www Oregon VRC org The Illusion of Democracy

www. Oregon. VRC. org The Illusion of Democracy: An Urgent Call to Action for National Election Reform

www. Oregon. VRC. org Prepared by Oregon Voter Rights Coalition www. Oregon. VRC. org June 2006

Shaken Voter Confidence n In 2000, a post-election Harris Poll estimated that 20 -30 million Americans did not trust the validity of the Presidential election results n Before the 2004 election, a poll by the legal website Find. Law. com found that 42% of voters already did not trust the new electronic touchscreen voting machines www. Oregon. VRC. org

Shaken Voter Confidence n A Jan. 2005 National Annenberg Election Survey interviewed 100, 000 voters and found that 30% of American voters— representing over 36 million voters— were not confident that their vote had been counted accurately in 2004 www. Oregon. VRC. org

Shaken Voter Confidence n The initial results of a May 2006 Zogby People’s poll of Pennsylvania voters, commissioned by Op. Ed. News, found that the majority of people who do not use Fox News as their primary news source believe that the 2004 presidential election was stolen www. Oregon. VRC. org

Shaken Voter Confidence The analysis found “that except for viewers of right wing news show, Fox News, poll respondents believe that the 2004 presidential election was stolen”

This Is NOT a Partisan Issue After the invention of lever voting machines, Dem. Gov. Earl Long of Louisiana once boasted that, with the right election commissioners, he could get the machines to sing “Home Sweet Home. ” Governor Earl Long May His Voice Live On! He also wanted to be buried in Louisiana “so he could remain active in politics after his death”. www. Oregon. VRC. org

Other Election Rigging Examples n 1948: Democrat Lyndon Johnson’s U. S. Senate victory in Texas over Republican Coke Stevenson, earning him the name “Landslide Lyndon” n 2000: Florida’s Republican Gov. Jeb Bush and Secretary of State Katherine Harris’ disenfranchising felon database n 2003: Republican U. S. Rep. Tom Delay’s gerrymandering in Texas www. Oregon. VRC. org

The Founder’s Intent When the American founders developed our democratic framework, one of the things they understood with absolute clarity was that there are some things that We the People do for ourselves — where We the People hold the rights These things are known as The Commons www. Oregon. VRC. org

The Commons Examples include: public schools the water we drink public lands the air we breath public roads the internet police/fire dept. public airwaves All of these things are currently under attack by privatization www. Oregon. VRC. org

The Commons The most precious of all The Commons is The vote is the beating heart of democracy! In a healthy democracy, every citizen’s vote is sacred www. Oregon. VRC. org

Legitimate Transfer of Power “In a democratic republican form of government such as ours, where people place the political power in the hands of their representatives, voting is the only legitimate way to transfer power from the people to the government” * * Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 667 (U. S. , 1884) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Legitimate Transfer of Power Having an honest and transparent election system for all American citizens is therefore the cornerstone of our government and our society www. Oregon. VRC. org

Purpose The purpose of this presentation is to sound an alarm that our elections and the electorate are no longer under the control of the American people Partisan politicians are privatizing our local and national election systems through the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) www. Oregon. VRC. org

www. Oregon. VRC. org Brief Review of the 2000 Presidential Election

Election Night, Nov. 7 -8, 2000 At 2: 16 a. m. on Nov. 8, 2000, Fox News declared that the pivotal state of Florida had gone for George W. Bush www. Oregon. VRC. org

Election Night Nov. 7 -8, 2000 Minutes later, other news organizations joined Fox News in calling Florida for Bush www. Oregon. VRC. org

Election Night Nov. 7 -8, 2000 At Fox News Network, the person at the helm of the election decision team was John Ellis The election numbers he was working from were not official, but the viewers did not know that. Nor did they know that Ellis was G. W. Bush’s first cousin www. Oregon. VRC. org John Ellis was in phone contact with cousin G. W. Bush throughout election night

Election Night Nov. 7 -8, 2000 Two hours later, the networks were forced to retract the Florida call for Bush www. Oregon. VRC. org

Election Strategy a Success The strategy was a complete success— creating a lasting impression that Bush had already won the election www. Oregon. VRC. org

www. Oregon. VRC. org Overview of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002

HAVA Signed by President Bush On Oct. 29, 2002, President Bush signed the Help America Vote Act The stated intent of HAVA was to correct many of the problems that occurred in the 2000 election www. Oregon. VRC. org

EAC U. S. Election Assistance Commission HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission, in part, to “establish a program to provide funds to States to replace punch card voting systems” As of Dec. 1, 2005, over $2. 3 billion in payments had been distributed to states, including $27. 8 million to Oregon www. Oregon. VRC. org

