The Madrid Protocol Trademark Potential of State

The Madrid Protocol & “Trademark Potential” of State Actors. Dr. Amir H. Khoury Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. July 4, 2007

Debate over the Adoption of a TRIPS et al -Trademark Régime Proponents • Reap Income Otherwise Lost to Counterfeiters. • Investment by Foreign Brand Owners. • Creating New Jobs. Opponents • Developing Countries are Users & Not Owners of Brands. • Developing Countries do not have trademarks. • Foreign Investments are “Turn Key” Projects.

The Theoretical Backdrop of the Debate (Political Economy) Development Theory Modernization can only be achieved by adopting the norms of others. • Legal • Economic • Moral Dependency Theory • Norms of countries/nations not necessarily universal & needs not identical. • Adoption of norms might leads to dependency.

Measuring “Effects” of Madrid System Régime • Law in Action; • Data Analysis re present & future use of trademarks. • Minus Well Known Marks (WKMs), Passing-off -- trademark protection based on registration of mark in given jurisdiction.

Assumptions of a workable Madrid Protocol • Existence of marks. • Mark owner needs to register oversees.

Effect of the Trademark Régime: Registration TRADEMARK USE THROUGH REGISTRATION --”Three Levels” ABSOLUTE (How Many TMs Registered? ) RELATIVE (Residents: Non-Residents) PARTICULAR (Which Non-Residents? )

The ABSOLUTE Level (1973 -2000)

The RELATIVE Level (1973 -2000)

The PARTICULAR Level Total Registrations by Non. Residents in JORDAN (1994 -2001)

The “Trademark Potential” © of Economic Sectors ECONOMIC SECTOR MANUFACTURE BASIC PRODUCTS Low ADVANCED PRODUCTS EXTRACTIVE Very Low V. High SERVICES BASIC SERVICES ADVANCED SERVICES V. Low High

The Trademark Potential of Countries: Exports 1970 -2000

What about WKMs? The 100 Leading Global Brands for the year 2002

The 100 Leading Global Brands for the year 2005

Madrid Agreement Membership June 29, 2007 (1970— 18; 2007 ----59). • Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, N. Korea, Egypt, Hungary, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tajikistan. • Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Cyprus, Poland, China, Portugal, Russia.

“Legal Equality” v. “Real Inequality” Legal Equality &Access to Protocol • National Treatment (TRIPS Art. 3) • Most Favored Nation (TRIPS Art. 4) • National Law Allows Registration by All • National Law Provides Equal Protection to All Real Inequality—renders protocol irrelevant • Trademark Deficit (Absolute/Relative/ Particular) • Low-V. Low Trademark Potential • No Leading Brands • V. little to register abroad.

Rethinking Conventional TM Régimes: “The MARTINA Scale” © • Matrix of • • • Absolute & (Absolute level) Relative (Relative Level) Trade-marking; Industrial & (Trademark Potential) Negotiating (TRIPS etc. - “Green Room”, Trade Block) • Advantage

Matrix of Elements Points Details Absolute 5 Av. Trademarks reg. 1994 -00 153, 000 5 6, 400 2 2300 1 Relative (Reg. ) 10 Res. 137, 000 9 1, 500 1 1, 000 1 Non-Res. 16, 000 1, 300 Japan Israel Jordan 4, 900 Industrial Trademark Potential 80% V. High TM P. 21 60% High TM P. 15 30% Low TM P. 7 Negotiating 10 9 No role. FTA: US, EU 3 No Role. FTA US 2 50 Did/does it shape int’l TM norms? “Green Room Quad” Total 25 44 21 11

Responses to the Existing Trademark Régime? NO LOGO NO CHANGE RESPONSE MIDDLE COURSE ADDITIONAL MEASURES

Thank You! Amir H. Khoury Faculty of Law Tel Aviv University