rest of 10 and started placed to defend had about 50% casualties following up the 10 of ammunition… Glossary: CSM = Company Sergeant Major – A Warrant Officer Class 2 [WO 2] - the senior non-commissioned officer in an Infantry Company. CAP = Company Aid Post – the place where wounded are treated first before evacuation to hospital. Cpl = abbreviation for Corporal. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1710 -1720 hrs (5: 10 -5: 20 pm) SLIDE 23 OF 50

B- 6 RAR D 10 47 46 48 6 RAR D 9 12 11 D 12/D 49 D 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 30 10 10 30 10 x 600 I 67 10 Suoi Da Bang 30 47 47 48 100 67 Reinforcements 30 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 At 1710 the enemy began to probe the CHQ defences… … 12 it be dropped fromtowards 11 overhead. He also As hrs, Smith requested an ammo resupply, asking that Platoon advanced choppers Platoon… …where theyair-strike thethe enemy’s depth positions, and that the Bravo Company patrol be sentin contact. asked for an ran in to on probes trying to flank 11 Platoon. By 1730 hrs, all three platoons were to assist. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1720 -1730 hrs (5: 20 -5: 30 pm) SLIDE 24 OF 50

Brigadier O. D. Jackson CO 1 ATF AT THE BASE Brigadier Jackson was concerned at denuding the base of too many troops and APCs. He was worried about the whereabouts of the other VC Regiment, the 274 th. 5 RAR was only now returning from its Binh Ba operation, its perimeter defended by assorted small units 6 RAR had three Companies out, with Charlie Company defending the whole 6 RAR perimeter. Lt. Col. C. Townsend CO 6 RAR When Major Noel Ford, the OC of the Bravo Company patrol, asked if they could move towards Delta Company, Townsend told him to remain in his location and await further orders. Meanwhile, with Delta requesting an ammo resupply, Major O’Brien and RSM Chinn started to coordinate the delivery of the spare ammo to the 6 RAR “Eagle Farm” chopper pad. Flt/Lt Bob Grandin Pilot, 9 Sqn. , RAAF Lt Adrian Roberts OC 3 Troop, 1 APC Sqn “The artillery just kept firing so the “I took ten Carriers – 3 Troop and pilots went to the TFHQ Ops tent to 2 Section, 2 Troop – to A/6 RAR’s see what was happening. When lines. Once there, I went to 6 RAR Smith asked for an ammo resupply HQ for a briefing. Major Passey, by helicopter, Gp Capt Raw knew the 6 RAR Ops Officer, ordered me that such a flight was against to ‘Pick up Alpha Company and get Canberra’s policy at the time. Riley to Delta Company and break up the stepped forward and said he would attack’. He said 6 RAR’s CO would go. I suggested it was a suicide join us later by helicopter. mission. Frank just responded ‘You I rushed back to the Carriers. But don’t have to come’. ” the order to move did not come”. “We rushed over to the pad”. …and things were no less busy at the Task Force base… Glossary: OC = Officer Commanding (the Company Commander) RSM = Regimental Sergeant Major – the senior noncommissioned officer in an Infantry Battalion, amongst whose responsibilities is ammo resupply. TFHQ = Task Force Head Quarters – Ops = Operations. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1720 -1730 hrs (5: 20 -5: 30 pm) SLIDE 25 OF 50

B- MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE. . . The two crews raced to their helicopters and flew from the Task Force helipad to the 6 RAR helipad to collect the ammo. 3 Troop 1 APC, with 2 Section of 2 Troop, were now at A/6 RAR; However, permission to load and go had not yet been given; 6 RAR D RAAF 3 Tp 9 Sqn A 1 APC B 6 RAR D 47 46 10 6 RAR 48 6 RAR D 11 D 12/D 9 49 D 12 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 10 10 Weir 67 30 30 x ? 10 10 Suoi Da Bang 600 ? ? ? 100 30 30 I 67 ? ? ? ? 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 The 12 Platoon contacts large groups of the enemy flanking them to flank their new defenders. Unknown to the Australians, quickly escalated asenemy wereprobes sought out of sight of the target. The two other helicopters flew base… …the ammo. Vung Tau, processwere called toof reinforcementspositions. Meanwhile, at the Task Force the concert the enemy was trying to gauge the limits Long Australian air-strike. As same thing happened at 10 Platoon – party to resupply US jets started and the Tan for the waited… Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1730 -1740 hrs (5: 30 -5: 40 pm) SLIDE 26 OF 50

B- 6 RAR D 10 47 46 48 6 RAR D 11 D 12/D 9 49 D 12 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 10 30 ? ? ? 10 10 67 Super Sabre F 100 D 10 10 x 600 I 10 100 67 Reinforcements 30 30 ? Suoi Da Bang ? ? ? 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 ? ? ? ? Overhead, the jets arrived… – having found a cloud target -they couldn’tconsolidate and prepare their attack. At 10 Platoon, the enemy …Due to the thick solid cover, withdrew to identify the target, which was to be the At Still 12 Platoon, the 11 Platoon. couldn’t they dropped probes, and napalm prepared the survivors to withdraw. 11 Platoon, it was obvious they Instead, hold flanking bombs tryingwestwards to extent of the Australians. At unknown to Delta Company, thesend out much longer. Sgt Buick a thousand metres furtherforce. enemy opposing VC continued to columns of VC soldiers moved to define the outflank this new east. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1740 -1750 hrs (5: 40 -5: 50 pm) SLIDE 27 OF 50

MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE. . . B- The two helicopters, loaded with ammo, left the 6 RAR pad and flew into the storm clouds. One circled over the rivers as the other flew to Long Tan village to get a visual fix. 3 Troop and A/6 RAR still awaited the order to go to Long Tan…. . 6 RAR 9 Sqn RAAF 3 Tp A 1 APCB 9 Sqn 6 RAR RAAF D 6 RAR 48 6 RAR 10 6 RAR 47 46 D D 11 1111 - 12/D 9 D [15 men [13 men] M. I. A. ] 49 D 12 68 68 N Nui Dat 2 ? 30 10 ? ? ? 30 10 10 Weir 67 30 ? Suoi Da Bang 30 10 x 600 I 100 30 67 Reinforcements ? ? ? 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 ? 49 ? ? ? With artillery and small arms fire suppressing the enemy, the 11 Platoon men pulled back in a 150 metre dash… They. The enemystill engaged VCcircling of the series position buttosought to cut offthe eastor from thebase…dead. At. And still withenemy’s wide bypass to north and of platoon-sized attacks from at the Tasktest withdrawal. 12 Platoon 10 Platoon, theto patrols the originalwere continued. follow up the withdrawal believed flanks. CHQ and reaction was known wounded but south which leave behind 15 known Platoon carried them all the VC launched a Company forced to to be Meanwhile, the 11 to Force defences. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1750 -1800 hrs (5: 50 -6 pm) SLIDE 28 OF 50

B- MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE. . . As the helicopters returned to base, the order was finally given for The two helicopters, loaded with ammo, left the 6 RAR pad and flew into the storm clouds. leave. circled Company boarded. the APCs and A/6 RAR to One Alpha over the rivers as The CO 6 RAR had said Longfollow by chopper, aso the 10 APCs the other flew to he’d Tan village to get visual fix. sped to the nearest gap in the perimeter wire… Long Tan…. . 3 Troop and A/6 RAR still awaited the order to go to B/6 RAR again sought permission to go to D/6 RAR: now approved. 6 RAR 3 Tp A 1 APCB 9 Sqn 6 RAR RAAF 9 Sqn D D 10 RAAF 6 RAR 47 46 48 6 RAR D 11 - 12/D 9 119 Sqn 49 D 12 68 N D D 11[13 men] [15 men M. I. A. ] 68 D [13 men] Nui Dat 2 RAAF ? 10 10 10 Weir 67 ? 30 ? ? ? Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 30 ? ? ? 9 Sqn 30 x RAAF 600 10 67 30 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 ? 49 ? ? ? The VC assaulting the CHQ & 10 Platoon position then pulled back to reorganise. Their fire-fight died down. The chopper was the first helicopterwe’ll throw again”. Company’s location. Redthe crew called “Red”. The about 1800 hrs (6 pm) called in and the ammo was thrown out at treetop height “right smoke was thrown. At second crew called “Orange”. “Wrong; approached Delta D/6 threw another Red – into the CSM’s lap”. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1800 -1810 hrs (6 - 6: 10 pm) SLIDE 29 OF 50

“After we delivered the ammo we returned to the Task Force helipad and thence to the Operations Tent – Frank [Riley]’s idea of staying involved and maybe seeing some more action. We reported that we had not seen anything of note during the mission. It had been our first taste of action, yet the talk was mostly about the weather. As the squadron commander, Wing Commander Ray Scott, was on his way with the rest of the squadron, we were sent back to the helipad to await further orders. Our thoughts turned to the possibility of an attack from the north east and how vulnerable we would be with the whole squadron sitting side by side on the helipad. The sound of the artillery firing repeatedly and continuously kept us intact with the raging battle happening less than five kilometres away. ” Flt/Lt Bob Grandin Pilot, 9 Sqn. , RAAF Lt Adrian Roberts OC 3 Troop, 1 APC Sqn “Within the 1 ATF perimeter there were only a few places APCs could enter and exit. Arriving at the engineer’s wire, I was horrified to discover that the gap had been changed. The new gap was so well concealed that I had to send a runner to the engineers to get some one to open it. That took about ten minutes – ten minutes that we really couldn’t afford. Thinking ahead, my experience on earlier operations was that the only place I could get the Troop across the Suoi Da Bang [river] was upstream from a concrete dam south of the Long Tan road. I would make for that after getting past the wire. It was a big diversion but entry to and exit from the river any further north in the wet season was simply not possible. ” The helicopters arrived back at the base just as the APC and A/6 RAR reinforcement column were leaving. . . The constants at the base were the rain and the intense rate of fire sustained by the 24 guns of 1 Field Regt. Glossary: Helipad – the area set aside for helicopter landings. 1 Field Regt – First Field Regiment (artillery) – the parent unit for all the artillery at Nui Dat, comprising 6 guns each from 103 and 105 Australian Batteries, 161 NZ Battery and Battery A, 2 Battalion, 35 th Artillery, US Army (of M 109 Medium [155 mm] self-propelled guns). Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1800 -1810 hrs (6 - 6: 10 pm) SLIDE 30 OF 50

MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE. . . As the helicopters returned to base, the order was finally given for the APCs and A/6 RAR to leave. Alpha Company boarded. The CO 6 RAR had said he’d follow by chopper, so the 10 APCs sped to the nearest gap in the perimeter wire… 6 RAR B/6 RAR again sought permission to go to D/6 RAR: now approved. B- RAAF 9 Sqn B- 1 APC A 68 3 Tp 6 RAR 47 48 6 RAR 10 6 RAR D 46 D D 11 - 12/D 9 D [15 men M. I. A. ] 49 6 RAR D 12 11 - N 9 Sqn 68 D [13 men] Nui Dat 2 RAAF ? I 100 ? ? ? 10 Weir 67 ? 30 ? ? ? Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 60 30 10 30 x 600 10 67 30 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 ? 49 ? ? ? 10 Platoon could look more assaults from north and south were eliminated – the in the distance to their east. At 12 Platoon, down the rubber tree avenues and see the VC forming up firefight died away. As. Several. Platoona yellow encirclingtheir withdrawal, they lost smoke and came in to thepullingto theposition. 12 the VC continued six tosmoke followed themgroup saw the radio comms. They were 12 Platoon “blind”. Platoongroups survivors started moves… …a group formed up facing the known CHQ/10 Platoonsouth. 11 threw of their 10 VC grenade. The in, while more enemy were seen to move past back location. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1800 -1810 hrs (6 - 6: 10 pm) SLIDE 31 OF 50

MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE. . . As the helicopters for the to base… the order isopened, when… the finally given The APCs waited return gap in the wire to be 6: 40 6: 50 for APCs and A/6 RAR to leave. Alpha Company climbs carriers Sending two carriers back for CO 6 RAR, the other eight aboard. The CO 6 RAR had saidgap…followcontinued to thethe 10 deployed sped. Lt Adrianthe he’d They by chopper, so weir, APCs through Roberts speed to the nearest gap in the perimeter wire… OC 3 Troop, “I was informed through 6 RAR to again the crossing and to go to D/6 RAR one at a time. B/6 RARprotectseeks permission started to cross, – now approved. 1 APC Sqn 1 APC Squadron that the CO with A/6 RAR on board. of 6 RAR now wished to move 6 RAR B- B- 46 3 Tp A- 68 1 APC 6 RAR N with the APCs to Delta 6 RAR D Company and wanted my 47 force to return to collect him. D 10 48 6 RAR D 12/D 9 I was aware that Delta Company was in dire straits at Long Tan. What to do? 11 - carriers returned for the CO’s party] would catch up with Suoi Da Bang 47 47 I D 60 48 x 600 20 me at the crossing where I knew we would be delayed. ” Nui Dat 2 D 100? [13 1030 men] ? ? ? 10 I 30 100 Weir 49 68 D [13 men] 12 I opted to send back two carriers … while I pushed on to the river crossing … with the other eight carriers. D [15 men M. I. A. ] D 12 I believed that [the two 67 11 - 67 30 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright? Dave Sabben 2007 49 ? ? ? The group formed up and started an advance towards CHQ. They were ambushed and stopped by 12 Platoon. The. CHQ and 10 Platoonencircling move, as from south-east and east by groups of about platoon strength. VC continued their were then attacked Bravo Company approached and the APCs cleared the base wire. A water crossing is a dangerous move for APCs. The vehicle floats with only a foot or so (30 cm) Aug 1966 18 of 1810 -1820 hrs Click to picture shows the APC beginning to climb out of the space between the water and the top hatch. (This proceed… (6: 10 -6: 20 pm) water, so the front is raised. ) The crossing to get to Long Tan took place when the river was swift and SLIDE swollen, it was raining, within an hour of full darkness, and with the real threat of an enemy ambush. Click to proceed… 32 OF 50

MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE. . . Once the company assumed its final defensive position Bravo Company was mortared as it made its way to Delta Coy. the placements of the sub-units didn’t change. At that There were no casualties and they were soon on their way again. time the average strength of a Section was 5 or 6 able Meanwhile, the APCs crossed the swift-flowing river one at a time. men. The brunt of the fighting for the next 30 minutes At 6 RAR HQ, the CO’s party boarded the returned APCs and they prepared to leave the base. was in the arc from north clockwise to south west. B- 1 APC 3 Tp - D 6 RAR A -HQComposite 68 N Section 47 6 RAR A 11 Platoon 9 Section, 12 Platoon CHQ Section 6 RAR 7 & 8 Sections, 12 Platoon CAP CHQ & FOO 3 Tp - 48 6 RAR 10 6 RAR x 46 D D 11 - 12/D 9 49 68 1, 2 & 36 RAR Sections, A 10 Platoon 11 - Nui Dat 2 D 12 1 APC I D ? [13 men] 10 10 I ? ? ? 100 Weir Approx. 100 metres 67 D [15 men M. I. A. ] x 600 20 67 50 30 Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid ? Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 ? ? ? The VC attacks on 10 Platoon failed - the VC pulled back to reorganise. Theyand unknown by with fresh troops. The enemy encirclement proceeded, out of sight of the Australians were reinforced them… The survivors of the ambush moved south. For the first time in over two hours, there was a lull in the fighting. 12 Platoon and the 11 Platoon group made their way back to CHQ where they took up perimeter positions. Glossary: CAP = Company Aid Post – first aid for the wounded. CHQ = Company Headquarters FOO = Forward Observation Officer - the officer and his signallers who controlled the artillery firing – in this case, Captain ‘Morrie’ Stanley of 161 Bty, RNZA. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1820 -1830 hrs (6: 20 -6: 30 pm) SLIDE 33 OF 50

MEANWHILE, BACK WITH DELTA COMPANY… “The company had no time to dig in … Fortunately, the position at which we had chosen to stop was on a slight reverse slope and therefore the enemy machinegun fire mostly went just over our heads, with only the fire of the upright VC assaulting waves getting right into our area. ” “The VC continued to launch assault waves on the 10 and 12 Platoon area. Machinegun fire poured in from out near the slopes of Nui Dat 2. Preceded by bugle and whistle calls. . . the enemy assault waves continued relentlessly. ” “The artillery was closed in to 100 metres. We could see the shells land. We could feel the concussion through the sodden earth and we could smell the explosive. Best for us, we could see the damage it was doing as it protected us from the VC masses. ” Major Harry Smith OC D/6 RAR Captain ‘Morrie’ Stanley FO 161 Bty, Attached to D/6 RAR Throughout much of the battle, especially after the defensive position had been established, Morrie Stanley had ordered almost continuous artillery fire in a series of regimental fire missions with adjustments. “One effect of all this gunfire was the noise. From the time fire commenced at about 1600 hrs until about 1900 hrs when the battle proper ceased the tremendous din gave the effect of a continuous violent thunderstorm. ” “Generally, the situation was very frightening with the rain, sound and shock of shell and small arms fire. I think the incessant violence and confusion caused us to draw mainly on instincts that we had developed from training and previous experience. ” Morrie Stanley had been walking the artillery in from all sides, carefully avoiding the original 11 Platoon position. By the time of the final assaults, artillery was falling about 100 metres out from the perimeter – and was still being called in closer. The company – then with about 60 men effective - was finally in the position from which it would not withdraw. Near-continuous artillery fire formed a screen of destruction between the Australians and the VC. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1830 hrs (6: 50 pm) SLIDE 34 OF 50

MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE. . . Bravo Company moved into the rubber after the mortaring… With the CO 6 RAR party aboard, the two APCs sped to the gap in the wire and exited the base… At the river, Roberts left one APC to guard the crossing point and lead his 7 remaining APCs towards Delta Company… x HQ - 6 RAR A- 46 D 6 RAR 48 68 6 RAR 10 6 RAR B- 1 APC 3 Tp - D D 11 - D [13 men] 12 D [15 men M. I. A. ] D 68 N 3 Tp - Nui Dat 2 1 APC A- 6 RAR x ? I 100 600 ? ? ? 30 x 600 Weir 67 49 x 600 67 50 Suoi Da Bang 47 47 ? 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 ? ? ? The the VC circling moveup the 12 Platoon withdrawal. Soon they probed the groups of APCs were on the move. As VC quickly followed continued…. … Bravo Company advanced and both south edge of D/6 RAR in strength. The enemy to the east, then estimated at a battalion… …started company-strength assaults from the east. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1830 -1840 hrs (6: 30 -6: 40 pm) SLIDE 35 OF 50

MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE. . . Lt Peter Dinham The seven Platoon, A Coy, into the rubber plantation and followed OC 2 APCs charged “When the firing started, my the axis ofthe APCs northwards – right into the circling VC. aboard the road sergeant, Frank Alcorta, rolled As the APCs werecontact. off the APC, followed by Ron and dismounted on in contact, the two others reached the river, crossed and, with the. Brett, and engaged the VC. third APC, raced to join the others. Meanwhile, Bravo Company reached the road where 11 Platoon I quickly got the rear ramp of Bhad its first contact. 46 3 Tp x HQ - 68 A- N 67 6 RAR Bthe APC lowered and we all debussed – platoon HQ and 6 RAR D Lou Stephens’ section – about 1 APC 12 of us in total. We formed an extended line 6 RAR 1 APC 3 Tp and, with the APCs’. 50 cals 6 RAR firing support, we engaged 6 RAR Aabout 100 enemy to our front. 1 APC 3 Tp The firing was intense but 6 RAR Alasted only a minute or so before I ordered the group to remount the APC. | We estimated later that we’d Weir 100 inflicted some 40 casualties with no casualties to us. ” 6 RAR D 10 48 11 - D [13 men] 12 D [15 men M. I. A. ] 49 D 68 Nui Dat 2 Ix I I x. I 50 100 600 100 x 600 67 | Suoi Da Bang 100 | | 100 100 | 47 47 3 Tp - 1 APC A- 6 RAR 100 ? ? 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 The enemy circlingencirclementcompany consolidated as thein a cut-off positionis was still the door” on theand Thethe battle, south of the that reached theto have been D 445 of the major It near the crossroads… After inner the a POWCompany this was a companythe rubber plantation. assaults from the east came in. enemy to VC Delta said group appears road in from first Battalion sent to “close raining heavily, they were beaten off, companiesto theirthe north of them rather than watching return to (southern) flank… As weresound of the APCbattle raging. D 445 werecame appear to did not come under fire from the APCs. Australians. The other company-plus to south, in thein from south east, thento their thenthe east. At the focussed on the contact of assaults they area but have decided south, left east again. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1840 -1850 hrs (6: 40 -6: 50 pm) SLIDE 36 OF 50

“Despite the repeated assaults and the scarcity of ammo, the company stood – or rather, laid on - its ground. There was no thought of withdrawal from this place. It did not occur to me that we would not survive. I guess I was too busy to worry, exploring every past experience to seek guidance in what we might do to repel the enemy. I would have given quids for a few Vickers machine guns… Maybe the mind and body accepted what was happening and regardless of the uncertainty and danger, you just did the job and that was all that mattered. ” Major Harry Smith Officer Commanding Delta Company, 6 RAR Captain Morrie Stanley 161 Bty, RNZArtillery Attached as FO to D/6 RAR “After the defensive position had been established, [I] ordered almost continuous artillery fire in a series of fresh regimental fire missions with adjustments. I was able to take advantage of the rain and intense gunfire that caused the area to be shrouded in smoke, steam and fog. This helped me because my judgement of distance was assisted by the observation (or lack of it) of flash against this screen. The enemy and some of our own boys were also silhouetted to us. Because of the rain, I had to keep remarking our position on my map, and to keep the map oriented so that I did not make mistakes with the grid lines. ” The company experienced its heaviest attacks from 6: 35 to 6: 50. Enemy assaults came in “human waves” Artillery was called in from 100 metres out, to 50 metres out and finally to only 25 metres from the perimeter… Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1840 -1850 hrs (6: 40 -6: 50 pm)) SLIDE 37 OF 50

D 10 46 48 47 68 D 11 - B- 100 A - 68 6 RAR Nui Dat 2 I x. I 6 RAR | 49 Ix I x HQ - D [15 men M. I. A. ] D 1 APC 3 Tp - 11 - D [13 men] 12 N 67 6 RAR 100 100 600 x 600 67 Suoi Da Bang 3 Tp - 1 APC A- 6 RAR | 47 100 47 3 Tp 1 APC 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 x HQ - 6 RAR In As the last shots of thisthe contact 6 RARintonorth-south track, Roberts’ seven APCs on the sped north. east. In the last few minutesthe fading-echoed the now-dark rubberdesperate assaults again company position. the few minutes of of battle light, the VC launched APCslast plantation, the first seven. The VCarrived. Breaking through contact, the remaining three their caught up with on B Company group fled A The now, artillery could. Robertswithin 25 yards of the Delta Company flickering through the trees to their 7: 00 pm. By CO 6 RAR ordered landing to pursue. The APCs turned east andperimeter. who werethe gathering darkness. As they approached the crossroads, they hit another company-sized VC unit The into moving west to east. The defenders was see the headlights of the approaching APCs chased the VC assaults ceased at south. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1850 -1900 hrs (6: 50 - 7 pm) SLIDE 38 OF 50

