Скачать презентацию V Kim V Kuznetsov G Balakan South-Ukraine Скачать презентацию V Kim V Kuznetsov G Balakan South-Ukraine

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V. Kim, V. Kuznetsov, G. Balakan ‑ South-Ukraine NPP, Ukraine G. Gromov, A. Krushynsky V. Kim, V. Kuznetsov, G. Balakan ‑ South-Ukraine NPP, Ukraine G. Gromov, A. Krushynsky ‑ Analytical Research Bureau of SSTC NRS S. Sholomitsky, I. Lola ‑ Energorisk Ltd ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMATED EMERGENCY ALGORITHM TO CONTROL PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LOCA FOR SUNPP SAFETY UPGRADING Yalta, Crimea, Ukraine, September 24 -29, 2007. 17 th Symposium of “Atomic Energy Research”

Contents Ø Problem description Ø Accident progression under design automatics operation without operator actions Contents Ø Problem description Ø Accident progression under design automatics operation without operator actions Ø Description and criteria of algorithm operation Ø Result of simulations Ø Analysis of influence of failures or additional IEs on accident control algorithm realization Ø Conclusions

Problem description • • • The primary-to-secondary leak accident is one of the most Problem description • • • The primary-to-secondary leak accident is one of the most complex and specific accidents for the VVER type Reactor Unit. Design operation of Unit automatics and systems does not allow reaching a safe stable condition without actions of plant personnel. Such accident historically have belong to BDBA because of low frequency of occurrence, bur now after Rovno NPP accident with multiple SG collector cover liftings this accident have classified as DBA. According to results of the safety analyses under the Level 1 PRA for SU NPP Unit 1, contribution of "small" leaks (break of one tube) into total core damage frequency (CDF) equals to 6% and "large" breaks (collector cover lifting) equals to 11% of CDF. In accordance with Safety program stated by government authority of Ukraine, appropriate safety upgrading should be implemented for overcoming such accidents. Thermal hydraulic analyses of primary to secondary leaks show that the time interval for critical actions during an active phase of the leakage is enough short. The results of simulation of such an accident with FSS show, that an operator quite often makes critical errors or controls the accident not optimally. As means for overcoming of accident, the algorithm of primary-to-secondary leak control has been developed.

Accident progression under design automatics operation without operator actions Leak diameter, mm Time of Accident progression under design automatics operation without operator actions Leak diameter, mm Time of scram, s Reason of scram Coolant mass through leak before scram, t 100 6 P 1≤ 150 kgf/cm 2 , N>75%NNOM 80 15 60 Leak mass flow rate, kg/s Mass release into atmosphere during 1 hour after scram, t End state Initial Steady 4, 9 870 140 402 Leak not stopped. CD with bypass of containment Same 6, 0 430 130 408 Same 37 Same 8, 3 260 123 382 Same 40 85 Same 8, 6 124 108 276 Same 30 190 Same 11 61 55 136 Same 4 13 749 PRZ level≤ 4. 6 m 26, 7 41 16 19. 6 Same 20 1280 Same 20, 2 27 26 14 Same 2 13 2703 Same 49, 5 19 8 24. 5 Same 13 4227 Same 49, 2 12 11 21. 4 Same

Accident progression under design automatics operation without operator actions Figure 1 – Time interval Accident progression under design automatics operation without operator actions Figure 1 – Time interval before BRU‑A opening after TSV closing depending on primaryto-secondary leak diameter (with prohibition of BRU‑K operation)

