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The Future of Corporate Takeovers in Europe ECGI Session at the Federation of European The Future of Corporate Takeovers in Europe ECGI Session at the Federation of European Securities Exchanges' 6 th European Financial Markets Convention Brussels, 31 May 2002

Corporate Takeover Defences in Europe Marco Becht Université Libre de Bruxelles & ECGI Corporate Takeover Defences in Europe Marco Becht Université Libre de Bruxelles & ECGI

The U. K. Takeover Panel says : “Though Shalt not have Post-Bid Defenses” The U. K. Takeover Panel says : “Though Shalt not have Post-Bid Defenses”

No “Level Playing Field” with the US No “Level Playing Field” with the US

Texaco Inc. (Global FT 500 #162) • no 5%+ block holder • blank check Texaco Inc. (Global FT 500 #162) • no 5%+ block holder • blank check preferred stock • poison pill shareholder rights plan • pill approved by shareholders • vote (1998) : 65. 1% for, 34. 1% against • 1/3 staggered board with 3 year terms • 11/12 directors independent Texaco Inc. Source : Proxy Statement for meeting April 26, 2000; IRRC 2000

How typical is Texaco? • Poison Pill is always available • Staggered Boards – How typical is Texaco? • Poison Pill is always available • Staggered Boards – 58% in IRRC sample (S&P 1500 + 1000) – 70% of IPO firms in 2001 • Only 92 hostile bids 1996 -2000 – 32 failed (34. 8%) – 23 acquired by bidder (25%)

No “Level Playing Field” within Europe No “Level Playing Field” within Europe

Main Pre-Bid Defences in Europe • Majority voting blocks – with proportional amounts of Main Pre-Bid Defences in Europe • Majority voting blocks – with proportional amounts of capital – with disproportional amounts of capital (shares with no vote, multiple votes, pyramids) • Voting right ceilings • Shares with special rights

How will the “breakthrough rule” affect these pre-bid defenses? How will the “breakthrough rule” affect these pre-bid defenses?

Blocks Blocks

Percentage of listed companies under majority control Source : country chapters in “The Control Percentage of listed companies under majority control Source : country chapters in “The Control of Corporate Europe”

Percentage of with less companies with a at times listed capital blocking minority of Percentage of with less companies with a at times listed capital blocking minority of at least 25% often with much less capital Source : country chapters in Barca and Becht (2001)

Companies not affected by the “Breakthrough Rule” Companies not affected by the “Breakthrough Rule”

KBC Bank and Insurance Holding Co (Euronext 100 company) Almanij 67. 9% capital 67. KBC Bank and Insurance Holding Co (Euronext 100 company) Almanij 67. 9% capital 67. 9% votes KBC Bank and Insurance Holding Co Source : www. kbc. com (consulted 24 May 2002)

Porsche AG Porsche/Piech Family Voting Pool 100% 10%* Porsche AG Voting Stock Porsche AG Porsche AG Porsche/Piech Family Voting Pool 100% 10%* Porsche AG Voting Stock Porsche AG Non-Voting 50: 50 capital Source : Hoppenstedt Guide 1999; * estimate

Allianz AG and Munich Re AG Share transfer restrictions locked in by cross-holding 24. Allianz AG and Munich Re AG Share transfer restrictions locked in by cross-holding 24. 9% Allianz 6. 8% 13. 7% (V 14. 04) Munich Re 20% 6. 8% Bay. Hypo-Vereinsbank AG 5. 05% (V 5. 18)

Companies under blockholder control potentially affected by the “Breakthrough Rule” Companies under blockholder control potentially affected by the “Breakthrough Rule”

Investor AB Wallenberg Foundations 21% capital Investor AB Class A 1 vote 40. 6% Investor AB Wallenberg Foundations 21% capital Investor AB Class A 1 vote 40. 6% capital 87. 2% votes 44% votes Investor AB Class B 1/10 vote 59. 4% capital 12. 7% votes Source : www. investorab. com (situation as of 12/31 2000)

Volkswagen AG Land Niedersachsen votes 18. 8% 14% of total capital VW AG Voting Volkswagen AG Land Niedersachsen votes 18. 8% 14% of total capital VW AG Voting Stock 13. 05% 100% Volkswagen Beteiligungs. Gesellschaft mb. H VW AG Non-Voting 75: 25 capital Voting right ceiling of 20% No “blank” proxy voting Major decisions require 80% supermajority Source : Volkswagen Law, Company Statutes, Ba. We, Hoppenstedt 2002

ING Groep N. V. Aegon nv Fortis nv ABN Amro Holding nv 6. 25% ING Groep N. V. Aegon nv Fortis nv ABN Amro Holding nv 6. 25% 6. 15% 5. 12% Certificate Holders 100% capital 0% votes ING Administratie Kantoor 100% capital 100% votes ING Source : Form 20 -F, Handboek Nederlandse Beursfonden 2000

Companies under Minority Control potentially affected by the “Breakthrough Rule” Companies under Minority Control potentially affected by the “Breakthrough Rule”

Banco Santander Central Hispano S. A. Chair, Vice-chair Standing Committee 70% supermajority to : Banco Santander Central Hispano S. A. Chair, Vice-chair Standing Committee 70% supermajority to : - change 10% voting limit - change supermajority amendment 3 year waiting period Board 2 year waiting period BBVA S. A. 10% voting right ceiling potential raider Source : Company Statutes

Royal Dutch/Shell (Global 500 #10) Priority Share Foundation Ten Royal Dutch Board Members 10 Royal Dutch/Shell (Global 500 #10) Priority Share Foundation Ten Royal Dutch Board Members 10 x 6 shares and votes 1440 shares with 6 votes meeting of priority shareholders general meeting dispersed holdings binding nomination; assigns priority shares; block change (one equal 3. 2%) compliance with Combined Code 0. 05% of issued capital Royal Dutch Petroleum Company NV 60: 40 The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company p. l. c. Source : Form 20 -F 2000

Radical Italians Voting right restrictions are null and void in a full bid for Radical Italians Voting right restrictions are null and void in a full bid for a privatised company

Telecom Italia 51. 8% 25. 2% GPi Pirelli & C. A. p. a. Camfin Telecom Italia 51. 8% 25. 2% GPi Pirelli & C. A. p. a. Camfin Spa 100% (? ) Marco Tronchetti Provera 60. 6% 100% Agreement (8 Partners) Pirelli & C. Lux. S. A. 6% 8. 5% 27. 5% 10. 9% Pirelli Spa Benetton Family 60% 20% Olimpia 26. 96% Olivetti Spa BCI Spa 10% 54. 2% UCI Spa not listed 10% Telecom Italia Spa 51. 8% Source : Consob filings Seat Spa 56. 1% TIM Spa