Strategic Division Israel Defense Forces 1701 VIOLATION

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces 1701 VIOLATION – CASE STUDY HIZBULLAH’S PROHIBITED ARMS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON Unclassified || Slide 1

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Hizbullah Deployment Overview Hizbullah’s military assets are deployed within populated areas throughout Lebanon, as part of its strategy, doctrine and preparation for war. Hizbullah’s Deployment in Southern Lebanon 5, 000 Activists ≈30, 000 Rockets Command Unit Sector Each village area contains dozens of activists and hundreds of rockets Village Concept of Operation Massive long-range strike Targeting mostly Israeli population centers Territorial defense of the launching units Unclassified || Slide 2

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Background Previous Arms Cache Explosions The events of September 3 rd join two previous incidents of explosions in Hizbullah arms depots located within villages in Southern Lebanon Hirbit Silim 14/7/09 A series of explosions were observed in a building on the outskirts of Hirbit Silim. Evidence of rockets, mortars, artillery shells and more were found on site, as well as vehicles and equipment indicating that the site was active. LAF played a role in denying UNIFIL access to the site, as Hizbullah activists removed military evidence from the scene. Tayr Falsay 12/10/09 An arms depot in the house of a senior Hizbullah official exploded. Hizbullah operatives immediately began to remove the arms, using trucks to transport them to the nearby village of Dir Kanoon. UNIFIL access was denied throughout the event Unclassified || Slide 3

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Background UNIFIL‘s Lessons Learned “ UNIFIL Investigation - Hirbat Silim UNIFIL Investigation - Tayr Falsay “LAF and UNIFIL should intensify efforts to Strengthen current activities…improve their discover and remove weapons…make sure no capacity to respond promptly to such incidents armed elements are in the area and prevent and ensure a presence at incident sites possible UNIFIL’s within a minimum time delay…. include a freedom of movement is fully respected and set of coordinated procedures to immediately ensure that UNIFIL is able to discharge its seal off and isolate areas in which incidents responsibilities according to UNSCR 1701” have taken place and ensure that they are smuggling…Ensure that effectively secured” 11/09/09 08/01/10 Unclassified || Slide 4

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Overview Based on IDF intelligence, corroborated by Lebanese media reports, the Shihabiya site, owned by Wisam Saloum, a senior Hibzullah activist, was known to be used for Hizbullah military activity. The site contained arms, in violation of UNSCR 1701, which specifically prohibits armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL between the Blue Line and the Litani River. In addition, the proximity of these weapons endangers the local population, which UNIFIL is required to protect, as per its mandate. Shehabiyya, Southern Lebanon || 1245, 03/09/10 A fire broke out at 1245 in a Hizbullah arms asset, followed by some secondary explosions. Hizbullah operatives immediately cordoned the area, preventing all access. After extinguishing the fire, the operatives transferred the arms from the shed into the nearby building and removed all evidence. LAF and UNIFIL representatives were shown into the shed. At night, after UNIFIL and LAF departed, dozens of activists transferred the weapons into trucks and nearby buildings, and from there to other villages, all undistributed by UNIFIL or LAF. Unclassified || Slide 5

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces FIRE IN HIZBULLAH MILITARY SITE First Responders

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Initial Events 03 September 2010 TIMELINE 1245 Fire observed in a known Hizbullah arms depot in Shehabiyya. Secondary explosions follow 1330 IDF informs UNIFIL regarding the incident 1413 Hizbullah activists block off the area, extinguish the fire and transfer contents to nearby building 1418 IDF updates that it believes munitions were present 1428 LAF forces arrive but are not granted entry into the area of the arms shed 1517 Hizbullah activists arrive on scene 1530 LAF forces depart from the scene 1550 Trucks arrive and begin to load the site’s contents 1550 IDF informs that several trucks were 100 m from the building and were being loaded 1630 Following UNIFIL request, IDF provides UNIFIL with precise coordinates of trucks Unclassified || Slide 7

