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UNCLASSIFIED Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) Report Card Brief 21 July 2016 This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) Report Card Brief 21 July 2016 This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED Mission l l 2 Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands UNCLASSIFIED Mission l l 2 Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands – Complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multidisciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency – Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff (JS/J-39) and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO SMA efforts are Coalition based Mission areas – Counter-Terrorism – Counter-Insurgency – Countering Proliferation of WMD (State and non-State) – Individual, State and National-level Deterrence Assessment – Strategic Global & Regional Assessments UNCLASSIFIED

Agenda l l l 3 Intro and Purpose of the Session Assessment Results by Agenda l l l 3 Intro and Purpose of the Session Assessment Results by Geographical Region – Middle East – Eurasia – Central and South Asia – Pacific – Africa Assessment Results by Global Issue – Cyber – Deterrence – Counter-Terrorism – Counter-WMD – Collaboration – Gray Zone Independent JHU/APL effort sponsored by IARPA SRG Feedback

UNCLASSIFIED Significant Projects (FY 00 -04) FY 00 -02: Counter-Terrorism Effort (USG) (ADM Fry) UNCLASSIFIED Significant Projects (FY 00 -04) FY 00 -02: Counter-Terrorism Effort (USG) (ADM Fry) l FY 00 -01: C-WMD Demo (CENTCOM) (Gen Franks) l FY 00, 04, 07, & 08: C-WMD Assessments (USFK & PACOM) (Gens Blair Physical Widgets l and Sharp) FY 01 -02: OEF Support l Jan-May 03: SMA Cell at CENTCOM l 03 -06: Support OIF (MNF-I) (Gen Schwartz), Teamed with then COL Votel l FY 04: Developed Concept and Established SKOPE Cell (Gen Mc. Chrystal) l Not Assessed in Report Card (Classified) 4 Social Science Widgets l UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED l l l l l Assessed in Report Card l Not Assessed in UNCLASSIFIED l l l l l Assessed in Report Card l Not Assessed in Report Card (Classified) 5 Bio-Psycho. Social Widgets l FY 07: Sudan Strategic Assessment (CENTCOM) FY 07: DAPSE (STRATCOM) FY 08: WMD-T (SOCOM), Global Assessment of WMD-T (SOCOM/DTRA Cell established) FY 08: P 4 (USFK) FY 09: Interagency LOE (STRATCOM) FY 09: Deterrence (STRATCOM) FY 09 -10: Support to ISAF (Gens Mc. Chrystal/Flynn) FY 10: Vulnerability (CENTCOM) FY 11: IVEO (CENTCOM/SOCOM) FY 11: Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Stability – CANS (STRATCOM) FY 12: Insights from Neurobiology on Influence and Extremism (Joint Staff J 39) FY 12 -13: Strategic Short- and Long-term Stability in South Asia (CENTCOM/PACOM/STRATCOM) Social Science Widgets l Significant Projects (FY 07 -13) l UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED Significant Projects (FY 14 -16) l FY 14: A Multi-disciplinary, Multi-method Approach to UNCLASSIFIED Significant Projects (FY 14 -16) l FY 14: A Multi-disciplinary, Multi-method Approach to Leader Assessment at a Distance: The Case of Bashar al-Assad FY 14: Megacities RSI (PACOM) FY 14: Drivers of Conflict and Convergence in the Asia-Pacific Region in the Next 5 -25 Years (PACOM) FY 14: US Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa (AFRICOM) FY 14: The Dynamics of ISIL Success in Multi-method Assessment of ISIL FY 15: Coordinator’s Mission Review (USSC) FY 15: Looking Beyond ISIL: What Would the Region Look Like Beyond the Current Phase? (SOCCENT) FY 15: Russia and NATO Post Putin: The Space Between Peace and War (EUCOM) FY 16: Gray Zone Conflicts - Challenges and Opportunities (SOCOM) FY 16: Counter Da’esh Messaging (USASOC) l Assessed in Report Card l l l l l 6 UNCLASSIFIED

How to Judge SMA-like Products l Physical Domains: Physical “widget” is king! l In How to Judge SMA-like Products l Physical Domains: Physical “widget” is king! l In Human/Cognitive Domains: We have concept and cognitive “widgets” l In current geopolitical environment, maneuver occurs in multiple domains (USASOC J-9 brief) – – Virtual – l Physical Cognitive How do you judge value when there is no physical gadget? – – 7 Human domain products are critical to the planning process Best judge are Command planners

Observations on This Report Card l Human affairs dynamically changing and evolving – l Observations on This Report Card l Human affairs dynamically changing and evolving – l At best, focus is on broad trends and forecasts – – l l SMA uses multiple approaches to avoid cognitive failure (qualitative, quantitative, simulations, and gaming, etc…) Plus a GLOBAL SME elicitation network SMA project results integrate multimethod, multi-source analyses without forcing reconciliation of differences among analyses and SMEs Need to assess overall corpus across all efforts – 8 Predictions are a “Fool’s Errand”! One effort by itself not sufficient: Broken clock correct twice a day! VER E … OW As valuable as they are, H products (analyses and widgets) are only part of SMA’s value: SMA is a transparent process that exposes Commands and planners to voices, analyses, and ideas from outside the Beltway “The SMA process is as valuable to the COCOMs as SMA products” Maj Gen Tim Fay, Deputy A 8

Cognitive Maneuver Campaigns G 9 THOUGHT LEADERS PROCESS MASTERS FUTURE THREATS U. S. ARMY Cognitive Maneuver Campaigns G 9 THOUGHT LEADERS PROCESS MASTERS FUTURE THREATS U. S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ARSOF 2022 PERSISTENT CHALLENGES EMERGING CHALLENGES UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES VISION PRIORITIES ARSOF 2022 CAPABILITIES Physical Campaigning Cognitive Campaigning • • CRITICAL CAPABILITIES SPECIAL WARFARE // SURGICAL STRIKE • • Purpose - effect Objective - specific Time - bounded Environment – select geographic AOs Shape to dominate Arrange operations • • Purpose - advantage Objective - adaptive Time - unbounded Environment – global human AO Shape to position Arrange narratives Redefining the Win : (1) Decision space has been preserved for our National leaders. Of note, decision space is characterized as providing decision makers with scalable, cost imposing options to hold, either unilaterally or with our partners, potential adversary interests at risk. (2) Conditions are set for an acceptable political outcome in the areas that matter to the United States. (3) Positional advantage is retained in terms of time, forces, and relationships to advance U. S. interests. The human domain necessitates a cognitive campaign approach characterized by: understanding, engagement, shaping conditions, influencing decision behaviors, action, and reframing perceived baselines. 9

