Securing a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran Our

Securing a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran

Our National Interests Dictate our Objectives Vital v Survival of the Iranian Islamic Republic with our Fundamental Institutions and Values intact v Stability of Iran and our Territorial Integrity v Prevention of a Military Attack on Iran v Enhancement of Iran‘s Power within the Region and Beyond Very Important v Survival of Iranian allies (Hezbollah, Syria) v Promoting the prosperity and virtue of Iran‘s population Objective Secure a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran by completing at least three nuclear weapons by 2012 while avoiding an attack

Background Analysis STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES v Strong options for distraction and chaos (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi‘a Insurgents in Iraq) v Domestic enrichment process means time is our ally v IAEA inspectors obstruct secret enrichment v Single, concentrated enrichment facility in Natanz as large target v Economic situation inside Iran already fragile OPPORTUNITIES v IR-2 will speed up enrichment, offers diversification v Reluctant, over-stretched enemy may endure more provocations v Enemies‘ split interests offer chance for division THREATS v Enemies‘ fear may trigger attack v Economic sanctions may stir turmoil inside Iran v Technical difficulties with IR-2 may delay enrichment

Assessment of Key Players Player Interests/ Drivers Weaknesses U. S. Ensure stability in region; decrease price of oil; restore US credibility in region; avoid regional hegemon; ensure Israel’s security; ensure no nuclear weapons in the region (ex. Israel); Iran’s regime transformation/change Weak standing and influence in the region due to Iraq and lack of progress in the Peace process; economic downturn; dependence on the regional oil supply; increasing influence of Russia/China in the region Ensure survival; mitigate Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah Regional geopolitics; loss in the 2006 Lebanon war EU/EU-3 Economic and energy ties to the region; sympathetic to peaceful nuclear energy Lack of a unified policy toward Iran; economic dependence on oil China/Russia Expand economic ties; get access to energy sector Increasing economic ties to Iran; must maintain delicate balance between US and Iran Maintain credibility of the NPT regime; prevent nuclear Iran; prevent nuclear arms race in the region Iran controls access; NPT has loopholes Israel IAEA

Nuclear map Covert site possibility • Along route to Tehran • Provides cover for transport • Sufficiently distant from Natanz (approx 100 miles)

We need to change the enemies‘ perception Problem: Continued enrichment reinforces this perception “Iran doesn’t have the bomb now, but will have it soon, thus we have to act” B A “Iran doesn‘t want the Bomb so we don‘t have to stop them“ To prevent an attack we need to change the perception in one of two ways “Iran wants the bomb but it is too costly to stop them“

Technological implementation cannot be our only concern Geostrategic End-State Middle Eastern Brotherhood Divide and Conquer Autarky Information Policy Technical Implementation Accomodating Concealment Ambiguous Diversification Assertive Fast Forward

Current capabilities and paths for completion by 2012 Uranium Enrichment Kg of LEU Optimal Enrichment Scenario: 4550 3900 3250 2600 1950 1300 650 0 0 Goal: 3 Bombs • • • P-1 Uranium IR-2 Uranium 2 4 6 8 3, 000 P-1 at Natanz + 200 IR-2 per month 1 bomb after 6 months 3 bombs after 12 months 6 bombs by 12/2008 10 12 14 16 18 20 Number of months from now Completion Arak Heavy Water Plutonium Option Project 2012 Impossible • Time-frame too long Bushehr Lightwater Summer 2011 Problematic • Must exit NPT • Single Target

All three options generate enough material by 12 / 2012 1 “Charming Our Way to the Bomb“ 3900 • • • P-1 Uranium IR-2 Uranium 2600 1300 0 0 2 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 “Distract and Deter“ P-1 Uranium IR-2 Uranium 3900 2600 1300 0 0 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 • 3, 000 P-1 at Natanz (25% lower rate) • + 200 IR-2 per month (25% lower rate, no enrichment before 11/2008) • 1 bomb after 7 months • 3 bombs after 16 months • 4 bombs by 12/2009 “Autarky and Micro-Enrichment“ 3900 Kg of LEU 3 2 3, 000 P-1 at Natanz (normal rate) + 200 IR-2 per month (25% lower rate) 1 bomb after 6 months 3 bombs after 13 months 5 bombs by 12/2009 P-1 Uranium 2600 IR-2 Uranium 1300 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 • 3, 000 P-1 at Natanz (50% lower rate) • + 200 IR-2 per month (50% lower rate) 1 bomb after 8 months • 3 bombs after 20 months • 3 bombs by 12/2009

