Session 12 New Methods of Planning for Catastrophic

Session 12 New Methods of Planning for Catastrophic Disasters 1

Learning Objectives • Objectives: By the end of this course session students should be able to: – 12. 1 Describe catastrophe response planning assumptions and context – 12. 2 Describe newly developing methods – 12. 3 Know current legislation – 12. 4 Describe current planning initiatives – 12. 5 Understand politics and planning 2

FEMA’s Catastrophe Definition • “. . . any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. ”

Setting the Catastrophe Assumptions and Context • Magnitude and scope of the catastrophic event • Lack of prior experience with the catastrophic event and • Increased overall complexity of event 4

Magnitude and scope of the catastrophic event • Local government incapable of response • Basic life support systems in turmoil • Regional collaboration and response necessary 5

Lack of prior experience with the catastrophic event and • Experience is a resource • Some individuals, communities and regions are better prepared than others 6

Increased overall complexity of event • Operational tempo is faster • More interdependency of systems • Disaster effects snowball 7

Catastrophe Response Planning Innovations • New decision making tools • Change in focus from all-hazard to scenario-specific planning • Predictive modeling techniques and analysis 8

New Decision Making Tools • Catastrophic Incident S (CIS) Supplement • Catastrophic Incident Annex (ultimately available at fema. gov/nrf) 9

Change of Focus from All-hazards Planning to Scenario-specific Events • All-hazards planning assumption concept is that response to all disasters is basically the same • Scenario based planning uses a specific event to establish a framework for modeling disaster effects 10

Predictive Modeling Techniques HAZUS-MH estimates potential loss from physical, economic, and social impacts Gap analysis determines the resources on hand, the resources that may be required for a catastrophe and the gap between those two. 11

Current Legislation for Catastrophic Planning • The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act and amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002) have greatly changed and expanded the responsibilities of FEMA. 12

Catastrophe Response Planning Initiatives • Integrated Planning System (IPS) • Catastrophic Planning Program (CPP) • Northatlantic Hypercomplexity 13

Integrated Planning System (IPS) • • Is more traditional Mostly a top down approach Terrorism centric Created by government professionals 14

Strength of Integrated Planning System (IPS) • Access to classified information • Involved many governmental levels and departments • Fits into traditional ICS • Is scenario and exercise based 15

Weakness of Integrated Planning System (IPS) • • Federal in orientation Limited in scope and detail Uses scenario outlines making it easy May not integrate lessons learned from exercises 16

Catastrophic Planning Program (CPP) Uses an extensive bottom-up regional focus based on a single scenario. The approach is scientifically sound, focused on capability and required resources, based on collaboration and partnerships and is holistic in nature 17

Case Study #1: The Florida Catastrophic Planning Project • Considers two incidents: A breach of the Herbert Hoover Dike and Hurricane Ono • Uses gap analysis • Is participatory and inclusive • Bottom-up approach 18

Case Study #2: The New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Earthquake Planning Project • What do we do if a major earthquake hits the central US tomorrow? • Is collaborative and inclusive • Uses HAZUS • Bottom-up approach 19

NMSZ scenario estimates • • • • • • • 3, 500 deaths and 82, 500 injuries 715, 000 buildings damaged 300, 000 buildings completely destroyed 141 counties in 8 states with significant impact 87 hospitals moderately damaged and 3 completely damaged 1, 540 schools moderately damaged and 117 completely damaged 23 EOCs moderately damaged and 1 completely damaged 377 police stations moderately damaged and 62 completely damaged 864 fire stations damaged and 62 completely damaged 79 potable water facilities damaged. 2, 853 waste water facilities damaged. 637 electrical facilities damaged. 553 natural gas facilities damaged 7, 265 oil facilities damaged 2, 480, 000 households without power on day 1. 2 million people need shelter by day 3 10, 100 communications facilities damaged 139 airports damaged 168 dams damaged 103 levees damaged 3, 550 highway bridges damaged 296 billion dollars direct economic loss 250 HAZMAT facilities damaged 50 million tons of debris 223 ports damaged 20

Strength of the CPP • National in orientation • Plan will be integrative and synchronized at all levels of government • Encourages local ownership of plan • Is realistic and detailed • Process is on-going • Is inclusive 21

Weakness of the CPP • • • Plans limited to response operations Is expensive and time consuming Is scenario and site specific Is complicated Lack of single response plan may be confusing 22

The Northatlantic Hypercomplexity Approach • Believes catastrophes are “hypercomplex” because of the extremely high degree of interdependent linkages in modern societies regarding the production and delivery of basic life-supporting services, such as food, water, electricity, natural gas, oil and communications. So because of these linkages, the focus of decision-making cannot be limited to a single control center and the effects of the event are greatly broadened to other jurisdictions, countries and continents, as well as to other aspects of human life, such as health, economics, and security. 23

Strengths of the Northatlantic Approach • Is international • Focused on entire systems • Considers the possibility of real time interventions and their effects • Uses a decentralized decision making structure 24

Weaknesses of the Northatlantic approach • Is very young, theoretical and conceptual in nature • Does not have bench marks from which to document progress 25

Comparison of IPS, CPP, and Northatlantic Approaches • • Response time Responder Broad Issues Approach Control Event Focus Regional focus IPS Unknown Federal No Top down Centralized Terrorism No CPP Northatlantic 72 hours Unknown National all Yes Bottom up Both Decentralized Natural Yes 26

Power and Politics of Planning • • • You can not please everyone Credibility and trust Knowledge Respect differences Be inclusive 27