The Problem: Identifying, Planning for, and Responding to Multi. Domain Threats Across all Six The Problem: Identifying, Planning for, and Responding to Multi. Domain Threats Across all Six Domains Common belief: the battlefield of the future will be a network of humans and machines that flows seamlessly across security domains rapidly and seamlessly 10 “The U. S. has been more successful when its policies and actions stemmed from a focus on achieving an understanding of the human and societal dynamics of the nations or regions where we have deployed military forces …” R. Odierno and W. Mc. Craven (2013)

Four Modes of Evaluation 2) RATINGS… How did we do? Forecasts were pulled from Four Modes of Evaluation 2) RATINGS… How did we do? Forecasts were pulled from project deliverables and then compared to current status/outcomes * ** 1) IMPACT and USAGE … Who uses SMA products and how? = occurred as projected by SMA team = occurred somewhat = conditional event that has not taken place = no evidence either way = event definitely did not occur/ we got it wrong *Only a sample of forecasts for each project are shown on the project slides ** See Report Card spreadsheet for complete list plus grading justifications 11 3) SMA WIDGETS … What tools were produced that can be used by others? 4) SRG/COMMAND FEEDBACK … What did the customer think?

Assessment Results SMA 2007 -2015 12 Assessment Results SMA 2007 -2015 12

Quick Overview of Impact & Usage of SMA Products 40% Citations. Of 54 SMA Quick Overview of Impact & Usage of SMA Products 40% Citations. Of 54 SMA reports sampled, the percentage cited in a reviewed academic journal, published as a book, and/or cited in a book available on Amazon. com Usage. Of 54 SMA reports sampled, the percentage that were reposted on websites not related to SMA Team 67% SMA reports have shown up • on Twitter • In Congressional testimony • For sale on Italian Amazon • in National Academy of Science reports • on the desk of President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan 3177 individuals on SMA products distribution list 95 US universities 20 foreign universities 17 US states in which a university not does receive SMA products 14 major Think Tanks 8 foreign military Global Reach. Foreign organizations locations of addressees receiving SMA products 7/8 Ivy League schools (Cornell is missing) 13 42 Topical White Papers ……… 200+ Since May 2015, SMA int’l and US Speakers Event telecons (avg. 35 participants)

SMA at a Glance 2007 -2015 All Project Ratings Summary 37% Green of 144+ SMA at a Glance 2007 -2015 All Project Ratings Summary 37% Green of 144+ forecasts 18% Orange 26% White 14% Yellow 5% Red Widgets Produced 20+ Widgets 8 Qualitative analytic tools for planners and analysts 4 Quantitative analytic tools for 2007 - 2016 Total planners and analysts 4 Software concepts/alphas 3 Developing Counter VEO Messaging content 2 Tools/processes for collaboration 1 Command steady-state 14 engagement prioritization

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – – – Middle East USSC, Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – – – Middle East USSC, SOCCENT II, Eurasia Central and South Asia Pacific Africa Counter ISIL Messaging, Al Assad Leader Assessment By Global Issue – – – 15 Cyber Deterrence Counter-Terrorism Counter-WMD Collaboration Gray Zone

USSC March 2015: Assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian Security Conundrum Study Overview & Selected Expectations USSC March 2015: Assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian Security Conundrum Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Conduct Coordinator’s Mission Israeli security activities in the West Bank have reinforced adverse effects on PA legitimacy and development of security sector institutions: the more stringent IDF ROEs are, the more difficult it will be to build Palestinian security institutions and to quell Palestinian social tension. Review to provide increased understanding of potential future security environments and their implications for Palestinian security sector reform. 14 12 Project Total (count) Simulation Finding: The Palestinian team faced immediate internal legitimacy issues and moved to project solidarity with Palestinian sentiment, while privately negotiating with the Israelis to minimize actions that could further inflame tensions. 10 8 6 4 2 0 16 Team NSI, ICONS Project at University of MD, Texas A&M, TRADOC, Carnegie Endowment, CTTSO

USSC March 2015 SMA “Widgets” #1 ICONSnet DISTRIBUTED SIMULATION #2 PERSPECTIVE TAKING Geographically distributed USSC March 2015 SMA “Widgets” #1 ICONSnet DISTRIBUTED SIMULATION #2 PERSPECTIVE TAKING Geographically distributed participation by SMEs in an anonymous environment allows inclusion of non-typical perspectives and voices as well as exploration of creative policies ICONSnet – a distributed, Internet-based simulation platform allows participants to send messages, participate in conferences, take actions, and engage with social media. Injects by a Control Team can drive the simulation’s plot forward, and can be used to represent intelligence communities, traditional and social media, states, spoilers, and civil society… 17 Perspective Taking techniques in communications helps mitigate conflict among disputing actors. Perspective-taking techniques used by International Team during ICONS sim “repaired’ prior negative effects of confrontational “black-white” thinking by other teams, i. e. , it increased the use of complex logic (high Integrative Complexity IC) by all other teams. Higher IC is associated with more empathetic and cooperative behaviors. The pattern of stress-repair-gain is an achievement, and by no means automatic (IC drops without mediating third party or IC training).

USSC March 2015 Command Feedback LTG Frederick Rudesheim, USSC “This effort has provided valuable USSC March 2015 Command Feedback LTG Frederick Rudesheim, USSC “This effort has provided valuable insights that will provide utility to the USSC in its efforts to support Israeli-Palestinian coordination and cooperation. … interesting insights with respect to Israeli-Palestine joint security and minimum thresholds for security forces … the paradox that security force capability enhancements reduce PA legitimacy and effectiveness is spot on … insights derived from third-party monitoring missions is concerning. ” 18 COL Brian Lamson, USSC “USSC was thrilled with the findings from the ICONS simulation and the neuroscience components of the simulation. Additionally, the insights … regarding maintaining legitimacy, earning trust, and creating transparency were of particular value to the USSC in assisting operational objectives. ”

