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THE EUROPEAN GLOBAL STRATEGY. Securing European Influence in a Changing World. EU CENTRE, NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE August, 22 2013. Dr. David Garcia Cantalapiedra. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Spain.
“YOUR LACK OF FAITH IS DISTURBING”
INTRODUCTION WHY AN EU GRAND STARTEGY AND WHY NOW.
RATIONALE The European Council meeting in December next will include, for the first time in five years, a thematic discussion on defence issues. The European Council will discuss three clusters of issues. These are: (a) increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; (b) enhancing the development of defence capabilities; and, (c) strengthening Europe’s defence industry.
INITIATIVE From this point of view, it is imperative create a strategic guideline for those issues. This was an initiative of the foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden in July 2012 in a bid to foster and structure debate about the European Union’s role as a global actor at a time of sweeping international changes”.
JOINT EFFORT Thus, there has been an effort from 20 European foundations and think-tanks but carried out mainly by four of them: International Affairs Institute (IAI ), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PI SM), the Elcano Royal Institute (RIE) and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI ). This effort tries to reflect some debate and, to certain point, certain guidance, from the academic and civil society point of view, even from the strategic community.
VALUABLE This document is trying to offer a view about the challenges faced by the EU and some ideas about the role and policies that the EU should undertake to firmly establish the European Union in that changing international system. Thus, the effort to develop a proposal for a “Grand Strategy” for the European Union must be recognized and congratulated for the difficulty of the task, the creation of working groups at this level and the conciliation of ideas, mentalities, perceptions, interests and procedures across Europe.
THE EGS: VIRTUES AND PROBLEMS AS GRAND STRATEGY GENERAL CONCEPTIONS AND STRATEGIC GOALS
GRAND STRATEGY “The direction and coordination of all resources of the nation, or group of states, for obtaining political objective pursued. A feasible Grand Strategy must include coordinated mobilization of the political, economic, military and moral of the nation”.
Characteristics of a Grand Strategy This design pays great attention to the nonmilitary aspects of the strategy: economicindustrial mobilization, internal political culture and diplomacy – Any strategy must begin with the definition of what constitutes the national interest. – Security policy, military and defense should be anchored in the essential interests. – The choice of a policy becomes even more important because all interests are not actually permanent. Kennedy, Paul (ed). Grand Strategies in War and Peace. Yale Un. Press. New Haven. 1991. pp 4 -5
Structure of the EGS report An introduction and a chapter for Values and Interests. Both offer really a world vision that is necessary for a real Grand Strategy. Then, the largest part and the core of the report, Strategic Interests. Finally, a part related to Capabilities and Instruments.
EGS as Grand Strategy Taking into account this, and according to the statement delivers in the executive summary and the introduction, the report defines the interests and structures the EU vision and mission, focusing in all the aspects in strategy to obtain 3 main aims: peace, well-being of the population and shared values including human rights, freedom, equality, non-discrimination, democracy and the rule of law. Thus, the EGS seems to comply the structure of a Grand Strategy or his guidelines. However, the problem rest in the content of some arguments and concepts that it develops or, in some cases, do not really develop.
ANALYSIS The language: ins and outs 1. The EU and the International System – EU World View: Multipolarity – EU identity: Economic block-community of values – Goals: peace, EU population well being and shared values – Value-based Interests 2. Geopolitical/Geo-economic Vision: – Strategic Neighbourhood 3. Security conception: – Comprehensive Security and Comprehensive Approach
Language The language and conceptions used commonly and conceptually in EU “doctrinal” language has almost disappeared from the report: United Nations (2), normative power (1), civil power, soft power, human security and Effective Multilateralism (0). However it has adopted a “realist” language and concepts as multipolarity.
1. The EU and the International System EU World View: Multipolarity
‘World order’’ as “the regimes of values, morals, and rights that extend to all mankind and infuse the international order with a sense of justice and purpose. It connotes the complex of Western liberal international law and economics that is currently institutionalized through international organizations, like the United Nations”. The Anarchical Society Hedley Bull
International System, regimes and “Democratic Peace” In the report still could be envisaged (and running underneath all the report) an unconscious vision of a favorable system that saw the birth of the EU in a western liberal order (as Headly Bull said in his classical The Anarchical Society) under the US leadership and then the US Unipolarity, But there is a realist assumptions about the current dynamics and actors, and a disputable idea about multipolarity (in real terms or as useful theoric concept) than the report itself deployed in some points. Saying “Securing European Influence in a Changing World”, the case is not anymore to march on Paris or Berlin, the case is who is marching onto us.
