The comintern and the Western Communist Parties 1930

The comintern and the Western Communist Parties 1930 -1949 Dr. Nikolaos Papadatos- University of Geneva

The communist Party of France: the popular front. • The SFIO split over the question of issuing war credits in support of World War I. During that war the minister of armaments (until 1917) was the socialist, Albert Thomas, who implemented wage cuts for workers in industry and coordinated support for the war effort. While the war played a crucial role in the rise of class-consciousness in France, it is important to remember that during the war a new type of syndicalism emerged in France. This took the form of a “class-alliance syndicalism” that tried to replace the pre-World War I revolutionary syndicalism that still existed but was limited in the PCF. The aim of this new syndicalism was, of course, the défense nationale.

• October Revolution (1917): The workers movement generally supported the February revolution, that toppled the Tsar, but the October revolution led to more intense debates. The trade-union organization, CGT, as well as the leadership of the SFIO, criticized the October revolution. • There were numerous strikes in France, especially in June 1919 and again in 1920, which were broken by the Millerand government; the French Left fared badly in the elections (for instance, the SFIO lost the legislative elections in November 1919); and there was a worldwide revolutionary conjuncture. • In December 1920 these tensions finally resulted in a split within the Socialist Party between the minority (SFIO), which rejected the twenty-one conditions of the Third International, and the majority (SFIC), which later became the French Communist Party (PCF), which accepted them. It is important to note here that the majority which supported the Bolsheviks— and created the Section Française de l’Internationale Communiste— should not be seen simply as puppets of the Bolsheviks. The vast majority of French Socialists did not know a lot about Bolshevism from a theoretical point of view.

• Nonetheless, it is true that the twenty-one conditions for membership in the Third International were known by the majority who created the SFIC, and that they were the main topic of debate during the Congrès de Tours where the SFIC was created. • t is true that during its first congress in Marseille (from December 25 to December 30 1921), the PCF was very close to the Communist International on the question of colonialism, but it was mainly a rhetorical position on which the PCF’s membership was divided. • The main argument put forward during this congress was that Communists should have a strong record of anticolonial activity, not just because people in the colonies were victims of capitalist expansion, but also because indigenous people were “used” by the French bourgeoisie in its imperialist wars and could be used as counterrevolutionary forces in the future. However, the PCF decided to create a “comité d’études coloniales” in order to work in the colonies. In summary: in its first years of existence, anticolonialism in the PCF was the task of some individuals who were “specialized” on this issue, but the PCF as a whole was unable to mobilize French workers on it.

The PCF and the Comintern on colonialism: • The colonial question in the PCF was the 1922 statement of the Sidi Bel Abbès section of the party—one of the most important sections of the PCF in Algeria. This came in the form of a letter to the party declaring the section’s complete disagreement with the “Moscow thesis” on colonialism. • The Moscow thesis was a reference to the Comintern’s call for the liberation of Tunisia and Algeria. The members of the section also stated that if the indigenous people of Algeria were successful in an anticolonial uprising before a proletarian revolution were to happen in the French metropolis, then Algeria would revert back to feudalism. What undergirded this astonishing claim is the idea that a revolution in France was a precondition to any social change in Algeria.

• The statement was sharply criticized by Trotsky. Indeed, during the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, Trotsky characterized the PCF section of Sidi bel Abbès as being stuck in a “slave-holder mentality. ” The Sidi bel Abbès thesis was roundly criticized during the Fourth Congress (November–December 1922). • The PCF’s record was not exactly stellar when it came to the national question in the colonies, one should also add that anticolonial figures played a major role in the foundation of the French section of the Communist International and that the PCF was the only French organization at that time that tried to mobilize people around the colonial question. • During the Tours Congress, a young Vietnamese man made a remarkable speech on colonialism. Indeed, Nguyễn Ái Quốc (who later became famous as Ho Chi Minh) participated in the founding of the French Communist Party and became an active anticolonial activist. In 1922, Nguyễn Ái Quốc played a crucial role in editing the journal Le Paria, which was important for carrying analyses of the colonial situation. Even though the journal was not so much concerned with independence but more taken with ending repression in the colonies, it played an important role at that time.

