Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the New Financial World Richard Segal March 2007
Table of Contents Belize: State of Denial Ecuador: Drowning in Shallow Water Zambia: A Rogue by any Other Name Sovereign Debt Restructuring Frameworks Investor Relations Programs Paris Club-Private Sector Issues Multilateral Development Bank Issues 2
Belize: State of Denial • External debt climbed unsustainably • The Government overlooked negative signals for two years • The Government resisted an IMF program • Authorities were wary of disturbing the BZD/USD currency peg • Officials eventually “came to their senses” • The restructuring was successful and valuable lessons were learned • Conclusion: It’s never too late to make amends 3
Ecuador: Drowning in Shallow Water • Belize: Willing but unable – Ecuador: Able but “unwilling” • Presidential campaign focused on debt issues • Politicians did not understand the economic repercussions of “tough talk” • “Tough love” from foreign investors could hurt the economy: eg, capital flight, fewer trade lines • Competing priorities imply delay in debt decision • Conclusion: Policy stubbornness can damage economic prospects 4
Zambia v DAI: A Rogue by any Other Name • DAI, a US company, purchased Romanian claims against Zambia in the late 1990 s • Negotiations lasted about seven years but ultimately failed • Reasons: DAI’s tactics, Zambia’s internal politics • DAI ultimately litigated and received a favorable court judgment • Debt relief campaigners are aghast • Some facts: GDP in USD terms has more than doubled in four years, private investment is 20% of GDP, external debt is less than 15% of GDP • Conclusion: Rogueness is in the eye of the beholder 5
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Frameworks • Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (IMF) • Collective Action Clauses (various private sector umbrella organizations) • Two-stage process (JP Morgan) • “Muddle Through” (pre-existing) 6
Investor Relations Programs (IRPs) • IRPs arose in the wake of the Mexican peso crisis • Data transparency has improved tremendously • Best practices/league tables for both are published • Data transparency is essential for any capital market participant • The value of IRPs is overstated 7
Paris Club-Private Sector Issues • “Comparability” should be revisited • Better/more creditor coordination is advisable • Paris Club accounting practices are opaque • The Paris Club’s mission may need to evolve further • The Paris Club should take more items in-house • The Paris Club should not subsidize new borrowing 8
Multilateral Development Bank Issues • Private Sector Involvement (PSI) is heavy handed and lacks accountability • The IMF’s signalling approach should be debated • Evidence of new initiatives is mixed (FSI v GDDS) • The IMF/World Bank preferred creditor status should be reviewed • Restructuring processes suffer from the lack of an information clearing house FSI: Financial Soundness Indicators GDDS: General Data Dissemination System 9
Conclusions: • Debt restructuring frameworks have improved • Borrowers and creditors have become more transparent • Information asymmetries still exist, and creditor coordination is still imperfect • The roles of the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club should be further reviewed • The system is not broken, but complacency is a risk 10
Скачать презентацию Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the New Financial World
d0a65243dcd336c4816ffedfef9d1373.ppt