SOCCENT I February-December 2015 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Request: Short-term effort SOCCENT I February-December 2015 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Request: Short-term effort for SOCCENT Commander to understand the psychological, ideological, narrative, emotional, cultural, and inspirational (“intangible”) nature of ISIL Even if ISIL is weakened militarily, there is a psychological element tied to Sunni grievance that could actually enhance ISIL legitimacy as it suffers certain types of military losses. Select Expectations Direct threats to the Syrian Ba’athist regime’s hold on power; demands for Assad’s resignation are non-starters for him and will lead to failed negotiations. As ISIL leaders are pressured militarily, we will see: ISIL leaders moderate antagonism in rhetoric aimed at Sunni Arab states; ISIL military activities avoid attacks on Sunni states; ISIL leadership easing ferocity with which it institutes Islamic law, especially where local power elites; relative shift in emphasis on recruiting “fighters in place” or alliance with local groups 16 Team 19 ICONS Project at University of MD, NSI, NDU, TRADOC, CTTSO/SOSA, NPS 14 Project Total (count) Civilian acquiescence to ISIL rule may be achieved over time without ISIL having to change its tactics: even when civilian acquiescence is based in fear and violence, Daesh’s demonstration of control reinforces popular belief in its ultimate success. 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

SOCCENT I December 2015 SMA “Widget” #1 VEO EVOLUTION & LONGEVITY ASSESSMENT MODEL An SOCCENT I December 2015 SMA “Widget” #1 VEO EVOLUTION & LONGEVITY ASSESSMENT MODEL An analysis framework for evaluating the sources of an organization’s support, influence and the means of reducing these and thus its longevity The Evolution & Longevity model helps analysts characterize the power base and threat posed by a VEO, TCO, or non-state actor. It facilitates quick assessment of change/the success of counter efforts over time and can serve as an organizing frame for fusing multi-approach, multi-method analyses. The model is based on continua representing different aspects of an organizations power the patterns of which suggest different types of adversaries (e. g. , one with grassroots support but very little external support requires a different approach than one with little local support and ability to maintain control only through 20 violence and external support).

SOCCENT I 2015 Command Feedback LTG Mike Nagata, SOCCENT Commander July 2014 “There is SOCCENT I 2015 Command Feedback LTG Mike Nagata, SOCCENT Commander July 2014 “There is a magnetic attraction to IS that is bringing in resources, talent, weapons, etc. to thicken, harden, and embolden IS in ways that are very alarming. It all rotates around this intangible aspect. It also plays to some of our weaknesses. We do not deal with intangibles very well. . . Understanding the ideological and inspirational nature of ISIL is our biggest intellectual deficit. ” 21 Brig. Gen. Charles Moore, Deputy Director Global Operations (J-39) May 2015 “I think you have to find and continue to support good leaders at high and intermediate levels. You do not necessarily build change from the bottom up; top down is important too. We need to highlight the role models… Information operations should drive the fight. Daesh should be responding to us. Our OODA loop should be rapid. And we should have a whole of government strategy that all things feed into, and that everyone understands what role they have to play, so that we can keep up. ”

SOCCENT II December 2015 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Request: The ICONS SOCCENT II December 2015 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Request: The ICONS Project was asked, as part of a Strategic Multilayer Assessment carried out for the U. S. Special Operations Command Central, to design a simulation exploring potential pathways of regional fragmentation in the Middle East over the next two to three years. Select Expectations Fragmentation usually refers to the dissolution of power centers with multiple state and non-state actors vying for power and territory. In the ME, the pattern is actually much more complex and is best characterized as a fragmentation of the nation-state itself, which in turn contributes to fragmentation on a regional basis. Communications patterns in the ICONS simulation highlighted two “communications” factions. The first faction centered around Saudi Arabia, and included the Free Syrian Army, Sunni Tribes, Iraq, Turkey, Nusrah Front, and ISIL. The second faction was centered around Iran and included Iran, Lebanon, Shi’a Militias, Hezbollah, and the Assad Government. Nusrah Front likely to call for the establishment of a Caliphate. 7 Project Total (count) 6 Team ICONS Project at University of MD, 22 NDU, TRADOC, CTTSO/SOSA, NPS NSI, 5 4 3 2 1 0

SOCCENT II December 2015 SMA “Widgets” #1 ACROSS TEAM NETWORK ANALYSIS Network graph displays SOCCENT II December 2015 SMA “Widgets” #1 ACROSS TEAM NETWORK ANALYSIS Network graph displays the communications patterns of key participants in ICONS fragmentation simulation The vast majority of all members of the network are directly connected through a small number of intermediaries. The high degree of connectedness reduces the probability that any one member will be isolated from the network. Two main factions emerge: a Saudi faction and an Iranian faction. Turkey and Hezbollah are key bridges between factions. 23

Counter-Da'esh Messaging in the Narrative Space April 2016 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Counter-Da'esh Messaging in the Narrative Space April 2016 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Simulations were conducted bringing together nearly 100 Psychological Operation (PSYOP) operators, USG and international observers, interagency representatives, population experts from Iraq and North Africa, Da’esh experts, universities, and think tanks. These ICONS simulations served as both a test bed for messaging techniques and a training opportunity for PSYOP operators. Increased operational tempo within the narrative space, combined with embedded expertise from multidisciplinary experts, can force Da’esh into a reactive position vis-àvis interactions with their target populations. This in turn can increase the effectiveness of Do. D messaging in the narrative space. In an environment devoid of trust, the population often rejects USG messaging as lacking a credible voice. Suggests that USG messaging only credible if reinforced through action by coalition forces. Preferred to hear counter-Da’esh messaging from local religious and cultural leaders. 2 Project Total (count) Request: Two Counter-Da’esh Messaging Select Expectations 1 0 Team Charles River Analytics, ICONS Project at University of Maryland, University of Nebraska Omaha, Fielding Graduate University, Iowa State, University of Pennsylvania, NSI, SRC, TRADOC G 27 24

Counter-Da'esh Messaging in the Narrative Space April 2016 SMA “Widgets” #1 WITHIN TEAM NETWORK Counter-Da'esh Messaging in the Narrative Space April 2016 SMA “Widgets” #1 WITHIN TEAM NETWORK ANALYSIS #2 ON-THE-FLY NETWORK ANALYSIS Social network analysis to help diagram the level of play and operational efficiency of messaging efforts during a simulation Affords an opportunity to assess current communications networks and recommend needed adjustments Network diagrams show that as PSYOPS operations progress, more Blue team actors play active roles in crafting and shaping messages to counter-Da’esh efforts. Although Blue slowed down in its efforts by the sheer number of team members. Smaller, more focused expertise on PSYOPS teams may be more operationally effective. Real time communication analytics: development of a real time network analytic tool that displays the communication between actors as they occur. Identify the actors that are involved at each step of planning, who is leading each effort, and who is being left out. Allow for more rapid redeployment of human resources. 25

