Скачать презентацию UK Unclassified 21 ISMOR The Use of Objective Скачать презентацию UK Unclassified 21 ISMOR The Use of Objective

57df2dff5a9c073e22ea9fbf31015776.ppt

  • Количество слайдов: 27

UK Unclassified 21 ISMOR: The Use of Objective Analysis for the Prioritisation of UK UK Unclassified 21 ISMOR: The Use of Objective Analysis for the Prioritisation of UK Equipment Plan Options for TST Kevin Smith (BAE Systems) Brian Spedding (Qineti. Q) © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified Presentation Structure • Time Sensitive Targeting - the military task • Analysis UK Unclassified Presentation Structure • Time Sensitive Targeting - the military task • Analysis Challenge • Assessment of Baseline military capability • Assessment of Enhancement Options • Critique of Approach – strengths & weaknesses – opportunities © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified 2

UK Unclassified Time-Sensitive Targeting: the Military Task © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified Time-Sensitive Targeting: the Military Task © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified Time Sensitive Targets Those targets requiring immediate response because they represent a UK Unclassified Time Sensitive Targets Those targets requiring immediate response because they represent a serious and imminent threat to friendly forces or are high payoff, fleeting targets of opportunity © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified 4

UK Unclassified 5 TST Categories Examples Imminent Threat Limited window of vulnerability Enemy Forces UK Unclassified 5 TST Categories Examples Imminent Threat Limited window of vulnerability Enemy Forces in transit TBM operations Aircraft refuelling/rearming “Terrorist in a Taxi” TBM in launch position Aircraft on the ground Surface-Air defences Helicopter FOB High pay-off Limited window of opportunity HQs/command centres Target at range/endurance limit Early Warning sites Timely intelligence Leadership targets Operational environment (weather) © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified The Analysis Challenge © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified UK Unclassified The Analysis Challenge © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified Analysis Challenge • “What” do DECs need to do in order to UK Unclassified Analysis Challenge • “What” do DECs need to do in order to make TST work? – assess likely performance of possible Kill Chains and impact of potential enhancements • Facilitate objective, analysis-based TST Decision Conference – Analytic definition of TST – Evaluation of UK baseline capability – Enhancement Options many and varied (aircraft sensors, C 2 support tools, new comms bearers. . etc) – Assess impact of these Options in a consistent way • Within resource & timescale constraints © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified 7

UK Unclassified Assessment of Baseline Military Capability © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified Assessment of Baseline Military Capability © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified Baseline Capability Assessment - Overview of approach “Operational Analysis in a Systems UK Unclassified Baseline Capability Assessment - Overview of approach “Operational Analysis in a Systems Engineering framework” Operational Requirement System Definition attack the target, in its environment, under constraints day/night urban environment CCD end-to-end kill chain, comprising equipment and military process, implemented as a functional chain weather sensitivity analysis tgt mobility threat (S-A & A-A) Evaluate System against Requirement © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified 9

UK Unclassified Kill Chain Elements 10 sensors C 2 nodes shooters © Qineti. Q UK Unclassified Kill Chain Elements 10 sensors C 2 nodes shooters © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified Kill Chain Examples Shallow Targets – IPB: Nimrod R > ASTOR > UK Unclassified Kill Chain Examples Shallow Targets – IPB: Nimrod R > ASTOR > Fast Jet – IPB: Land EW > Watch. Keeper > MLRS – IPB: Formation recce > Attack Helicopter Deep Targets – IPB: Surveillance UAV > Fast Jets – IPB: Overhead > RAPTOR > Fast Jet – IPB: Special Forces > Fast Jet © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified 11

UK Unclassified Kill Chain Evaluation - Analysis Levels 12 Level 1 - Preparation of UK Unclassified Kill Chain Evaluation - Analysis Levels 12 Level 1 - Preparation of a ‘capability map’ (traffic light analysis) using existing information - basic performance data - SME opinion Level 1 Level 2 Simple probability Analysis Metrics: - Kill Chain element compliance - overall Kill Chain timeliness Level 3 Full Compliance Constructive Simulation Uncertain Compliance Further Analysis Required Level 4 Synthetic Environments (NITEworks) Level 5 Trials / Warfighting Experiments © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified Non-Compliance