Provisional Ballots HAVA introduced Provisional Ballots, a. k. a. Placebo Ballots “Individuals shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot if they present themselves to vote at a polling place in an election for Federal office and either”: n don’t appear on the official list of eligible voters n have their eligibility challenged by an election official www. Oregon. VRC. org

No Paper Trails in HAVA According to an April 2006 article in Rolling Stone Magazine: “Diebold paid some $275, 000 to [Jack] Abramoff’s firm, Greenberg Traurig, with the apparent aim of keeping legislation requiring paper trails in the voting process from getting into HAVA. Conveniently, Abramoff pal [Rep. ] Bob Ney [R-OH], one of the HAVA architects, blocked every attempt to put paper trails into law. ” Jack Abramoff www. Oregon. VRC. org

www. Oregon. VRC. org Election Systems

Components of Election Systems n Registered voter records / database n Ballots n Ballot definition files (BDFs) for electronic systems n Voting systems n Vote counting systems www. Oregon. VRC. org

Voting Systems Hand-marked 1, 2 paper ballots Punch cards 1 Lever machines Electronic voting (e-voting/DRE) 1 Paper ballot system www. Oregon. VRC. org 2 Includes optical scan systems

Vote Counting Systems Hand-counting Electronic tabulators* (centrally located, such as at the county elections office) – includes optical scan systems * Electronic election system www. Oregon. VRC. org

Voting Technologies Used in the 2004 Election Technology Expected use in Nov. 2004 Optical Scan Electronic Voting Punch Card Lever Machine 32% 29% 13% Paper Ballot <1% Source: Verified Voting, http: //verifiedvoting. org/article. php? id=5135 Electronic tabulators (centrally located) are used for optical scan, electronic voting, punch card, and lever machine systems

Voting Technologies n n ALL electronic election systems, including e-voting (touchscreen/DRE) and optical scan systems, currently use proprietary, undisclosed software, i. e. , secret vote counting There is NO government or public examination of the software for inaccurate or malicious code www. Oregon. VRC. org

Optical Scan Voting Systems Paper ballots with “fill in the oval” or similar type of votermarked paper ballot system Your County Optical Scan Machine reads the paper ballots using an electronic Ballot Definition File (BDF) and votes are tabulated using proprietary, trade secret software Contest 1 Johnson Peterson Larson Svenson Data transferred via disk or electronically Your County Contest 1 Johnson Peterson Larson Svenson www. Oregon. VRC. org Tabulated data is compiled on computer; the potential may exist for undetectable hacking and tampering with election results in database

Electronic Election Systems So what’s the big controversy about these systems? Numerous studies and test demonstrations have shown that current electronic election systems, including paper ballot/optical scan systems, can have serious security flaws and potential for error www. Oregon. VRC. org

Who Opposes These Systems? Computer scientists have been some of the primary activists leading the fight against electronic voting machines and tabulators that use proprietary (trade secret) software Dr. Avi Rubin Technical Director of the Information Security Institute at Johns Hopkins University www. Oregon. VRC. org Dr. Rebecca Mercuri Research Fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government Dr. David Dill Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University

Test Demo. Discovers Flaws Recent News – Spring 2006: Harri Hursti, a computer programming expert from Finland, working with Bev Harris of Black Box Voting, discovered a major security flaw in the Popular Diebold Accu. Vote TSx e-voting system Harri Hursti Finnish computer programming expert See Hursti’s reports at www. blackboxvoting. org www. Oregon. VRC. org

Hursti’s Findings n The machines can be contaminated through: u network connections (wireless or otherwise) u PCMCIA cards u other peripheral devices www. Oregon. VRC. org

Hursti’s Findings n There are several backdoors that pose security risks u each backdoor exists in 3 layers and allows the system to be modified in extremely flexible ways without even basic levels of security involved www. Oregon. VRC. org

Hursti’s Findings n The design allows someone to take over the computer motherboard and turn it into a zombie n Anyone with a screwdriver and a $20 electronic gadget bought at Fry’s can take control of the machines www. Oregon. VRC. org

Hursti’s Findings n “[T]hese attacks are permanent in nature, surviving through the election cycles. Therefore, the contamination can happen at any point of the device's life cycle and remain active and undetected from the point of contamination on through multiple election cycles and even software upgrade cycles. ” ~ Harri Hursti Source: Hursti, Harri. 2006. Diebold TSx Evaluation – SECURITY ALERT: May 11, 2006 Critical Security Issues with Diebold TSx; Black Box Voting, Inc. (www. blackboxvoting. org) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Comments on Hursti’s Findings “What Mr. Hursti discovered in Utah is the most serious vulnerability that we've ever seen in a voting system. This particular vulnerability is serious enough that you can affect multiple machines from a single attack. That's what makes it so dangerous. ” ~ David Jefferson, the Computer Scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory who independently reviewed Hursti's work for California's Secretary of State, Bruce Mc. Pherson www. Oregon. VRC. org

