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US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Race and Disarmament Matt Rosenstein Associate Director Arms Control, Disarmament, US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Race and Disarmament Matt Rosenstein Associate Director Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at UIUC REES 200 October 30, 2006

“Pop Quiz” 1. What are the greatest threats to U. S. national security today? “Pop Quiz” 1. What are the greatest threats to U. S. national security today? 2. What are the greatest threats to Russian national security today?

Objectives for This Session Arms Race • What hath we wrought? (“Results” of the Objectives for This Session Arms Race • What hath we wrought? (“Results” of the USRussian arms race) • How did it come to this? (motivations and policies that explain the build-up) Disarmament and Nonproliferation • What steps did the US and Russia take to reduce risk of nuclear war and # of arms? • What are the salient security concerns today with respect to US and Russian nuclear arms?

What Hath We Wrought? Only country in the world to carry out a nuclear What Hath We Wrought? Only country in the world to carry out a nuclear attack? • United States, on Japan, WWII • Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945) Fat Man and Little Boy

The Destructive Potential of Nuclear Arms: In Perspective Event Casualties (approx. ) Iraq war The Destructive Potential of Nuclear Arms: In Perspective Event Casualties (approx. ) Iraq war 2, 800 9/11 3, 000 Vietnam war 47, 000 Hurricane Katrina 1, 800 Pakistani earthquake 80, 000 Indian Ocean tsunami 275, 000

Hiroshima and Nagasaki Estimated that between 115, 000 -170, 000 were killed immediately v Hiroshima and Nagasaki Estimated that between 115, 000 -170, 000 were killed immediately v Twice as many more died over time (radiation poisoning) v 95% of deaths were civilian v

Hiroshima and Nagasaki v v Little Boy: 13, 000 tons of TNT equivalent Most Hiroshima and Nagasaki v v Little Boy: 13, 000 tons of TNT equivalent Most nuclear warheads today: yield between 150 kiloton-1 megaton “Tsar bomba”: Soviets exploded a 50 -megaton bomb in test (1961) Spasm attack by US or USSR would result in 40 -75 million Soviet and 110 -150 million US deaths (RAND, 1960)

US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces, 1950 -2000 US USSR/Russia Year Launchers Warheads 1950 US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces, 1950 -2000 US USSR/Russia Year Launchers Warheads 1950 462 400 22* 84* 1960 1, 559 3, 127 144 354 1970 2, 100 5, 239 1, 985 2, 216 1980 2, 022 10, 608 2, 545 7, 480 1990 1, 903 12, 477 2, 500 10, 271 2000 1, 407 7, 519 1, 266 6, 094 2005 1, 225 5, 966 981 4, 732 Source: Arms Control Association, Fact Sheets (2005) *=1956 totals

Characteristics of US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces • Both US and USSR created Characteristics of US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces • Both US and USSR created “nuclear triad” forces: • Ground (ICBM) • Sea (SLBM) • Air (Bombers)

Military Fissile Material Stocks Country Pu (tonnes) HEU (tonnes) Israel 0. 51 -0. 65 Military Fissile Material Stocks Country Pu (tonnes) HEU (tonnes) Israel 0. 51 -0. 65 ? ? Pakistan 0. 02 -0. 06 1. 0 -1. 3 India 0. 3 -0. 5 0 UK 3. 2 21. 9 France 5. 0 30. 0 China 4. 8 20. 0 US 47. 0 580. 0 Russia 95. 0 773. 0 Source: Albright and Kramer, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Nov-Dec 2004)

The Arms Race: Why? • Territorial integrity and national sovereignty • Ideological struggle • The Arms Race: Why? • Territorial integrity and national sovereignty • Ideological struggle • Capitalism vs. communism • Liberal democracy vs. authoritarian rule • Military prowess: nukes as visible symbol of power • USSR could not keep up economically • MAD = Mutually Assured Destruction • Deterrence • Bargaining power / leverage in multilateral bodies

US-Russia Arms Race: A Brief Chronology 1942 US initiates Manhattan Project 1945 Hiroshima and US-Russia Arms Race: A Brief Chronology 1942 US initiates Manhattan Project 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1949 Soviet explosion of nuclear device 1957 Sputnik 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty • End of atmospheric US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty • End of atmospheric testing • “Hotline” • Halt proliferation to other states 1969 -1972 SALT I • Set numerical limits on missile launchers (not warheads-->MIRVs) 1972 -1979 SALT II • Broader limits than SALT I…but Afghanistan spoiled negotiations

US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology 1972 ABM Treaty • Limited each to two ABM US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology 1972 ABM Treaty • Limited each to two ABM sites (no nationwide defense) • Prohibited sea-, air-, space-based systems • Limit on qualitative improvement • Problematic: “Star Wars”, US pullout in 2001 -2 1972 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology 1991 START I Treaty • Negotiated almost 10 years US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology 1991 START I Treaty • Negotiated almost 10 years • Reductions in launchers (max. 1, 600) and warheads (max. 6, 000) 1993 START II Treaty • Further reductions; never ratified by US Senate and Russian Duma