UK Unclassified Kill Chain Functions 13 Search/ Detect Locate Identify Assess Decide Transit Plan/ UK Unclassified Kill Chain Functions 13 Search/ Detect Locate Identify Assess Decide Transit Plan/ Re-Plan Acquire Disseminate Effect/Deny BDI © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified Example Kill Chain - Simplified 14 JFACHQ-JAOCNimrod-R JAOCCombat Gnd Stat Intell Plans/Operations UK Unclassified Example Kill Chain - Simplified 14 JFACHQ-JAOCNimrod-R JAOCCombat Gnd Stat Intell Plans/Operations Nimrod-R Aircraft ASTOR Gnd Stat Tornado GR 4 Target Confirmation Search/ Detect Assess Search/ Detect Decide Plan/ Re-Plan Locate Attack sequence Assess Identify Search/ Detect Decide Initial Target Detection Exploitation, tasking of additional information Possible Communication © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 Locate Acquire Plan/ Re-Plan Identify Effect/D Effect/ eny Decision to attack; retasking of GR 4 Initial assessment of attack effectiveness UK Unclassified BDA BDI Assess

UK Unclassified Detailed Kill Chain Definition Functional Definition IERs - Kill Chain Delivered and UK Unclassified Detailed Kill Chain Definition Functional Definition IERs - Kill Chain Delivered and Others External to Kill Chain © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified 15

UK Unclassified Kill Chain Analysis – Integration 20 Nimrod. R Nodal Performance Analysis Time UK Unclassified Kill Chain Analysis – Integration 20 Nimrod. R Nodal Performance Analysis Time Nodal Resource Analysis Information DIV HQ T 1 Identify Time T 3 T 2 Solution Analysis • KC delivered IER Analysis • IPB/Background delivered IER Analysis • IER Time Analysis Assess IPB T 4 Overall Kill Chain time analysis including identification of critical path How long does it take for the KC to complete? © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 Time for this part of the KC = T 1+T 2+Fn(T 3, T 4) UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified Example KC Assessment 21 JFACHQ-JAOCNimrod-R JAOCCombat Gnd Stat Intell Plans/Operations Nimrod-R Aircraft UK Unclassified Example KC Assessment 21 JFACHQ-JAOCNimrod-R JAOCCombat Gnd Stat Intell Plans/Operations Nimrod-R Aircraft Search/ Detect Assess ASTOR Aircraft Tornado GR 4 Search/ Detect Decide Plan/ Re-Plan Locate ASTOR Gnd Stat Locate Assess Identify Search/ Detect Decide Locate Plan/ Re-Plan Possible Communication Identify What do we need do to What do we need toto do to make this part work? Effect/D Effect/ eny Deny BDA BDI Assess © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified Baseline Analysis outputs - by KC, by tgt Time Budgets & delays UK Unclassified Baseline Analysis outputs - by KC, by tgt Time Budgets & delays Functional deficiencies Insight for ‘process re-engineering’ © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified 22

UK Unclassified Assessment of Enhancement Options © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK UK Unclassified Assessment of Enhancement Options © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified Analysis of Enhancement Options Embedded Option in appropriate node in relevant KCs UK Unclassified Analysis of Enhancement Options Embedded Option in appropriate node in relevant KCs e. g. new effector sensor Consider Savings Measures also buy back Re-evaluate node or link, and IER - compliance - time ê Determine effect on overall Kill Chain © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified 24

UK Unclassified Effect on Overall Kill Chain 25 Baseline TY RI plus Option “X” UK Unclassified Effect on Overall Kill Chain 25 Baseline TY RI plus Option “X” IO R P Baseline plus Option “Y” © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified RY A S ND CO E KC now feasible, leading to more engagement opportunities some within KC improvements

