What we will do for beam preparation in

What we will do for beam preparation in 2009 Beam Interlocks (= ‘Beam related’ MPS) J. Wenninger BE-OP Acknowledgements : B. Puccio, B. Todd, M. Zerlauth, R. Schmidt, B. Dehning, A. Mac. Pherson, V. Kain, S. Redaelli. R. Assmann, B. Goddard, J. Uythoven and many other members of the MPP. Some related aspects are covered in : - Powering Interlocks (M. Zerlauth) - Injection and LBDS (J. Uythoven) 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 1

Outline q q Soft matters q Commissioning strategy q 05. 02. 2009 Beam Interlock System Conclusion Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 2

LHC MPS The LHC Machine Protection System is: Complicated o Many elements. Complex …glued together by a simple Beam Interlock System o Interaction of the elements in space and time. o Large phase-space for failures. But the MPS can be broken up into testable components… …and the outcome of the tests allow us to quantify or predict its performance with respect to failures. 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 3

Energy Scales Setup Beam Limit - 1012 p 450 Ge. V 72 k. J Pilot b Nominal b 360 J 100 8. 3 k. J 1 k 10 k ‘ 156 b’ physics Nominal beam 23. 3 MJ 449 k. J 100 k 1 M 10 M Stored Energy (J) 100 M 1 T 5 Te. V Setup Beam Limit - 1. 7 x 1010 p 13. 6 k. J Pilot b 4 k. J Nominal b 92 k. J ‘ 156 b’ physics 5 MJ Nominal beam 258 MJ Stored Energy (J) 2 MJ ! 100 1 k 100 k 1 M 100 M 1 T 4

Stored Energies Kb Nb (charges) Stored E inj Stored E 5 Te. V Stored E 7 Te. V Proton 1 1 72 n. J 0. 8 m. J 1. 12 m. J Pilot bunch 1 5 x 109 360 J 4 k. J 5. 6 k. J Nominal bunch 1 1. 15 x 1011 8. 3 k. J 92 k. J 129 k. J Inj. Safe Beam 1 1 x 1012 72 k. J 800 k. J 1. 12 MJ 5 Te. V Safe Beam 1 1. 7 x 1010 1. 2 k. J 13. 6 k. J 19 k. J 7 Te. V Safe Beam 1 1 x 1010 720 J 8 k. J 11. 2 k. J Early physics 156 4 x 1010 449 k. J 5 MJ 7 MJ Nominal beam 2808 1. 15 x 1011 23. 3 MJ 258 MJ 362 MJ Ion bunch 1 5. 7 x 109 410 J 4. 6 k. J 6. 4 k. J Early ion 62 5. 7 x 109 25 k. J 279 k. J 390 k. J 592 5. 7 x 109 245 k. J 2. 72 MJ 3. 81 MJ Scheme Nominal ion 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 5

Beam Interlock Systems 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 6

SPS & LHC MPS q SPS + Transfer lines: o 1 ring beam permit loop. o 2 extraction systems. o 16 BIC modules, 2 special ‘extraction master’ BICs. o 1000 devices/interlocks connected to the BICs, 50% in the high energy TLs. >> concentrated in 120 inputs to the BIS 1000 SIS interlocks. o q ‘The guinea pig’ LHC o 2 ring beam permit loops. o 2 injection systems. o 21 BIC modules. o 10’ 000 devices/interlocks connected to the BICs. >> concentrated in 180 inputs to the BIS 3800 SIS interlocks. o 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 7

BIS overview Timing LHC LHC Devices SMP Software Interlocks Movable Devices SEQ via GMT BCM Beam Loss Experimental Magnets CCC Transverse Operator Experiments Feedback Buttons Collimator Positions Beam Aperture Kickers Environmental parameters Collimation System BTV screens FBCM Lifetime Mirrors BTV MKI Beam Dumping System Safe Beam Flag Beam Interlock System Injection BIS PIC essential + auxiliary circuits WIC Magnets QPS (several 1000) FMCM Power Converters Power AUG Converters ~1500 05. 02. 2009 RF System UPS Cryo OK BLM Monitors aperture limits (some 100) BPM in IR 6 Monitors in arcs (several 1000) Doors Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 Access System EIS Vacuum System Vacuum Valves (~300) Timing System (PM) Access Safety Blocks RF /e. Stoppers 8