Counter-Da'esh Messaging in the Narrative Space 2016 SMA “Widgets” #3 PROCESS FOR EMBEDDING TECHNICAL Counter-Da'esh Messaging in the Narrative Space 2016 SMA “Widgets” #3 PROCESS FOR EMBEDDING TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN COUNTER-VEO MESSAGING Embedding one or two trusted “technical” experts into PSYOP teams is a force multiplier Embedding Technical Team liaisons into Blue both saved needed time and proved to be a significant enhancement to message development tasks. Embedding a Tech Team representative directly into Blue allowed for frequent and highly valued technical input during message development and expert review when new messages had to be developed rapidly. Technical Team embeds were able to bridge the gap between Blue team operational needs and theoretical or other academic work that is relevant but not necessarily tailored to the operational environment. 26

Bashar al-Assad: Leader Assessment at a Distance, Apr 2014 Overview & Selected Expectations Project Bashar al-Assad: Leader Assessment at a Distance, Apr 2014 Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Request: This study explored the potential types of actions and messages most likely to influence and deter Bashar al-Assad from using force in the ongoing Syrian civil war in advance of the Geneva II Talks. Assad’s reasoning is consistent with his Arab nationalist Ba’athist political ideology. Assad exhibits high IC; Although his IC decreased in association with certain events, he has not exhibited a trend of decreasing IC throughout the conflict, suggesting that his level of stress has not, in the long run, impeded his ability to process and respond to information. Team NSI, University of British Columbia, John’s Hopkins APL, TAMU 27 Select Expectations Direct threats to the Syrian Ba’athist regime’s hold on power and demands for Assad’s resignation are non-starters for him and will lead to failed negotiations. al-Assad exhibits dynamic levels of Integrative Complexity that can be used to assess his relative susceptibility, develop arguments, and recommend psychological actions and/or refine assessment criteria at a specific point in time

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East – Eurasia – Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East – Eurasia – – – Central and South Asia Pacific Africa By Global Issue – – – 28 Cyber Deterrence Counter-Terrorism Counter-WMD Collaboration Gray Zone EUCOM

EUCOM 2015 SMA Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Identify EUCOM 2015 SMA Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Identify emerging Russian threats and opportunities in Eurasia; examine future political, security, societal, and economic trends to identify where US interests are in cooperation or conflict with Russian interests; and, in particular, identify leverage points when dealing with Russia in a “global context” Unless Russia is able to overcome its economic crisis and maintain stability, regional stability and prosperity will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. NATO expansion may decrease its ability to quickly respond to Russian actions, undermining its deterrent credibility. Team AOWG, CEIP, GMU, NGA, NPS, NSI, TAMU, UBC, 29 ICONS, START Even if relations between Russia and the West improve, Russia will strive to build alternative international economic and political institutions. 9 8 Project Total (count) In an attempt to undermine NATO credibility and erode confidence in Article V, Russia will pursue a strategy of low-level violations of sovereignty and influence operations in its periphery. Nationalist framing of Russia’s foreign policy goals and the belief that Russia is faced by enemies, increases the likelihood of risky behavior and unintended escalation. 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

EUCOM 2015 SMA “Widget” #1 Virtual Think Tank (Vi. TTa) Vi. TTa provides rapid, EUCOM 2015 SMA “Widget” #1 Virtual Think Tank (Vi. TTa) Vi. TTa provides rapid, customizable analyses of current situations and emergent crises by tapping into an extensive global network of subject matter experts (SMEs) drawn from academia, think tanks, government, and industry to provide a broad and varied perspective. The Vi. TTa process involves establishing core questions and developing a survey and questionnaire to relay to the relevant SME network. Initial findings are then categorized to identify areas of convergence and divergence and to develop hypotheses for further exploration. Vi. TTa analysis highlights and assesses key findings, schools of thought, areas of agreement and disagreement among SMEs, critical insights, and knowledge gaps. 30

EUCOM 2015 Command Feedback Mr. Jason Werchan, USEUCOM: “A number of insightful themes have EUCOM 2015 Command Feedback Mr. Jason Werchan, USEUCOM: “A number of insightful themes have arisen from the work done as part of this effort that will be helpful in informing the work that is currently being done at USEUCOM. …This effort has made it clear that in some cases the best course of action is to not actually take a course of action. …USEUCOM is working to build its understanding of this theme, and the work done as part of this effort will certainly aid USEUCOM in further building that understanding. ” 31

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia – Central Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia – Central and South Asia – – – Pacific Africa By Global Issue – – – 32 Cyber Deterrence Counter-Terrorism Counter-WMD Collaboration Gray Zone South Asia, Megacities, PAKAF

South Asia 2012/2013 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Explore South Asia 2012/2013 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Explore issues pertaining to long- South Asia’s economy will not collapse and is unlikely to experience social collapse. term and short-term regional and sub-regional stability and escalation dynamics in South Asia. The overall flat trajectory (muddling) is the result of political and social stability on slight downward trajectories (muddling down) together with a slightly more robust economic outlook (muddling up). Extremist Islamist political parties in South Asia are unlikely to achieve success. Team DNI NIC, CSIS, LLNL, NSI, SOSA, START, GMU, TRADOC 33 7 6 Project Total (count) South Asia will continue to muddle along. Political development in South Asia is on a downward path as nearly all of the key muddling down path markers are both present and substantial. 5 4 3 2 1 0

South Asia 2012/2013 SMA “Widgets” #1 STATE FRAGMENTATION PATHWAY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK The Fragmentation Pathway South Asia 2012/2013 SMA “Widgets” #1 STATE FRAGMENTATION PATHWAY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK The Fragmentation Pathway Assessment Framework guides users in identifying I&W as well as the barriers to political, economic, and social instability and fragmentation The Fragmentation Pathway Assessment tool is based on global case analyses of complete, semi, and reversed state fragmentation. It helps users quickly identify the political, social, and economic markers of fragmentation in each domain, and estimate the likelihood and degree of state fragmentation 34 #2 Use of Timed influence net models to develop and assess risk minimization courses of action Timed Influence Net (TIN) models were used to document diverse inputs from subject matter expert (SME) groups for use in engagement strategy development and operational planning. The models identified knowledge gaps as well as opportunities: for example, thirdparty capabilities to influence behaviors in ways favorable to the US and its allies.