Comments on Hursti’s Findings “It is like the nuclear bomb for evoting systems. It's the deal breaker. It really makes the security flaws that we found (in prior years) look trivial. ” ~ Avi Rubin, computer science professor, Johns Hopkins University Dr. Avi Rubin Technical Director of the Information Security Institute at Johns Hopkins University www. Oregon. VRC. org

Optical Scan Security Flaws June 3, 2005, Leon County, Florida: In a test demonstration done in conjunction with Black Box Voting and with the consent of Leon County Elections Supervisor Ion Sancho, Harri Hursti was able to hack into a Diebold optical scan system undetectably and change the results of a test election Harri Hursti Finnish computer programming expert -- known as the “Hursti Hack” www. Oregon. VRC. org

Hursti Hack Findings “The Diebold optical scan system uses a dangerous programming methodology, with an executable program living inside the [memory card of the] electronic ballot box. This method is the equivalent of having a little man living in the ballot box, holding an eraser and a pencil. ” Source: On. Line. Journal. com (www. onlinejournal. com/evoting/060305 BBV/060305 bbv. html) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Hursti Hack Findings The Black Box Voting team “proved that the Diebold optical scan program, housed on a chip inside the voting machine, places a call to a program living in the removable memory card during the election. (contd. ) Source: On. Line. Journal. com (www. onlinejournal. com/evoting/060305 BBV/060305 bbv. html) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Hursti Hack Findings The demonstration also showed that the executable program on the memory card (ballot box) can easily be changed, and that checks and balances, required by FEC standards to catch unauthorized changes, were not implemented by Diebold —yet the system was certified anyway. ” (contd. ) Source: On. Line. Journal. com (www. onlinejournal. com/evoting/060305 BBV/060305 bbv. html) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Hursti Hack Findings Routine logic & accuracy tests — touted by election officials across the nation as being the gold standard for discovering problems — will not catch this type of manipulation -- See Hursti’s reports at www. blackboxvoting. org Source: On. Line. Journal. com (www. onlinejournal. com/evoting/060305 BBV/060305 bbv. html) www. Oregon. VRC. org Harri Hursti Finnish computer programming expert

Brennan Center Study Latest News – June 27, 2006: The Brennan Center for Justice, a nonpartisan think tank at NY University School of Law, released a report on its year-long study of vulnerabilities in electronic election systems Task force participants: internationally renowned government, academic, and private-sector scientists, voting machine experts and security professionals www. Oregon. VRC. org

Brennan Center Study The task force examined the 3 primary types of electronic election systems: n e-voting without a paper trail n e-voting with a voter-verified paper trail n precinct count optical scan systems These systems account for 80% of the voting machines that will be used in Nov. 's election www. Oregon. VRC. org

Brennan Center Study Findings n ALL of these electronic election systems “have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities” n There are more than 120 security threats to these systems Source: Brennan Center (http: //brennancenter. org/programs/downloads/Executive%20 Summary. pdf) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Brennan Center Study Findings n ALL of these systems “are equally vulnerable to an attack involving the insertion of corrupt software or other software attack programs designed to take over a voting machine” n Such attacks could threaten the integrity of a state or national election Source: Brennan Center (http: //brennancenter. org/programs/downloads/Executive%20 Summary. pdf) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Brennan Center Study Findings n Random, transparent audits of the paper records or ballots are necessary to enhance security Source: Brennan Center (http: //brennancenter. org/programs/downloads/Executive%20 Summary. pdf) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Other Documented Problems Electronic election systems are also prone to mechanical problems and error Many, many such problems have been documented, some that have actually changed the election outcome and were corrected only with a hand count (For an extensive list of documented errors and problems, see Voters Unite’s website at www. votersunite. org/) www. Oregon. VRC. org

What’s the Impact? Basic errors or outright manipulation with electronic election systems can affect tens of thousands of votes or more, rather than just the hundreds that might be impacted by paper errors or manipulation www. Oregon. VRC. org