BIS changes & tests Changes: q New monitoring firmware for BICs. q New firmware in CIBG to ease arming sequence and provide diagnostics. q Modifications in some optical components. q Automated pre- and post-operation checks (IPOC). q Automated tests (PIC ok, WIC, BLMs, BTVs … on going). q CIBU user connections: all LHC clients will be forced to provide redundant signals next slide. Tests: q All components (BICs, loops etc) will basically be re-commissioned. q Aim to retest ALL CIBU connections. 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 9

BIS client connections A COINCIDENCE of 5 ‘events’ have led to a complete Blind Failure of a BIS input in 2008 Event Change 2009 1. Two different Equipment systems sharing to the same channel No longer tolerated. 2. PLC Voltage against rules No additional protection possible with existing design. . . Test, test. 3. Transient Voltage Suppressor blocked Short-Circuit Slight change of the interface (on User system side) for each connection. 4. Inputs were not redundant Redundant signals should be supplied. It will become mandatory in 2009. 5. Not re-commissioned after change B. Puccio, MPP 5 th Dec. 2008 05. 02. 2009 Tests, tests and tests… Regular tests before every fill will be the best option : => implementation of Automatic tests Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 10

Safe Machine Parameter (SMP) systems 2008 Experience: q Very good experience on SPS – operational system. q LHC never really got going… Changes for 2009: q No changes for the SPS. q LHC: Ø New version (not the last one !). Ø Improvements in the handling of tables for SBF… Ø Signal cross-check and interlocking must be implemented. Ø Ions : adapt ‘Safe/Setup Beam Flag’ limits – to be analyzed. Ø … 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 11

Changes to SPS and transfer lines BIS inputs q New turn-by-turn beam position interlock in the vertical plane. Ø Ø q Horizontal plane protected by existing (old) system. Presently only BLMs protect against fast loss/orbit change in V plane. Beam quality interlocks before extraction. Ø Ø q RF system : bunch pattern, position, bunch length, bunch intensity spread. Fast BCT : bunch intensities. Test of a new beam ‘position before extraction’ interlock. Ø Ø q New system to replace existing system based on the SPS orbit system. Much faster and higher availability (present system ~ 2 -3% un-availability). Some ‘input reshuffling’ between TI 2/TI 8 and LHC Injection BICs. 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 12

Changes to LHC BIS inputs 3 new inputs: q Access Safety block : independent input (was coupled to Vac. ) q Electron stoppers : independent input (was coupled to Vac. ) q Fast beam lifetime interlock : will be connected. 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 13

Software Interlock System changes q Minor changes to the SIS software itself. SIS core process has multiple dependency on CO software products (FESA, JAPC, etc) - must follow trend… q For the LHC new tests will be added: Ø Ø Orbit and COD current surveillance. Ø IR 6 beam position wrt TCDQ and secondary collimators. Ø q Powering interlocking with access zone – tbc. … Core of the interlocks on PC states (~ 3600 tests) will not be touched to avoid necessity of complete re-commissioning. The role of SIS will become more and more important since it is the only system to implement interlocks that perform ‘LHC wide correlations’. See yesterday’s talk by B. Goddard – multiple failures. No limit to interlock complexity – but watch the availability ! Response time limit ~ 1 second. 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 14

Soft matters 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 15

Commissioning procedures q q Procedures: • Powering interlock system • Fast magnet current change monitors • Warm magnet interlock system • Beam interlock system • Collimators • Beam loss monitors • Injection • Beam dumping system 16 • Vacuum system Most procedures have been reviewed based on 2008 experience. Procedures should be released by April 2009 ! approval closed under approval released work in progress under approval closed work in progress