South Asia 2012/2013 SMA “Widgets” #3 REGIONAL NUCLEAR ACTOR ESCALATION CONTROL Escalation framework effective South Asia 2012/2013 SMA “Widgets” #3 REGIONAL NUCLEAR ACTOR ESCALATION CONTROL Escalation framework effective as a means to anticipate the actions of non-US actors in a crisis, as well as to assess the potential for USG activities to influence the decision calculus of the non-US actors 35 US actions to de-escalate crises involving nuclear actors pose a potential risk to counter-proliferation objectives—if other actors perceive nuclear weapons as a way to influence US behavior

South Asia 2012/2013 Command Feedback Brig Gen Tim Fay, SRG Cochair “For SMA, success South Asia 2012/2013 Command Feedback Brig Gen Tim Fay, SRG Cochair “For SMA, success is determined by the use of the product by the COCOMs. They have already used it and leveraged it to shape planning, thought, and strategy. Victory can be declared when the COCOMs apply these resources to their wicked problems—a huge well done to the SMA team. ” 36

Megacities, 2014 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Prototype a Megacities, 2014 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Prototype a COCOM mission-relevant, low-cost method of producing early indication and tracking of social, political, environmental, and economic sources of state and population fragility and failure in large urban environments. The pilot city is Dhaka, Bangladesh. Climate change increasingly will become a source of instability in Bangladesh. The additive effects of water scarcity, disease, food insecurity, and population migrations elevate concerns about rising extremism. At present there is no reason to expect that flooding will significantly increase the risk of intra-state violence/ extremism in Dhaka in the future. Team NSI, ERDC, AT&L, PACOM, ONR, USACE, 37 NPS GMU, 4 Project Total (count) Indicators of a change include 1) an increase in frequency and intensity of floods, 2) mobilization of those affected against the government, 3) extremist groups providing essential services to flood victims, or 4) growing anti-government sentiment among the population 3 2 1 0

Megacities, May 2014 SMA “Widgets” #1 Humanitarian response Needs Assessment tool Adaptation of PACOM Megacities, May 2014 SMA “Widgets” #1 Humanitarian response Needs Assessment tool Adaptation of PACOM Socio-cultural Analysis (SCA) Framework instantiated in software makes analysts research more time effective. The SCE instantiated in SWIF interface using the Ozone Widget Framework (OWF) allows multiple users to build and manipulate socio-cultural models collaboratively and interactively. 38

Megacities, May 2014 Command Feedback Mr. Mike Poore, USPACOM “The effort’s findings have provided Megacities, May 2014 Command Feedback Mr. Mike Poore, USPACOM “The effort’s findings have provided USPACOM with relevant insights for understanding operations in its AOR. The growing acknowledgement of the relevance of this effort’s insights is evident through the important follow on efforts that are being planned by ERDC and USSOCOM. ” 39

PAKAF, 2010 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: “I need PAKAF, 2010 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: “I need a ‘rich contextual understanding’ of the Afghan political and social environments …” Gen S. Mc. Chrystal, COMISAF The effort prototyped rapid development of an RCU down to the district level in AFG intended to facilitate ISAF’s COIN mission. Focus was on 16 districts in Afghanistan and 10 in Pakistan 2 Project Total (count) Neither a solely national nor a solely local police force is likely to be sufficient for Afghanistan’s current needs for basic social order and antiinsurgent security needs. A multi-tier, multi-ethnic, hybrid national-local structure is more likely to succeed. Afghan cooperation with the Taliban is more likely when GIRo. A is expected to be weak in the future, suggesting a decision calculus based on loss minimization, rather than utility maximization. 1 Team NSI, Harvard University, Gallup, Monitor 360, Strategic Communications Lab, USACE, IDA, U. of Nebraska-Omaha, Sentia, Aptima, ODNI, TRAC-MTRY, NPS, 40 PA Consulting, Australia MOD, JIEDDO, Mitre 0

PAKAF, 2010 SMA “Widget” #1 TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING AND TRACKING MULTI-DOMAIN STATE AND SUB-STATE PAKAF, 2010 SMA “Widget” #1 TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING AND TRACKING MULTI-DOMAIN STATE AND SUB-STATE MULTI-DOMAIN STABILITY INDICATORS (Sta. M) Sta. M is an analytic methodology that guides researchers to identify and track economic, political/security and social factors that drive the stability-instability of a state, region, or city. Sta. M output includes immediate and longer-term buffers to political, economic, and social instability and sources of population resilience, as well as immediate and longer-term drivers of destabilization, instability, and collapse. A completed Sta. M can be used by analysts s to: assess 2 nd and 3 rd order effects of engagement activities; provide a common operating picture to improve interagency coordination; assess the implications of external actor actions; and for 41 monitoring and early warning. #2 ONE STOP SHOP FOR PAKAF INFO: RCU DATA LIBRARY A repository of over 124 SMA documents on Afghanistan and Pakistan produced for the RCU effort plus 100 s more on background research. The RCU documents are stored in a searchable Share. Point RCU Data Library. These include responses to 40+ questions from the ISAF J 2, 19 Afghanistan District “Baseball Cards” of background information, 17 “Info Bin” documents , 22 additional studies and “Quick Looks, ” 14 individual team analyses and 100 s of searchable academic sources, data sets, official documents, etc.

PAKAF, 2010 Command Feedback Maj Gen Michael Flynn, ISAF J 2: “At the beginning PAKAF, 2010 Command Feedback Maj Gen Michael Flynn, ISAF J 2: “At the beginning of the PAKAF RCU effort, the major challenge was about trying to get buy in from the (academic) community. The SMA effort reached into academia, where you have an unbelievable pool of talent that can help you understand the environment—that capability does not exist in the intelligence community… this is an important lesson learned from this effort. … as the SMA team finishes its effort … it would be helpful to capture lessons learned and the issues and processes that are helpful in this information heavy, open source world. …tying the RCU team and effort to the field will go a long way to gaining and maintaining a level of relevancy that we otherwise would not have. ” 42

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and South Asia – Pacific – Africa – – By Global Issue – – – 43 Cyber Deterrence Counter-Terrorism Counter-WMD Collaboration Gray Zone PACOM, Kim Jong Un Speeches

Pacific 2014 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Identify areas Pacific 2014 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Identify areas of strategic risk in the As China becomes more dependent on imported energy, and global concerns over energy security grow, the salience of disputed maritime territories in the South and East China Seas that possibly contain significant energy resources will increase. Asia-Pacific region over the next two decades. Examine future political, security, societal, and economic trends to identify where US interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests, particularly in the East China Sea. Weak China vs. Strong China will be more aggressive, increasing risk of escalation and challenges to US alliance structure Economic issues, in particular resource security, will continue to shape relations between regional states. Over the next 25 years China will become the region's major military power Team CEIP, CSIS, CTTSO, GMU, Monitor 360, NPS, NSI, OSD, STRATCOM, Texas A&M, UBC, UMD/ICONS, UMD/START, USN, USAF, USMC 44 14 12 Project Total (count) China will be more aggressive, increasing risk of escalation 10 8 6 4 2 0