International System, regimes and “Democratic Peace” (II) Some of the assertions and assumptions in the report on Human Rights, values, rule of law, democracy, stability and cooperation, are more recognizable 20 -30 years ago more than now. However, his reaffirmation seems to be directed to a “soft” recognition about the decline of his supremacy in the international system.
International System, regimes and “Democratic Peace” (III) From this point of view, if there is really a multipolar system, then these assumptions should be changed: they could be the same affirmed values than 20 -30 years ago, but the international system is a less liberal by far now, even recognized by the report in several points. Still, if the structure of the international system is still dubious, then there exists a clear double and incompatible narrative in the report with grave consequences in terms of misperception and mismanagement in EU strategic vision.
Misperceptions, multipolarity and EU international position. It seems that the EU perception of a multipolar system rests more on the belief about the decline of the United States than for a EU decline and the reduction of his role and weight in the “Unipolarity Club”, as much as at global level; it could be also added the idea of creating an ”identity” of his own, for opposition to the US’. (The “Unipolarity Club” could be formed by the US and his closest allies in Europe, Asia and America: probably the NATO states, EU states, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zeland, Canada and maybe some others)
Misperceptions, multipolarity and EU international position. (II) The EU (the report) accepts a redistribution of power assuming the reduction of the US position, but not the EU´s, within the dynamic of the rising of other great powers. This reduction in US power regarding these “new” powers and to the EU, lead us to establish necessarily a multipolar system, where the distribution of relative power left the EU in a “better relative position” regarding the US at global level, reinforced by the reduction of the US relative position globally regarding to the rising powers.
Misperceptions, multipolarity and EU international position. (III) But this is an illusion. The EU position in terms of relative power also has been reduced, and then the EU relative position is worse in any of the categories used here, that is, regarding the US and related to the rising powers. The question is why the report (and politically the EU) could accept this idea. It could be contested in the case of US position (despite real certain relative decline), but it is almost an acceptation of a fatum fatalem by the EU.
POSSIBLE CONCLUSION EU “RELATIVE DECLINE”?
Possible conclusion: EU “relative Decline”? . It seems that the EU is more prone to believe in a multipolar system for maintaining a role among the great powers as such, than for the belief of a re-definition of the international system in less favorable terms, as a case of Bipolarity, and a more marginal role than during the Cold War. This is a trend entrenched in the belief that the ideational structure of the system and the “recognition” by other powers of that EU position really will create such position. The EU does not state “The EU will promote…”. etc but “Securing European Influence in a Changing World”: the case is not anymore to march on Paris or Berlin, or “spread the Word” short of vision; the case is who is marching onto us. If any, it would be a nuclear multipolarity, and this is also absent from the report and main concerns
OPTIONS LIVING BETWEEN BALANCING AND BANDWAGONING
OPTIONS The EU has been developing the CFSP and the CSDP, among other reasons as EU periphery security, for balancing (although an internal balancing) mainly the United States: it is easier to say the world is multipolar and using it as the main reason to strenghten CSDP. At the same time it has been maintaining a bandwagoning posture through NATO/US when needed. The EU/Member States has responded to the Alliance Security dilemma’s entrapmentabandonment dynamic
The integration of the European defense industry On July 24, the European Commission presented reform plans for the European defense sector. The report points out that EU countries still spend more than 75 percent of their investment for defense equipment nationally and that Europe has 16 different frigate types compared to one type in the United States. The European Commission warned that the fragmentation in the European defense industry is threatening Europe's competitiveness in defense markets and capabilities in the field since defense spending has dropped in the European Union while considerably increasing in the United States, Russia and China.
EU vs. Member States. Countries still prefer to procure their hardware nationally and want to keep investment in the country to sustain their domestic defense industries. This was highlighted in 2012 when Germany blocked the merger of two defense industry heavyweights, British BAE Systems and Franco-German EADS, because Berlin reportedly believed it would lose influence in the new company since most operations would be located in the United Kingdom and France.