6 RAR D D 10 11 - x 46 48 47 D 6 RAR [13 men] 6 RAR AD 12 6 RAR B- HQ 11 - 68 N BD- 1 APC 3 Tp x x HQ A- 67 6 RAR 600 49 68 6 RAR 3 Tp - D [15 men M. I. A. ] Nui Dat 2 x 600 67 Suoi Da Bang 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 At. On arrival, the B Company troops They and A/6 RAR were deployed by OCarc of theinhad ended. the east. aboutwas totally dark. The rain had stopped. It was silent… The Battle of Long Tancompany perimeter. It 7: 10 pm, the APCs arrived. were placed on the south-west to west D/6 RAR a screen to The artillery was 6 RAR, Lt for the APCwas then dismounted the remain laid on last-fired targets – just in case. After. The CO of stopped Col Townsend, apparent that the VC had withdrawn from the immediate battlefield. a ten-minute wait in silence, it approach but ordered to APC and assumed command of the force. Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1900 -1910 hrs (7 - 7: 10 pm) SLIDE 39 OF 50

Lt Peter Dinham OC 2 Platoon, A Coy, 6 RAR 7: 10 pm to Midnight “During this time, movement and moaning could be heard to the east. Hopeful that it might have been some of our own wounded. A Coy’s WO 2 Jack Roughley and Cpl Ross Smith made three separate attempts between them to crawl forward, but the sounds ceased when the source was approached. These were acts of heroism that were never fully recognised. ” Major Harry Smith OC D Coy, 6 RAR “I was not happy when Colonel Townsend [CO 6 RAR] ordered a withdrawal of everyone back to the edge of the rubber to dustoff the casualties. I argued heatedly with the CO that I wanted to stay and sweep through the area in APCs at first light to where 11 Platoon had been. We could have made an LZ by having the APCs push over a few rubber trees. ” Lt Adrian Roberts OC 3 Troop, 1 APC Sqn. Cpl Robin Jones 5 Platoon, B Coy, 6 RAR “We loaded the dead onto 2 Lt Ian Savage’s APC, the rest of D Coy onto the others and left the battle area at 2245 hrs. We moved out with convoy lights on and the leading vehicle using headlights. At the edge of the rubber, I had the troop stop, turn outwards and form a hollow square. With hatches open and internal lights on, we defined the dustoff LZ. ” “Bravo Company led the way from the battle area on foot to the new APC LZ, followed by Alpha. It was a case of blind navigation on a compass bearing – you couldn’t see your hand in front of your face. We stopped numerous times after falling over or running into a tree. We made the rubber’s edge about an hour or so later. I never liked night navigation ever again. ” With no threat of an enemy counterattack, Townsend ordered the whole force to move to the edge of the rubber plantation to evacuate the dead and wounded: D Coy on the APCs; A and B Coys to follow on foot. Glossary: WO 2 = Warrant Officer Class 2 – the senior NCO in a Company – the Company Sergeant Major (CSM). “Dustoff”= the code name for a helicopter casualty or medical evacuation flight. LZ = Landing Zone for helicopters Click to proceed… 18 Aug 1966 1910 -2400 hrs (7: 10 pm to midnight) SLIDE 40 OF 50

11 - x 68 N 67 9 Sqn 6 RAR 1 APC 6 RAR 49 68 Nui Dat 2 67 Suoi Da I Bang RAAF 1 sortie D- B- 47 6 RAR A- 48 HQ - 3 Tp - 46 D [15 men M. I. A. ] USArmy 47 47 48 Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 Bravo the Alpha APCs with moved by foot and Company a new moved to Smithfield” was started. At 2245 hrs (10: 45 pm) the Companies CO 6 RARVendetta” ended and aboardaround thethe edge of the LZ. At midnight, and Delta Company “Operation and Delta secured the area “Operation APCs and the plantation. There, they formed Taskand square and called forto follow Australian helicopters to evacuate from Long Tan. The helicopters a an open took the casualties direct to up the enemy Vung withdrawing the casualties. “Smithfield” wasflew in Force operation formed US andthe hospitals at forces Tau (15 minutes flying time). Click to proceed… Overnight 18 Aug to dawn 19 th SLIDE 41 OF 50

I RAAF 9 Sqn I (Various) D USArmy x 5 RAR HQ D- 46 3 Tp 47 A- 68 B- N 67 The two 11 Platoon soldiers found on the battlefield on the 19 th 6 RAR Barry Mellor 6 RAR and 1 APC Jim Richmond were medivac’d 6 RAR to hospital. 11 - 48 49 68 6 RAR AB- Both recovered from their wounds. Nui Dat 2 6 RAR Whole Company 10 Pl 12 Pl APC 2 Suoi Da Bang APC 1 47 D [15 men M. I. A. ] 47 48 11 Pl 67 Artillery In depth Scale: approx 1000 metre grid Copyright Dave Sabben 2007 49 The APCs rest of August, platoons moved to the areas of their own contactsthey started their own tasks: At The and Delta Coy Dreturned to 5 RAR, was Delta’s final stand, where and split to to clear the battlefield. dawn 19 th the force Company, the area of flown in to the APC LZ and “Operation Smithfield” began. AD/5 RAR swept through of their missing 15 still alive, thoughno ambushes laid, andcasevac’dthe eastern limit. and. Platoon found two the edges area tobattlefield and, with wounded. They were secured immediately. battle of the ensure there were D/5 RAR, started to follow up the VC withdrawal. 11 B Coys cleared to Click to proceed… Dawn 19 Aug to evening 21 Aug 1966 SLIDE 42 OF 50

