Teaching Counterterrorism in the 21 st Century COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point James JF Forest, Ph. D. Director of Terrorism Studies
Agenda 1. 2. 3. 4. Advice from Sun Tzu MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) CT Approach U. S. Counterterrorism Strategy Conclusion & Recommendations for Teaching Notes: - This presentation is entirely at the unclassified level. - The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
1. Understanding the Terrorist Threat • NATO definition of terrorism: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives • Sun Tzu – Know yourself – Know your allies – Know your enemy COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Sun Tzu: Know Your Enemy Understanding the Terrorist Threat • • • What motivates terrorists? How do they get to a willingness to be a suicide bomber? What do they want? What are they capable of? How do they view this struggle? “You have to be lucky everyday – We only have to be lucky once” - IRA Bomber COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
The Terrorists’ Perspective • For one thing, al Qaeda’s leaders believes that they have been tested by two superpowers (Soviets and Americans); they defeated the first, and survived the second despite overwhelming military force – thus, both are considered victories • Globally, members of this global religious-inspired insurgency believe this is an epic struggle that will likely take place beyond the current generation of fighters • In Iraq, terrorists are developing a new “cult of the insurgent” by demonstrating how they, not the once-feared Saddam Hussein’s military, can inflict pain and suffering on the mighty U. S. (and coalition) forces • Rationale for terrorism: perceived as only available means by which to achieve strategic goal COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Terrorism as Strategy • Terrorism is not new • Terrorism is not merely religious: 1980 Bologna, Munich attacks; LTTE (Sri Lanka) • Terrorism as weapon in a strategy • Terrorist attacks as a form of strategic communication COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Terrorism as Strategic Communication • What audiences are they attempting to communicate with? • What message for each audience? • How are they communicating (beyond acts of violence)? • What are your actions, foreign policies, etc. communicating, and to whom? • How can you determine the effectiveness of your own communications? COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Some Strategic Acts of Terrorism The terrorist act is generally a symbolic gesture against a group or national government. Tactics include: – – – – armed attacks arson assassination bombing hijacking hostage-taking kidnapping, etc. COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point Suicide bombings
Terrorism as Strategy • Terrorism as means to achieve goals and objectives • Strategic goals include: – – Political change (e. g. , overthrow govt. ) Social change (e. g. , France headscarf ban) Economic change (e. g. , stop resource export) Religious change (e. g. , fundamentalism) • Overall goal: create a “better” world COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Some Strategic Objectives of Terrorism • Recognition: Gaining national or international recognition for their cause; recruiting new personnel; raising funds; demonstrating their strength • Coercion: Force a desired behavior of an individual or government • Intimidation: Prevent individuals, groups, or governments from acting • Provocation: Provoking overreaction by a government to the attack on symbolic targets or personnel, thereby gaining sympathy for their cause. • Insurgency support: Forcing the government to overextend itself in dealing with the threat, thereby allowing the insurgency to gain support and commit further attacks against the government. COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Marine Barracks Beirut, Lebanon 23 October 1983 • 241 Dead • 105 Injured COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point “We couldn’t stay there and run the risk of another suicide attack on the Marines. ” -- Ronald Reagan, An American Life
Khobar Towers - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 25 June 1996 • 19 Dead • 240 Injured COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
New York, World Trade Center 12 October 1993 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point 6 Dead 1, 042 Injured
Murrah Federal Building Oklahoma City 19 April 1995 • 168 Dead • 490 Injured • Some religious motivation, but different religion • Same tactics (ammonium nitrate truck bomb) as 1993 WTC attack COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
American Embassy Bombings, Kenya and Tanzania August 1998 224 Americans, Kenyans, and Tanzanians dead Over 4, 025 injured COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
1999 LAX Attack Plan COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
USS Cole, Aden, Yemen October 12, 2000 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point 17 Dead 39 Injured
Terrorism as Strategy • Increasing interest in “soft targets” (economically strategic impact, and less protected) such as: – – – – – pubs in Northern Ireland & London UK open markets & cafes in Israel international airport, Sri Lanka bus in Manila, the Philippines shopping mall in southern Philippines nightclub in Bali, Indonesia banks in Istanbul, Turkey hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia nightclub in Berlin, Germany – and, of course. . . COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