WHERE WE EUROPEANS ARE? VALUES AND INTERESTS
EU identity Economic block-community of values
Definition of Europe The European Union is defined as an economic bloc, with a large population and the EU/Member States duality. To define Values and Interests, it is necessary to talk beyond the economic and structure realm, although there is also a mention to a community of values. 6 “European vital interests” identified in the report. These will be secured by 11 strategic objectives. The first “programmatic” problem is the very beginning of the introduction. Furthermore, it repeated the same definition included in 2003 ESS
VALUES AND INTERESTS The principal aim of the EU , as the Treaty on European Union asserts, is: – – – to promote peace, the well-being of its peoples and its shared values including human rights, freedom, equality, nondiscrimination, democracy and the rule of law. Since peace and values-based well-being at home can only be secured by means of an ambitious international agenda, this defines its external goals too: – The EU is under a treaty obligation to base its external action on the principles that inspired its own creation and to promote its values abroad.
VALUES AND INTERESTS In a heavily Interdependent world where compromise and cooperation with different kinds of partners are even more necessary, an investment in the EU ’s collective capacity for global action could help overcome this tension. Presumed cooperation in the interactions among the actors, when interdependence produces also conflict s and non cooperative actions.
VALUES AND INTERESTS The further development of the internal market would increase the EU ’s capacity to act as a normative and standard-setting power beyond its borders at a time when interdependence is growing and international norms are under strain. This will require not only a deepening of internal cooperation in the neglected services and telecommunications sectors, but also closer ties with partners. These ties can be achieved either by exporting the EU ’s own rules or by finding alternative routes towards regulatory convergence, depending on the partner in question. In developing its market and regulations, the EU should be transparent, inclusive and vigilant about the external effects of its actions. (Strategic goal 1. Internal market)
VALUES AND INTERESTS The analysis could be realist in terms of “internal balancing”: even though still the report sees the EU as mainly a normative power, to recognize growing interdependence and more anarchy (uncertainty) in the International System in terms of reduction of ability to behave according to international rules, is an important change although still the only option is cooperation. The report do not talk about other possible solutions as reconsidering the EU external and internal rules in terms of stronger and more powerful protection and penalty measures. In a world in which the behavior of states and states companies is not to comply and/or is intended to bend the international rules, it could be time to change the rules or act seemly.
THEN WHAT ARE “EUROPEAN” INTERESTS AND WHERE…. EUROPEAN VITAL INTERESTS
6 EUROPEAN VITAL INTERESTS European economic and social development; a secure and resilient EU; a neighbourhood of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; a sustainable environment and access to natural resources; Minimal constraints on the global flow of people, ideas, goods and services; Just and effective governance systems at a regional and global level.
2. A secure and resilient EU. No definition of “strengthening social resilience” Mix challenges and security threats: armed aggression, state failure, regional conflicts, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and natural hazards. Lack of definition of challenges, vulnerabilities, risks, and threats.
2. A secure and resilient EU. This is very illustrative as the inability to define clearly threats, whether deliberate ambiguity due to political reasons or because misperception. Other option is the consideration of Comprehensive Security and Comprehensive approach as a general cluster to face challenges and threats, using, as always referenced, “civil and military means” together. But it not the same a failed state than a WMD threat or use. The report seems more worried about to be able to deliver an institutional solution that to identify and solve the problem. But it not the same the challenge of Climate change that the threat of a terrorist group either
3. A neighbourhood of democracy, human rights and the rule of law Human rights, the rule of law and democracy are, at the same time, shared European values and preconditions for deepened international cooperation and stability. This paragraph envisages the concept of Democratic Peace This implies that the promotion of European values is the promotion of European interests, that is, promotion of these values on areas, regions or states that could reject them as an imposition; and what is worse, as a precondition to cooperate and for stability!! It means that could not exist cooperation without adopt our values; then stability would be widely reduced.
3. A neighbourhood of democracy, human rights and the rule of law (II) Probably other actors’ incentives to do it would be reduced in cases of non shared values actors. Then how to match the necessity for cooperation (Shared values paragraph) due to a more interdependent world with a precondition for stability. This could result in less stability, confidence reduction, uncertainty or even hostility. Any action or policy following this trend could feed not only a “security dilemma in ideational terms” but also in power terms if this promotion policy through an investment in the EU ’s collective capacity for global action, could means an investment on increasing crisis management (security and defense) capabilities.