Soviet Nuclear Assets at Time of Break-Up ICBMs: 94 ICBM Launcher Pads: 54 Warheads: Soviet Nuclear Assets at Time of Break-Up ICBMs: 94 ICBM Launcher Pads: 54 Warheads: ~225 Belarus Ukraine ICBMs: 258 ICBM Launchers: 176 36 HBs: ~1, 984 Warhead: ICBMs: 115 ICBM Launchers: 104 HBs: 40 Warhead: ~1, 462 Russia ICBMs: 1, 340 SLBMs: 1, 924 87 HBs: Warheads: : ~11, 296 Kazakhstan SSBN Base ICBM Base (Silo) Mobile ICBM Base Production Facilities Non deployed ICBMs Heavy Bombers Major Destruction & Dismantlement Site Chemical Weapons & Support Facility

Bioweapons Programs • 1960 s: both US and USSR were developing bioweapons programs • Bioweapons Programs • 1960 s: both US and USSR were developing bioweapons programs • 1972: BWC: US, USSR (other actors, such as UK) agreed to halt bioweapons research • 1992: several Russian scientists reported work with smallpox from 1970 s-1990 s • Bio program cheaper than nukes • Grew smallpox in large quantities • Various research efforts: aerosolizing the virus; placed on ballistic missile warheads…

After the Break-Up: Proliferation and “Brain Drain” • Concerns over safeguarding nuclear technologies and After the Break-Up: Proliferation and “Brain Drain” • Concerns over safeguarding nuclear technologies and materials • Dysfunctional military: command control? • ~150, 000 scientists, engineers, technicians employed in weapons-related work • 1990 s economic crisis meant low wages (or back wages owed…) --> “nuclear entrepreneurs” • Sell their knowledge? Seek employment in countries with nuclear aspirations?

Cooperative Threat Reduction • Mil-mil program initiated in 1992 (Nunn. Lugar) • Objectives: assist Cooperative Threat Reduction • Mil-mil program initiated in 1992 (Nunn. Lugar) • Objectives: assist FSU states in dismantling WMD; secure WMD materials, technology, facilities and structures; reduce threat of proliferation • Cooperation • US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) • 1993 -2003: US spent avg. of $402 million/yr (~0. 18% of total US defense budget); $4. 4 billion total during that time

Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia Silo Launcher Elimination Heavy Bomber Elimination SS-24/SS-25 Mobile Launcher Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia Silo Launcher Elimination Heavy Bomber Elimination SS-24/SS-25 Mobile Launcher Elimination SSBN/SLBM Dismantlement & Elimination Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination Liquid Propellant ICBM/ SLBM Elimination

Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia Keeping out the terrorists at Vector (biotechnology facility, Koltsovo, Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia Keeping out the terrorists at Vector (biotechnology facility, Koltsovo, Russia)…

Cooperative Threat Reduction: Accomplishments • More than 6, 000 nuclear weapons destroyed • Thousands Cooperative Threat Reduction: Accomplishments • More than 6, 000 nuclear weapons destroyed • Thousands of launchers, missiles, devices • Removed all weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan • Employed thousands of former weapons scientists • Also destroying chemical and biological weapons

The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road? • In Dec. 2001, Bush administration The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road? • In Dec. 2001, Bush administration gave 6 month notice that US would withdraw from treaty • Why? US wants to develop NMD to protect against WMD threats from terrorists, “rogue states” • Putin regime protested vehemently-->felt it would limit their deterrence capabilities (made START II levels undesirable) • Failure of Russian diplomacy?

The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road? • SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road? • SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), or “Moscow Treaty” signed in May 2002 • Cut warheads to 1, 700 -2, 200 by 2012 • Ratified in 2003 by Duma and Senate

US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns • Potential for technology, materials, knowledge transfers • US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns • Potential for technology, materials, knowledge transfers • “Setting a bad example”—weapons stockpiles and fissile materials stocks are disincentives for India, Pakistan, Israel(? ), Iran, N. Korea, etc.

US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns • Whither the United States? • National Missile US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns • Whither the United States? • National Missile Defense • Earth-penetrating nukes, mini-nukes • Nuclear primacy? • Whither Russia? • Superpower nostalgia • Maintain credible deterrence • Relations with China, Iran vs. with US, EU

Perceived National Security Threats Today U. S. national security • Terrorism • Proliferation of Perceived National Security Threats Today U. S. national security • Terrorism • Proliferation of WMD • Rogue states (harbor terrorists, foment extremism) • Regional conflicts Source: National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006

Perceived National Security Threats Today Russian National Security Concept (2000) • Focus on domestic Perceived National Security Threats Today Russian National Security Concept (2000) • Focus on domestic security concerns: weak economy, organized crime, etc. • Erosion of multilateral security institutions (UN, OSCE) • Weakening of Russia’s political, economic, military influence • Strengthening of military alliances (NATO enlargement)

Perceived National Security Threats Today Russian National Security Concept (2000) • Foreign military bases Perceived National Security Threats Today Russian National Security Concept (2000) • Foreign military bases near Russia’s borders • Proliferation of WMD • Weakening of integration in CIS • Conflicts near CIS member states’ borders • Territorial claims against Russia

Perceived National Security Threats Today Russian national security concerns (2006) • Domestic issues: economic Perceived National Security Threats Today Russian national security concerns (2006) • Domestic issues: economic growth, financial stability, demographic problems • Terrorism • Local conflicts (ethnic, religious) • Proliferation of WMD • Lack of military readiness Source: Putin’s Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, May 10, 2006