The 2007 Sub-Prime crisis and the current Credit

The 2007 ‘Sub-Prime crisis’ and the current Credit Crunch David Allen Senior Lecturer School of Economics Bristol Business School, UWE The purpose of this session is to explain: the background to current credit crunch the short-term & long-term implications of this credit crunch the possible impact it will have on your future employment prospects

Credit Crunch = shortage of bank credit The implications are fairly obvious If there is less lending there will be less spending means less output means higher unemployment However we need to know WHY it has happened, to then understand whether this is a short-term problem or a long-term problem and, to assess whether it will happen again. This in turn means we have to explain the workings of the Financial Sector in a modern global economy.

The Financial Sector & the Circular flow of Income FOP Y Cd O E J W = Factors of Production = National Income = Consumption of Domestically produced Output = Domestic Output = National Expenditure = Injections: I – Investment, G- Government Spending, X- Exports = Withdrawals: S – Savings, T- Taxes, M - Imports The question is: How do SAVINGS get turned into INVESTMENT (I) and CONSUMPTION (Cd)?

Financial institutions and financial intermediation Turning SAVINGS into INVESTMENT Recall the TV show: The Dragon’s Den The financial sector’s purpose is to turn savings into lending and is known as the process of financial intermediation. For example; an individual saves money in a bank, the bank then lends this money to borrowers who might use it to buy a car (i. e. Consumption) or, it could lend this money to firms - the firms then benefit by having access to this ‘spare’ cash (SAVINGS), which they will then use to INVEST in their business.

Financial institutions & Financial intermediation Besides returning savings back into the circular flow of income financial intermediation has other advantages: 1) Maturity transformation (where short term saving plans can be turned in to long term loans) 2) Collating (recording who’s borrowed/lent what) 3) Risk assessment (evaluating the probability of a default on any loan) As we will see later, items 2 & 3 (Collating and Risk Assessment) have played a role in the present credit crunch

Other types of Financial institutions: money & debt markets Our focus is on the banking sector & its relationship with the money markets CLEARING BANKS SHORT LOANS TERM OVER DRAFT MONEY MARKETS (DEBT MARKETS) * * * Certificates of deposit LOCAL AUTH' BILLS COMMERCIAL BILLS EURO CREDIT TREASURY BILLS Money & Equity markets are sub-divided into Primary Markets (where new issues are offered) Secondary Markets (where existing financial instruments are offered for sale) (CAPITAL MARKETS) ['GILTS'] LONG TERM Bus’ LOANS MORTGAGES EQUITY MARKET * * * RIGHTS ISSUE * NEW SHARES * PREFERENTIAL VENTURE CAPITAL DEBENTURES (FIRMS) EURO BONDS LOCAL AUTH' BONDS GOVE' BONDS Items marked * are collectively known as ‘financial instruments’ and all can be sold in the secondary markets if holders require ready cash (i. e. liquidity)

Banking: How SAVINGS get tuned in to SPENDING DEPOSITS: The Bank’s LIABILITIES LENDING: The Bank’s ASSETTS Ready Cash £ 5 m (Tills & ATMs) £ 500 m Advances (Loans) Investments £ 500 m Liabilities must equal Assets To met the daily needs of depositors Note: Ratio of Cash to other Assets is 1% (LIQUIDITY RATIO) £ 200 m Overdrafts to mortgages Treasury bills, £ 295 m Gove’ Bonds Debentures & others £ 500 m £ 495 m back into the economy! How do Banks make a profit? They charge borrowers a higher rate of interest than they offer to depositors (savers). They also hope that the return on their investments is higher than the rate of interest they pay to depositors.

Banking: How SAVINGS get tuned in to SPENDING THE AIMS OF BANKS LIQUIDITY: If the liquidity ratio is too high there is less to lend, which means lower profit PROFITABILITY Risky loans are given higher rates of interest rate - they are profitable. But risky borrowers often default. PRUDENCE Capital adequacy, the level of unsecured loans compared to secured loans. Also banks need to have enough of their own money (profit) on hand to cover any defaults on unsecured loans. ALL THESE AIMS ARE IN CONFLICT As will be shown later, it was the ‘sub-prime’ crisis of 2007/08 that led to problems with Prudence and Profitability, which ultimately resulted in problems with Liquidity and the resulting credit crunch.

Banking: Maintaining liquidity: Banks & the Money Markets As ‘lender of last resort’ £ £ REPO Money Markets A bundle of paper assets Bank of England (Supplies £) REPO £ Other Banks (Supply £) If a bank is short of ready cash (to meet its day today obligations to depositors) it can go to the MONEY MARKETS and enter into a “REPO” aggreement. ‘Repos’ = A sale & repurchase agreement of a bank’s assets (e. g. a bundle of gilts or other INVESTMENTS). The bank that purchases this bundle of ‘instruments’ is making a short-term cash loan. The bank ‘selling’ the ‘repo’ agree to buy the ‘repo’ back on a certain date – usually within 2 weeks. They will be charged a rate of interest (LIBOR).