5 th and 6 th Vital Interests. According to the Executive Summary, in order to secure the vital interests, at home the EU needs: to reduce the barriers between its internal market and the world beyond across all four freedoms – capital, services, people and goods. Its energy market needs to be developed to improve efficiency, resilience, independence and sustainability. Trade and innovation are key to sustaining the EU ’s societies and its global role, and should be further developed by way of beneficial conditions for imports and exports and enhanced educational and scientific cooperation programmes beyond its borders. But regarding to 5 th and 6 th vital interests this could be problematic or even dangerous in a multipolar environment:
5. Minimal constraints on the global flow of people, ideas, goods and services But the report recognizes a growing interdependence and more anarchy (uncertainty) in the International System in terms of reduction of ability to behave according to international rules. Then Free flow in a situation of mutual recognition, and free trade, with no mercantilism and hidden protectionism used by some rising powers, could be excellent. But this is not the real situation.
Minimal constraints on the global flow of people, ideas, goods and services (II) There are no comments on tariff barriers, dumping and unfair conditions, including problems related to copy rights, intellectual property and patens widely used, and unfair actions in other internal markets related to discriminatory conducts and corruption that makes unfair trade and avoiding international rules. Still the solution (strategic goal 1) is exporting the EU ’s own rules or by finding alternative routes towards regulatory convergence, depending on the partner in question. But other measures could be tariffs and no tariffs measures, retaliatory measures, or higher quality standards, limitations to takeover in certain strategic companies, etc.
6. Just and effective governance systems at a regional and global level Effective systems of cooperation and governance at the regional and global levels are critical because advancing many of the EU ’s principles and shared values requires cooperation with other international actors and institutions. Many of today’s challenges are emerging at the regional level, which often makes regional institutions best placed to take effective action. The problem is the asymmetry in governance mechanisms. Cooperation will not assure the advance of EU principles and shared values. Furthermore, uncertainties make governments reluctant to enter into comprehensive agreements that make substantial policy demands.
Just and effective governance systems at a regional and global level To the contrary, if you are in multipolarity and in a position of “relative decline”, probably EU should have to assume no cooperative behaviour and probably accept other conditions, precisely not in the vein of EU principles and shared values (see Doha round for instance). INDIA position in the negotiations with the EU about a free trade agreement. (rejecting WMD clause)
2. Geopolitical/ Geo-economic Vision STRATEGIC GOALS
11 Strategic Goals Furthering the internal market – Developing the external dimension of internal European policies; – Enhancing energy efficiency and resilience; Establishing the neighbourhood as the basis for a global role; – Staying the course on EU enlargement; – Engaging with the strategic neighbourhood; Taking comprehensive security responsibility in the strategic neighbourhood; – Forging a new Atlantic community with the United States; Establishing targeted partnerships; – Co-shaping global governance; – Promoting human development and preventing conflict; Boosting international economic and environmental problem-solving; Anticipating new domains of global action; Linking regional and global governance.
“STRATEGIC NEIGHBOURHOOD” GEOPOLITICS PLUS GEOECONOMICS?
AOI-AOR In today’s multipolar world, the EU is thus situated within an ever more complex region – a geopolitical space that includes not only its traditional neighbourhood, comprising states whose geographical proximity connects them to the EU, but also broader areas that are functionally linked to vital European interests: The Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Arctic and Adjacent sea-lanes. This vision is very interesting because comprises exactly the US concept of Greater Middle East.
Regional View EU should continue the enlargement process, but change the guiding rationale for relations with its neighbours. It should look on its surroundings as a Strategic Neighbourhood: a geopolitical space that includes not only its traditional neighbourhood, states whose geographical proximity connects them to the EU , but also broader areas that are functionally linked to vital European interests. In this space, the EU should work in partnership with local governments and societies for democratic transition, human rights and free trade and take security responsibility. This will demand the ability to deploy effective military and civilian capabilities and the political will to use them. The EU should permit smaller groups of member states to initiate and implement EU policies, but must sharpen political coordination by strengthening the High Representative’s coordinating power and by developing the role of its external delegations.