UK Unclassified Brigading Options - Synergy 26 Baseline Kill Chain Capability Brigaded Option Search UK Unclassified Brigading Options - Synergy 26 Baseline Kill Chain Capability Brigaded Option Search and Detect LCC HQ (US) ISTAR Co-ord Cell DIV HQ G 3 Ops 16 AAB HQ Avn Regt HQ KC 5 - Vignette 1 Kill Chain B Version 1. 4 UC 00001 - Updated 03 June 2003. Div Recce (UK) (A+B+C) Option C Option B Option A Div Recce (UK) AH TG Note: For this KC many of the processes are shared between G 2/ISTAR, G 3 Ops and other cells/groups within the Div HQ. The distinction shown is only intended to reflect who is likely to lead the activity. Search and Detect LCC HQ (US) ISTAR Co-ord Cell DIV HQ G 3 Ops 16 AAB HQ Div Recce (UK) Avn Regt HQ AH TG Note: For this KC many of the processes are shared between G 2/ISTAR, G 3 Ops and other cells/groups within the Div HQ. The distinction shown is only intended to reflect who is likely to lead the activity. Search and Detect LCC HQ (US) ISTAR Co-ord Cell DIV HQ G 3 Ops 16 AAB HQ Avn Regt HQ AH TG Note: For this KC many of the processes are shared between G 2/ISTAR, G 3 Ops and other cells/groups within the Div HQ. The distinction shown is only intended to reflect who is likely to lead the activity. Locate Identify Disseminate (Create Tgt Report) Assess (TST, Collateral Damage, AGM, DALO) Assess Decide (Re-task Strike Asset) Plan / Replan (Deconfliction) Decide (Finalise Plan) + Disseminate Target Updates Disseminate Plan Decide (Strike Mission) Disseminate Tasking to AH TG Plan / Replan (Mission Routing) Decide (Finalise Mission) Transit to Target Acquire + Disseminate Plan Decide (Strike Mission) Disseminate Tasking to AH TG Plan / Replan (Mission Routing) Decide (Finalise Mission) Transit to Target Acquire Effect BDI BDI BDI Disseminate Notes/Comments Green Text Timing - tbd. TST Processes - V 1 KC B Based on: Creator: Green Text. Timing - tbd. TST Processes - V 1 KC B Range of data: M Ballone /P Wainwright Based on: Purpose of report: Creator: Range of data: M Ballone /P Wainwright QINETIQ Malvern CONCEPTUAL PROCESS MODEL - 2006/8 © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 Purpose of report: CONCEPTUAL PROCESS MODEL - 2006/8 05/06/03 10: 37: 43 UK RESTRICTED Created: UK Unclassified 05/06/03 Green Text. Timing - tbd. TST Processes - V 1 KC B Based on: Creator: Range of data: M Ballone /P Wainwright Purpose of report: QINETIQ Malvern Created: Disseminate 10: 37: 43 CONCEPTUAL PROCESS MODEL - 2006/8 UK RESTRICTED Created: 05/06/03 , 10: 37: 43 UK RESTRICTED

UK Unclassified Interaction with the Decision Maker For each option, or group of options: UK Unclassified Interaction with the Decision Maker For each option, or group of options: • score capability increments • Hi-Priority used to combine scores Overall Rating Decision maker selects & manipulates weightings KC Capability ΔT weightings Environment Light good Weather cloud © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 27 Threat level Environt Sensitivity Mobility rain UK Unclassified Target chars Depth Size

UK Unclassified Critique of the Approach © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK UK Unclassified Critique of the Approach © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified

UK Unclassified Strengths & Weaknesses of the Approach WEAKNESSES STRENGTHS • Highly transparent & UK Unclassified Strengths & Weaknesses of the Approach WEAKNESSES STRENGTHS • Highly transparent & traceable • • End-to-end assessment across multiple DECs Limited to mission-level analysis of a single Kill Chain • Limited to the functional Kill Chain boundary – Based on whole system-level analysis, not individual equipment • Inherently scaleable - targets, Kill Chains, analysis fidelity • – target detection to initial BDI assumed – prior ISR operations equally important Generates database of analytic results providing objective evidence © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified 29

UK Unclassified Critique - Opportunities • Though branded ’TST’ this approach is equally applicable UK Unclassified Critique - Opportunities • Though branded ’TST’ this approach is equally applicable to other missions / targets – flexibility of capability chain methodology • ‘Simple’ analysis highly valuable to focus detailed analysis & SE experimentation – e. g. NITEworks Kill Chain experiments • Effective input into multi-mission and campaign analyses – multi-mission addressing resource conflicts with parallel Kill Chains – selection of effective Kill Chains at campaign level © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified 30

UK Unclassified Any questions? Kevin Smith Brian Spedding kevin. smith@baesystems. com 01772 -855168 bpspedding@Qineti. UK Unclassified Any questions? Kevin Smith Brian Spedding kevin. [email protected] com 01772 -855168 [email protected] Q. com 01252 -396635 Qineti. Q/KI/CIS/Pub 042262 © Qineti. Q and BAE Systems 2004 UK Unclassified