
28d58ac951a95846e4413f64ef455e12.ppt
- Количество слайдов: 25
The Evolving Federal PKI Richard Guida, P. E. Member, Government Information Technology Services Board Chair, Federal PKI Steering Committee Richard. Guida@cio. treas. gov; 202 -622 -1552 http: //gits-sec. treas. gov
E-Transaction Landscape • Intra-agency – personnel matters, agency management • Interagency – payments, account reconciliation, litigation • Agency to trading partner – procurement, regulation • Agency to the public
E-Transactions Drivers • • Long-term cost savings Trading partner practices (e. g. , banks) Public expectations Federal/State Statutes (e. g. , GPEA) and policies • International competition
Challenges All Applications Face • • • Authentication of Users Non-repudiation for transactions Confidentiality (privacy) Interoperability Liability Scalability/extensibility
Public Key Technology • • • Authentication Technical non-repudiation Data integrity Confidentiality Interoperability Scalability/extensibility
How PK Technology Works • • Two keys, mathematically linked One is kept private, other is made public Private not deducible from public For digital signature: One key signs, the other validates • For confidentiality: One key encrypts, the other decrypts 6
Digital Signature (example) (example • Sender hashes document, signs hash with private key and sends with document • Recipient hashes document he or she received, creating “raw hash” • Recipient applies public key of sender to signed hash to get sender’s raw hash • If raw hashes are same, transaction validates
Confidentiality (example) • Sender generates symmetric encryption key and encrypts document with it • Sender encrypts symmetric key with public key of recipient, sends that and encrypted document to recipient • Recipient decrypts symmetric key with his or her private key • Recipient decrypts document with symmetric key
The Critical Questions • How can the recipient know with certainty the sender’s public key? (to validate a digital signature) • How can the sender know with certainty the recipient’s public key? (to send an encrypted message)
Public Key Certificate A document which • is digitally signed by a trusted third party (called Certification Authority) • is based on identity-proofing done by a Registration Authority • contains the individual’s public key and some form of the individual’s identity • has a finite validity period
X. 509 v 3 Certificate 11
Public Key Infrastructure • Registration Authorities to identity proof users • Certification Authorities to issue certificates and CRLs • Repositories (publicly available data bases) to hold certificates and CRLs • Some mechanism to recover data when encryption keys are lost/compromised • Certificate Policy and related paper
Federal PKI Approach • Establish Federal PKI Policy Authority • Develop/deploy Bridge CA using COTS – Four levels of assurance (emulate Canada) – Prototype early 2000, production mid 2000 • Deal with directory issues in parallel – Border directory concept; “White Pages” • Use ACES for public transactions
Federal Policy Authority Overlay • Federal PKI Policy Authority facilitates interoperability through FBCA (e. g. , determines cert policy mappings) • All agencies that interoperate through FBCA are voting members • FPKIPA members = FPKISC members • Interoperability through the FBCA is NOT required (but hopefully attractive)
FBCA Overview • Non-hierarchical hub for interagency interoperability • Ability to map levels of assurance in disparate certificate policies • Ultimate “bridge” to CAs external to Federal government • Directory contains only FBCA-issued certificates and ARLs
Policy/Political Boundary Conditions • Desire to use COTS if possible • Desire solution which is as fully “inclusive” for vendors as possible • Support four levels of assurance – Rudimentary, Basic, Medium, High – Analogous to Canadian PKI • FBCA use not mandatory • Requirements focus on agencies as certificate issuers, not relying parties
Current Status • Prototype FBCA: Entrust and Cybertrust (Baltimore) CAs – Began operation 2/8/00 – Used for EMA Challenge 4/6/00 • Migration from prototype to production FBCA will entail adding other CAs inside the membrane • GSA/FTS has responsibility to execute
Schedule • Draft Bridge Certificate Policy: late 1999 (done - CIO Council reviewing) • Draft FPKIPA Charter/CONOPS: late 1999 (done - CIO Council reviewing) • Prototype Bridge: early 2000 (done - 2/8) • Operational Bridge: late 2000
FBCA Directory Concept PCA 1 Internal Directory Infrastructure Agency 3 PCA 2 FBCA Respon LDAP Query- Internal Directory Infrastructure Border DSA 1 LDAP Server SP 0 -D X. 50 ing n chai Agency 1 se FBCA DSA Border DSA 2 X. 500 DSA Agency 2 Internal Directory Infrastructure
Access Certs for Electronic Services • “No-cost” certificates for the public • For business with Federal agencies only (but agencies may allow other uses on case basis) • On-line registration, vetting with legacy data; information protected under Privacy Act • Regular mail one-time PIN to get certificate • Agencies billed per-use and/or per-certificate
Access Certs for Electronic Services • RFP 1/99; bids received 4/99; first award 9/99 (DST), second award 10/99 (ORC), third award 10/99 (AT&T) • Contract has provisions for ACES-enabling applications • Potential use with state/local government • Certificates available very shortly
Electronic Signatures under GPEA • Government Paperwork Elimination Act (October 1998) • Technology neutral - agencies select based on specifics of applications (e. g. , risk) • Gives electronic signature full legal effect • Focus: transactions with Federal agencies • Draft OMB Guidance 3/99; final 4/00
Organization
Federal PKI Steering Committee • Over 50 members from two dozen agencies • Three Working Groups – Business – Technical – Legal and Policy • Minutes/activities on the web • http: //gits-sec. treas. gov
PKI Use and Implementation Issues • • • Misunderstanding what it can and can’t do Requiring legacy fixes to implement Waiting for standards to stabilize High cost - a yellow herring Interoperability woes - a red herring Legal trepidation - the brightest red herring