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure In the UK the ‘crisis broke in August 2007, when Northern Rock experienced a ‘run on the bank’ the first in the UK for 140 years! A ‘run on a bank’ : - where large numbers of depositors present themselves at a bank and demand the return of all their savings – in cash at once ! Problem? The bank does not have the depositor’s money in cash – they have lent most of it to borrowers (advances) or used it to make investments. To return the depositor's money would mean either: a) Foreclosing on the loans they have made. b) Selling some of their investments (assets) on the secondary money markets, in the sub-prime crisis, this is where part of the problem lay: the INVESTMENTS many UK banks (including Northern Rock) made turned out to be virtually worthless.

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure In the case of Northern Rock, their only (and immediate) solution was to approach the Bank of England as the lender of last resort for a straight loan. It couldn’t use a ‘repo’ agreement simply because so many of its Financial Assets where made up of these worthless investments. It was press ‘rumours’ that Northern Rock was approaching the Bank of England that then lead to the run on the bank. So where did it all start to go wrong? And why were so many of these investments now worthless?

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure. The seeds of the problem lay in the USA mortgage markets It started with the creation of CDOs: “Collateralized Debt Obligations” A consumer gets a mortgage, the lender (bank) then sells the debt (the loan) to an investment bank. A safe bet? These CDOs were considered safe ‘bets’ – after all if someone defaulted on their mortgage, the house could be reprocessed and sold (i. e. the were backed by collateral). The investment bank ‘pools’ loans with similar risks of default into one financial instrument (a Bond). Which would be sold in the Money/Debt Markets (world wide) Technically, these bonds would be rated as low risk (of default) to high risk (of default). The ‘return’ on the bond would come from the repayments on these mortgages and would reflect the level of risk associated with each ‘pool’ of mortgages.

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure. Building a CDO As a rule of thumb you will pay back 3 times the value of the mortgage over the 20 years of the life of the loan. Loan $100, 000 Repayment $300, 000 $100, 000 $300, 000 $500, 000 $1, 500, 000 Combine into one CDO & sell for $750, 00 Not a bad ‘return’! However, if homeowners, start to default on their mortgages the CDOs return will fall e. g. If there are 3 defaults the CDOs returns would fall to $600, 000 The market value of the CDO is now virtually worthless

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure Many US householders have defaulted on their mortgages - in large numbers. Why so many defaults? Many of the provincial mortgage lenders where lending money irresponsibly (they were seduced by profits rather than being prudent ). They were granting mortgages to people who could not afford to keep up the repayments (let alone pay off the principal sum). In some cases the repayments represented 80% of the householder’s monthly disposable income. As a result many CDOs became worthless –

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure Other Problems? For the Investment Banks the problem was then of trying to track back and find out which CDOs included mortgages that had defaulted (i. e. the process of collating has turned out to be rather shoddy). Another problem? The mix of low and high risk mortgages was incorrect, making any assessment of a CDO’s value difficult and uncertain. Why did this happen? Risk assessment agencies (and mortgage lenders) were sloppy in their work or, to say the least; they were ‘over optimistic’ on peoples’ ability to service their loans.

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure For the FINANCIAL SECTOR Two major outcomes from the sup-prime crisis 1) The high level of defaults saw returns on these CDOs fall – greatly reducing the value (the price) an investor would offer if invited to buy the bond on the secondary money markets 2) The uncertainty over the mix of risk further reduced the value of CDO’s on the money markets The Implications for the FINANCAL SECTOR? a) Bank balance sheets would not balance; their assets would be lower than their liabilities. As a result many banks have had to ‘write down’ their asset values and seek additional capital from existing shareholders or seek new investors to pump money into the bank to restore their balance sheets. B) CDOs were of such indeterminate value they could not be used in any type of ‘repo’ / ’reverse repo’ arrangement with other - arrangements that could then assist the banks in maintaining their daily liquidity (there was a credit crunch!).

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure Banks ‘Taking a hit’ Dec 07 Share Prices of Banks since March 07

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure The overall ‘fall out’ of the sub – prime crisis? Short – Term i) Central banks (e. g. the ‘Fed’, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank) have had to pump taxpayer’s money into the banking system to maintain liquidity and to restore confidence in the banking system. ii) In the UK banks have had a ‘wake up call’ on the way they lend money, they are more ‘risk averse’ result: credit – crunch; - business are finding it harder to get loans - many consumers have seen their credit limits reduced significantly - home buyers are now having put down sizable deposits More Long term? In order to restore their balance sheets many of the US and UK banks have approached ‘Sovereign Funds’. Sovereign funds have been around for a while but they are a relatively new phenomena. Basically, these are investment trust that are owned by a national government, notably the state governments of many Arab nations (e. g. Kuwait, Oman), but include China, Russia, Norway, Singapore, Brunei

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure The overall ‘fall out’ of the sub – prime crisis? From your perspective? Things have significantly changed – the impact is likely to be quite long term ( 5 - 6 years) • You will find it harder to get a loan or credit • You will have to start saving – NOW if you want to buy a home in the future • Job prospects in the financial markets less assured • Likewise job prospects in industries whose products are sold using a lot of credit will be less assured

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis: a case study in banking failure The question is will it happen again? Probably, because banks know that the central banks will ALWAYS step in to restore confidence. Put another way, they know the taxpayer will always bail them out when they make the wrong lending decisions.