Скачать презентацию Social Value Orientation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas Скачать презентацию Social Value Orientation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

040478dc6f7e81ae52da6f5bd884a8fe.ppt

  • Количество слайдов: 13

Social Value Orientation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis Daniel Balliet Singapore Management Social Value Orientation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis Daniel Balliet Singapore Management University Craig Parks and Jeff Joireman Washington State University

Social Value Orientation (SVO) • The weights people assign to self and other outcomes Social Value Orientation (SVO) • The weights people assign to self and other outcomes in interdependent contexts. – Prosocials (altruists and cooperators) – Proselfs (individualists and competitors)

Purpose of Meta-Analysis • Central tendency • Variation • Moderators – Iterated vs. one-shot Purpose of Meta-Analysis • Central tendency • Variation • Moderators – Iterated vs. one-shot – Give-some vs. take-some – Paid vs. non-paid participants – Group size

Iterations vs. One-Shot Dilemmas • Partner strategy may reduce SVOcooperation relationship in iterated dilemmas. Iterations vs. One-Shot Dilemmas • Partner strategy may reduce SVOcooperation relationship in iterated dilemmas. – Behavioral Assimilation: Prosocials conform to a proself’s defection during iterated social dilemmas (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975)

Give-Some vs. Take-Some • Two reasons to expect SVO may be more predictive of Give-Some vs. Take-Some • Two reasons to expect SVO may be more predictive of cooperation in G-S than T-S. – Prospect Theory: Losses (G-S) more important than gains (T-S). Therefore, defection and Cooperation more attractive for proselfs and prosocials, respectively (De Dreu & Mc. Cusker, 1997) – Equality norm more salient in take-some dilemmas (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995), and SVO less predictive when equality norm is salient (de Kwaadsteniet et al. , 2006).

Paid vs. Non-Paid Dilemmas • Two reasons to expect SVO may be more predictive Paid vs. Non-Paid Dilemmas • Two reasons to expect SVO may be more predictive of cooperation in non-paid dilemmas. – Payment may prime a business frame. • This may change prosocials ‘communal’ construal of the dilemma to a ‘business’ construal, thereby reducing their level of cooperation. – Payment may reduce expectations of other’s cooperation.

Group Size • All SVO measures include decisions while interacting in a dyad. • Group Size • All SVO measures include decisions while interacting in a dyad. • Does this limit SVO’s ability to predict behavior in groups of 3 or more?

Methods and Analyses • Criteria for Selection – Adults – Measure SVO (Ring or Methods and Analyses • Criteria for Selection – Adults – Measure SVO (Ring or TDM) – DV is strict social dilemma • Analyses – Correlation as effect size – Prosocial vs. Proself – Mixed-Effects models

Results: Main Effect • Prosocial vs. Proselfs – Q(81) = 248, p <. 001 Results: Main Effect • Prosocial vs. Proselfs – Q(81) = 248, p <. 001 – (n = 82) r =. 30, 95% CI, LL =. 26, UL =. 33 – Orwin’s fail safe N = 510 • Individualists vs. Competitors – Q(18) = 33. 9, p =. 013 – (n = 19) r =. 27, 95% CI, LL =. 19, UL =. 34 – Orwin’s Fail Safe N = 110

Results: Moderators • Iterated vs. One-Shot – Q (1) =. 157, p =. 692 Results: Moderators • Iterated vs. One-Shot – Q (1) =. 157, p =. 692 – One-Shot: r =. 31, 95% CI, LL =. 26, UL =. 35 – Iterated: r =. 29, 95% CI, LL =. 24, UL =. 34 • Give-Some vs. Take-Some – Q (1) = 5. 26, p =. 022 – Give: r =. 29, 95% CI, LL =. 25, UL =. 34 – Take: r =. 22, 95% CI, LL =. 17, UL =. 27

Results: Moderators • Paid vs. Non-Paid Participants – Q(2) = 20. 6, p <. Results: Moderators • Paid vs. Non-Paid Participants – Q(2) = 20. 6, p <. 001 – Not Paid: r =. 39, 95% CI, LL =. 33, UL =. 45 – Lottery: r =. 36, 95% CI, LL =. 23, UL =. 47 – Paid: r =. 23, 95% CI, LL =. 20, UL =. 26 • Group Size – Slope = -. 007, Q(1) = 4. 75, p =. 03

Future Directions • Payment X SVO Implications – Is an implicit measure of SVO Future Directions • Payment X SVO Implications – Is an implicit measure of SVO needed? • Research needed on SVO in the context of iterated social dilemmas. – Forgiveness • Why is SVO more predictive of G-S games? • SVO in strong vs. weak situations. – Do paid/take-some dilemmas have more uniform expectations, construal, and incentives for appropriate behavior?

Questions? Balliet, D. , Parks, C. , & Joireman, J. (2009). Social value orientation Questions? Balliet, D. , Parks, C. , & Joireman, J. (2009). Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A metaanalysis. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 12, 533 -547.