“Securing European Influence…. ” The European Union does not claim to rely principally or heavily on its ability for power projection. Instead, the EU prides itself for being a model for prosperous and peaceful reconciliation. Europe ‘leads’ as an example for the rest of the world. There is a powerful logic behind this notion. The problem is that the influence of European leadership on other countries diminishes rapidly with any increase in geographic distance. – Those countries that join the European Union feel the influence most strongly; – those on its borders feel it considerably less; – and those in other parts of the world hardly realize that such a thing as European leadership exists. That is the problem of a lack of Power Projection, and not only in military terms.
Competing visions There are other strategic visions as the US Pivot or the “Greater Middle East”, the Russian “Near Abroad” or the Chinese “Strategic Frontier”, but as instruments of power projection or global capacity. In the Chinese case, China does not adhere to the western Westphalian concept of nation states with stationery borders. Rather, its concept is based on “strategic frontier” of geopolitical landscape, whose flexible territorial borders expands or contracts according to a nation’s power projection The report also expresses surprisingly ideas of regime change (of course, veiledly) and talks with non-states actors.
ALLIANCES If that conception responds to a long term vision, it is overlapping on areas of interest (and friction) with other powers in Middle East-Persian Gulf, Caucasus-Central Asia or even the Mediterranean, Sahel-Horn of Africa. In this situation, and from a realist point of view, the report faces the necessity to reinforce or recreate alliances with the United States or with other members from the former West (Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, etc).
POWER PROJECTION This is very interesting because the creation or recreation of alliances respond to an idea for rebalance the system against a hegemonic challenger, a coalition of states, for security or for influence, among others. Really, the idea seems to reinforce the former “Unipolarity Club” (the former “West”), and to accommodate when needed (lack of support or interest by the United States) to other great powers as Russia and China.
Strategic Friction This posture in vital regions as Middle East. Persian Gulf or Caucasus-Central Asia (origin of 70% of EU oil imports, counting with imports from Russia) is not sustainable, strategically or from a resilience point of view: how much resilience the EU could sustain paying Eur 500 -600 billions/year? The lack of real capacity in the area, as demonstrate during the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war, it is a lack of correlation between the Vital Interests, the concept of Strategic Neibourghhood and the point Capabilities and Instruments.
Global view In linking the EU’s regional and global ambitions, four countries are of particular importance: the United States, which is the EU ’s only global partner and with which it should forge a new Atlantic community; Turkey, with which an enhanced political partnership should be agreed even before its EU accession; and China and Russia, with which targeted partnerships should focus on mutual interests.
Forging a new Atlantic community with the United States The U. S. -EU economic relationship dominates the world economy by the sheer size of the combined economies. The combined population of the United States and the EU members approaches 800 million people who generate a combined gross domestic product (GDP) that is roughly equivalent to 40% of world GDP in 2010. 2 Combined EU and U. S. world trade accounts for over 47% of all world trade. “A New Atlantic community based on the right mix of complementarity and commonality between the two sides, the first building block of which should be the timely conclusion of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” (including Canada, Mexico and Turkey!!)
3. Security conception: Comprehensive Security and Comprehensive Approach PERCEPTIONS, CHANLLENGES, THREATS AND COMPLEXITY
WHAT ARE THE “EUROPEAN” THREAT PERCEPTIONS? ARE THEY CONSISTANT WITH COMPLEX THREAT DYNAMIC?
2 nd EU Vital Interest, a secure and resilient EU Challenges and security threats are mixed: armed aggression, state failure, regional conflicts, terrorism, proliferation of WMD, organized crime and natural hazards. The 2003 European Security Strategy established clearly a difference between Global Challenges and security threats. The 2008 review offered the inclusion of cyber-security, energy security and climate change but as security risks. None of them have been included now. This could be a lack of consensus or a threat misperception at the time to face these problems and develop a wellfocused comprehensive security concept. It is not clear if it is a threat-centered or capabilitiescentered concept, although the use of a comprehensive approach is expected.
Strategic objective Anticipating new domains of global action This point is regarding to so-called “new domains” as conventional weapons, WMD, space militarization, and cyberspace/cyberwar, But these areas and their integration, are not discussed in the report. It focused instead on preventive measure through legal instruments when the space militarization is in progress, nuclear disarmament only has been carried out by US and UK/France, and EU WMD strategy (EU Non Proliferation policy) has not worked properly, about all in Iran’s case Finally, Cyberspace is absent from the point related to security challenges or threats. It is not seen as a security threat.