• The key event in which the French Communists were deeply engaged was organizing a strong opposition to the Rif War in Morocco. This war, conducted by Spain, later joined by France, to subdue the Berber people in the mountainous Rif region of Morocco. It became a crucial reference point for Communist anti-colonialism. For the first time in French history, French workers were mobilized against a colonial endeavor—including a PCF-called twenty-four-hour general strike on October 12, 1925 that drew out 100, 000 workers to protest the war. • The PCF called for recognition of an independent Rif republic, fraternization between French and Riffian soldiers, and the withdrawal of French troops from Morocco.

• The expulsion of men such as Rosmer and Pierre Monatte was accompanied by the “classe contre classe” strategy. This strategy refused to consider any alliances with the socialists. Meanwhile, French capitalism was restructuring itself in the interwar years and accelerating its development. With the cost of living rising dramatically, strikes exploded between 1927 and 1930. The period was seen by the PCF as a kind of “terminal crisis” of capitalism—a period where the party aimed to be everywhere in order to play an active role in the revolutionary moment. The twin processes of Stalinization and consequent expulsions of radicals brought an entire new set of leaders to head the party from the mid 1920 s and, in the 1930 s, Maurice Thorez became the head of the party.

The Comintern’s perception of fascism: • In the Fourth Congress, 1922 -1923, Zinoviev explained fascism as representing agricalturists. Radek and Bordiga disagreed. It spoke of stabilization in an economistic sense. • The fifth Congress (1924) was silent on stabilization and no longer accepting « economing stabilization » . • The Fifth Plenum of the Comintern (March 1925) did refer to « economic stabilization » . Zinoviev declared that Lenin’s 1921 concept of the « relatively balance of present forces » had led, « when things became cleared, to the stabilization formula » .

• The sixth Congress (1928) concluded: the end of the period of « stabilization » . This end was however envisaged as an economic crisis, which must in itself be final and catastrophic. • Consequently : 1. Fascism according to PCI and KPD (Germany) would only be a « passing episode » in the revolutionary process. Amadeo Bordiga, introducing the resolution on fascism at the Fifth Congress. He declared: the italian fascist regime was «a change in the governmental team of the bourgeoisie » . • 2. In the light of the above analysis, The Presidium of the Comintern executive committee notes, just after Hitler’s accession to power: «Hitler’s Germany is heading for ever more inevitable economic catastrophe. The momentary calm after the victory of fascism is only a passing phenomenon. The wave of revolution will rise inescapably in Germany despite the fascist terror » .

• Based on the above assumptions, the Fourth Congress (1924) stated : «In this epoch of the capitalistic crisis , fascism ends after its victory in political bankruptcy, its internal contradictions leading to its destruction from within » . • 2. Fascism was a simple passing episode in the economic advance of imminent revolution. Therefore, fascism had this positive meaning because it was itself an expression of the catastrophic economic crisis. The KPD declared (15 June 1930): « The advcance of fascism … it is the counterpart of the revolution upsurge, the necessary concomitant of a maturing revolutionary situation » . • These conceptions let many communists to believe that fascism has to be the « last » political form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, to be immediately followed by the revolutionary establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

• Bukharin criticized this approach during the fifth Congress : « We communists ourselves have sometimes seen the situation too simply and believe that first there was democracy, after that comes fascism, and what must come after fascism is the dictatorship of the proletariat. That may happen, but it equally well may not. In the case of Italy, Mussolini’s regime may not necessarily be followed straight away by the dictatorship of the proletariat, but by a new form of « democracy » . • What Bukharin expressed politicaly, Eugene Varga, a Hungarian economist who went to the USSR after the collapse of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, expressed it in economic terms: «Italy is the greatest European power to embark so late upon capitalist development, but it has in a very short time taken on a exceptional imperialist character. The development of capitalism in Italy lies in the fact that the dictatorship of the bourgeois has there assumed the particular form of fascism » .

The Comintern and the national communist parties : • The USSR’s foreign policy took over the Comintern policy through the necessary link of a single general line dominant in the USSR and in the foreign communist parties. • The goals: Defence of the USSR, the only proletarian State, in other words Protection of the USSR as a great power. • Attention: after 1928, the Comintern adopted the term of social fascism: social democracy was a variant of fascism. • The German big capital favoured a policy of mutual understanding and « collaboration » with the USSR.