Other Documented Problems “Nationwide, according to the federal commission charged with implementing election reforms, as many as 1 million ballots were spoiled [in the 2004 election] by faulty voting equipment – roughly one for every 100 cast. ” ~ Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. Source: Kennedy, Robert F. , Jr. 2006. Was the 2004 Election Stolen? Rolling Stone Magazine, 6/1/06 (http: //www. rollingstone. com/news/story/10432334/was_the_2004_election_stolen) Article also found at Common. Dreams. org (http: //www. commondreams. org/views 06/0601 -34. htm) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Who Would You Believe? Who would YOU rather believe about the security and accuracy of current electronic election systems — n n private, for-profit vendors with close ties to a political party and/or a foreign government, or computer scientists and computer security experts? www. Oregon. VRC. org

Criticism Where Due Criticism of electronic election systems is NOT a criticism of our election officials and workers, whose jobs are to ensure elections are conducted properly The problems with the current e-election systems and processes are beyond their control www. Oregon. VRC. org

www. Oregon. VRC. org Electronic Election System Company Ownerships

According to Spokesmen: Brian Hancock Jorge Martinez United States Election Assistance Commission United States Election Justice Department n there is NO federal agency with regulatory authority over the elections industry n there are NO government standards or restrictions on who can sell or service voting machines and systems n there is NO agency or organization that even has a complete list of voting machine companies in the U. S. In other words, the vendors are policing themselves www. Oregon. VRC. org

Top 3 Companies in the U. S. ES&S and Diebold together tabulate 80% of the votes in the U. S. 1. 2. 3. www. Oregon. VRC. org Sequoia has 1/3 of the electronic voting machines on the market

ES&S 1980: American Information Systems (AIS) was founded by brothers Bob and Ted Urosevich Bob Urosevich 1999: AIS became ES&S Ted Urosevich www. Oregon. VRC. org

Background of AIS / ES&S Half of the company startup money for AIS came from millionaires William & Howard Ahmanson, Jr. www. Oregon. VRC. org Howard F. Ahmanson, Jr.

Who’s Howard Ahmanson, Jr. ? n A Christian Reconstructionist / Dominionist, he stated in the Orange County Register his goal of replacing constitutional law in the U. S. with Biblical law n Openly advocated a radical plan for theocratic takeover of America www. Oregon. VRC. org

Who’s Howard Ahmanson, Jr. ? n Currently a member of the ultraright wing Council for National Policy n Provides millions of dollars to causes that are designed to discredit and defeat the teaching of Darwin’s theory of evolution and the promotion of teaching “Intelligent Design” www. Oregon. VRC. org

Urosevich Brothers’ Influence Diebold President: Bob Urosevich ES&S Vice Pres. : Ted Urosevich www. Oregon. VRC. org During the 2004 elections, the companies run by the Urosevich brothers counted an alarming 80% of the votes

Chuck Hagel, New CEO at ES&S When Bob Urosevich left ES&S for Diebold, he was replaced at ES&S by new CEO Chuck Hagel Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Chuck Hagel, New CEO at ES&S n In 1995, Hagel was running the voting machine company that would count the votes in his 1996 bid for the U. S. Senate n He was trailing in the polls to his opponent, former Gov. Ben Nelson, 65% to 18%, yet Hagel amazingly came from behind to win with 56% of the vote n He was the first Republican Senate winner in the state in 24 years n In both the 1996 and 2002 elections, ES&S counted 85% of the votes in Nebraska www. Oregon. VRC. org

Chuck Hagel, New CEO at ES&S Senator Hagel retains a $1 - $5 million ownership in ES&S’s parent company, Mc. Carthy Group, as he contemplates a run for the Presidency in 2008 www. Oregon. VRC. org

Diebold’s Influence In the 2004 election, Diebold counted 50% of the votes in 30 states www. Oregon. VRC. org

Diebold’s CEO, Wally O’Dell In August 2003, Wally O’Dell, the CEO of Diebold and a major donor to the Bush campaign, invited 100 wealthy fellow partisans to a fundraiser at his mansion in suburban Canton, Ohio. His invitation stated: Wally O’Dell “I am committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year. ” www. Oregon. VRC. org

Diebold’s CEO, Wally O’Dell resigned his position in Dec. 2005 after whistleblower allegations that Diebold may have mishandled elections in Georgia and Ohio in 2004 Wally O’Dell www. Oregon. VRC. org

Diebold’s Employees Prior to the 2004 election, Diebold employed 5 convicted felons as senior managers and software developers to help write central compiler computer code that counted the votes www. Oregon. VRC. org

Diebold’s Employees One of those convicted felons was Jeff Dean, Senior Vice-President and senior programmer on Diebold’s central compiler code Prior to being hired by Diebold, Dean had been convicted on 23 counts of felony theft in the 1 st degree Jeff Dean He had been convicted of planting back doors in his software using a “high degree of sophistication” to evade detection while stealing a half million dollars over a period of 2 years www. Oregon. VRC. org

