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Secure and Efficient Network Access DIMACS Workshop, November 3 rd, 2004, Piscataway, NJ, USA Secure and Efficient Network Access DIMACS Workshop, November 3 rd, 2004, Piscataway, NJ, USA Jari Arkko Ericsson Research Nomadic. Lab Pasi Eronen Nokia Research Center Pekka Nikander Vesa Torvinen Ericsson Research Nomadic. Lab This presentation has been produced partially in the context of the Ambient Networks Project. The Ambient Networks Project is part of the European Community's Sixth Framework Program for research and is as such funded by the European Commission. All information in this document is provided ``as is'' and no guarantee or warranty is given that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The user thereof uses the information at its sole risk and liability. For the avoidance of all doubts, the European Commission has no liability in respect of this document, which is merely representing the authors view Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 1

Presentation Outline • • • The Problem Ongoing work Some new ideas An example Presentation Outline • • • The Problem Ongoing work Some new ideas An example protocol run Conclusions Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 2

The Problem Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 3 The Problem Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 3

Some Problems in Current Network Access Approaches (1/3) - Efficiency • Attachment involves a Some Problems in Current Network Access Approaches (1/3) - Efficiency • Attachment involves a large number of messages – – – – Scanning & 802. 11 attachment 802. 1 X and EAP messaging 802. 11 i four-way handshake DNA & IP router and neighbor discovery Address autoconfiguration, DAD Mobile IP home registration Mobile IPv 6 correspondent node registration • Over 50% of this is due to security • Request/Response style, even across the Internet – Amount of data is growing with certificates, configuration, and discovery • Multiple mandatory waiting periods – Even a second, such as for DAD • Iteration over available accesses Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 4

Some Problems in Current Network Access Approaches (2/3) - Security • “I’m one of Some Problems in Current Network Access Approaches (2/3) - Security • “I’m one of the trusted network nodes” approach – Sufficient for large cell size, well protected base stations – Not very good for devices on the coffee shop wall • Focus on authentication, not authorization – Does everyone know/agree with the service parameters ? • Denial-of-Service problems – Use of cryptographic keys very late in the process – Attacks that create/leave state to network side elements – Insecure lower-layer “detach” messages – 802. 11 countermeasures functionality • Privacy protection is non-existent or incomplete Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 5

Some Problems in Current Network Access Approaches (3/3) - Functionality • Security models do Some Problems in Current Network Access Approaches (3/3) - Functionality • Security models do not fit all types of deployment – Credit card payments – Home deployments (e. g. leap of faith or physical connection instead of a certificate exercise) • Configuration, discovery, and movement support – – What are the IP parameters that I can get from this access point? Is my home operator available via this access point? How much would accessing this network cost? Could the network tell me when to move, and to what channel and parameters to use? Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 6

Ongoing Work Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 7 Ongoing Work Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 7

Ongoing Work to Address the Problems. . . • IP mobility – Better implementations Ongoing Work to Address the Problems. . . • IP mobility – Better implementations that employ parallism allowed by the RFCs – Faster route optimization schemes, such as moving tasks out of the critical path • Address autoconfiguration – Turning DAD off – Optimistic DAD – DHCP and SEND security Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 8

Ongoing Work, Continued • DNA, Router and Neighbor Discovery – Faster algorithms for detecting Ongoing Work, Continued • DNA, Router and Neighbor Discovery – Faster algorithms for detecting whether or not movement has occurred – More frequent and precise router advertisements – Elimination “first message” delays from RFC 2461 – SEND security • EAP authentication – Methods work (new credentials, deployment, …) – Channel binding and parameter authentication Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 9

Ongoing Work, Continued • Link layer – Pre-authentication and proactive key distribution – Better Ongoing Work, Continued • Link layer – Pre-authentication and proactive key distribution – Better protection of payload packets (AES etc) – Better information channels from the network to the clients (e. g. , 802. 21) – Discovery (WIEN SG) – Faster scanning techniques, parameter tuning – Bigger subnets (less IP layer work after attachment) –. . . Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 10

Observations • People care about this! • A lot of results! • Most work Observations • People care about this! • A lot of results! • Most work focused on a particular “slice” of the problem • No good understanding of what the impact of individual improvement is for effiency – E. g. , “I can’t afford 1 RTT in Mobile IP” • Not enough system-level understanding of the security issues Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 11

Some New Ideas Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 12 Some New Ideas Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 12

Approach • Focus on the problem as a whole! – – – There are Approach • Focus on the problem as a whole! – – – There are multiple parties involved -- not just two Who needs to communicate with who? How are the parties identified? What is the optimal order of messages? What system security properties are needed? Are there bulk information transfer needs? How can they best be addressed? – Can we learn something from solutions in other contexts? Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 13

Caveat • This may not be compatible with current protocols • Layer-purists might object Caveat • This may not be compatible with current protocols • Layer-purists might object to our views • We do not have all the details, just pointers to ideas Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 14

Potential Solution Ingredients (1/5) Addressing: • All nodes (not just the client) need an Potential Solution Ingredients (1/5) Addressing: • All nodes (not just the client) need an address • Addresses are hashes of public keys • Benefits: – All parties -- such as the “access network” can be addressed in communications – Avoid address stealing and functionality to bind addresses to credentials – Nodes can generate their addresses and keys on their own, without infrastructure – Privacy can be achieved via ephemeral keys • Identifier vs. routing semantics Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 15

Potential Solution Ingredients (2/5) Message order: • Find out what information the whole problem Potential Solution Ingredients (2/5) Message order: • Find out what information the whole problem involves, and how many messages need to carry it • And re-think message order • Example: If the client’s IP address was known earlier, the authentication process with the home network could handle mobility-related registrations as well • Benefits: – Number of messages can be reduced – “Ping-pong” delays can be avoided Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 16