D Company, 6 RAR, manning on 18 August 1966 My Company was sent out briefed to find an enemy force expected to be about a Roll of Honour – Long Tan (Those entitled to wear the US Presidential Unit Citation for the Battle of Long Tan) platoon strong – perhaps 30 men. We did not know at the time, but Task Force HQ had dismissed reports of at least one VC Regiment in the area of Long Tan in CHQ 10 Platoon 11 Platoon 12 Platoon the days after mid-August 1966. Maj H. A. Smith, MC 2 LT G. M. Kendall (MID) 2 LT G. C. Sharp † 2 LT D. R. Sabben (MID) Capt H. l. Mc. Lean –Williams. How was it then, that we were able to withstand a prolonged engagement with # Sgt 2781704 MM R. S. Buick, Pte P A Large Sgt J. Todd 2781465 2 Lt G C Sharp N. J. Rankin WO 2 J. W. Kirby DCM †† perhaps up to 2000 NVA and VC over a three hour plus period? L. Drinkwater Cpl T. H. Lea # Cpl J. M. Duroux †† Cpl SSgt R. Gildersleeve P E Clements (1 APC) Cpl I. E. Mc. Donald Cpl 1730993 (MID) A F Mc. Cormack W. R. Moore Pte Cpl M. V. Mc. Cullough ## 54570 Cpl Sgt W. O’Donnell (MID) Each of my three well-trained but inexperienced platoons in their individual Cpl D. R. Mogg Cpl B. E. Magnussen # Cpl K. T. Miller 2781847 J Jewry G. J. Ballinger Sgt D. A. Thomson L/Cplactions, and then the company in defence, fought tenaciously against the LCp. I LCpl 1730994 Pte D J Mc. Cormack J. C. Robbins # LCpl C. T. Lithgow †† Cpl P. N. Dobson (MID) LCp. I G. K. Crowther LCpl C. T. Ainslie ## LCpl W. T. Luther ## overwhelming VC forces. Our initial wide dispersement and flanking moves, the 55120 A Aldersea Jewry Cpl MW. Green Pte R regimental artillery support and the RAAF ammunition resupply were all to our LCp. I J. † LCpl 1731013 Pte W D Mitchell Slack-Smith R. C. Carne # LCpl P. Cpl J. W. Harris Pte R. A. Aldersea † Pte J. E. Beere # Pte AG. Bartlett 1730929 A Drabble Belford Cpl C. M. Marchant. Pte G advantage. The timely arrival of reinforcements on APCs as the enemy withdrew # Pte S. R. Pte 1731040 Pte D J Salveron Beahan D. A. Drabble † Pte D. F. from the battlefield may have prevented a possible counterattack after dark. LCpl MG. Campbell Pte K. D. Branch Pte R. M. Eglinton, MM Pte N. R. Bextrum 1730941 Pte K H Gant C. W. Brown LCpl G. R. Richardson Pte # Pte 38712 D. F. Fabian Pte D J Thomas Brown, MM ## # Pte R. D. But if not for the outstanding leadership at section and platoon levels, practiced LCpl G. R. Smith Pte J. C. Cash # Pte 1200265 Pte F B Topp W. R. Buckland K. H. Gant † Pte 3411673 Pte E F Grant A. R. Deller application of basic Infantry, weapon and fieldcraft skills, gallantry, courage and LCpl D. A. Spencer # Pte E. F. Grant † Pte R. T. Burstall determination on the battlefield, we would not have survived. Pte W. A. Akell (MID) Pte P. R. Dixon Pte 216559 V. R. Grice Pte M R Wales † Pte V. M. Cameron 1730947 Pte V R Grice K. P. Doolan Pte I. M. Campbell Pte B. Halls Pte G. R. Davis # Some of my minimal recommendations for honours and awards were Pte D. J. Collins Pte J M Houston Pte P. J. Doyle Pte 3787607 Pte C J Whiston Dettmann J. E. Heslewood Pte P. H. 43893 downgraded and others were not forwarded to higher HQ for processing. The Pte I. Dixon Pte H. T. Esler Pte J. R. Holmes ## Pte B. D. Forsyth # company was later awarded the US Presidential Unit Citation (PUC) but other Pte R. C. Healey Pte B. D. Firth # Pte W. F. Hornett Pte A. R. Fraser USA and GRVN medals offered in 1966 were rejected by Canberra. Pte P. R. Hunt Pte D. A. Graham Houston # They shall grow not old, as we. Pte J. M. Mc. Cormack †old. Pte K. W. Graham that are Pte R. V. Perandis Pte B. G Jameson Pte A. F. left grow† Pte S. Hodder The lesser Australian Imperial awards approved for Delta Company were, to Pte R. N. Stewart Pte l. J. Mc. Grath Pte D. J. Mc. Cormack † Pte T. R. Humphries Age shall not weary them, #nor the years condemn. quote the Official History, To Long Tan (Page 564, endnote 74), “…little short of Pte S. R. Williams Pte D. l. Mitchell Pte B. C. Meller # Pte G. D. Langlands ## insulting for the heroism displayed…” for the now-iconic battle of the war. At the going down of the sun, and in Mitchell † Major Harry Smith Pte D. B. Montgomery Pte W. D. the morning, Pte P. A. Large † OC D/6 RAR Pte R. C. Moss Pte l. D. Munro ## Pte T. Newall I remain very proud of my officers and men and am saddened by those we lost. We will Attached from Pte P. Nash remember them. Pte J. H. Quincey ## Pte A. L. Parr 161 Battery Pte G. M. Peters Pte J. P. Richmond # Pte B. R. Reilly RNZ Artillery Pte J. E. Riley Pte D. J. Salveron † Pte T. P. Ryan # Capt M. Perhaps it is fitting to allow the. Roche Stanley MBE Pte W. A. commander. Pte the battle to have the last word… D. J. Thomas † Pte V. W. Simon of LCpl W. G Walker (MID) Pte A. M. Stepney Pte F. B. Topp † Pte B. F. Vassella LBdr M. N. Broomhall Pte L. S. Vine Pte K. J. Tronc Pte G. C. Warrell Pte M. R. Wales † Pte C. J. Whiston † Pte H. P. Webb # CLICK INSIDE THIS BOX TO Pte T. W. Watts SEE THREE on other Operations & Tours) (+ = KIA CLICKTan; #THIS BOX TOTan; ++ = KIA Click to proceed… & Tours; ## = WIA OTHER SLIDES: Long INSIDE = WIA Long on other Operations GO TO THE END OF • The VC/NVA version; SLIDE THE PRESENTATION • Was Long Tan a VC ambush? Click to proceed… OF • Long Tan’s legacy. Lest we forget. 43 50