Pacific 2014 SMA “Widget” #1 REGIONAL STABILITY MODEL, DECISION CALCULUS MODEL Regional stability model Pacific 2014 SMA “Widget” #1 REGIONAL STABILITY MODEL, DECISION CALCULUS MODEL Regional stability model used to address CDR PACOM’s challenge to employ forces in the region in a way that reduces risk to US strategic objectives (peace and economic stability) Development of strategic messaging capability would serve as a force multiplier to mitigate disturbances, restore stability following a disturbance, and potentially offset the impacts of disruptive technologies. 45

Pacific 2014 Command Feedback BG Burt Thompson, USPACOM J 5: COL Kris Smith, USPACOM: Pacific 2014 Command Feedback BG Burt Thompson, USPACOM J 5: COL Kris Smith, USPACOM: “This effort has provided useful, informative, and valuable insights to key USPACOM questions. …Given the significant brainpower that has been put into this effort, the impact that the effort has had at USPACOM cannot be discounted. The recommendations derived from this assessment provided useful insight. … media analysis that helps to provide an understanding of the nature of an adversary is of value to USPACOM. ” 46 “The effort’s findings reveal a clear correlation in thinking between the academic community and USPACOM, which provides extremely valuable reassurance to USPACOM in its thinking and planning processes. ”

Kim Jong Un’s Speeches Discourse and IC Analysis, Apr 2013 Study Overview & Selected Kim Jong Un’s Speeches Discourse and IC Analysis, Apr 2013 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: This was a rapid assessment project Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric invokes themes commonly seen before conflict in other studies and therefore the tense situation is likely to escalate. conducted during tensions over a threatened North Korean missile launch in March of 2013. Kim Jong Un exhibits extremely low Integrative Complexity (IC), indicating he lacks an ability to appreciate nuances of opponent’s position and, therefore, is unlikely to compromise Evidence was equivocal that Kim Jong Un would launch a missile – He did not in March, but on 24 April he did launch a ballistic missile from a submarine. Team NSI, Indiana University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne 47 Project Total (count) 4 3 2 1 0

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and South Asia Pacific – Africa – – – By Global Issue – – – 48 Cyber Deterrence Counter-Terrorism Counter-WMD Collaboration Gray Zone Sudan, Nigeria

Sudan Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Conduct a proof-of-concept Sudan Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Conduct a proof-of-concept effort on A North-South partition of Sudan has mixed outcomes: it simultaneously reduces the likelihood of conflict within the new “partitioned” states, but increases the possibility of conflict between these states. how to assess a complex state like Sudan with contested borders, many competing interests, and a lack of “analytical” products and vetted data. Likelihood of conflict increases if resources are more evenly distributed Team ONR, IDA, LLNL, University of Indiana Purdue, U. Penn, UC Berkeley, University of Nebraska-Omaha, Kettering U. Rhode Island College, NSA, NSI, Inc. , NGA, CIA. DIA, 49 OSC, MIT, Sentia, Active Computing, Evolving Logic, Aptima, MITRE, NPS, STRACOM 2 Project Total (count) Sudan is on path towards escalating instability. Existing low levels of regime capacity and high level of dissidence in Sudan makes it difficult to achieve successful outcomes from current mitigation options. 1 0

SUDAN Command Feedback MAJ Rob Renfro, CENTCOM J 8: “In terms of a proof SUDAN Command Feedback MAJ Rob Renfro, CENTCOM J 8: “In terms of a proof of concept, this was successful. All comments on Research and Development and Operationalization are outstanding. The process is less mature than we’d hoped – need to mature it. Tools need to come with data sources. Command is meeting to determine transition plan and we need the deliverables. Overall successful effort. ” 50

Nigeria: US Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa 2014 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Nigeria: US Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa 2014 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: To provide the AFRICOM analytical The Nigerian Federal Government can establish a secure environment in northeast Nigeria by developing additional local security forces. capability to assess stability and Instability dynamics in core area of interest to aid in prioritization and metric development for command engagement activities. Boko Haram has the following vulnerabilities: • Growing reliance on conscription; • Dependence on local resources, which may be increasingly depleted; and • Need to maintain control of territory, as well as expand. Boko Haram may destabilize northeast Nigeria but it will not gain control of northeast Nigeria. Team TRADOC, NGA/AGC, START/UMD, NSI, 2 Project Total (count) Boko Haram has the ability to become an AQIM-like multi-state disrupter Decreased oil bunkering will be positively related to social stability in Nigeria. 1 Wiki. Strat 51 0

Nigeria: US Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa 2014 SMA “Widgets” #1 NIGER RIVER WATERSHED Nigeria: US Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa 2014 SMA “Widgets” #1 NIGER RIVER WATERSHED GEO NARRATIVE #2 HEART (HOLISTIC ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES RANKING TOOL) Provides visualized data to answer question of how water relates to security and stability in Nigeria. HEART is a multi-criteria framework and decision aid for identifying and The Niger River Basin GEOnarrative provides geospatial and historic data, as well as images and videos. Information is divided into chapters that relate to the SMA AFRICOM exercise on Nigeria. Also included is a chapter on "Lessons Learned" that can be used to guide an investigation of the data provided. 52 prioritizing Command Engagement activities. HEART allows planners to compare engagement activities over varied time spans, countries, mission priorities, and funding. It includes prompts for users to collaborate on planning and evaluating engagement programs.

