Religion in Contemporary American Politics Questions for this

Religion in Contemporary American Politics Questions for this section: What is the “God Gap” in American politics? How did it arise? What role does religion play in vote choice and public opinion? I. God Gap: Where are we and how did we get here? A. The 2004 election; what did it show us? 1. Mainline Protestants have continued to become more Democratic and Evangelicals more Republican 2. The more religiously active of all types increased their support for the GOP 3. Latino Protestants moved significantly to the GOP 4. Social issues mattered more for Bush’s religious constituents; economic issues mattered most for all of Kerry’s constituent groups B. Today’s partisanship and vote choice, by the numbers: 1. Partisanship 2. Vote Choice

C. The mobilization of Evangelical Protestants In 1960, there were more people in the (what are now considered) Mainline Protestant churches than Evangelical churches (40 to 27%). Today that number is 15 -25%. Further, they were strongly Republican. In 1960, Evangelicals were strongly Democratic (their overall % of pop stayed the same at about 20 -30%). But they began defecting and/or being replaced by younger GOP leaning evangelicals. In 1960, Catholics were strongly Democratic. They are split today with traditional Catholics voting more for the GOP. 1. What happened? A religious realignment. • “The 1960 s and 1970 s introduced a new cultural politics, associated with the counterculture, sexual revolution, newly legalized abortion, women’s rights, and gay rights. ” That is, when the Dem Party introduced culture war issues and the more orthodox and traditional responded by becoming either independent or Republican. • Further, seculars and the less religious responded by moving to the Democratic party. The GOP seized the opportunity by courting theologically orthodox (especially Reagan; Kennedy story).

• 2. • • • Key: prior to the 70 s, religious traditionalism, orthodoxy, beliefs, were not significant predictors of PID or vote choice. Socioeconomic factors were the primary predictor of vote choice (no longer the case). Polarizing Trend data from 1952 to present, the political differences between those attending church frequently and those attending infrequently grew dramatically on at least the following issues: GOP vote choice for President, House, and PID (from no difference to 20 -25 points) Regarding the same political behaviors since 1980; distance between those who say religion is important to them and others grew from 5 -10 favoring GOP to 20 -30 points From 1964, same behaviors; distance between “Biblical literalists” and “Biblical minimalists” grew from no difference to 30 -38 points) Occurred in Two Waves (late 1970 s and early 1990 s): Key formative events include the formation of the Moral Majority, election and friendship of Reagan, the age of liberalism in the DEM party in the 1970 s and 1980 s, Pat Robertson candidacy, formation of Christian Coalition, Pat Buchanan campaigns, 1994 election (turnout, Contract with America, and big GOP bump from evangelicals); nomination of George W. Bush. GOP support among evangelicals higher than ever. Public Opinion on Policy Issues

a. Evangelicals are the least in favor of economic liberalism (25%) and Black Protestants are the most (51%). b. Evangelicals are most likely to agree that “new lifestyles” will destroy society (80%) while seculars and Jews are least (45%). c. Jews, Hisp. Catholics, and seculars most likely to favor absolute gender equality in all spheres of society (80%), EP and LDS least (65% and 50% respectively) d. Abortion – Hisp Protestants and EPs least likely to favor unrestricted abortion (15 & 22%); Jews and seculars most likely (80 and 59%). Most people of all traditions are in the middle. e. Committed evangelicals most likely to agree that homosexuality should be discouraged (78%); Jews and seculars least likely (18% and 26%). Less than 10% of LDS and EPs favor same-sex marriage compared to 50% of seculars and 67% of Jews; 74% EPs disfavor gay adoption compared to 18 and 36% of Jews and seculars (Catholics split; BP = 70%). f. Committed evangelicals, C mainliners, C C, most likely to call id as conservatives (75, 56, 45%); BP, seculars least likely (30%). g. EP most likely to say cultural issues are important (48%); seculars, noncommitted Catholics, C BP, least likely (13 and 20%). h. EPs least supportive of Aff Action, most conservative on military and defense (nearly 80% of EP and LDS support Iraq war compared to 13% of Muslims, 22% of BPs, 32% of Jews, 34% seculars, 50% HC, 55% MP, 58% C). Key point for culture war discussion though, lots of people in the middle.