THE VC AND NVA VERSION OF THE BATTLE OF LONG TAN A few days after the battle, Radio Hanoi and Radio Peking each broadcast a version of the battle at Long Tan. Excerpts include: “. . . wiped out 500 (Australian) mercenaries. . . ” “. . . set fire to three M 113 armoured cars. . . ” “. . . shot down one of the US aircraft that went to the rescue. . . ” “. . . captured a large quantity of arms and ammunition. ” “The day before, 17 August, the LAF. . . wiped out one hundred Australian mercenaries. ” The official history of the (so-called) liberation of the South was published in 1986. In it, the description of the battle bears no similarity to the Australian version. Several high awards are listed as being bestowed on participants of the battle. No mention at all is made of casualties inflicted upon VC or NVA forces. It wasn’t until July 2006 that, in a “ 60 Minutes” interview on camera, a senior VC/NVA commander admitted to two Long Tan veterans, Bob Buick and Dave Sabben, that the Australians had, in fact, won the battle. Click to proceed… SLIDE 44 OF 50

WAS LONG TAN A VC / NVA AMBUSH? It wasn’t until the late 1980 s that a theory gained temporary popularity that suggested the battle at Long Tan was the result of a carefully laid VC / NVA ambush and that Delta Company stumbled into the trap, surviving only by pure luck. The evidence speaks against the Battle having been a planned and prepared VC ambush: 1. 2. 3. 4. There were no pre-positioned battlefield communications; The VC had no pre-dug positions on or within small arms range of the Battlefield; The first contact was initiated by the Australians; The initiation of the main action does not indicate an ambush. First one then two machine guns, firing at a range somewhere between 150 and 250 yards; 5. The idea of an ambush is to force those ambushed to have to assault the ambushers. It was the reverse at Long Tan – the enemy had to go looking for those “ambushed”; 6. The VC did not use command detonated devices (ie, Claymore-style devices), nor were any being carried by the VC; 7. There was no VC force to hit the APCs at the river crossing – an obvious place to stop them; 8. The VC had to spend three hours trying to find the Delta Company Platoons and to define their perimeters within their own so-called ambush killing zone; 9. A planned ambush has a planned withdrawal - the actual withdrawal was described as “shabby”; 10. The VC in their assaulting waves were still carrying crew-served weapon ammunition and unprepared grenades in pouches; 11. The VC had grenades and satchel charges, but there were no reports of them being used against Delta Company; 12. Since then, no VC paperwork cut before the event (orders etc. ) to indicate that an ambush was planned have come to light. 13. The theory that Long Tan was an ambush is untenable. Click to proceed… SLIDE 45 OF 50

LONG TAN’s LEGACY… The battle at Long Tan was not the largest battle the Australian or ANZAC forces experienced in Viet Nam. It did not have the most troops involved, nor did it last the longest time. However, the stakes involved were the most critical to the Australian and New Zealand involvements, and the results in proportion to the ANZAC forces involved were the greatest. After Long Tan, the enemy, both VC (local forces) and NVA (North Vietnamese Army) never again sought to “take on” the Task Force base at Nui Dat. While they still operated in the Province, and engaged the ANZACs, all the subsequent major engagements took place at or outside the province borders, or when they were trapped in or near towns. By the end of the first year of the Task Force, unarmed vehicles moved unescorted on the main access roads. Long Tan was not feted in Australia, and was not accorded “icon” status until the Viet Nam Veterans themselves chose its date – 18 August – as national Viet Nam Veterans’ Day. The date was ratified by the government and all Viet Vets now honour Long Tan Day as “their” day for remembering those who served, were wounded or died in the Viet Nam campaign. For the record – 105 men of Delta Company, 6 RAR, moved into the rubber plantation, along with a three-man New Zealand artillery party. 17 of the Delta men died and 21 were evacuated wounded. One APC man was wounded and later died of his wounds. A Company experienced several lightly injured but these were not serious enough for evacuation. The enemy lost 245 plus men by bodycount, with captured documents and POWs later affirming that over 800 had died and some 1400 had been wounded in the battle. In 2006 a Chinese General speaking informally with an Australian ex-Brigadier suggested that the actual number of troops lost (dead and severe amputees) was in excess of 2500. Click to proceed… SLIDE 46 OF 50