New York City & Washington, DC September 11, 2001 2, 973 Dead 10, 000+ Injured COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Karachi, Pakistan May 8, 2002 Bus attack 14 Dead, including 11 French engineers COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point June 14, 2002 Attack on U. S. Consulate 12 Dead 50 Injured
Bali, Indonesia October 12, 2002 202 Dead 350 Injured Citizens from 21 countries, mostly Western tourists, were killed in the blasts COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Casablanca, Morocco May 17, 2003 44 Dead 107 Injured COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Jakarta, Indonesia August 5, 2003 12 Dead 60 Injured J. W. Marriott Hotel, Jakarta COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia November 8, 2003 3 simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks on Al-Muhaya apartment complex April 21, 2004 Attack on Security Services Headquarters 4 Dead 148 Injured 17 Dead 122 Injured COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Istanbul, Turkey November 20, 2003 27 Dead 400 Injured Primary Targets: British consulate and the HSBC bank headquarters COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Madrid, Spain March 11, 2004 191 Dead 1, 035 Injured COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Jakarta, Indonesia September 9, 2004 9 Dead 173 Injured Australian Embassy was primary target COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
London, UK July 7, 2005 54 Dead 716 Injured COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Strategy and Recruitment • Terrorism is an individual’s strategic choice most often driven by a combination of: – Intense grievances – Sense of crisis – Address a power imbalance - empower the disenfranchised • The ties that bind: training camps, extended family, social networks; trusted networks = key • Combination of ideology and psychology • No constraints re: geography, organizational affiliation, etc. COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Strategy and Recruitment • Recruit individuals with differing talents or attributes to offer – – Locals with knowledge of customs, culture Foreigners with passports, language skills Sleepers or operationalists who can “fit in” Individuals who can serve as critical functionaries • Sleeper cells were key for the 9/11, Madrid and London attacks COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Terrorists as Strategic Actors Even though it’s a decentralized network, there are still critical functions that enable the network to operate • Critical functionary roles – can become a hub of multiple networks – – weapons procurement financier (funder or banker) (particularly in Halawa system) document forgerer human traffickers • Support individuals (trusted contacts) can and sometimes do support multiple networks; can provide supplies/facilitate trafficking of weapons & funds to multiple networks • Example: 60% of day spent moving legitimate charity money around; 20% of day on Hamas transactions, other activity on side • Some may get profit for doing these support/function roles COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Different members of the network play support and action roles
Strategy and Training COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Strategy and Training Establish training camps – developing the will to kill and the skill to kill • Operational space: Geographic isolation • Teachers: Experts in relevant knowledge, e. g. , military combat experience • Committed learners • Time, money, and basic necessities • • • Afghanistan Algeria Bosnia Chechnya Colombia Egypt Indonesia Japan Kashmir Lebanon Libya COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point • • • Northern Ireland Peru The Philippines Somalia Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Syria Turkey United States Uzbekistan
Strategy and Training • Psychological dimensions • Moral disengagement – – Displacement of responsibility Disregard for/distortion of consequences Dehumanization Moral justification • Group power over behavior, personal decisions • Preparation for martyrdom COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Strategy and Training Lessons for new recruits include: • education in explosives and detonators: how to assemble bombs (e. g. , TNT, C 4), mines and grenades, pressure and trip wire booby traps, and the basic knowledge of electrical engineering • how to mount rocket launchers in the beds of pickup trucks • how and where to launder money • how to successfully conduct a kidnapping • how to conduct target identification, surveillance and reconnaissance • how and where to build camouflage-covered trenches • how to covertly communicate with other members of a group or network • how to fire handguns, machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Strategy and Training Lessons for new recruits include: • the rudiments of chemical and biological warfare • field command escape tactics • marksmanship and camouflage • the use and employment of Soviet rocket-propelled grenades and shoulder borne STRELA missiles • sniper rifle skills; how to fine-tune a rifle sight at short range to ensure