• This policy was inaugurated by Von Seekt in the Rappallo (1922) treaty. German social democracy was oriented towards an «anti. Russian » policy of open alliance with Anglo-French or even American «imperialism » . • This is one of the reasons of the 1928 turn: Stalin conceived European social democracy as a potential enemy. In order to understand the socalled « ultra-left » turn in the USSR, a period which started with the forced « collectivization » of the peasantry, it is important to consider also the general line: • 1. After 1928: The first Soviet Five Year Plan. • 2. The USSR was condemned to a lengthy period of isolation and would be driven to war with the imperialistic countries. • 3. The economic crisis of 1929: Comintern’s interpretations. • 4. Last but not least: The relation between the USSR and the Comintern: the series of massive turns taken by the Bolshevik party in its internal policy and the effects of these turns on the Comintern.

Hitler’s victory and Comintern’s reaction: • The extremely strong reactions of the European Communist Parties to Hitler’s victory and the policy of KPD, did move the Comintern executive to pass a resolution on 5 March 1933 in response to a call for common struggle against fascism made by the Socialist Internationalist on 19 th February. The executive recommended contact with the central committes of social democracy in certain countries, because of their special situation, with a view to joint actions against fascism. • The ECCI calls on all communist parties to make a further attempt to establish a united fighting front with the social-democratic working masses through the social-democratic parties.

• The 13 th Plenum in November-December 1933 went back and did not adopt the previous resolutions. • The first real signs of the 1935 turn came only in 1934: let’s see the reasons: • 1. 30 January 1933: at the window of the Reich Chancellery Hitler received an ovation on the evening of his inauguration as a chancellor. • 2. On 12 February 1933 the social democratic militia in Vienna rose against the installation of the Dollfus clerical-fascist dictatorship. The rising took place despite the stance taken by the social democratic leaders. Il showed that social democracy as a whole was not doomed to accepte fascism. (Remember the previous concerns of Stalin). It was a catastrophic defeat but it had an impressive political impact beyond the boundaries of Austria, and, significantly, the social democratic fighters fled in large numbers to Moscow.

• 3. In March 1933 Dimitrov was in Berlin. He was arrested and accused of setting fire to the Reichstag. At the trial in Leipzig, he succeeded in making a mokery of the Nazis and an international reputation for himself. Although, acquitted at the trial, he remained in prison. The Comintern was conducting a world-wide campaign for his release, and he had become a distinct embarrassement for the Nazis. After his own government disowned him , Dimitrov received Soviet citizenship, and on 16 th February 1934, the Soviet embassy in Berlin made its firsts representations to the German government for his release. The Germans finally relented. The Comintern executive committee rushed to the airport to welcome him. Dimitrov was showered with congratulations and Manuilisky, Soviet representative on the committee, pointed out the outstanding example given to communist the world over. • In France, the year 1934 opened with a background of economic and social crisis and a politico-financial scandal. Since 1932, the country has been governed by the Radicals, supported in parliament by the Socialists. The partners do not agree on the policy to implement. The paralysis of the government is patent and fuels a strong anti-parliamentarism. On January 8 th, the stockholder Rogue Stavisky was found dead, killed by a revolver. The extreme right-wing leagues go down the street saying “kill the Thieves”.

• The combination of the rising in Austria and events in France convinced Dimitrov that the current Comintern hostility towards social democracy was mistaked. Later, he was summoned before the Soviet politburo to air his views on the needs of the international communist movement. There he argued for a new strategy based on co-operation with social democracy against fascism. • Stalin was sceptical, however the politiburo appeared to have been impressed by Dimitrov’s arguments. After discussion, Stalin suggested that Dimitrov take charge of the Comintern and promised him the continuing support of the Politburo. • All these changes were ratified during the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935.

• Dimitrov’s new concept: « We cannot avoid » , he said, « referring also to a number of mistakes committed by the Communist Parties, mistakes that hampered our struggle against fascism. In our ranks there was an impermissible underestimation of the fascist danger, a tendency which to this day has not everywhere been overcome. A case in point is the opinion formerly to be met with in our Parties to the effect that « Germany is not Italy » , meaning that fascism may have succeeded in Italy, but that its success in Germany was out of the question, because the latter is an industrially and culturally highly developped country, with forty years of traditions of the working-class movement, in which fascism was impossible. Or the kind of opinion which is to be met with nowadays, to the effect that in countries of « classical » bourgeois democracy the soil for fascism does not exist. Such opinions have served and may serve to relax vigilance towards the fascist danger, and to render the mobilization of the proletariat in the struggle against fascism more difficult.