Thank you for watching THE BATTLE OF LONG TAN THE END ERRATA (version 01 b) The following mistakes and enhancements are fixed / added in this version: (1) 102 Battery changed to 103 Battery in the glossary text, slide 30. (2) Text on slide 46 altered to say that the VC/NVA never again tried to attack the base there were still contacts This presentation is distributed – 18 text. (4) Added versionwithin theon slide 2. dot PPT Province. (3) Fixed tense in slide number Power. Point Animations (5) On slide 7, may free, but is copyrighted and SAS definition changed from “Services” to “Service”. the valuable acknowledges (6) On slide 18, the B/6 element remaining in the field was 32 men, not 48. not be used by others for profit. D Coy, 6 RAR Manning Roll for 18 Aug 1966 of excerpts contribution (7) The addition of a and a Long Tan battle Honour Roll, both on slide 43. from the book (8) And the best one – the addition of pix of artillery in supporting action! “The Battle of Long Tan as told by Any comments or feedback on this ======= the Commanders to presentation may be directed toenhancements have been advised and may be fixed Bob Grandin” The following mistakes or (Allen target date). or address next the “contact” email added in the in version of this presentation (no & Unwin, 2004, ISBN 1 74114 199 0). www. dot. PPT. com above the APC symbol – I have used three dots to indicate a (1) The number of dots Troop of 10 vehicles, two dots to indicate 2 vehicles and one dot to indicate 1 vehicle. However, in slide 32 and the early part of 33, the 2 vehicles are shown with three dots. (2) APC and Infantry movements on 19 Aug – Slide 42 is roughly correct but not accurate in detail. C/6 came out to the plantation as did the rest of 1 APC Squadron. I need to get the sequences and movements a bit better than they are here. A dot. PPT Power. Point Animation presentation (3) Artillery pix - I am trying to source more authentic 1966 pictures of 105 artillery This presentation took crews in actionhours to. L 5 Pack Howz (not M 2 A 2 s) in you have enjoyed it or learned from it, and would hundreds of with the research and develop. If their Nui Dat base positions. like to contribute. Ifto can development, plus permissions I will deposit of a small amount (say, $5 or $10? ) I its obtain more pix please consider a add more to the next version. to (Australian) Westpac bank account BSB# 733 000, Account# 853 546 (branch = 360 Collins St, Melbourne), _______________________________ or (Australian) CBA bank account BSB# 063 550, Account# 1024 7640 (branch = Hampton, Victoria), Ifthe name feedback, Sabben. Your anonymous contribution to costs will be much appreciated. you have of David please go to website www. dot. PPT. com, select ‘contact’ and either account in Who knows? send your feedback /other similar (Good intentions offered, but no guarantees!) Thank you. This may enable corrections. presentations to be developed in the future. Click to proceed… end the presentation.

MILITARY SYMBOLS FOR UNITS AS USED IN THIS PRESENTATION Above the flag, a small symbol will show the size of the unit x | = = = Battalion – over 600 soldiers Company – about 100 soldiers Platoon – 30 -35 soldiers Section – 7 to 10 soldiers single man/group or vehicle On the left of the flag is the name or number of the unit – in this case, A (Company). (Sometimes there will also be a minus sign meaning that the unit is not at full strength. ) On the right will be the name of the unit’s parent unit – in this case, 6 RAR. Inside the flag there’ll be a symbol to indicate the type of unit. We’ll show X for infantry, for armour and for helicopters. On the staff there’ll be one or more ‘flag’s. If there’s more than one flag, then there’s more than one unit in that location. Above it is a ‘staff’ - like a flagpole. A coloured disk shows the location of the unit on the map. Blue for our units; red for enemy. A 6 RAR Enemy units will not have the same “staff” and “flag” symbol. They will have red location disks to show location but, since size of unit, name, parent unit and type of unit are not known, the standard symbols used In this presentation will be: 10 for a section or squad, for a platoon, 30 I 100 for a company x 600 and for a battalion. Where the size of the enemy force has been estimated by an observer, that number is included within the disk but these are estimates only. However, since the numbers roughly match our units, the appropriate size symbol will be placed above the disk. x | = = = Battalion – over 600 soldiers Company – about 100 soldiers Platoon – 30 -35 soldiers Section – 7 to 10 soldiers single man/group or vehicle CLICK THIS BOX TO RETURN LESSON: Military Unit Symbols. SLIDE 48 OF 50

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE USE OF GRID REFERENCES ON MAPS A standard grid reference is a 6 -digit number used to identify a location on a map. On maps (and in these map-diagrams) there are numbered vertical and horizontal lines… These are called ‘grid lines’. We’ll use them to identify the location of the hut in the plantation: 47 48 68 Nui Dat 2 68 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2 9 67 67 47 1 48 The first two digits indicate the vertical line to the left (west) of the location to be identified = 47 The next digit is the number of tenths from it to the next vertical line to the right (east) = 7 The next two digits are the horizontal line below (south of) the location to be identified = 67 The last digit is the number of tenths from it to the next horizontal line above (north of) it = 3 The grid reference for the hut in the plantation is therefore 477673 (Where a grid reference has two letters before the digits, the letters identify the map. ) CLICK THIS BOX TO RETURN LESSON: Grid References SLIDE 49 OF 50

WHAT DELTA COMPANY DIDN’T KNOW ABOUT ENEMY DISPOSITIONS Source: ‘To Long Tan’ the official history of the Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950 -1966, and other histories. To Long Tan, Page 371: [The enemy troops] appear to have consisted of: the full strength [three battalions] of 275 Regiment, possibly augmented by one NVA battalion. In the vicinity [at Long Tan] was D 445 Battalion. One of the battalions took the high ground on Nui Dat 2, the others remaining outside Line Alpha. x 600 10 x 600 xx 400 x The course of the battle and searches on the day after the battle confirmed the locations of some of the battalions and of the 275 Regt HQ position. 600 x 600 A VC battalion was usually 500 -600 and up to 850 strong. Regt HQ was from 300 -500 depending on support units operating with them at the time. While in defensive positions, the VC battalions had constant screen patrols out to secure their positions. It was one of these patrols which 11 Platoon contacted at 1540 hrs (3: 40 pm). 10 x 600 In theory, up to 3500 VC troops were in the area on 18 Aug 1966. However, it is thought that not more than 1500 -2000 became involved in the battle. Click to proceed… CLICK THIS BOX TO RETURN LESSON: Enemy Dispositions SLIDE 50 OF 50

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