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Terrorism: A Threat Assessment John Parachini June 26, 2003 Unclassified R 1 Terrorism: A Threat Assessment John Parachini June 26, 2003 Unclassified R 1

Three Enduring Aspects of Combating Terrorism • Terrorism is a perennial, ceaseless struggle • Three Enduring Aspects of Combating Terrorism • Terrorism is a perennial, ceaseless struggle • Enmity towards the U. S. is unlikely to diminish • U. S. will remain vulnerable It is important to prioritize protection activities according to both threat and vulnerabilities. Unclassified R 2

New Trends Inexorable Diffusion of Technology Mass Casualty Terrorism Unclassified Religiously Motivated Violence R New Trends Inexorable Diffusion of Technology Mass Casualty Terrorism Unclassified Religiously Motivated Violence R 3

Anti-US Mass Casualty Incidents Source: Report of the Accountability Review Boards, Bombings of the Anti-US Mass Casualty Incidents Source: Report of the Accountability Review Boards, Bombings of the U. S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, August 7, 1998 Unclassified R 4

Inexorable Spread of Technology Unclassified R 5 Inexorable Spread of Technology Unclassified R 5

Tactically, Terrorists Mostly Use Explosives to Conduct Their Attacks Weapons used in Terrorist Attacks: Tactically, Terrorists Mostly Use Explosives to Conduct Their Attacks Weapons used in Terrorist Attacks: 1 April 2001 – 1 April 2002 Unclassified R 6

Analysis of Terrorism Threat • Capabilities • Motivations • Vulnerabilities • Context Unclassified R Analysis of Terrorism Threat • Capabilities • Motivations • Vulnerabilities • Context Unclassified R 7

Two Factors Affect Terrorists’ Choice of Targets • Accessibility –Seizing opportunities to attack –Exploiting Two Factors Affect Terrorists’ Choice of Targets • Accessibility –Seizing opportunities to attack –Exploiting vulnerabilities for desired ends • Shock-value –Destruction of symbolic buildings, institutions, or sites –Attacks that cause large amounts of casualties Unclassified R 8

Terrorist System Possible to Influence State Enablers • Family Members • Financiers • • Terrorist System Possible to Influence State Enablers • Family Members • Financiers • • State Sponsors • Weapons • Talent • Foot Smugglers Spotters Soldiers • Leaders Importance to the Terrorist Enterprise Unclassified R 9

Key Types of State Support Sanctuary A=Active P=Passive Political Support Train. Finance Arms Intel Key Types of State Support Sanctuary A=Active P=Passive Political Support Train. Finance Arms Intel Logistics A A A A State/Insurgency Group A State/Terrorist Cut-out A State/Terrorist Political Goals P A A A P Weak State/Strong Terrorist Group A P P P A Joint Ops. P Unclassified R 10

n (p ista A A P A A A Political Support A A P n (p ista A A P A A A Political Support A A P A P A A P Training P A A ? ? A Financing P A A A ? A P P A Documentation ? ? A ? ? ? A Weapons A A A ? P A ? A Intelligence ? A ? ? Logistics P A ? Joint Operations ? Unclassified A P P ? * Lib Ira q Ira n Gr A A Sau A Pak A No rt A ya* P * A eec e * A Cu ba Sanctuary Afg han h. K ista ore a* n (T alib an) A = Active P = Passive * = Designated State Sponsor rio r to di A 911 rab ) ia Sud an* Syr ia* Ve nez uel a Examples of State Support for Terrorism A A A P P ? ? A A P A R 11

Middle East States Seeking WMD and the Terrorist Groups They Support Al Aqsa Martyr Middle East States Seeking WMD and the Terrorist Groups They Support Al Aqsa Martyr Brigade PKK Hamas ANO Al Qaeda ALF al-Gama’a al –Islamiyya PFLP Islamic Jihad MEK Hezbollah PIJ PFLP-GC PLF Iran Syria Iraq Sudan Libya Nuclear Biological Chemical Biological Nuclear Biological Chemical Biological Unclassified R 12

17 Groups That Target Within Their Area of Operations Are Also Anti-U. S. Focus 17 Groups That Target Within Their Area of Operations Are Also Anti-U. S. Focus on U. S. Anti-US Sentiment Al-Qaeda IG DHKP/C N 17 RO PIJ ELN FARC Le. T GSPC HAMAS Hizballah SL ASG IMU Maoists GIA MILF AUC Unclassified RIRA ETA Coordinate multiple attacks Strike guarded target Kill 150+ Attack unguarded foreign nationals LTTE Kill 50 People Conduct an Attack Anti-U. S. Rhetoric Kach R 13

Terrorist Groups and Unconventional Weapons CR C CRBN High Al Qaeda Danger Hizbollah Low Terrorist Groups and Unconventional Weapons CR C CRBN High Al Qaeda Danger Hizbollah Low RIRA ETA MILF AUC IMU N 17 RO SL ASG Kach Low PIJ GSPC GIA LTTE FARC (? ) HAMAS (? ) DHKP/C (? ) PKK (? ) BKI AUM Chechen Rebels Sophistication of Unconventional Weapons Unclassified High R 14

Al-Qaeda Motivations • Launch an Islamic revolution • Perception that U. S. props up Al-Qaeda Motivations • Launch an Islamic revolution • Perception that U. S. props up corrupt Arab regimes that oppress Muslims peoples • Attack U. S. to avenge sense of religious, economic, and political grievance • Inflicting large number of U. S. casualties will cause it to leave the Middle East and lessen support for Israel • Struggle against the U. S. , Israel, and the West affirms personal identity of al-Qaeda terrorists Unclassified R 15

Al-Qaeda CBRN Threat We have the weapons [nuclear and chemical] as deterrent. ” Unclassified Al-Qaeda CBRN Threat We have the weapons [nuclear and chemical] as deterrent. ” Unclassified R 16

Documents from Al-Qaeda Sites in Afghanistan • Reveal extensive interest in WMD • Basic Documents from Al-Qaeda Sites in Afghanistan • Reveal extensive interest in WMD • Basic information from open sources • Little evidence of progress towards significant acquisition or weaponization Unclassified R 17

Ahmed Ressam and the CNN Tapes • Describes training on how to release cyanide Ahmed Ressam and the CNN Tapes • Describes training on how to release cyanide gas into buildings Unclassified R 18

Planting Dangerous Ideas “. . . we only became aware of them [biological weapons] Planting Dangerous Ideas “. . . we only became aware of them [biological weapons] when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concern that they can be produced simply. ” Memo on computer disk allegedly written by Al Zawari April 1999. Unclassified R 19

Image Found in Al Qaeda Safe House • Al-Qaeda took note of U. S. Image Found in Al Qaeda Safe House • Al-Qaeda took note of U. S. official fears • Tension between prudent preparedness and communicating our vulnerabilities Source: ABCnews. com Unclassified R 20

Another View of New Trends Tactical Fanatic Violence Mass Casualty Violence CBRN Weapons Capabilities Another View of New Trends Tactical Fanatic Violence Mass Casualty Violence CBRN Weapons Capabilities Unclassified Interest in CBRN R 21

Dangers in the Future • Al Qaeda sleeper cells? • New grouping of terrorists Dangers in the Future • Al Qaeda sleeper cells? • New grouping of terrorists trained in Al Qaeda camps? • Others struggling against modernity? • Strong terrorists operating in weak and beholden states? Unclassified R 22