The Popular front: the PCF • On January 25 th, 1934, the PCF approved the decisions of the 13 th Plenum of the IC. Thorez says: "All parties of the bourgeoisie, including the fractions of social democracy, are cooperating with fascism, and we do not seek an agreement with the leadership of the Socialist Party, the Socialist Party which is considered rightly by un as an enemy”. • Hitler’s rise to power did not affect the PCF’s stance in 1933 -1934. Thorez continued to defend the official line of Comintern "class against class" and in parliament attacked Daladier (member of the Radical party created after the split with the SFIO). Thorez said, among other things : "All you deputies of the right or of the left, you are leading the country to fascism, and international experience proves that there is no difference of nature between bourgeois democracy and fascism, which are two forms of the dictatorship of capital. The fascism is born of the dictatorship of the bourgeois democracy. We do not want to choose between cholera and plague”.

• Refusing to learn from the lessons of the tragic events in Berlin, the Communists are ignoring the initiatives that are multiplying on the left, such as the creation, on February 17, of the committee of vigilance of the antifascist intellectuals (CVIA), led by the socialist professors Paul Rivet, Paul Langevin (pro-communist) and Doriot, who in Saint-Denis tried to impose a unified policy, tried to break the communist sectarianism but without success. • Thorez responded by applying the “turns” of the C. I. He said: "The PCF, which organizes the single front of struggle, admits that its Central Committee can proceed to discussions about specific goals of action with the leadership of Socialist Party, in some occasions, but it would never tolerate a policy of summit agreement and calls for an effective struggle against the bourgeoisie and the Socialist Party”.

• Doriot criticized the anti-unitary policy in the Politburo and then in the conferences (Saint-Denis, Paris North) and rallied the majority of the militants against Thorez. On 19 April 1934, he sent an open letter to the Communist International signed by many militants. The quarrel became crucial. On 21 April, the Comintern convened Thorez and Doriot in Moscow. Doriot refused the trip and in order to reaffirm his popular legitimacy, he resigned from his position as governor of Saint-Denis. He was re-elected on 6 May. It is the rupture that very quickly led to his exclusion from the PCF and the C. I. He created later the French popular party. • However, after the Seventh Congress of the Communist International (1935), Thorez was forced to change his attitude. He published an article entitled "for an immediate joint action" but its context was still anti-socialist and the perspective remained always under the influence of “the single front” aiming for the transition of all socialist workers to communism.

• The Comintern sent a comminatory telegram on 25 June 1935. At the National Conference of the PCF on 26 June 1935, Thorez said: "We do not want fascism to pass through France. The question of the united front of struggle is a question of life or death for all proletarians, a question of whether we can prevent the fascist dictatorship from establishing itself in France and consequently preventing the outbreak of war”. • Thorez also wished to “train the middle classes and save them from the demagogy of fascism in order to take charge of the defense of every demand of the middle classes. ” Thorez wants to protect the middle classes on condition that they respect the proletariat. He details them: the employees, the civil servants, the small shopkeepers, the craftsmen and the working peasants.

• Therefore, the PCF plans to complete its political alliance with a social alliance. Its speech no longer refers to the working class alone, but to the whole country. In this sense, Thorez declares: "We love our country". But, he distinguishes the country from the homeland embodied by the USSR. This turn is undeniable and of great magnitude. It poses the political framework in which the party will move for decades, and which largely corresponds to the policy advocated for months by Doriot. • Once again an old Stalinist method of eliminating a political rival at the very moment when Thorez adopted his policy. On June 27, 1935, when Doriot was expelled from the party, Thorez triumphed.

The Popular front and the colonialism: • Thorez led the PCF into the project of a Front Populaire (FP) in 1934, which became a reality in 1935. This period was an important step in the “nationalisation” of the PCF. As a member of the FP, the PCF radically altered its political strategy. • In 1932, during the Seventh Congress of the PCF, Maurice Thorez had argued for the independence of Alsace-Lorraine because, he stated, “French imperialism operates a regime of national oppression” in the region.

• The Front Populaire period actually entailed the revival of an older political strategy. At the beginning of the 1930 s, the PCF shared the German Communists Party’s (KPD) approach in denouncing all social democrats as social-fascists. But with the PCF now committed to the FP, the necessity of building a front against fascism (even if it was too late to stop it) became the priority. • The concept of “peuple” (people) became a new and central theoretical category for the PCF. Until then, this concept was used to define oppressed people in the colonies, now it became a concept employed to speak about French people, as a living vital link with the French nation. This political discourse about the French nation was accompanied by a schematic workerism. Thus, the Communist ideology became, with the threat of fascism, a kind of “self-defence” as the revolution was no longer the priority: the main enemy was fascism and the main political subject became the French people.

