Unclassified For Official Use Only PAINT Dynamic — Counter-Intelligence

Unclassified//For Official Use Only PAINT Dynamic - Counter-Intelligence Simulation Lab (MIT D-CISL) (name still being discussed) Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) PI: Stuart Madnick Co-PIs: Nazli Choucri Michael Siegel National Security Innovations (NSI) Robert Popp Version as of 2 Sept 2007; 11: 30 AM Unclassified//For Official Use Only 1

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Products • System Dynamics (SD) causal model – Shows the cause-and-effect relationships within and between the key sub-systems (e. g. , Leadership, Infrastructure, Terrorist Groups) which provides high-level insights • Software (in Vensim) of the SD causal model – Allows for running simulations of the SD model – Including outputs of simulations of various “what if” cases Sample SD Model Sample SD Simulation Output Unclassified//For Official Use Only 2

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Technology • Technology: SD models formalize causal relationships and simulate system behavior over time using differential equations – Analytical techniques are used to test contingencies and study range of potential pathways – SD has been used as modeling & simulation method over 50 years • Challenge: Sample Inputs/Outputs of SD Models – Develop model to address the PAINT challenge problem. • How overcome: – MIT-NSI team combines SD modelers, political scientist experts, and domain experts with experience in developing complex social science SD models for Do. D/IC problems. Unclassified//For Official Use Only 3

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Evaluation & Validation (12 ways in proposal – 2 key ways are) • Behavioral Reproduction – Use past data (as well as other sources) to help determine parameters up to, say, two years ago. • Including known planned changes – Each “stock” (e. g. , number of terrorists) is a metric. – Measure how well SD model projections match the following years. • System Improvement of Pro. Active Intelligence – Does the model generate useful insights as judged by decision makers? – In particular, identify emerging threats and effective proactive intelligence options (i. e. , tipping points, counterfactual analysis, high-leverage mitigation) Identification of Tipping Point Unclassified//For Official Use Only 4

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Contributions • Demonstrate iterative model development & experimentation – Combines the objectives of designing system architecture and developing a platform to identify high-leverage mitigation options and proactive strategies – Simulations combine inputs from domain knowledge and data • Produce output which informs problem domain by – Early identification of emerging threats – Ability to explore the counterfactual – Propose effective probes and iterate with proactive intelligence Parameterize Model Architecture Refine response options; drill down on high leverage substructures Pro. Active & Mitigation Strategy Generation Probe Experiments & Compare with Simulations Unclassified//For Official Use Only 5

Unclassified//For Official Use Only PAINT Information Flow Strategy Generation & Exploration 3 Data 1 Dynamic Simulation Models 2 Core Function • Our contribution is at the nexus of goals 2 -3 -4: Response Options c Feedba k 4 Range of Functions (2) Develop dynamic simulation model (3) Explore range of possible strategies, simulate outcomes & pathways (4) Test feedback and multiple-order effects from mitigation and intervention (2) Incorporate feedback and refine model parameters - Also has a synergy with (1) Data: Utilizing data to set parameter values & determining what data is needed/useful. Unclassified//For Official Use Only 6

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Domain • Domain: Directly address Challenge Problem. – High level domain consists of the interaction between the structure of political and social institutions (e. g. . Leadership, Military, Terrorists) and the physics of material systems (e. g. , nanotechnology, engineering systems) • Needs: – Access to relevant Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and IC analysts • MIT resources: – MIT’s access to multi-disciplinary literature and perspectives in Political Simplified High-Level View Science & Nanotechnology Mobilization & – Develop the overall domain and individual system of elements Coordination – Focus on sensitive processes that shape immediate threats – Develop and identify the range of potential pathways that develop Political Capacity from different contingences to Plan Intent Unclassified//For Official Use Only Nano. Tech 7

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Unclassified//For Official Use Only MIT Backup Slides For possible use in discussions and backup groups - • Previous Historical Cases • Brief Nanotechnology Sources Unclassified//For Official Use Only 9

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Historical Cases - Goal • Provide examples of countries which have formed technologically-oriented military plans: – Identify what conditions caused the countries to form these plans. – Identify conditions and dynamics which may have signaled the formation of these plans. • Work with our MIT Political Science colleagues (SMEs) to develop case studies – specific emphasis on the conditions, dynamics, pathways, and indicators Unclassified//For Official Use Only 10

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Partial List of Countries which formed technologically-oriented military plans • Developing Countries: – North Korea – Biological, Chemical, and especially Nuclear research in last 15 -30 years. – India/Pakistan – Nuclear arms race. – Libya – Sought weapons for regional military dominance. – Iran-Iraq War (1980 s) – Biological & Chemical weapons. – South Africa – Supposedly had a nuclear weapons project following nuclear energy development assistance. – Early China – Acquired nuclear weapons’ technology and support from Soviets in exchange for Uranium ore. – Egypt – Sought to develop weapons. Unclassified//For Official Use Only 11