Diebold’s Employees When word of Dean’s past began to surface, Diebold demoted him to a consultant status, replacing him with John Elder Turns out that Dean and Elder met in prison while Elder was serving a 5 -year sentence for cocaine trafficking Cedar Creek Correctional Facility Elder went on to manage a Diebold division responsible for printing election ballots and punch cards www. Oregon. VRC. org

Sequoia Voting Systems Sequoia began as American Voting Machine under the control of stockholders in Rockwell, a major defense contractor in the 1960’s www. Oregon. VRC. org

Sequoia’s Employees Lloyd Dixon Founder & CEO Resigned in 1973 and later went to prison, after being indicted by NY Federal Grand Jury for bribing Buffalo, NY election officials Louis Wolfson Next Owner Phil Foster Regional Mgr. Rocco Ricci Southeast Rep. www. Oregon. VRC. org Convicted of bribing Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas Convicted on charges related to bribing the Louisiana Commissioner of Elections, paying $8 -10 million over a 10 -year period

Sequoia’s Foreign Ties Sequoia’s parent company is now Smartmatic International Company www. Oregon. VRC. org

Sequoia’s Foreign Ties Discovering the ownership of Sequoia was difficult. According to Illinois officials in April 2006, it took them tracing it through “four countries, two hemispheres and three shell corporations. ” www. Oregon. VRC. org

Sequoia’s Foreign Ties What they found was that Smartmatic International Company is owned by Venezuelans with close ties to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez www. Oregon. VRC. org

Triad is a smaller company but played a key role in the 2000 and 2004 elections in Florida and Ohio Owner Tod Rapp is a generous donor to the Republican Party as well as to President George W. Bush’s campaign www. Oregon. VRC. org

Triad Rapp is also President of the Psephos Corp. , a Triad affiliate, which supplied the notorious butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach County, Florida in the 2000 presidential election You can still order a commemorative butterfly ballot set from the Psephos website for just $59. 95 www. Oregon. VRC. org Palm Beach Butterfly Ballot Set

Prophetic Statement Rep. King and President Bush on Air Force One In the summer of 2003, Rep. Peter King (R-NY), while at a function on the White House lawn, was interviewed on film by Alexandra Pelosi for her documentary, Diary of a Political Tourist. King exalted, “It’s already over. The election’s over. We won. ” When asked by Pelosi how he knew that Bush would win, King answered, “It’s all over but the counting. And we’ll take care of the counting. ” www. Oregon. VRC. org

Republican Prediction So why has Karl Rove so boldly predicted a Republican dynasty for the next 40 years? Karl Rove (Senior Advisor and Deputy Chief of Staff in the Bush Administration) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Election Systems in Oregon The entire state of Oregon now uses optical scan election systems In 2004, 98% of Oregon’s votes were tabulated (counted) on machines manufactured by AIS, BRC, ES&S, and Sequoia www. Oregon. VRC. org

www. Oregon. VRC. org Problems With the 2004 Federal Election

Problems in Ohio Secretary of State during the 2004 elections n Co-Chair of Ohio’s 2004 Bush re-election campaign www. Oregon. VRC. org

Ohio – Sec. of State Blackwell’s actions resulted in the suppression and disenfranchisement of well over 100, 000 voters in Ohio www. Oregon. VRC. org

Ohio – Sec. of State Blackwell n On Sept. 7 th, 2004, all county boards of elections were ordered to reject all voter registration forms not printed on white, uncoated paper of not less than 80 lb. text weight n Limited the use of provisional ballots, effectively disenfranchising over 100, 000 citizens (according to Ohio’s Republican Gov. Bob Taft) by using a narrow interpretation of HAVA requirements www. Oregon. VRC. org

Ohio – Sec. of State Blackwell n Provided insufficient voting machines in more minority, less affluent, and Democratic areas, causing tens of thousands of voters to wait in lines for up to 10 hours (How many voters couldn’t afford to wait for several hours and gave up? ) www. Oregon. VRC. org Mark Duncan / Associated Press

Ohio – Sec. of State Blackwell n On Nov 2 nd (Election Day), he banned all press and exit pollsters from Ohio’s voting places n Arranged Ohio’s post-election recount schedule so as to leave no time for adequate recounts n Has yet to file a compliance report with the Government Services Administration, which had given him $41 million to enforce the Help America Vote Act in Ohio n Now a candidate for Ohio Governor www. Oregon. VRC. org