• On November 12, 1935, the PCF newspaper L’Humanité led with the following headline: “The Unknown [Soldier] has returned to his comrades. ” This may be one of the best examples of the “nationalrepublican” turn of the PCF. • This issue of the journal founded by Jean Jaurès—famous for his opposition to World War I—was now about to resurrect this national imagining. In this issue, one could clearly see the reversal of the French Left that had been against the war credits in 1914. Indeed, this issue of L’Humanité was a celebration of veterans.

• Recruitment was made on two bases: first, the anti-fascist struggle; the second—obviously linked to the former—was a strong republican patriotism. • Note: (With the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939, the PCF’s antifascism was abandoned for a time). Nevertheless, the consequence in the long run of this “national” Communist language is that the PCF adopted the idea that the socialist transition would only happen through reforms, and that the interests of France were paramount. • The other important aspect of the Front Populaire period is the attitude the FP government—which assumed office after winning a majority in the May 1936 legislative elections—had towards national liberation struggles in the colonies. • Note: The coalition between Stalinists and Trotskyists in Vietnam. La Lutte proposed to organize a congress with representatives from the colonies, but Marius Moutet (SFIO minister for colonies) refused because he thought that a congress where the Trotskyists were a majority would be dangerous.

• While the SFIO was in power, the PCF took part for the first time in traditional French political life, but the anticolonial struggle was not a priority for the French communists and socialists. • With the Laval-Stalin declaration of May 15, 1935, the national defense of France became the chief priority for the communists. This in turn meant that any struggle against colonialism could be interpreted as a serious obstacle to French interests and to its fight against fascism. • André Morel played a huge role in the counter-propaganda during the Rif war, taught classes at the Leninist school in Moscow and wrote a book called Histoire du parti communiste français in 1931. He was responsible for editing L’Humanité and headed the colonial section of the PCF. In this capacity he began to be interested in peasant movements, as well as realizing the importance of publishing works in Arabic. In his analysis of the conjuncture in North Africa he foresaw an imminent uprising in the colonies. He concluded that the communists should ally themselves with the nationalist movements in the colonies in order to fight against both fascism and colonialism. But such figures within the party were very rare, and Morel was expelled from the party in 1936 because of his opposition to the leadership on this question.

• The period of the Front Populaire was a crucial period in the making of a French colonial Communist Party, which now located its heritage in the French nation and distanced itself from its legacy of opposition to the war credits in 1914. The party began to regularly participate in patriotic July 14 (Bastille Day) ceremonies, complete with French flags, and in the celebrations of November 11 (Armistice Day). Official publications of the party carried articles about France’s global “civilizing mission. ” • It is worth noting here that the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) was also created in this period, but it was a mirror image of the French party. The day after the founding Congress of the PCA, L’Humanité published an article explaining that this congress was remarkable in its composition, in that sixty-two Arab delegates were present along with sixty-seven French delegates. The report featured a photograph of the secretary of the new party, Amar Ouzegane, who was to be expelled in 1947 for “nationalist-deviations. ”

The PCF in 1944 -1945 : Staline et Thorez • At the end of World War II, the PCF was one of the strongest parties in France. This favorable balance of power in 1944 pushed the party to adopt a very optimistic view of the political moment. The party had some significant successes in several municipal elections, and its membership grew rapidly between 1944 and 1947. The party’s publications, especially L’Humanité. As Maurice Thorez told the Times, the march to socialism would take other “ways than the way of Russian Communists. ” Thorez made an explicit connection between the reformism of the party and its commitment to the French nation, describing the PCF as a “national and democratic organization, ”.

• The PCF has been weakened since 1939: the signing of the nonaggression pact between Hitler and Stalin on 23 August 1939 amazes the entire world. The French Communist leaders are not the least surprised. Nothing in their eyes foreshadowed this event negotiated for months in total secrecy. Thorez and Duclos returned to Paris until on 24 August, and on the 25 th the communist parliamentary group published a communiqué which attempted to articulate the pact and the anti-fascist line: "The Soviet Union, faithful to its policy of peace, has undertaken a policy of dislocation of the bloc of aggressors who had united on the basis of the anti-Comintern pact. . . But if Hitler, in spite of everything, triggers the war, when he knows well that he will find before him the people of united France , the Communists in the first rank, in order to defend the security of the country, the freedom and the independence of the peoples ".