Potential Solution Ingredients (3/5) Information transfer: • Do not fetch everything from the original Potential Solution Ingredients (3/5) Information transfer: • Do not fetch everything from the original source – Cache information about, say, roaming consortium in the AP • Learn from TCP… no req-resp across the Internet – Either run TCP-like protocols directly between the client and the, say, home network – Or have the access point do this over the Internet, and use a requestresponse over the final radio hop • Information transfer capabilities should not be restricted to the initial authentication exchange • Benefits – More and faster information transfer, at any time Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 17

Potential Solution Ingredients (4/5) Miscallenous • Delegation – – Does the client have to Potential Solution Ingredients (4/5) Miscallenous • Delegation – – Does the client have to be involved in tasks? Can some tasks be delegated to the access point/router? For instance, router based address assignment and DAD Even a mobility related registration could be delegated • Denial-of-Service protection – No separation to “attachment” and “secure attachment” – Stateless design on the network side Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 18

Potential Solution Ingredients (5/5) Miscallenous, continued • Privacy protection – Build the protocols for Potential Solution Ingredients (5/5) Miscallenous, continued • Privacy protection – Build the protocols for non-static identifiers and addresses – Protect communications from the start, not at the end Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 19

An Example Protocol Run Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 20 An Example Protocol Run Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 20

The Example Flows: – – Current message flow Suggested basic message flow Variant with The Example Flows: – – Current message flow Suggested basic message flow Variant with better mobility support Handoff Assumptions: – – Authentication needed; roaming case IPv 6 Mobility with RO & one peer Client - home authentication in 2 RTT (identifier / challenge / response / success) Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 21

Example: Current Flow Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 22 Example: Current Flow Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 22

access network client other node home Beacon 802. 11 Attachment 802. 11 Authentication 802. access network client other node home Beacon 802. 11 Attachment 802. 11 Authentication 802. 1 X and EAP 802. 11 i 4 -Way HS IPv 6 Router Discovery IPv 6 DAD MIPv 6 Home Reg MIPv 6 RO Reg Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 23

Example: Improved Basic Flow Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 24 Example: Improved Basic Flow Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 24

access network client other node home Beacon includes: - Access node identifier - Access access network client other node home Beacon includes: - Access node identifier - Access network identifier - Possible other “advertised” information, such as capabilities, roaming partner identifiers, and so on Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 25

access network client other node home Beacon Secure Attachment The functions of the secure access network client other node home Beacon Secure Attachment The functions of the secure attachment protocol: - Authenticate the claimed identities (opportunistically) - Turn ciphering on, as in 802. 11 i 4 -way handshake It also piggybacks the following: - Deliver IPv 6 router advertisements - Authentication and authorization to the home (partially) - May perform address allocation on behalf of the client - May perform mobility registration on behalf of the client Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 26

access network client other node home Beacon Secure Attachment I 1: trigger exchange -------------> access network client other node home Beacon Secure Attachment I 1: trigger exchange -------------> select precomputed R 1: puzzle, D-H, key, sig <------------check sig remain stateless solve puzzle I 2: solution, D-H, {key}, sig -------------> compute D-H check cookie check puzzle check sig R 2: sig <-------------check sig compute D-H Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 27

access network client other node home Beacon Secure Attachment Home auth & authz - access network client other node home Beacon Secure Attachment Home auth & authz - The home authentication process follows the identity/challenge/response/success model (for instance) - A mobility protocol home registration is carried in the same messages -- executed after the final response message is sent Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 28

access network client other node home Beacon Secure Attachment Home auth & authz RO access network client other node home Beacon Secure Attachment Home auth & authz RO registration 1. Client delivers its public key, other parameters, and a statement that delegates the access network to allocate an address for it. 2. Access network has a statement from an authority about the prefixes it “owns”. It constructs an address and sends the address, the statement, and the client’s information to the home network. 3. Home network sends the information along to the correspondent node. Correspondent node believes the validity of the care-of address since it trusts the same authority. in a HIP-like mobility solution there is no need to verify the home address; client’s signed statement is sufficient. Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 29

Example: Variation with Better Mobility Support Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 Example: Variation with Better Mobility Support Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 30

access network client other node home Beacon Secure Attachment Home auth & authz RO access network client other node home Beacon Secure Attachment Home auth & authz RO registration Care-of Address Test Variation: A common authority can be avoided by a care-of address test. Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 31

Example: Handoffs Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 32 Example: Handoffs Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 32

access node 1 client access network access node 2 Beacon Secure Attachment - Access access node 1 client access network access node 2 Beacon Secure Attachment - Access node 1 has a signed statement from the access network that it is a part of the network. This is given to the client. - After authentication and authorization at the home network, a set of explicit authorization criteria are known. A signed statement is given to the client, saying that the client is allowed to move to another access node within the same network, as long as the criteria are fulfilled. Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 33

access node 1 client access network access node 2 Beacon Secure Attachment - Access access node 1 client access network access node 2 Beacon Secure Attachment - Access node 2 has a similar statement from the access network as well. - Client presents its statements and the usual home authentication/authorization process can be skipped. Client gets access. - However, access node 2 needs to verify authorization criteria. In many case this implies contacting a central node in the access network (e. g. concurrent usage limit). Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 34

Conclusions Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 35 Conclusions Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 35

Conclusions • Need to look at the whole problem – Measurements – System-level security Conclusions • Need to look at the whole problem – Measurements – System-level security story – Solutions • Some early solution ideas presented – Clearly more work is needed for the details, security analysis & actual benefits • Feedback appreciated! Arkko et al, DIMACS Workshop Nov ‘ 04 36