Documentation To find a good documentation schema for the diversity of test that have to be performed for each system involved in MPS has been a moving target… Results range from simple YES/NO to extensive analysis for beam related tests. q In 2008 documentation was based on a WEB page and EXEL sheets. Difficult to maintain for such a complex system. q As from 2009 we are starting a more rigorous approach: MTF/EDMS ‘tuned’ for MPS – work in progress. 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 17

Issue tracking q In 2008 the AB-CO software issue tracking tool was used for tracking MPS issues. Apart from some software development specific ‘overhead’ it works fine. >> Proposal is to continue with this tool. 05. 02. 2009 18

Commissioning strategy 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 19

General commissioning strategy Test everything again! q Repetition (with improvements) of 2008 work. Signification number of changes (HW, SW) q 05. 02. 2009 Complete what was NOT done. Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 20

Automate, automate… Guideline: systematic testing - not sample testing ! q A few systems concentrate a large amount of devices. Ø Ø They are tedious and lengthy to test. Ø q PIC, BLMs, Vacuum, Collimators… Automation to avoid mistakes due to repetitive work. Automated testing: Ø Transfer line PCs and BTVs already operational. Ø PIC already in place in 2008 – consolidated for 2009. Ø Collimator tests largely automated in 2008, improvements in the pipeline. Ø Tests of BLMs (pre-fill). Ø Vacuum : preparations ongoing. Ø … >> Requires carefully testing of the SW ! 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 21

Reliability (dry) runs Reliability runs were made for q the LBDS, q the beam permit loops. >> Important & successful ! >> For 2009 we should aim for a BLM reliability run ~ July/Aug ! Conditions to be specified… beam energy distribution ! Essential since a large no. of BLMs of 4 sectors will be dismounted / reinstalled. BLM monitor tests with radioactive source will be repeated. 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 22

Post-mortem This year we need a rather complete (BIS + powering + essential BI) postmortem to analyze: q some MPS tests, q the programmed dumps, Even a perfect dump provides information on abort gap population, TCDQ and TCT settings and protection. q the ‘natural’ failures that will occur. They provide invaluable info on MPS performance and complete the information obtained from tests. >> We must analyze the MPS performance for ALL events due to failures. Build an ‘event’ database. 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 23

MPS test with ‘entire’ LHC q Some MPS components can only be tested when the Beam Energy Tracking System (BETS) of the LDBS is working. q Requires dedicated periods where eventually at least ½ of the LHC must be available (also ramps !) – sectors 45, 56, 67 and 78. q Systems: Ø BETS – internal interlock tests. Ø LBDS dry dumps. Ø SMP : Safe Energy. Ø BLM thresholds with energy. Ø Full chain interlock tests (source dump) on a selection of inputs. >> we must avoid to push that to the ‘last minute’ – 2008 effect! 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 24

Towards beam operation In an IDEAL WORLD we would perform all MPS test as soon as possible, and then go on with (beam) commissioning. But: Some critical tests require beam… There is a margin for beam operation without fully tested MPS. There is a pressure to go ahead (cannot ignore !!). >> Strategy to provide LIMITED flexibility for safely interleaving beam and MPS commissioning! 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 25

Beam commissioning stages - principle Guidelines for when to perform MPS tests: q Follow the definition of ‘Safe/Setup Beam’ : I ≤ 1012 * (450/E)1. 7 q Take into account uncertainties on ‘what is safe’. Ø Ø q Uncertainties arising from E >> 450 Ge. V. Shock damage, plastic deformation. ALARA : even safe beams should not be lost in the machine too frequently. Ø Only allowed with ‘very safe’ beams during the initial beam commissioning, e. g. with few 109 at 450 Ge. V. >> see 2008. q Anticipation: Ø 05. 02. 2009 Need time for test analysis (PM data). Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 26