Nigeria: US Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa 2014 Command Feedback Dr. Barb Sotirin, USAFRICOM Nigeria: US Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa 2014 Command Feedback Dr. Barb Sotirin, USAFRICOM J 5: “The more that efforts like SMA can help USAFRICOM further understand situations, provide context to problems, and analyze implications of decisions, the better off USAFRICOM will be. It would be of great value to USAFRICOM if the approach and insights from this effort can be generalized beyond Nigeria to be applicable to other areas of interests on the African continent. ” 53

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and South Asia Pacific – Africa – – – By Global Issue – – – 54 Cyber Deterrence Counter-Terrorism Counter-WMD Collaboration Gray Zone

Insights from Neurophysiology on Influence and Extremism, Oct 2012 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Insights from Neurophysiology on Influence and Extremism, Oct 2012 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: 1) aid the operational and policy communities in understanding the unique behavioral and neurobiological factors that underlie political extremism in the cyber realm; and 2) assess the implications of new research in cyber-neurobiology and cyberpsychology for countering extremist messaging False consensus in online groups has been linked to an increase in members’ offline political participation. An emotionally encoded message is more likely to be persuasive than a non-emotionally charged message. Team NSI, White House OSTP, Georgetown 4 Project Total (count) The Internet and other forms of cyber-based communication technology do not likely contribute to radicalization and mobilization to political extremism in a linear fashion. 3 2 1 University Medical Center 55 0

Insights from Neurophysiology on Influence and Extremism, Oct 2012 SMA “Widget” #1 RADICALIZATION TRANSITION Insights from Neurophysiology on Influence and Extremism, Oct 2012 SMA “Widget” #1 RADICALIZATION TRANSITION TABLES Identifying levers of influence through careful examination of unique shaping and transition factors. Key to note that a potential lever of influence may be built off of an existing inhibitor rather than injecting an external intervention. 56

Insights from Neurophysiology on Influence and Extremism, Oct 2012 Command Feedback Maj Gen Shanahan, Insights from Neurophysiology on Influence and Extremism, Oct 2012 Command Feedback Maj Gen Shanahan, JS J 39: That there is great interest in the neurobiology of radicalization from the cyber perspective, but there is also increasing interest in the topic from the Military Information Support Operations (MISO) community which is engaged in more thoroughly understand the implications of attribution in online interactions. … There are likely to be times where attribution is helpful, others when it would be counter-productive to reveal one's affiliation. … the project was an important step in understanding cyber radicalization, which is a topic of great interest to the IO community. 57

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and South Asia Pacific – Africa – – – By Global Issue – Cyber – Deterrence – – 58 Counter-Terrorism Counter-WMD Collaboration Gray Zone DAPSE, STRATCOM Deterrence, CANS

Decision Analysis Planning & Support Environment (DAPSE), 2007 SMA “Widget” #1 SMA SOCIO-CULTURAL TYPOLOGY Decision Analysis Planning & Support Environment (DAPSE), 2007 SMA “Widget” #1 SMA SOCIO-CULTURAL TYPOLOGY An ontology that represents the breadth of socio-cultural variables that influence an adversary’s decision calculus Based on previous typologies and an SMAorganized series of workshops that involved 120 leading social scientists from academia and government specialists Typology captures the full range of economic, military, political, and cultural factors that can influence an adversary’s decision calculus 59 SMA employed it in DAPSE, JIPOE and NK projects #2 DECISION ANALYSIS PLANNING & SUPPORT ENVIRONMENT (DAPSE) DAPSE is an end-to-end decision analysis tool that allows planners to explore different modes of deterrence. DAPSE guides planners through the steps of gathering the necessary data, conducting a robust decision analysis and using the completed decision matrix to gauge likely adversary behaviors and modes of deterring them

Decision Analysis Planning & Support Environment (DAPSE), 2007 Command Feedback Lt Gen Elder, Commander, Decision Analysis Planning & Support Environment (DAPSE), 2007 Command Feedback Lt Gen Elder, Commander, Global Strike Command: “…the idea was to develop a set of tools to achieve deterrent effects; we have kinetic effects but no good methodology for deterrent effects – all we have is the DOJOC and it is difficult to use. DAPSE helps generate requirements to get people (IC) to help us out with information we need but don’t currently have. We have lost the expertise to do strategic planning. We do tactical planning very well. DAPSE provides a framework to guide people [planners/analysts] with different backgrounds to build a plan to deter adversaries. This will help day-to-day users through the process and make sure they’re asking for the things they need to know. The work you've done so far has paid huge dividends. Due to their participation in this effort, STRATCOM planners are re-looking at how they do business. ” 60

Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Stability (CANS), 2011 SMA “Widgets” #1 ATTRIBUTE TRADE-OFF MODEL Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Stability (CANS), 2011 SMA “Widgets” #1 ATTRIBUTE TRADE-OFF MODEL (ATOM) #2 DECISION ANALYSIS TOOL (DAT) ATOM assists analysts to evaluate and compare force postures across a range of policy objectives, risk and cost. DAT is a decision analysis tool that represents the decision space from the perspective of a specified decision maker. ATOM assists analysts in decomposing the problem space from higher-order concepts to basic elements and then evaluating the value of individual elements (weapons) to each of those higher order concepts (policy objective, cost, risk) via two aggregation algorithms: Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) and Evidential Reasoning (ER). The DAT enables analyst to assess the robustness of possible outcomes and assumptions about an actor’s choice processes by providing outcomes calculated according to a variety of choice rules. It guides the analyst to construct a decision analysis and assess robustness of possible outcomes and assumptions about an adversary’s choice processes 61

CANS SMA “Widgets” #3 USE OF MULTI-MODELING TO SUPPORT NUCLEAR POLICY AND STRATEGY ANALYSES CANS SMA “Widgets” #3 USE OF MULTI-MODELING TO SUPPORT NUCLEAR POLICY AND STRATEGY ANALYSES Timed Influence Network (TIN), Multi-agent Dynamic Network Analysis, and Dynamic Organization Analysis “multi-models” were used to inform nuclear policy analyses addressing nuclear policy and strategy questions The generic TIN model developed for the CANS wargames was used to assess the effects of different Courses of Action on key CANS objectives (nuclear weapon use, regional stability, strategic stability) in two different regional settings and a range of 62 operational phases.

Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Stability (CANS), 2011 Command Feedback Maj Gen (Ret) Ron Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Stability (CANS), 2011 Command Feedback Maj Gen (Ret) Ron Henderson, Deputy A 10: “The TIN model provided the Air Force a means to demonstrate the problems with a proposal to de-alert ICBMs. The model clearly showed that dealerting is destabilizing during periods of heightened tensions, and the concept was abandoned. ” 63

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and South Asia Pacific – Africa – – – By Global Issue – Cyber Deterrence – Counter-Terrorism – – 64 Counter-WMD Collaboration Gray Zone I-VEO

Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations (IVEO), 2011 SMA “Widgets” #1 INFLUENCE ACTION FRAMEWORK Diagnostic tables Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations (IVEO), 2011 SMA “Widgets” #1 INFLUENCE ACTION FRAMEWORK Diagnostic tables to structure VEO’s objectives, strategy, and enablers across key time frames and compare against actions taken by the US and two sample VEOs. Develops an approach to evaluate influence actions the U. S. pursued against Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) to inform future influence efforts. This framework is needed because VEOs typically operate in environments that limit traditional US military options and have complex socio-cultural and political dynamics. 65 #2 I-VEO KNOWLEDGE MATRIX An expansive analysis of the academic literature on VEOs encapsulated in a Knowledge Matrix. The Matrix is organized so that users can sort various types of influence operations according to five conceptual schemas. In addition, the matrix includes expert commentary to contextualize the research findings. This provides users with ready access to a broad base of theoretical alternatives and existing empirical evidence upon which to build concepts, theory, policy, and doctrine in government, academia, and military realms.

Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations (IVEO), 2011 Command Feedback RDML Harly, CENTCOM, BG Keene, SOCOM, Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations (IVEO), 2011 Command Feedback RDML Harly, CENTCOM, BG Keene, SOCOM, Mr. Jerry Gandy, STRATCOM J 9: “The effort was very beneficial and provided great insights and it appears to mirror real world events. ” 66

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and South Asia Pacific – Africa – – – By Global Issue – Cyber Deterrence Counter-Terrorism – Counter-WMD – – 67 Collaboration Gray Zone JIPOE

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (JIPOE) 2008 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (JIPOE) 2008 Study Overview & Selected Expectations Project Overview Select Expectations Request: Develop a concept for a Fingerprinting Model predicted Russia, Caucasus, India, and Turkey as main interdiction sites for nuclear smuggling activity between 20082011. sustainable, federated IA-Wide WMD-T intelligence and operations analysis enterprise to support JIPOE including a predictive analysis capability to anticipate how terrorists are likely to acquire and use WMD over the next ten years X has greatest incentive to pursue nuclear material for profit rather than use, and will increase these activities when under financial pressure. Prototyping efforts: Nuclear Smuggling, WMD-T Team approximately 200 people from over 50 organizations actively involved including DNI, NCTC, DHS, DOE, ARGUS, NCPC, NGIC, DOS, Commerce, FBI, CIA, 68 DIA, IDA, GMU, SUNY Albany 4 Project Total (count) Integrated empirical bioterrorism assessment indicates high likelihood of AQ bioterror attack in NWFP of Pakistan. A religiously motivated group, personal revenge motivated individual, or small group will conduct a bio attack with anthrax or typhus on a transportation system or government facility using either aerosol or food contamination by 2015. 3 2 1 0

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (JIPOE) 2008 Command Feedback CAPT Canfield, STRATCOM J Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (JIPOE) 2008 Command Feedback CAPT Canfield, STRATCOM J 2: “We will begin standing up a JIPOE cell next month – we will continue to evaluate these tools and techniques for use by the cell. We particularly want to look at the ARGUS work. ” Ms. Sharla Rausch, DHS: “From the DHS perspective, this has been an illuminating process – the interaction of the multi-agency participants is key – a single organization couldn't do it”. 69 Mr. William Miller, SOCOM J 5: “We have begun using some of the SMA ideas. SKOPE and NIKE have had some success in applying multi-layer analysis to small regions for specific questions – the challenge is to apply these techniques to more general questions over a global area. ”

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and South Asia Pacific – Africa – – – By Global Issue – Cyber Deterrence Counter-Terrorism Counter-WMD – Collaboration – Gray Zone – – – 70 – LOE

SMA LOE AUG 2009 SMA “Widgets” USAFA IA Collaboration Experiment Request: Conduct a joint SMA LOE AUG 2009 SMA “Widgets” USAFA IA Collaboration Experiment Request: Conduct a joint experiment that measures collaborative processes, tools, and environments used in a multi-agency & multidisciplinary environment to find and characterize indicators of illicit terrorist activity against the US; fuse the information across agencies and echelons, determine when it becomes actionable, and the ability of decision makers to act on the information. Specifically develop TTPs to: l. Anticipate emerging crises -- develop processes to distinguish real threat streams from false threat streams l. Provide situational awareness and common operational picture to support planning for preventive action l. Facilitate collaboration across JS, Commands, OSD, and IA OUTCOME Participants successfully used the tools to anticipate the rare event in a distributed virtual environment. However, l Introduction of new technologies can temporarily disrupt team productivity l Interpersonal conflict can also temporarily disrupt team productivity Leadership in such an environment is a shifting phenomenon; at different points in time, different leadership skills are valued 71 There are noticeable differences among participant categories (group, age, etc. ) in terms of how they perceive their ability to work in a virtual environment, although these differences are not statistically significant due to sample size.

LOE Aug 2009 Command Feedback Dr. Charles Perkins, OSD: “This is a hard problem LOE Aug 2009 Command Feedback Dr. Charles Perkins, OSD: “This is a hard problem but you appear to be making progress. Transition will be key. Now you are working an S&T effort. For the next phase you need to have two parallel efforts, one working S&T (DDR&E with IA participation? ) and one working with what little we have discovered to date to address the real world operational problem of anticipating rare events. An open question is what the impact will be in real-world operational applications in which the effort goes on for years and there are many false alarms. How do you keep people motivated? With respect to tools - you may want to consider SKIWEB and Event Management Framework that are being used by Joint Staff and NORTHCOM respectively. ” 72

Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and Results by Project SMA 2007 -2015 By Region – Middle East Eurasia Central and South Asia Pacific – Africa – – – By Global Issue – Cyber Deterrence Counter-Terrorism Counter-WMD – Collaboration – – – 73 – – Gray Zone

SOCOM Gray Zone Request from General Votel, then SOCOM Commander: determine how the USG SOCOM Gray Zone Request from General Votel, then SOCOM Commander: determine how the USG can identify, diagnose, and assess indirect strategies and develop response options against associated types of Gray Zone conflicts 1 What is the nature of Gray Zone conflict? 2 How should the US respond to Gray Zone activities? [tasks a, c, and d] [tasks b and e] 3 What capabilities does the US need in order to respond to Gray Zone activities? [tasks f and g] 4 What motivates actors to engage in Gray Zone activities? [tasks h and i] 74 SMA Approach l NO assessment of doctrine, strategy, planning, policy, and institutional issues on blue side l Focus rather on – – – rigorous assessment multiple analytical approaches and communities

Agenda l l l 75 Intro and Purpose of the Session Assessment results by Agenda l l l 75 Intro and Purpose of the Session Assessment results by geographical region – Middle East – Eurasia – Central and South Asia – Pacific – Africa Assessment results by Global Issue – Cyber – Deterrence – Counter-Terrorism – Counter-WMD – Collaboration Independent JHU/APL effort sponsored by IARPA SRG Feedback