2. Rise of the New Christian Right (NCR): The Causes • Evangelicals began to climb the socio-economic ladder • Theological divisions; the progressives vs the orthodox. Religious camps in the past were typically denominational; alliances across denominational boundaries were rare. But, in the 20 th century, theological orthodoxy became the most important dividing line among the religious, not denomination. Traditional Catholics discovered they had more enemies within Catholic circles than among the evangelicals (same could be said of Protestants regarding their own denominations). In the 20 th century, churches responded to theological liberalism by splitting off (PCA) or reforming from within (SBC). Today, what matters most in Protestantism is evangelicalism, not church affiliation (sharing pulpits). These theological alliances provided the framework for future political alliances and organizations in the Christian Right (Pat Robertson Charismatic, D. James Kennedy - Presbyterian, and Jerry Falwell - Baptist).

• Emergence of Culture War issues, especially as partisan issues (that is, when parties and candidates took sides, religious views on culture war issues became divided not just theologically but now along party lines as well. Dramatic increases in and moral acceptance of teen pregnancy and births (% of births to unmarried teens grew from 15 to 70%), illegitimacy (5% 1960 to 35% today, much more dramatic for minorities with blacks, for example currently at 70% up from 22% in 1960), crime, pornography, # and rate of abortions (million a year), television content (Seinfeld’s “The Contest” vs The Andy Griffith cast), sexualization of youth culture/entertainment (and stat associated rise in promiscuity), working mothers, cohabitation, age and likelihood of marriage, ratio of divorces to marriages (. 26 to. 51), social acceptance of homosexuality, juvenile delinquency (17 per 1000 juveniles to 55); Supreme Court opinions involving abortion, secularization of public schools, school prayer, homosexual rights, creationism, sex education, suicide, pornography and first amendment, etc. Read p. 108 -109 of Brewer and Stonecash. • Media – The NCR drawing on its institutional base (churches), took advantage of technological advancements and opportunities (from radio and television to webcasts and satellite, “Justice Sunday”). 1000 of 9000 radio stations are religious.

• Embraced the approach of Neo. Evangelicals and Reconstructionists – prior to the 1970 s, evangelicals largely believed (as good fundamentalists and dispensationalists) that this world did not matter much. In fact, things were going to get irreversibly worse just prior to Christ’s return (prophecy). The church should concern itself only with saving souls, not worldly things like politics (weapons of our warfare not carnal). But the Neo. Evangelicals and Reconstructionists, for different reasons, successfully convinced the others that God commands Christians to be politically active (render unto Ceasar; redeem the culture; kingdom work extends to politics; etc. ). "When I was growing up, " recalls Fundamentalist Pastor Keith Gephart of Alameda, Calif. , "I always heard that churches should stay out of politics. Now it seems almost a sin not to get involved. " • A giving people – evangelicals give money and time. They give lots of money and time. They give more money and time than other religious or non-religious people. Not only do they give lots to their churches, but they give significantly more to other religious and nonreligious non-profits (including charities and political interest groups) than others. They are more likely to believe they should and less likely to make excuses when they don’t than others. The NCR, with all of its fund-raising and group membership drives, have thrived on this.

3. • • • 4. • Who is the NCR? Evangelicals, but disproportionately fundamentalist (fewer confessional and reformed folk). Historian George Marsden jokes, “A fundamentalist is an evangelical who is angry about something. ” A fundamentalist, though no longer apolitical, is typically far more politically concerned about the moral behavior of non-believers than other evangelicals. Groups – Started with the Moral Majority, then the Christian Coalition, now the American Family Association (but also, Family Research Council, Focus on the Family, Center for Reclaiming America, Alliance Defense Fund, Traditional Values Coalition, Concerned Women of America, Eagle Forum, etc. ) People – James Dobson, Jerry Falwell, D. James Kennedy, Tony Perkins, Chuck Colson, Phyllis Schaffley Changes in the NCR – though the number of NCR identifiers and sympathizers has not seriously changed since the early 80 s, the NCR has experienced a few changes: Less visible in the GOP – Many believe that the 1992 GOP convention hurt the Republicans because so many keynote speakers were NCR representatives (Pat Buchanan, Pat Robertson). Today, they are rarely allowed to speak at the GOP and the few that do have softened their rhetoric.