• The Daladier government had banned the PCF on 26 September 1939. • The Committee of Free France (De Gaulle). • The Soviet intelligence service at that time had an excellent position in London (Cambridge 5), in a position to obtain accurate information on Chrchill's opinion of De Gaulle and his organization. • De Gaulle wanted to get in touch with the Soviet ambassador to London Ivan Maisky: on a reserved but clear form, the French people supports the Russian people in his struggle against Germany and want to establish a military collaboration. (De Gaulle). • Maurice Thorez. In October 1939, he deserted from his regiment. He went to the USSR. He was denounced in absentia (October 1939), and dismissed his French nationality in February 1940.

• April 1942 : le Général Giraud was a member of the Superior War Council, and disagreed with Charles de Gaulle about the tactics of using armoured troops. He became the commander of the 7 th Army when it was sent to the Netherlands on 10 May 1940 and was able to delay German troops at Breda on 13 May. While trying to block a German attack through the Ardennes, he was at the front with a reconnaissance patrol when he was captured by German troops at Wassigny on 19 May. • On 17 April 1942, he lowered himself down the cliff of the mountain fortress. He had shaved off his moustache and wearing a Tyrolean hat, travelled to Schandau to meet his Special Operations Executive (SOE) contact who provided him with a change of clothes, cash and identity papers. Through various ruses, he reached the Swiss border by train. Giraud eventually slipped into Vichy France, where he made his identity known. He tried to convince Marshal Pétain that Germany would lose, and that France must resist the German occupation. His views were rejected but the Vichy government refused to return Giraud to the Germans.

• Molotov to Bogomolov: We inform you for understanding and action for issues related to Giraud and De Gaulle you will have to follow the following line: we give our preference to De Gaulle because he is irreconcilably opposed to the Vichy regime and Hitler’s Germany. Secondly, we prefer to support De Gaulle, because he is in favor of a policy of reestablishing republican France in this democratic tradition, while General Giraud showed contempt for democratic practices. • Ivanovich Agayants (Avalov): In 1937 he was sent to Paris, under cover first of the trade mission, then of the consular section of the Soviet embassy. He returned to Moscow in 1940, but was sent to Teheran in August 1941 as resident. He reportedly helped prevent a German operation to attack the three allied leaders meeting at the 1943 Teheran Conference. He returned to Moscow later that year.

• De Gaulle devotes a large part of his conversations with Avalov to the struggle within the CFLN. Avalov tells him the position of the Americans in favor of Giraud. . . De Gaulle emphasized the cooperation with the USSR in times of war and after the war. He presented to him his conception of the world order after the war, the role and the significance of France and the USSR. He proposed a close cooperation, and also told him that he would like to discuss all this with Stalin. • The soviet foreign policy has 2 objectives: the eviction of General Giraud, it is necessary that De Gaulle becomes the only one leader of the CFLN.

• Giraud will be dismissed in 1943. De Gaulle will have the upper hand of the CFLN and the goal was achieved: • Lozovsky, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a note on 6 October 1943 stating: “the transformation of France into secondclass power is not advantageous for the USSR. Given that the German defeat is imminent, it will counterbalance England the United States. The only country that can play this role is France. It has a large continental power and a fairly good fleet. Nor do we need a too strong France. Because a bourgeois France could become an organizer of all anti-Soviet forces and with London or Washington could seriously damage the USSR.

• De Gaulle is received by Stalin, that is important. • De Gaulle amnestied Thorez. He is trying to calm down the game: calm the revolutionary wishes of the PCF (there are para-military organizations etc. ), De Gaulle abandoned, however, several political claims, he recognized the committee of Lublin on Poland. • Thorez and Stalin (november 1944): "The Communists have not yet understood that the situation has changed in France. The PCF takes no account of it and continues to follow the old political line. We will have to change the political line. Since October 23 1944, the government led by General De Gaulle was officially recognized by the three major forces. There is a government which is recognized by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. And the Communists continue to act mechanically. The Communists must have in view that De Gaulle will be induced to take measures against the Communists even if he does not want it, he will be incited by the English and the Americans who want to create a reactionary government in France as well as everywhere they will be responsible”.