Ohio – Other Dirty Tricks Break-ins at Democratic campaign offices: n July 2, 2004 – consulting firm employed by the Ohio Democratic Party n Oct. 11, 2004 – Lucas County Democratic headquarters in Toledo The only items taken were computers containing highly sensitive campaignrelated information and Democratic voter lists/strong Kerry supporters www. Oregon. VRC. org

Ohio – Other Dirty Tricks Massive Voter Suppression: Bob Bennett, Republican Chair of the Cuyahoga Board of Elections (BOE) and Chair of the Ohio Republican Party, has confirmed that prior to the 2004 elections, his BOE eliminated — without public notice — a staggering 175, 414 voters from the Cleveland-area voter registration rolls www. Oregon. VRC. org

Ohio – Other Dirty Tricks Massive Voter Suppression: The Republican Party used a technique called “caging, ” where they sent registered letters to newly registered voters in minority and urban areas, and then challenged the voting eligibility of 35, 000 individuals who refused to sign for the letter or if the mail came back undeliverable www. Oregon. VRC. org

Ohio – Summary of Problems The available data shows that “in Ohio alone, at least 357, 000 voters, the overwhelming majority of them Democratic, were prevented from casting ballots or did not have their votes counted in 2004” Source: Kennedy, Robert F. , Jr. 2006. Was the 2004 Election Stolen? Rolling Stone Magazine, 6/1/06 (http: //www. rollingstone. com/news/story/10432334/was_the_2004_election_stolen) Article also found at Common. Dreams. org (http: //www. commondreams. org/views 06/0601 -34. htm) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Ohio – 2004 Election Results In Ohio, the final machine tallies showed George W. Bush had 118, 000 more votes than John Kerry — an average winning margin of less than 6 votes per precinct www. Oregon. VRC. org

Overseas Votes Over 7 million Americans live and work abroad — a global bloc some call the 51 st state In addition to active and retired military, these citizens include a large number of professionals who are young, college-educated, multi-lingual, and progressive www. Oregon. VRC. org

Overseas Votes – D. o. D. Tactics The Dept. of Defense is responsible for administering the overseas votes, military and civilian, through the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) and its website (www. fvap. gov) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld www. Oregon. VRC. org

Overseas Votes – D. o. D. Tactics The FVAP’s website makes ballots more accessible abroad and serves as a clearinghouse for electoral requirements for all 50 states Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld www. Oregon. VRC. org

Overseas Votes – D. o. D. Tactics A Zogby poll of active passport holders, released in August 2004, found Kerry was favored over Bush 58% to 35% www. Oregon. VRC. org

Overseas Votes – D. o. D. Tactics On August 23, 2004, at the height of overseas voter registration requests, the FVAP website suddenly shut down, becoming inaccessible to civilians using several foreign internet service providers from 25 countries. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld www. Oregon. VRC. org

Overseas Votes – D. o. D. Tactics According to the FVAP’s web manager, Susan Leader, access was blocked due to users constantly attempting to hack these sites. “We do not expect the block to be lifted. ” An Army officer involved in the administration of the U. S. vote in Germany called this claim “patently ridiculous” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld www. Oregon. VRC. org

Overseas Votes – D. o. D. Tactics The website stayed down until Sept. 22 nd, 6 weeks before Election Day, making it much more likely that absentee ballots mailed from oversees would arrive too late to be counted in the election Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld www. Oregon. VRC. org

Overseas Votes – D. o. D. Tactics Result of the website shutdown: Thousands of overseas voters were disenfranchised Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld www. Oregon. VRC. org

Summary of Problems in 2004 These examples are just the tip of the iceberg of documented voter suppression and disenfranchisement dirty tricks used in Ohio — and several other states — in the 2004 election www. Oregon. VRC. org

Summary of Problems in 2004 Nationwide, millions of legitimate voters were prevented from casting ballots and approximately 3, 600, 380 ballots were cast but never counted Source: Palast, Greg. 2006. Armed Madhouse. Penguin Group, New York; pp. 189 -190. www. Oregon. VRC. org

Summary of Problems in 2004 One estimate is that Kerry won the popular vote by 8 million votes or more* * According to Mark Crispin Miller, author of the book, Fooled Again, an in-depth study of the 2004 election, as stated in speeches and interviews www. Oregon. VRC. org

www. Oregon. VRC. org Exit Polls

2004 Election Exit Poll The official national election exit poll was conducted by Mitofsky International — an internationally known exit polling firm — and assisted by Edison Media Research Warren J. Mitofsky was hired by the National Election Pool (NEP), a consortium of the major news organizations — the Associated Press, ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox, and NBC www. Oregon. VRC. org