1 Charming our Way to the Bomb v Mislead the enemy: • Continue P-1 enrichment, but focus on IR-2 • Seek to complicate and delay IAEA negotiations, e. g. offer multinational consortium RISK of attack 60/100 IMPACT of attack 80/100 COST v Pacify the enemy: • Collaborate in Iraq; restrain Hezbollah in Lebanon • Abstain from provocation in the Gulf • Moderate public discourse and favor moderate Presidential candidate 20/100 v Engage the enemy: v Encourage economic and security collaboration with Arabs v Offer advantageous energy deals to EU, China, India PRO CON o o o Minimizes economic sanctions to ensure political stability in Iran Creates the basis for long-term Iranian hegemony in the Middle East o Very high risk that our real intentions will be detected Negotiation over IR-2 enrichment at Natanz will slow production process

2 Distract and Deter v Distract most likely attacker (Zionists) • Arm, instigate Hezbollah, Hamas • Provoke Zionist Aggression against Lebanon, Gaza RISK of attack 30/100 IMPACT of attack 40/100 v Demonstrate credible threat but don’t provoke U. S. COST • Conduct missile tests • Fake intelligence about possession of bomb • Allude to nuclear retaliation to Zionist attack • Keep Shi‘a Militias in Iraq generally calm but prepare to instigate of chaos 40/100 v Accelerate and spread out enrichment • Make life harder for inspectors, conduct calculated violations of IAEA rules • Push Natanz and secret enrichment at other sites PRO o Fastest way to the bomb o Uncertainty will split international community (especially China, Russia) CON o Risk of attack if we are caught bluffing o Additional sanctions, but relatively easy to escape in the long run

3 Autarky and Micro-Enrichment v Undermine success of attack v Immediately diversify to large number of targets v Create capability to quickly reconstitute program v Move most sensitive material to densely populated areas v Distract the enemy v Trigger large conflict between Zionists, Hezbollah, Hamas v Create chaos in Iraq by leveraging Shi‘a militias to tie down U. S. RISK of attack 20/100 IMPACT of attack 20/100 COST 90/100 v Cut all links to the outside v Exit Non-Proliferation Treaty v Send inspectors home v Prepare for Economic and Security autarky PRO o Does not count on deceiving the enemy o Very narrow window for enemy attack CON o High economic cost, possibly also in the long run o Risk that difficulties of coordinating centrifuges may delay production

Recommendation: “Distract and Deter“ Fall back Option: „Autarky“ RISK of attack IMPACT of attack COST 1 “Charming Our Way to the Bomb“ 60/100 80/100 2 “Distract and Deter“ 30/100 40/100 20/100 90/100 3 “Autarky and Micro-Enrichment “ Option 2: “Distract and Deter“ balances risk of attack, impact of attack and economic costs most effectively

Implementation requires 2 -step strategy: moderation until US elections, escalation thereafter Until 11 / 2012: Moderation, ambiguity and diversification v Create ambiguity o Publicly deny first use doctrine o Conduct missile tests o Fake intelligence about possession of bomb v Continue current game with IAEA until US elections to moderate result o Calculated violations of IAEA rules, obstruction of inspections o Install IR-2 at secret enrichment sites but wait with operation v Lull the enemy o Moderate Hezbollah, Hamas while supplying with funds, arms o Cooperate in Iraq and hold back Shi‘a militias 12 / 2012 Chaos and Enrichment Push v Instigate major conflict between Zionists and Hezbollah / Hamas v Initiate surge in Iraqi violence for initial distraction of Great Satan v Condem aggression by Zionists, great Satan as excuse for short-term non-cooperation with IAEA but continue cooperating after v Use distraction to withdraw material from Natanz