We are not fighting so that you will offer us something. We are fighting to eliminate you. Hussein Massawi, Hizbullah
LA PROLIFERACIÓN NUCLEAR
The integration of several of these dynamics is creating… …. an Offensive-Dominance World, and according to Clausewitz….
Karl von Clausewitz “The first, the supreme, the most farreaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. ” Source: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors and translators. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 88
MAIN PROBLEM 28 different positions. Example at high political level-Nuclear Policy-experience on different positions. Germany, Holland Nordics, Austria. Then Italy and Turkey- Spain- UK/France Different Threat Perceptions and security interests.
Security conception Comprehensive Security: there is no definition of the concept or content in the report
Security Threats or Challenges? In this vein the second EU Vital Interest, a secure and resilient EU, security challenges with clear security threats are erroneously mixed: armed aggression, state failure, regional conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and natural hazards. This is a real threat misperception at the time to face these problems and develop a well-focused comprehensive security concept. It is not clear either if the Comprehensive Security concept (and the Comprehensive Approach) are a threat-centered or capabilities-centered concept. Moreover, it seems to relinquish real operative capability (and even political) on NATO.
Security Overview The main problem is not only to define the structure of the international system (several times) as multipolar. It is also to recognize that the security environment has changed dramatically, not only because several challenges, threats and different actors (other matter for discussion in the report) but because the main character of this environment in terms of security is the change to an offense-dominance world, This happen due to, above all, cyberwarfare, but also for the integration and the interrelation of this realm with Space systems, WMD, Missile defense, Conventional Global Strike capabilities, (Prompt Global Strike ) Battlefield robotization (drones and other kinds of robots) and nanotechnology.
Meaning of a Offense-Dominant World In terms of the Security Dilemma model, the ODW, would be the worst world resulted from no differentiation offense-defense and a situation where the offense has the advantage This, in a dynamic international system, include: – new alliances and alignments, including soft balancing – Lack of incentives and reduced interest convergence, and increased competition, It could makes the international system prone to : – offensive visions and military doctrines, first-strike postures, – and aggressive actions and postures even from an economic and technological points of view (for instance conceptions as the Chinese Unrestricted Warfare conception: use of the supply of rare earth elements, REEs, as coercive tool in negotiations). This has changed for instance, the meaning (or even the utility) of Deterrence and the ability for recognizing offense-defense balance and differentiation. This dynamic is producing a major change in security environment and definition, not discussed in the report, affecting the viability of the Comprehensive Security concept and the chapter Instruments and Capabilities.
Absence of Intelligence issues There is only one reference to Intelligence issues in all the report; It is absent from the points: Enhancing military and civilian capabilities; Promoting human development and preventing conflict; Boosting international economic and environmental problem-solving ; Taking comprehensive security responsibility in the strategic neighborhood. Only at the end of the report regarding institution building there is a reference: Intelligence support should rely on long-term trust-building efforts among national services and EU agencies, as well as on better use of available capabilities and the pooling of regional expertise within the EU system.
Some problems for this security conception COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY, EU WMD STRATEGIES, NATO DDPR (also US 2010 NPR) ARE NOT RESPONDING TO: – STRUCTURAL, REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC DYNAMICS IN AREAS AS MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA – NOR RESPONDING THE EXPECTATIONS CREATED BY THIS POLICIES. THIS COULD BE PRODUCED BECAUSE OF: – EXPECTATIONS ON MULTIPOLARITY BY SOME STATES ABOVE IN MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA, – REDUCTION ON CONFIDENCE ON INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND – REDUCTION ON US EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE IN EUROPE AND ASIA.
Conclusions? ? To conclude, this posture takes us again to the start of the report and of this analysis. These last ideas are not clearly helping to create an image of a more proactive European Union; it could also be more realist that in the past, but new converts rarely are convincing; As the introduction of the report says, there is a need for a more strategic EU discourse, which might help to mitigate the shortcomings of today’s European narrative. The attraction and attractiveness of EU as alternative model is a narrative that could not work anymore. Finally, in certain positions, more than adaptive, the report prefers to accommodate. In times of crisis this posture may be an intelligent posture, but not in long term, because irrelevance is around the corner.
Though much is taken, much abides; and though We are not now that strength which in old days Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are; One equal temper of heroic hearts, Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield. Ulysses Lord Tennyson