accuracy at longer distances • how to direct weapon fire at targets on the ground and in the air • training in four-man unit deployments and formations—including wedges, columns, echelons and lines—techniques similar to those used by U. S. Marines and Army Rangers COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Strategy and Training Increasing use of the Internet • Provide free tactical advice (print or online dissemination of information on bomb making, computer hacking, etc. ) • Advise sleepers on how to adapt to local surroundings (e. g. , dress, friendly relationships with locals, etc. ) • Examples of online resources include: – – – – The Terrorists’ Handbook How to Make Bombs, Book Two 13 volume Encyclopedia of Jihad Manual of Jihad The Green Book (IRA) The Turner Diaries (US extremists) Mu’askar al-Battar (The Al Battar Training Camp, an Al Qaeda magazine) The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook The Anarchist Cookbook Field Manual for Free Militia Sabotage Handbook Special Force – first-person shooter game, developed by Hizballah Cyber-attack tools and instructions COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Example of Tactics: Ammonium Nitrate • • Millions of tons produced each year for use as fertilizer Mining companies mix small amounts of explosive grade ammonium nitrate with fuel oil to create explosives • • • Used in several IRA bombings Used in World Trade Center bombing, 1993 (1, 200 lbs in truck bomb) Used in the Oklahoma City bombing, 1995 Used in the U. S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, 1998 Used in the Bali bombing, 2002 • March 30, 2004: More than half a ton of ammonium nitrate fertilizer is found in a lock-up in West London. Eight British citizens, one American and one Canadian were arrested on suspicion of being involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Strategy and Training • These are Learning Organizations = committed to capturing knowledge, analyzing it, forming new doctrine and tactics which are informed by lessons from the past – – Learn from each other Learn from trial and error (IRA example) Media showcasing ‘best practices’ to others Managing public image (PR) (becoming more sophisticated) • Terrorists are learning many things in Iraq, like: – – – Manufacturing and concealing IEDs Urban warfare Sniper and ambush techniques Hostage taking Media manipulation • OVERALL: How to recruit, fund, and execute assymetric warfare COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Suicide Terrorism as Logical Strategy COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Suicide Terrorism: Who? Perception: Reality • Generalized profile of suicide terrorists, including: • The “profile” is wrong • Terrorists are: – – – Young Single Male Uneducated Religious fanatics COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point – – – Preteen - mid-sixties Both single and married with families Both male and female Both educated and uneducated Not motivated by religious fanaticism World’s leader in suicide terror are Hindu; Tamil Tigers who are conducting insurgency against Sri Lanka
Suicide Terrorism: Why? Perception: Reality • Seemingly irrational act • Part of a strategy that is: – Well planned – Logical – Designed to achieve specific political objectives • Suicide attacks have increased over the past two decades • Why? COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point • Does two things: – Inflicts immediate punishment against target society – Threatens more punishment in the future
Suicide Terror Attacks are. . . • inexpensive and effective; extremely favorable per-casualty cost benefits for the terrorists • less complicated and compromising – no escape plan needed, and success means no assailant to capture and interrogate • perhaps the ultimate “smart bomb” – this “weapon” can cleverly disguise itself, use various modes of deception, and effect last minute changes in timing, access, and target • a strategic communication device – successful attacks are virtually assured media coverage • effective because the weaker opponent acts as coercer and the stronger actor is the target • Key difference from other attacks: The target of suicide campaign cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Suicide Terrorism: Where? Three types of attacks are most likely to occur: • High value, symbolic targets involving mass casualties – Important government buildings, installations, or landmarks – Major means of personal or commercial transportation • High value, symbolic targets against specific persons – Political assassinations (e. g. , head of state, regional governor, etc. ) • Deliberately lethal attacks targeting the public – Bus, train, subway bombings; attacks on shopping malls, cinemas, sports stadiums, public gathering spaces COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Understanding Counterterrorism COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
2. MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) CT Approach Question: Once we understand the threat, how do we address it? Answer: We employ all the instruments of national power available to us. • • Military Intelligence Diplomacy Legal Information Financial Economic COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point • Case studies of groups and events help us learn about each of these dimensions