Exit Poll Results In late afternoon of Election Day, exit polls in the presidential election showed that Democratic John F. Kerry candidate John Kerry was winning by a landslide in electoral votes and was ahead by 3% in the popular votes nationwide www. Oregon. VRC. org

Final Machine Tally Results During the late evening/ early morning hours, the final machine tallies showed George Bush the victor in both the popular and electoral votes — a stunning last-minute turnaround www. Oregon. VRC. org George W. Bush on Election Night 2004

Machine Tallies Bush Exit Polls Kerry Bush er rv. Flip Se wn lts % 5. 5 Do su e n. R i + Kerry

Machine Exit Polls Tally Results

5 Critical States with the Greatest “Red Shift” (NH, OH, PA, MN, FL) 5 Critical States with the Least “Red Shift” (NV, NM, CO, IA, MI) Average Percent of Red Shift Total Electoral College Votes Correlating “Red Shift” with Electoral College Votes in the Top 10 Critical States The 5 critical states with the greatest discrepancy between exit poll results and tabulated results also commanded nearly twice as many Electoral Votes as the other 5 critical states Source: Webb Mealy, Ph. D. http: //www. selftest. net/redshift. htm All Critical States All Non-Critical States

Explanation for Discrepancy The predominant explanation promoted by the media and political pundits was that the presidential exit polls were flawed and exit polls in general are not accurate www. Oregon. VRC. org

Proven Reliability of Exit Polls Historically, exit polls have proven to be very accurate, often to within ½ of 1% (0. 005) Discrepancies between exit polls and the final vote counts is solid evidence that something in the election results is wrong www. Oregon. VRC. org

Proven Reliability of Exit Polls Even the Bush administration considers exit polls to be such a reliable way to expose large-scale fraud that it has helped pay for election exit polls in other countries Example: Ukraine 2004 www. Oregon. VRC. org

Proven Reliability of Exit Polls In Nov. 2004, John Tefft, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, pointed to such a discrepancy to argue that the presidential election in Ukraine had been stolen Election protesters in Ukraine, Nov. 2004 www. Oregon. VRC. org

Proven Reliability of Exit Polls The Ukrainians, after protesting en masse in sub -freezing temperatures, got a new presidential election — which resulted in a different winner Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine www. Oregon. VRC. org

Official Explanation In the 2004 U. S. presidential election, the official explanation for the discrepancy between the exit polls and the final machine tallies, as stated in the Edison/Mitofsky report, was that more Kerry supporters participated in the exit poll www. Oregon. VRC. org

Official Explanation However, n the technical section in the E/M report contradicted the conclusion that more Kerry supporters participated in the exit poll n the analysis made the assumption that the machine tallies were correct — it did not consider the possibility that the machine tallies were incorrect and the exit polls correct www. Oregon. VRC. org

Official Exit Poll Data To date, the official, final exit poll data has not been released to the public www. Oregon. VRC. org

Additional Note According to computer security expert Chuck Herrin, “the sudden unreliability of exit polls in the U. S. coincides with the use of paperless electronic voting machines” www. Oregon. VRC. org

U. S. Senate Races - 2004 Discrepancies with substantial swings also occurred in as many as 7 U. S. Senate races — all in favor of the Republican candidates +9% swing +13% swing Jim Bunning (R-KY) Mel Martinez (R-FL) www. Oregon. VRC. org Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) Tom Coburn (R-OK) John Thune (R-SD) +9% swing Richard Burr (R-NC) Arlen Specter (R-PA)

U. S. Senate Race - 2002 +12% swing for Chambliss over Cleland Saxby Chambliss (R) Georgia Max Cleland (D) Note: Paperless electronic voting machines were used in the state www. Oregon. VRC. org

Gubernatorial Races – 2002, 2003 Georgia 2002: Republican Sonny Perdue defeated incumbent Democratic Governor Roy Barnes after a suspicious 16% electionday swing in the vote In 2003 in California, Republican Arnold Schwarzenneger defeated a popular Latino Democrat who substantially led in polls a week before the election in strongly Democratic California Note: Paperless electronic voting machines were used in both states www. Oregon. VRC. org

U. S. House Races There is no known information available on U. S. House races regarding anomalies or discrepancies in the 2002 or 2004 elections www. Oregon. VRC. org

Conclusion There is no basis for confidence in election results that were based on machine counts tallied with secret software www. Oregon. VRC. org

www. Oregon. VRC. org Is It Voter Fraud or Election Fraud?

