SSLstrip, Slowloris & Scary SSL Attacks Sam Bowne
Contact Sam Bowne n Computer Networking and Information Technology n City College San Francisco n Email: sbowne@ccsf. edu n Web: samsclass. info n
Topics n sslstrip – Steals passwords from mixedmode Web login pages n Slowloris – Denial of Service – Stops Apache Web servers n Scary SSL Attacks--ways to completely fool browsers
sslstrip
The 15 Most Popular Web 2. 0 Sites 1. You. Tube n 2. Wikipedia n 3. Craigslist n 4. Photobucket n 5. Flickr n 6. Word. Press n 7. Twitter n 8. IMDB n HTTPS HTTPS MIXED HTTPS
The 15 Most Popular Web 2. 0 Sites 9. Digg n 10. e. How n 11. Type. Pad n 12. topix n 13. Live. Journal n 14. deviant. ART n 15. Technorati n n HTTPS HTTP Obfuscated HTTP MIXED HTTPS From http: //www. ebizmba. com/articles/user-generated -content
Password Stealing Medium ssltrip Easy Wall of Sheep MIXED, 3 HTTP, 5 HTTPS, 7 Hard Spoofing Certificates
Mixed Mode n HTTP Page with an HTTPS Logon Button
sslstrip Proxy Changes HTTPS to HTTP To Internet HTTPS HTTP Target Using Facebook Attacker: sslstrip Proxy in the Middle
Ways to Get in the Middle
Physical Insertion in a Wired Network To Internet Attacker Target
Configuring Proxy Server in the Browser
ARP Poisoning Redirects Traffic at Layer 2 n Sends a lot of false ARP packets on the LAN n Can be easily detected n De. Caffienate. ID by Iron. Geek n n http: //k 78. sl. pt
ARP Request and Reply Client wants to find Gateway n ARP Request: Who has 192. 168. 2. 1? n ARP Reply: n n MAC: 00 -30 -bd-02 -ed-7 b has 192. 168. 2. 1 ARP Request ARP Reply Client Gateway Facebook. com
ARP Poisoning Attacker ARP Replies: I am the Gateway Forwarded & Altered Traffic to Facebook Client Gateway Facebook. com
Demonstration
slowloris
HTTP GET
Send Incomplete HTTP Requests n n Apache has a queue of approx. 256 requests Each one waits approx. 400 seconds by default for the request to complete So less than one packet per second is enough to occupy them all Low-bandwidth Do. S--no collateral damage!
OSI Model Do. S Attack 7 Application Slowloris – Incomplete HTTP Requests 6 Presentation 5 Session 4 Transport SYN Flood – Incomplete TCP Handshakes 3 Network 2 Data Link 1 Physical Cut a cable
Demonstration
i. Clicker Questions
Power failures brought down servers at 365 Main last year. What OSI Model was that attack in? A. B. C. D. E. Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5 or higher
Which type of website is the most dangerous? A. B. C. HTTP Mixed: HTTP with HTTPS elements HTTPS
What precaution protects you best when using a public Wi-Fi hotspot? A. B. C. D. E. Open Access WEP WPA VPN 802. 1 x
What precaution seems best against Slow. Loris? A. B. C. D. E. Do nothing and ignore it Adjust Apache timeouts Use a load-balancer Add a module to Apache Something else
What sort of logins do users of your Website use? A. B. C. D. E. Plaintext Mixed-mode HTTPS with a CA Self-signed SSL Something else
What plans do you have to use IPv 6? A. B. C. D. I don't care about IPv 6 at all I'll implement IPv 6, but not for years Planning to implement it within a year Planning to implement it sooner than a year E. I am already using IPv 6
Scary SSL Attacks
Man in the Middle To Internet HTTPS Target Using https: //gmail. com Attacker: Cain: Fake SSL Certificate
Warning Message
Certificate Errors The message indicates that the Certificate Authority did not validate the certificate n BUT a lot of innocent problems cause those messages n Incorrect date settings n Name changes as companies are acquired n
Most Users Ignore Certificate Errors n Link SSL-1 on my CNIT 125 page
Fake SSL With No Warning Impersonate a real Certificate Authority n Use a Certificate Authority in an untrustworthy nation n Trick browser maker into adding a fraudulent CA to the trusted list n Use a zero byte to change the effective domain name n Wildcard certificate n
Impersonating Verisign n Researchers created a rogue Certificate Authority certificate, by finding MD 5 collisions n n Using more than 200 Play. Station 3 game consoles Link SSL-2
Countermeasures Verisign announced its intent to replace MD 5 hashes (presumably with SHA hashes), in certificates issued after January, 2009 n Earlier, vulnerable certificates would be replaced only if the customer requested it n n n Link SSL-4 FIPS 140 -1 (from 2001) did not recognize MD 5 as suitable for government work n Links SSL-5, SSL-6, SSL-7
CA in an Untrustworthy Nation n Link SSL-8
Unknown Trusted CAs n n An unknown entity was apparently trusted for more than a decade by Mozilla Link SSL-9