Example of the Financial/Economic Dimensions: How does the LTTE Sustain its Operation Financially? In Areas heavily dominated by Tamils Local Enterprises Taxes from local Population Taxes from Business Robbery Blackmail & Ransom Taxes from Fishermen LOCAL Tax on Liquor Drug s/ Crime Investing/ running Local Business Ventures Fund raising Projects COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point Taxes from Visitors Taxes on Goods Playing the Stock Market
INTERNATIONAL FUNDING Funding from state Parties Aiding International Criminals Donations from Supporters (Tamil Diaspora) Terrorist training Credit card Fraud Foreign residence Tax International Propaganda/ Fund raising projects Asylum Seekers tax Money laundering/ Forgery Foreign Investments/Business Shipping/Gunrunning Human Trafficking COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point Drug Smuggling
US Counterterrorism Strategy • Helped Sri Lankan military develop 4 key capabilities – – Operate behind enemy lines Engage in night fighting SEAL, special boat operations Psyops capabilities • Helped Sri Lankan banking and commerce tracking systems locate & disrupt money laundering networks COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
The “L” in MIDLIFE • Legal/Law Enforcement • Rule of law is vital, both domestically and internationally • The primary intelligence gatherers and first responders are local law enforcement officers • Help countries develop their law enforcement capabilities and legal institutions • Must conduct CT within ethical and legal frameworks, to avoid exacerbating existing grievances COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Intelligence: Learn from our own mistakes • We assumed simultaneous 9/11 attacks in U. S. were beyond the capabilities of terrorists • Overestimated the significance of past successes & the terrorists’ own incompetence • Attention was focused exclusively on opposite ends of the terrorist technological spectrum • Believed terrorists were still interested in publicity and not killing COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
3. U. S. Strategy for Combating Terrorism National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (released in February 2003) Four main objectives: • defeating terrorist organizations with global reach • denying sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists • diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit • defending U. S. citizens and interests COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Elements of the National CT Strategy 4 D’s: • Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach • Deny terrorists the sponsorship, support, and sanctuary they need to survive • Diminish the underlying conditions that promote the despair and destructive visions of political change that lead people to embrace terrorism • Defend against terrorist attacks on the U. S. , our citizens and our interests around the world COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach Objectives: • Identify the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Intelligence, Diplomacy, Information) • Locate the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Intelligence, Diplomacy, Information) • Destroy the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Military, Financial, Legal) Requires considerable interagency coordination and multinational cooperation Particular importance given to organizations with combination of high motivation and significant capabilities COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Deny terrorists sponsorship, support, & sanctuary Objectives: • End state sponsorship (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Intelligence, Economic, Financial, Information, Legal, and in the most extreme cases, Military) • Establish & maintain international accountability (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal) • Strengthen international will to combat terrorism (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Military, Intelligence, Economic, Financial, Legal) • Interdict & disrupt material support for terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Intelligence, Economic, Intelligence, Financial, Legal) • Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Military, Intelligence, Economic, Intelligence, Financial, Legal) Requires considerable interagency coordination and multinational cooperation In particular, we must work with willing and able states, enable weak states, persuade reluctant states, and compel unwilling states COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Diminish the underlying conditions Objectives: • Strengthen international capacity to combat terrorism (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Intelligence, Military, Economic, Financial, Information, Legal) • Win the war of ideas (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Legal) Requires considerable interagency coordination and multinational cooperation Special attention is already being given to developing SOF capabilities in places like the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel Region (e. g. , TSCTI) We need to focus on strengthening law enforcement/rule of law; intelligence gathering & sharing; public diplomacy Local communities must de-legitimize terrorism COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Defend against terrorist attacks Objectives: • Implement National Strategy for Homeland Security (DIMEFIL dimensions: Intelligence, Economic, Financial, Information, Legal) • Attain domain awareness (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal) • Enhance measures to protect critical infrastructure (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal) • Integrate measures to protect U. S. citizens abroad (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal) • Ensure an integrated response capability (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal) Based on the mindset that “the best defense is a good offense” COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