• Meanwhile the situation has become different, it is a new, situation, favorable to De Gaulle. • The situation has changed, it is necessary to make a turning point. The PCF is not strong enough to strike the government at its head. (Stalin). • 18 noveber 1947: If Churchill had further delayed the opening of a second front in northern France by a year, the Red Army would have gone as far as France. We had the idea of going to Paris. Obviously, the Anglo-Americans could not let the Red Army liberate Paris, while for their part they would have remained on the African shores. • In the autumn of 1944, the French Communists could not take power in their hands. How much they would have taken, they would have lost it anyway because the Anglo-American troops were in the country.

• Stalin will give Thorez very precise instructions concerning the paramilitary groups of the PCF: French shooters and supporters (FTPF) or the patriotic militias. • A. Armed detachments must be transformed into another organization, into a political organization. As for weapons, we must hide them. (The government requested that weapons be returned). Stalin says, no. • B. November 1944: on the one hand, we must not frighten the French. We must take into account that our banner scares many people. It is necessary to avoid at all costs that the PCF be isolated, both by the socialists and by De Gaulle: it would be nice if the PCF had allies, find allies among radicals, a party penetrated by the Soviet secret services, including, among others, some informal groups of the radicals. We must seek to find allies among the socialists, we must try to create a block against the reaction (De Gaulle), we must create determined forces around the PCF for defense and when the situation will change for the attack. • The Communists want to send all the socialists to the devil, but, until then, we must strive to create a bloc, to find allies among the Socialists. (Stalin).

• Churchill and De Gaulle want to dismember Germany, to annex the region of the Rhine and the Saar. The situation is not clear. The best thing is to await annexations on this question. • We must take measures so that in the event of an offensive reaction the Communists can have a solid defense and can say that the reaction does not attack the Communists but the people. If conditions change, these forces will be used for the offensive. • Thorez will apply these guidelines to the letter. (During a party meeting, he said: One army, one state, one police, you hide the weapons). • Thorez initiated the battle for production. He took advantage of it in order to take over the strong positions in the nationalized sector of France. In October 1945, the PCF became the first parliamentary force in France with more than 26% of the votes and 159 deputies, whereas they had 72 at the time of the Popular Front. The Communists penetrated into force in the government led by General De Gaulle.

Conclusion: • How does this history explain the PCF’s support of the Vietnamese nationalists, the Viêt-Minh, in 1945? The Viêt-Minh were seen by the PCF as comrades and anti-Nazi fighters, and therefore the party wanted to negotiate with the Viêt-Minh. As the war ended, the PCF’s main political goal was to find a balance between the interests of the colonized people and the interests of France. • The PCF wanted a “peaceful end” to the fight between France and its colonies. After its eviction from the government, the PCF conducted massive propaganda against this “dirty war” not because it supported Indochinese independence, but because this was a “useless fight. ”

• Note: The definitive turn for the PCF, away from its anticolonial heritage, however, was most pronounced during the Algerian Revolution of 1954. The PCF characterized the Algerian insurrection of November 1, 1954 simply as individual terrorism and the party’s writing reflected its commitment to thinking within the framework of “French interests. ” In his book Années de feu, the former PCF member Jacques Jurquet, who later became a leading representative of French Maoism, stressed the responsibility of the socialists in colonial repression, as well as the politically cowardly attitude of the PCF, which by now had moved very far away from its attitude during the Rif war in the 1920 s.

• The difference between the Indochinese and the Algerian revolutions was that, with the latter, a new aspect of colonial subjects came to light: many who were fighting against France were Muslims. Amar Ouzegane in his study Le meilleur combat argued that the Communists were unable to understand the role played by religion in such a society as Algeria. • The PCF wanted the creation of a “real” Union française, and in every single text or speech from its leaders on Algeria, the interest of France was the central organizing principle. the Algerian revolution was a crucial step in the definitive reformist and “social-chauvinistic” turn of the PCF. After World War II, the conditions in the colonies offered a unique opportunity to create real international solidarity between French Communists and colonized people. But even if the PCF’s rhetoric in its press was anticolonialist—but always stressing the interests of France—the party failed to encourage French workers to support the liberation struggles.

• It is important to look back at how it evolved from its foundation in the 1920 s to the Front Populaire, and later during the Algerian revolution, in order to understand how the reformist turn of the PCF was accompanied by its entry into the “national scene” of France.