The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism Dr Charles

The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Science and Technology Fellow Council on Foreign Relations September 29, 2004 Georgetown University Financial support: John D. and Catherine T. Mac. Arthur Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and Nuclear Threat Initiative

Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism • Acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon • Crude nuclear weapon or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) • Attack against or sabotage of a nuclear power plant or other nuclear facility • Radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb”

Holmes to Watson: It’s Elementary ØMotive ØMeans ØOpportunity

Assessing Risk = Probability X Consequence Ø Large uncertainties Ø Lack of data Alternatively: Risk = Motivation X Intention X Capability X Consequence

Terrorist Motivations • Why haven’t there been any RDD or crude nuclear weapon terrorist attacks? • Those who study terrorist motivations are “underwhelmed by the probability of such an event for most – but not all – terrorist groups. ” – Jerrold Post (IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001) • Psychological and political constraints are great for most groups

Terrorist Motivations (continued) • Traditional thinking: “Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. ” -- Brian Jenkins, RAND • New Breed of Terrorist Group: ØAl Qaeda – politico-religious ØAum Shinrikyo – Apocalyptic Want to kill many and have even more watching in dread

But Can They Get the Means? • Nuclear weapons and fissile material are difficult to obtain • Radioactive materials are much more accessible • Variety of nuclear facilities to target: Security also varies

Acquisition of Intact Nuclear Weapon • Theft • Purchase • Gift (a little help from their friends)? • Coup

Estimated Nuclear Arsenals Nation United States Russia France Britain China Israel India Pakistan North Korea Total Active Weapons 7, 650 8, 200 348 200 380 75 -200 30 -35 24 -48 0 -8? Relatively Portable Weapons 3, 000 8, 000 -10, 000 60? Unknown Unknown

Greatest Risks of Terrorist Acquisition • Russia – ØLarge numbers of portable, forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons • Pakistan – ØPresence of al Qaeda ØUnstable political system ØParts of government (ISI) sympathetic to terrorist causes ØNascent nuclear command & control system

Highest Priority Efforts: Intact Nuclear Weapons U. S. should: • press Russia to fully implement 1991 -1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiative pledges. • revamp policy prohibiting security assistance to operational Russian nuclear weapons. • declare its intention to remove its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. • provide security assistance to Pakistan contingent on constraints of NPT

Can Terrorists Build Their Own Nuclear Bomb? • Gun-type: – Simplest design ØCannot use plutonium; must use HEU

Can Terrorists Build Their Own Nuclear Bomb? (continued) • Implosion-type: – More sophisticated, but still first generation weapon ØCan use either plutonium or HEU

Major Hurdle: Acquisition of Fissile Material Type Global Inventory (metric tons) Military plutonium (Pu) 250 Civil Pu (separated) 205 Military HEU Civil HEU 1, 670 20

Highest Priority: Put HEU at the Head of the Queue • Accelerate down-blending of Russian HEU • Speed up repatriation of Soviet/Russian- and U. S. -origin HEU and accelerate conversion of research reactors • Use Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility to secure HEU • Subordinate Plutonium Disposition Program to HEU First Strategy

Attacks on Nuclear Facilities • Commercial nuclear power plants • Research reactors • Spent fuel storage pools • Reprocessing facilities

Nuclear Facilities: Highest Priority Efforts • Design basis threat should reflect 9/11 magnitude of attack • Rapidly identify and implement urgent upgrades to vulnerable plant systems • Need performance-based (not-compliance based) security system • Need formal government assessment of potential vulnerabilities at research reactors

Dirty Bombs – Myth versus Reality • RDDs (Dirty Bombs) are NOT Weapons of Mass Destruction – Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDD • RDDs can be Weapons of Mass Disruption Major effects: • Panic (psychological and social effects) • Economic costs (decontamination and rebuilding)

High-Risk Radioactive Sources • Finding: Only a small fraction of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks • But still large number • High-risk sources are: • Portable • Dispersible • More radioactive

Dirty Bombs: Highest Priority Tasks • Improve security of high-risk radioactive sources Preparation and Response: • Develop and stockpile effective decontamination technologies • Involve public in development of decon standards • Provide better training of emergency first responders • Educate public about real versus perceived risks of radiation: psychological immunization