U. S. National Security Strategy, September 2002 (Replaces 2000 Clinton Edition) Table of Contents Introduction I. Overview of America's International Strategy II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends IV. Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
National Strategic Framework for the GWOT Ends Overall Goal: Preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to that way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists. Ideological support Comms & Movement Protect the Homeland Ways Funds Safe havens Enemy Leadership Weapons Foot soldiers Access to Targets Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism Help create and lead a broad international effort to deny terrorist networks the resources they need to operate and survive. COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER partner and international instruments of power National, at West Means Point
UNCLASSIFIED Ends Military Strategic Framework for the GWOT Strategic Goal: Preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to our way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists. END-STATE Termination Objectives from the Contingency Planning Guidance Ideological support Comms & Movement Ways Military Strategic Objectives Protect the Homeland Funds Safe havens Enemy Leadership Weapons Foot soldiers Access to Targets Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive. Enable partner nations to counter terrorism. Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for consequence mgmt. Defeat terrorists and their organizations. Persuade, coerce, and when necessary, compel states and non-states to cease support for terrorists. Establish conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism. COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Means Point Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies
Counterterrorism Strategy • Our strategy must involve denying terrorists sanctuary; separating terrorists from the population • Must isolate them, take away their support, force them to continually be on the run • Organizing force protection based on battle line mentality won’t work • UAV’s aren’t as useful as you might think; over-reliance on technical wizardry has been a problem in the field • Attrition – we must keep after them, never give up, while making sure they don’t recruit new members COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Counterterrorism Strategy • Human intelligence networks are critical (although non-efficient use of manpower) • Must have continual presence – cannot go into a village “looking for the terrorists” • Focus on the enemy’s ideology, in addition to their tactics • This is a War of Ideas: We need to convince them (potential supporters and recruits) that we (liberal democracies) offer a better way than separatist Islamic Jihad (but without attempting to convert them to our way of life) • We must work to bolster the image of American morals and values being compatible with those of the Arab and Islamic world, where we are too often portrayed as greedy, selfish hedonists COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Counterterrorism Strategy • Evaluate trends and potentials, capabilities and intentions, and provide an operational net assessment • The contemporary terrorist threat involves a series of adversaries linked in networks. Combating networks requires an understanding of networked threats • Must not over-react; terrorist strategy may be to provoke overreaction, leading to further alienation and possible supporters among populace • Tactical level: thwart an attack, pursue and bring to justice attack perpetrators • Strategic level: build resilient communities COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Counterterrorism Strategy Information warfare - We must develop an effective counter-ideological message - Manage perceptions/be more proactive in the information battlespace - Undermine the perceived legitimacy among supporters • How well do we invest in and support the “extremists whom we like” (a. k. a. , “moderates”) and support ways to amplify their voices? • We must invest in educational & social institutions; media organizations • Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism can only be achieved through – Multinational partnerships – Interagency coordination COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Coordination Levels ALLIES Coalition OTHER AGENCIES DOD DOS Interagency CIA Joint Army Navy Air Force Marines Army Combined Arms COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Interagency Coordination Process President Principals Committee Deputies Committee Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point Secretary Level Deputy Secretary Level Core Group: NSC, DOS, DOJ/FBI, DOD, CIA, Treasury (Secret Service), and Department of Homeland Security