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Focus Points Indications of weapons and ammunition at site - secondary explosions, shed roof blown off and top was immediately covered with plastic sheets. The area was blocked off by large numbers of personnel who rapidly arrived. LAF and UNIFIL arrived on the scene but were not granted access. Access was ultimately granted to shed only at 1750 (5 hours later). Reporters were also denied access. Concealment efforts included cordoning the area, covering the roof, cleaning the area and waiting for the veil of darkness for clean-up operations. Efforts to sanitize the scene relied on large amounts of trucks, other vehicles, personnel and many hours of labor. Unclassified || Slide 8

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces FIRE IN HIZBULLAH MILITARY SITE CLEAN UP

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Clearing the Depot 03 September 2010 TIMELINE 1750 UNIFIL and LAF officers are permitted entry to the cleared shed, not the building 1900 IDF conveys 3 possible munitions locations (one in Sela’a and two in Shehabiya), all which buildings known as Hizbullah military sites prior to the incident and to which the trucks arrived from the shed 1945 UNIFIL states that it does not intend to search the houses with ammunition 2100 UNIFIL informs the IDF that LAF would depart and return the next morning. 2200 IDF provides coordinates for truck obscured within a field nearby, intended for later transfer. 2239 Long and heavy objects (likely rockets) are transferred from shed to a nearby location 2254 Hizbullah operatives form a human chain to transfer objects to nearby location. Objects are also removed through windows 2330 UNIFIL encounters local resistance 0005 IDF requests UNIFIL engagement after extensive activity in the building. FC responds that area is cordoned and that the shed has been inspected. 0236 The trucks headed to Nabatiya 0240 IDF informs that the convoy began to move north. UNIFIL responds that exits are blocked. ~0310 The convoy crosses the Litani River without being stopped. Materials are transferred to a mosque in Nabatiya. Unclassified || Slide 10

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Focus Points Hizbullah went through great efforts to obscure the military equipment from the scene, waiting until nightfall to transfer the goods to other locations in the village, as well as another nearby village and a village north of the Litani River. q Hizbullah worked throughout the day and at night to clear the scene of evidence. LAF and UNIFIL were prevented access until this was completed. q UNIFIL and LAF’s assurances of checkpoint effectiveness proved irrelevant, reason remains to be seen. q The transfer to the mosque in Nabatiya reflects yet again Hizbullah use of civilian and religious sites for military purposes. q Probable rockets appeared in the aerial imagery. q The trucks and houses whose locations were conveyed to UNIFIL and LAF were not inspected. q Hizbullah’s military assets removed from the scene under the cover of night. THE MOSQUE IN NABATIYA q Side roads were used for the transfers, rather than major thoroughfares. Unclassified || Slide 11

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces FIRE IN HIZBULLAH MILITARY SITE THE AFTERMATH

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces The Aftermath 04 September 2010 q UNIFIL and LAF arrived late on scene, inspecting the shed only once access was permitted by Hizbullah. q UNIFIL was only granted complete access to the shed the following day and the building four days later, on September 7 th. q Investigations later showed that massive amounts of water were used to wash down the shed to obscure evidence. q LAF and UNIFIL failed to maintain grip and control of the scene following the explosion and especially after nightfall, allowing the removal of equipment. q LAF and UNIFIL checkpoints failed to meet Hizbullah’s convoys and check them, as required by 1701. q In two similar recent events (Hirbat Silim – 7/09, Tayr Falsay– 10/09), UNIFIL investigations recommended changes and lessons learned that were not implemented. Unclassified || Slide 13

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Summary q Third event in a little more than a year – emphasizing ongoing Hizbullah violations of UNSCR 1701 q Hizbullah’s military deployment within civilian populations and exploitation of local population violates 1701, endangers population in routine and wartime. q LAF’s conduct – cooperation with Hizbullah and ongoing, increasingly hostile provocations q Need for independent and proactive UNIFIL fulfillment of its mandate: prevent illegal arms in AOR, protect population. q Threat to Israeli security, to Lebanon and regional stability. q Need for decisive action from the UN and the International Community to disarm Hizbullah and other armed militias, starting with south of the Litani. Unclassified || Slide 14