Tests with beam Beam tests are essential part of the MPS commissioning. q BLMs and collimators are essential elements for failure protection. The BLMs cover the largest volume in failure phase-space. q Some failures must be provoked to verify assumptions on reaction times, loss patterns and BLM thresholds, and ensure that the machine can be protected at higher intensity/energy. q The beam tests are done with low intensity ~1010 p at 450 Ge. V (< 1 k. J). Factor 100 below setup beam limit ! q Beam tests are performed/repeated for higher intensity/energy as required. Only if lower intensity/energy tests are passed ! q One cannot rely on ‘natural’ occurrence of failures. Or else their frequency would drive the LHC commissioning ! 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 27

MPS ‘Rule of the Probe’ A probe beam (2 -5 x 109 charges) must be used when q New energy ranges are explored. q New squeeze steps are explored. q Significant changes are made that affect the aperture: Ø Beta-beat/optics corrections. Ø Changes to the reference orbit. Exact conditions to be defined >> Actions to be performed in collaboration with MPS expert(s). 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 28

MPS Commissioning Phases Phase Energy Int. Comments MPS-1: Probing 450 Ge. V 0. 45 ≤ 1010 • • Early commissioning phase. Can run with ‘minimal’ interlocks – ‘ 2008 -style’. ‘Light’ powering interlocking (maskable). Experiments protection must be ready ! MPS-2: Ramp 0. 45 – 7 ≤ 1010 • • All interlocks commissioned. Post-mortem recording operational. Beam related MPS tests passed at 450 Ge. V. Commission in steps of 0. 5 -1 Te. V. MPS-3: Increased intensity at 450 Ge. V (injection ≤ 1011) 0. 45 – 7 ≥ 1011 • All interlocks commissioned. • Post-mortem recording operational. • Beam related MPS tests passed at 450 Ge. V. • All interlocks commissioned. • Subset of beam tests must be repeated for every significant squeeze step. MPS-4: Squeeze MPS-5: Unsafe injection 05. 02. 2009 0. 45 ≥ 1011 • All beam related injection MPS tests passed. Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 29

Conclusions q The BIS will see ‘minor’ modifications – SPS is the usual guinea pig. q General strategy is to (re)test everything. q The MPS beam tests are essential. q The Post-Mortem system will be essential to analyze MPS beam tests and ‘natural’ failures – BI data integration & analysis is top priority. q Coexistence of beam and machine protection commissioning is possible with appropriate coordination (anticipation !). We profit from the natural commissioning evolution in steps of energy, complexity and intensity. q A core MPS team o must follow beam commissioning on a daily basis, o should ‘review’ the MPS performance at (to be defined) intensity/energy stages in the LHC commissioning. Can we safely continue to increase intensity/energy? 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 30

05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 31

User Diversity 32

Readiness for MPS-1 q Ring and injection BIS fully commissioned: Ø All USER_INPUTs operational Ø BEAM_PERMIT loops operational. q Fully commissioned clients (non-beam part): q All injection BIC inputs. q Pr op os a l PIC and WIC inputs. Ø PIC configuration is ‘light’ – all maskable. q Vacuum inputs. q Collimator inputs. q Experiment inputs. q SIS experiments protection. q BTV inputs (also SIS). q BLM inputs. q LBDS ready 450 Ge. V operation/commissioning. 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 33

Readiness for MPS-2 q FMCMs operational. q PIC configuration : Ø MBs, MQs and IPQs declared essential. Ø PIC configuration re-tested. q Collimators with minimal setup. q Some BLM beam tests passed : Pr op os a l Ø Thresholds adjusted, collimator tests passed. q BPM interlocks IR 6. q Safe Machine Parameters : Ø Safe Energy q Ramp: Ø RF frequency. Ø LBDS fully tested in dry-ramps (BETS !). Ø Programmed dumps on first ramps for LBDS. 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 34

Readiness for MPS-3++ q Collimators early setup & beam tests. q TCDQ setup & tests. q All BLM beam tests passed : Ø Thresholds adjusted, quench test(s). Pr Ø Collimator BLMs tests. q BPM interlocks IR 6. q op os a l Beam tests of WIC, PIC and FMCMs (overlap with BLM tests). 05. 02. 2009 Preparation for Beam Interlocks Chamonix 09 35