Voter Fraud vs. Election Fraud n Voter Fraud: fraud perpetrated by the individual voter(s) u Examples: voting more than once, voting when not legally allowed to vote (both felonies) u Small-scale fraud u Touted remedy: Voter I. D. laws www. Oregon. VRC. org

Voter Fraud vs. Election Fraud n Election Fraud – fraud perpetrated by others (i. e. , candidates or political parties) to rig an election, sometimes with help from corrupt election officials u Examples: voter suppression and disenfranchisement, stuffing of ballot box u Often large-scale fraud u Remedies: (Varies) www. Oregon. VRC. org

Voter Fraud vs. Election Fraud Which type of fraud do YOU think has been occurring? HINT: Claims of widespread voter fraud are totally false www. Oregon. VRC. org

www. Oregon. VRC. org What About the 2006 Mid-Term Elections?

A Solution or a Ruse? In the 2004 election, people felt calmed by the illusion that the problems of the 2000 election were being corrected — while in fact the opposite was happening www. Oregon. VRC. org Voter Lines in Florida, 2004

2005 GAO Report to Congress A Sept. 2005 Report to Congress by the Government Accountability Office on electronic voting system security and reliability identified a long list of vulnerabilities and problems www. Oregon. VRC. org

2005 GAO Report to Congress Identified problems included: n Weak security controls n n Incorrect system configuration n Inadequate system version controls n Vague and incomplete voting standards System design flaws n n Inadequate security testing Poor security mgmt. www. Oregon. VRC. org

2005 GAO Report Warning The 2005 GAO report states that, although the Election Assistance Commission has led efforts to address problems, changes have not been implemented. Therefore, there will be little improvement in the 2006 elections over the 2004 elections. www. Oregon. VRC. org

2006 Mid-Term Elections n n www. Oregon. VRC. org 40% of all votes will be cast on paperless electronic voting machines (66 million voters) More than 30. 6 million voters will see new voting equipment

www. Oregon. VRC. org Towards a Solution

Questions to Ask Ourselves Can WE THE PEOPLE afford to: n ignore the strong evidence of systematic election fraud in the last 3 federal election cycles? n trust private companies like ES&S, Diebold and Sequoia to accurately count our votes? n ignore the estimated 36 million voters who were not confident that their vote in the 2004 election had been counted or counted accurately? n believe that the 2006, 2008, or 2010 elections will be any different if we do nothing to address problems? www. Oregon. VRC. org

Actions to Take WE THE PEOPLE need to take action in order to reclaim our “common right” to an open, transparent, and verifiable election — to reclaim our vote and our democracy www. Oregon. VRC. org

Actions to Take WE THE PEOPLE need to: n demand that corporations and politicians get out of counting our votes n develop open-source election software for transparency n www. Oregon. VRC. org use a scientifically designed election verification process

Ensuring Election Integrity Methods of ensuring election integrity: n Logic and Accuracy Test n Audit of Precincts n Countywide or Statewide Verification n Recount www. Oregon. VRC. org

Methods of Ensuring Election Integrity n Logic and Accuracy Test Purpose: To test machine calibration Method: Compares the machine count with a small test deck of paper ballots, e. g. 100 or 1, 000 ballots www. Oregon. VRC. org

Methods of Ensuring Election Integrity n Audit of Precincts Purpose: To determine if a pattern of machine errors occurred by checking the accuracy of results in a specified percentage of precincts* Method: The machine count is compared with a hand-recount of paper ballots in a percentage of precincts; a pattern of discrepancies between the counts MAY trigger further investigation * This method is NOT, in itself, designed to find countywide or statewide inaccuracies or to trigger a countywide or statewide recount www. Oregon. VRC. org

Methods of Ensuring Election Integrity n Countywide or Statewide Verification Purpose: To ensure that the certified countywide or statewide results are accurate Method: Compares the countywide or statewide machine count with a hand-counted, scientifically determined sample of paper ballots; a significant discrepancy between the sample results and the machine results will trigger a mandatory full hand -recount www. Oregon. VRC. org

Methods of Ensuring Election Integrity n Recount Purpose: To determine the actual results Method: Hand-recounting ALL of the paper ballots for the race(s) in doubt www. Oregon. VRC. org

Democracy Requires Action We as patriotic individuals need to: n support non-partisan election integrity efforts n become more informed about the FACTS n help raise awareness about the need for election reform n ask your elected officials to support election reform www. Oregon. VRC. org

Democracy Requires Action Most importantly, don’t let another questionable election go unchallenged! www. Oregon. VRC. org

www. Oregon. VRC. org For more information, visit http: //www. Oregon. VRC. org “Either every vote is sacred, or democracy is a sham. ” ~David Cobb, 2004 Green Party presidential candidate