The National Security Council NSC Staff TE TA CS I DC Sec of Home. Sec. DOHS COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point VP W CO H S SE CS INTEL Community DOD EF POTUS CJ JCS CD SE DOS Nat’l Security Advisor NSC
Interagency Coordination: Lead Federal Agency Concept • Terrorist Incident Overseas: Department of State • Terrorist Incident in United States: FBI • Consequence Management in United States: Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) • Terrorist Financing: Department of the Treasury • Military Action*: Department of Defense • *and support lead agency Intelligence Community Support: • Identifying, locating and tracking terrorists and organizations • CIA, FBI, DIA and Do. D Intel Orgs, State INR (plus Allies and Partners) COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
National Counterterrorism Center Addressing the first “I” in MIDLIFE • NCTC currently has assignees (USG staff) from: • Federal Bureau of Investigation • Department of Defense • Central Intelligence Agency • Department of Homeland Security • Department of State • Others – DOE, NRC, HHS, USDA, USCHP • Assignees to NCTC retain authorities of parent entities • In NCTC, key organizations involved in the fight against terrorism are collectively fulfilling shared responsibilities COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Terrorism Information Access and Integration • Many U. S. Government networks are available in NCTC • Integrated architecture will enable a simultaneous, federated search capability against the terabytes of data available to the U. S. government • Advanced analytic tools are facilitating the automated sourcing and tailoring multi-use products; enhancing data exploitation and integration • “Terrorism information” covers an exceptionally broad array of data • Active information acquisition effort underway • Seeking awareness and integration of non-obvious terrorism information COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Terrorism Analysis and CT Requirements • What do we know? What do we need to know? • Providing daily terrorism analysis for the President, senior policymakers, and the U. S. Government • NCTC produces integrated and coordinated analysis – if there analytic differences on the nature or seriousness of a particular threat or issue, they are incorporated into the analysis • Producing special analysis and other in-depth, strategic, and alternative analyses • Counterterrorism Requirements - Identifying gaps in knowledge; prioritizing transnational terrorism information needs COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Toward a Counterterrorism “System” • Beyond implementing Center responsibilities, the greater goal is facilitating a counterterrorism “system” as part of a greater U. S. Government (USG) system-of-systems • All USG elements need not be centralized; however, a distributed but integrated framework must be consciously agreed upon and orchestrated • Roles and responsibilities of USG CT elements must be as unambiguous and straightforward as possible; intentional rather than haphazard redundancy COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Conclusion • You must thoroughly know your enemy before you can successfully defeat him • You cannot address terrorism in isolation – – – Root causes (socioeconomic, religious extremism, etc. ) Facilitators (criminal networks, arms trafficking) Finances are key Ideology, other motivators Information/public diplomacy is vital All must be done in the context of moral, ethical & legal principles • Bottom line: CT goes way beyond strategy and tactics; we must focus on environmental factors that facilitate terrorism COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Suggestions for Teaching Counterterrorism • Use case studies to frame the key issues/challenges (particularly the moral, legal, tactical dimensions) • Assign National Security Strategy and other White House documents as required reading • Have students analyze National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from MIDLIFE perspective, noting that effective CT requires integration of all dimensions • Assessment (papers, presentations, quizzes) – students should demonstrate - understanding of threat - the strategy behind the threat - dimensions of DIMEFIL model, and - the integration of DIMEFIL dimensions into holistic CT strategy COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Suggestions for Teaching Counterterrorism Integrative Exercise/Capstone Experience: • Complex terrorism scenario • Assign different readings to different groups of students; integrative exercise should focus on the complex requirements for information and force collective strategic thinking and action • Questions for groups to answer can include: – What will you recommend? – What are the moral, legal implications of your actions? – Who (what national assets) will you involve? • Overall goal is to integrate lessons learned throughout the course, and to learn while engaged in the exercise • Outcome should give you a sense of what they’ve learned, whether or not they “get it” COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
Questions? COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point
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