Description and criteria of algorithm operation actions To provide a transition of Unit to Description and criteria of algorithm operation actions To provide a transition of Unit to the safe end state, the proposed strategy and algorithm of accident control envisage the following: • Reduction of primary and ESG pressure difference to terminate leak loss of coolant (by injection in PRZ and/or operation of EGES). • ESG pressure control below setpoints of SDV operation to prevent radioactive release (by: (a) delay of FASIV closing; (b) prohibition of ESG BRU‑A closing; (c) by PRZ injection and EGES operation; (d) restriction of HPIS). • Localization of radioactive primary coolant within the ESG (by prohibition of BRU‑K after SG level increasing, and further closing of ESG FASIV and let-down of all SGs). Too early FASIV closing leads to pressure increasing in ESG, opening of SGVs with radioactivity release into the environment. • Primary inventory and pressurizer level control (by injection from HPIS or primary make-up system). For recovery of PRZ level, injection into PRZ or operation of EGES into the quench tank is needed. • Maintaining natural circulation via intact loops and recovery of a margin to saturation (by primary inventory control and secondary cooldown through intact SG). • Injection of boron to reach required concentration in primary coolant (by organization of water exchange in primary side by make-up/let-down operation).

Description and criteria of algorithm operation actions Criteria used for estimating results of accident Description and criteria of algorithm operation actions Criteria used for estimating results of accident control algorithm: • • Timely termination of loss of primary coolant through the leak. Maintaning primary inventory and reactor level. Sufficient secondary heat removal. Restoration of natural circulation via intact loops. Recovery of a PRZ level. Recovery of a margin to saturation. Keeping reactor subcritical. Minimization of radioactivity release from the primary side and outside the plant. • No ESG SDV opening. • Minimization of mass of primary coolant dumped through EGES into containment.

Result of simulations First stage: • prohibition of ESG BRU‑A closing • PRZ spray Result of simulations First stage: • prohibition of ESG BRU‑A closing • PRZ spray injection and EGES operation • closing of ESG FASIV (with delay) and let-down of all SGs • prohibition of BRU‑K after SG level increasing Second stage: • restriction of HPIS • secondary cooldown through intact SGs • injection of boron

Result of simulations Characteristics of process Leak diameter, mm 100 80 60 40 30 Result of simulations Characteristics of process Leak diameter, mm 100 80 60 40 30 4 x 13 20 2 x 13 15 Termination of loss of coolant through leak, s 800 500 600 1000 2000 1020 2250 1050 Coolant mass through leak after reactor scram, t 75 72 70 54 45 19 22 8 14 Coolant mass through ESG SDV, kg 0 0 0 0 0 Steady natural circulation via intact loops Yes Yes Yes Recovery of PRZ level, s 800 750 780 750 1100 700 no 700 No Recovery of margin to saturation, s 1910 1750 1780 1750 1900 2020 2030 2000 2050 Primary inventory (minimum / on algorithm completion), t 216 / 260 222 / 265 228 / 265 230 / 268 232 / 275 232 / 235 225 / 230 232 / 235 228 / 230

Result of simulations Figure 2 – Integrated mass flow rate through PRISE leak (after Result of simulations Figure 2 – Integrated mass flow rate through PRISE leak (after scram) under algorithm operation depending on leak equivalent diameter

Analysis of influence of failures or additional IEs on accident control algorithm realization For Analysis of influence of failures or additional IEs on accident control algorithm realization For efficiency analysis of suggested accident control algorithm in case of failures or additional IEs the following beyond design basis accidents (BDBA) have been modeled: • • • accident control using algorithm in case of HPIS failure (failure of primary inventory control SF); accident control using algorithm in case of PRZ spray and EGES failure (failure of primary pressure decrease and limitation SF); accident control using algorithm in case of EGES valve failure to close after opening (failure of primary pressure control SF); accident control using algorithm in case of HPIS pump failure to turn switch to recirculation mode (failure of primary pressure limitation SF); accident control using algorithm in case of secondary cooldown failure (failure of heat removal from primary to secondary SF); accident control using algorithm in case of false signal» primary-to-secondary leak” occurrence; accident control using algorithm in case of additional IE “primary leak inside the containment from cold leg”; accident control using algorithm in case of additional IE “primary leak inside the containment from pressurizer steam dome”; accident control using algorithm in case of additional IE “loss of offsite power”; accident control using algorithm in case of additional IEs “loss of offsite power” and ESG SDV failure to close after opening (failure of secondary pressure control SF)