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Partial List of Countries which formed technologically-oriented military plans • More Developed Countries: – Germany between the World Wars – Sought military development for aggressive purposes. – Contemporary China – Continues to do Biological and Chemical research – USSR – Arms race with the US. – United States, NATO – Leaders in development of advanced military tools. – Israel – Acquired technology and weapons through alliance with United States and other sources. – Britain, France, and Germany during WWI – Developed chemical gas weapons - each side escalated weapons. – Japan – prior to WW II Unclassified//For Official Use Only 12

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Brief history: India development of nuclear weapons • Mid-1950 s: Acquires initial technologies under “Atoms for Peace” campaign. • 1962: India attacked by China in 1962 (still territorial disputes). • 1964: China's first nuclear tests. • 1965 -1971: India fights two wars with Pakistan. • April 1998: India plans for nuclear testing after Pakistan tests new missiles. • May 1998: India successfully tests five nuclear devices. • Today: India now believed able to produce about 50 -90 weapons. Previous president, Dr. Kalam, was originally missile scientist, later head of various nuclear tests. Source: Federation of American Scientists – http: //www. fas. org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/index. html Unclassified//For Official Use Only 13

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Brief history: Pakistan development of nuclear weapons • 1972: Program started after 1971 India-Pakistan War. • 1975: Following India’s successful tests, Pakistan aggressively pursues nuclear technology. – Dr. A. Q. Khan, a Pakistani expat, returns from Europe after “stealing” nuclear technology secrets from Dutch research. • Pakistan continued to work towards nuclear weapons, possibly with help from China and N. Korea. • May 1998: Pakistan successfully tests six nuclear warheads. • 2004: A. Q. Khan is later dismissed after confessing to providing nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea by building devices in Malaysia with assistance from Dutch, German and South African individuals. Source: Federation of American Scientists – http: //www. fas. org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index. html Unclassified//For Official Use Only 14

Unclassified//For Official Use Only What does a state need to develop nano-weapons? • Two extreme methods of technology development for weapons: 1. Develop technology/weapons “in-house” • Need sophisticated technology research program – Needs state stability (Regime Resilience), government support, strong academic program. – Needs well-developed R&D, manufacturing plants, etc. • Such technologies usually need to be made in stable states (e. g. , democratic or autocratic). 2. Rely on “outsource” solutions • Need to have a well-developed ally who has interest in your region and in building you up. – e. g. Israel & US • Need to have access to black market products. – e. g. North Korea and Iran, via breakup of USSR. Unclassified//For Official Use Only 15

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Why would a state develop nano-weapons? • Real or perceived threat – India/Pakistan nuclear development – Cold War weapons race • Signaling mechanism / popular status booster – North Korea – China 1949 (nuclear weapons) • Area dominance – Globally – United States, NATO, etc. – Regionally – Libya, North Korea, etc. • As tools for aggression North Korean Weapon Parade Source: ABC News – Germany between WWs Unclassified//For Official Use Only 16

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Iranian Nanotechnology on Web www. irannano. org Structure of overall-management of nanotechnology development - Members of the Office: Special Office of Nanotechnology Development will continue to assume the responsibility of policy-making and management of nanotechnology development in the country with the following staff: – First vice-president (Director of the Office) – The ministers of Economic and finance affairs, Health and medical education, Agricultural Jihad, Defense and armed forces logistics, Industries and mines, Science, research and technology, Oil and the Director of planning and management (judicial members of the office) – The Chairman of Technology Cooperation Office of the Presidency (Secretary of the Office) – Five experts of the nanotechnology and experienced managers of the country (government and private) chosen by the Office Director – Sub-Systems of the Office: • The secretariat of the Office: The secretariat of the Office, Technology Cooperation Office of the Presidency (TCO), and the Secretary of the Office, is the Chairman of TCO. • Coordination Council of the Office: includes representatives of judicial members of the Office as well as the real members will be formed. The work description and the authority of the Coordination Council will be approved in the Office – Group works and apparatus committees • • Information from: http: //nano. ir/en/pages. php? Pages_Id=36 Only mention of weapons on these sites was carbon nanotubes were utilized to make the swords of Damascus: http: //www. nature. com/news/2006/061113/full/061113 -11. html Unclassified//For Official Use Only 17

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Nanotech At MIT A range of research groups and activities at MIT: • Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies: http: //web. mit. edu/isn/ • MIT Nanoengineering Group: http: //web. mit. edu/nanoengineering/ • Center for Nanofluids Technology: http: //web. mit. edu/nse/nanofluids/ • Suresh Research Group (Bio-focused): http: //sureshgroup. mit. edu/ • A partial list of other nanotech activities @ mit: http: //web. mit. edu/research/category/nano. html#l inks Unclassified//For Official Use Only 18

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Bio/Chemical Weapons Programs • http: //www. cnn. com/SPECIALS/2001/trade. center/biochem. weapons/ – Countries which have bio/chemical weapons & descriptions of most common weapons. Unclassified//For Official Use Only 19

Unclassified//For Official Use Only Nuclear Weapons Programs: http: //www. isis-online. org/mapproject/introduction. html http: //cns. miis. edu/research/cbw/possess. htm Unclassified//For Official Use Only 20