Analysis of influence of failures or additional IEs on accident control algorithm realization Stop Analysis of influence of failures or additional IEs on accident control algorithm realization Stop outside containment, s Mass through leak, t Mass through SDV, t Natural circulation Recovery of PRZ level, s Primary inventory (min/end), t End state 100 mm PRISE LOCA failure of HPIS Yes, 400 71 0 Yes No 2290 196/275 ОК-OK 100 mm PRISE LOCA failure of PRZ spray and EGES Yes, 650 83 2, 1 Yes No 1200 216/260 ОК(RS)OK 100 mm PRISE LOCA failure of EGES to close Yes, 400 74 0 Yes 480 No 215/253 ОК-L 100 mm PRISE LOCA failure of HPIS off No 130(1 h ) 40 (1 h) HPIS 680 320 216/320 NO(RG) Yes, 400 81 0 No 750 No 217/273 OK-L No PRISE 0 0 500 1820 257/275 OK-OK 100 mm PRISE LOCA IE « 11 mm leak from cold leg» Yes, 400 81 0 Yes 680 1800 215/273 ОК-L 100 mm PRISE LOCA IE « 50 mm leak from cold leg» Yes, 400 54 0 Yes No 700 209/235 ОК-L 15 mm PRISE LOCA IE « 50 mm leak from PRZ» Yes, 400 5 0 Yes 250 No 230/242 ОК-L 100 mm PRISE LOCA IE «LOSP» Yes, 400 71 10, 2 450 380 2540 219/264 ОК(RG)OK No 600 (1 h) 530 (1 h) No No 3100 133/220 NO(RG) Emergency process 100 mm PRISE LOCA failure of secondary cooldown False start of algorithm 100 mm PRISE LOCA IE «LOSP» and stick of SDV Margin to saturation , s

Analysis of influence of failures or additional IEs on accident control algorithm realization • Analysis of influence of failures or additional IEs on accident control algorithm realization • • Application of accident control algorithm demonstrates: stopping loss of primary coolant inventory for all emergency scenarios except (HPIS pump failure to turn switch to recirculation and SDV sticking); sufficient primary coolant inventory during accident and stable natural circulation in intact loops (except scenario with failure secondary cooldown) that is able for heat removal from the core; short time opening of ESG SDV happened in case of failure of primary pressure control and in case of loss of offsite power, nevertheless, algorithm performance allow to minimize a number of SDV openings and significantly limit mass of primary coolant dumped into the environment; in case of secondary cooldown failure positive result of algorithm consist in limitation of ESG pressure and exclusion of radioactivity release into the environment through ESG SDV; in case of SG SV failure to close after opening the primary pressure may decrease down to LPIS operation; positive effect of applying of accident control algorithm in case of failure to switch HPIS to recirculation consist in significant decrease of primary coolant radioactivity release into the environment through ESG SDV. Also it leads to increase of time margins for performing of required actions by plant personnel

Analysis of influence of failures or additional IEs on accident control algorithm realization Application Analysis of influence of failures or additional IEs on accident control algorithm realization Application of the algorithm for majority of considered above BDBA scenarios allows to meet acceptance criteria and safety functions. For the rest scenarios it ensures increase of time margins for required operator actions

Conclusions • The results of analysis of primary-to-secondary side breaks allow to reveal and Conclusions • The results of analysis of primary-to-secondary side breaks allow to reveal and generalize characteristic features of transient progression. • The analyses confirm efficiency of algorithm application. • Application of algorithm for some of the beyond design scenarios ensures fulfillment of safety functions and acceptance criteria, and for other part it, at least, facilitates course of emergency process and performance of required recovery actions. • Realization of the suggested algorithm, possessing sufficient universality, allows to transfer the power unit in a safe stable condition for all considered range of primary-to-secondary leaks.