• Focus a bit less on national elections and more on state and local political issues (gay marriage; abortion) • Has occasionally expanded its issue list, but this has been hard (why include lower taxes and immigration reform? Why exclude environmental policy? • Appears to be more “mainstream” and less organizational and peripheral inside the GOP. • A gradually growing group of evangelicals share the same values on cultural issues, vote GOP, but have more diverse views on other issues and do not like to be identified with the NCR. They would laugh at my Lord’s Prayer joke. 5. Assessing the success of the NCR • Some have argued that the NCR has been ineffective given its goals. Abortion is still legal, cultural change (“moral decline”) has only increased more rapidly, no significant number of evangelicals elected to major offices, GOP inaction in terms of policy priorities, DEM party liberalized even more after 2000. This has led many, including some of its earlier leaders and founders, to declare it a failure and seek alternative (nonpolitical) solutions to perceived cultural problems (see books by Cal Thomas, “Blinded by Might” and David Kuo, “Tempting Faith”).

• Others point to GOP success (elections); evangelical voter mobilization for GOP, Supreme Court appointments, Democratic moderation in the 90 s, and a few minor victories here and there as evidence of success. II. Rise of the Religious Left? Less than 30% of Americans consider the Democratic party to be “friendly” towards religion. As with the GOP and Blacks, if the Dems could garner just 10 -20% more of the churchgoing folk, it would win major elections with ease. Howard Dean declared that the Dems must go after this vote by changing its rhetoric (Dean quotes). The Faith in Public Life Resource Center, began as a Democratic leadership conference call, is now a stand alone group with Dean’s mission in mind. A. Can it be successful? It’s going to be hard…Why? 1. Theological disunity or incohesion - Principle difference between the Religious Right and Left: The Religious Right believes in objectively revealed Truth, the Religious Left does not. As a starting principle, the Religious Left accepts theologically the notion that Truth is not and can not be objectively known (except, perhaps, the tiny little group of evangelicals in it). If it is not objectively known and if everyone has their own version…

of it and if these versions must be equally weighted for pluralism’s sake (highest value), then how can a unified policy position, agenda, crusade ever be marked out? Pluralism trumps conviction and may leave the movement without a leg to stand on (NYT article). “We are a religious voice. ” Okay, what does that voice say? Uh, I don’t know, I don’t want to speak for anyone or impose my values on others or say that someone else is wrong or that I am right…The NCR is united around a common authority, the scriptures (or a God who speaks infallibly). What authority unites the RL? Indeed, a theological tenet of liberalism is the rejection of any common objective authority in theology. 2. #s ain’t good: the institutional structure (churches) that so helped the NCR get off the ground and stay in the air just isn’t there among the RL. Mainliners are not as liberal as their leaders and the # of churchgoing blacks is falling or joining white evangelical churches. 3. Tension with seculars in DEM leadership and among activists. Number of seculars, atheists, agnostic, and other unaffiliated has increased dramatically over the last 30 years (roughly doubled from 8 -16, though some dispute here). % of seculars in DEM party activists considerably higher. 4. Lack of religious influence over political ideology (Kohut reports that 31% of people cite religious beliefs as connected to their political conservatism, 6% connect it with political liberalism). This is especially true on the non-cultural or social issues like welfare.

These have led many strategists to suggest that Dems “give up” on the “Sunday vote” and be careful to solidify the left’s most loyal and promising constituent groups (racial minorities, the unmarried, especially unmarried women, the lowest on the socio -economic ladder, and seculars, atheists, and other unaffiliated). Somewhat parallel situation between the GOP and blacks. B. Hope for it? Why? l African-Americans – no significant sign of changing loyalties. This group is the second most likely to cite religious beliefs as a motivating factor for their political preferences. l Mainliners are not necessarily a spent force in politics. They may be divided today politically (and theologically in terms of laity vs leaership), but they still represent a formidable potential religious political group with vast resources, a strong history of “social gospel” and political engagement, and an established institutional structure in place. l Catholics are not firmly in the GOP camp, even traditional ones. Their support for the GOP can hardly be considered unconditional. They are relatively new supporters and may change; GOP support for policies out of accord with Rome may lead Catholics back home (War, social services, death penalty, etc. ).

4. Tiny evangelical left – Jim Wallis, Randall Balmer, Tony Campolo, The Sojourners Magazine. Main message: the evangelical political agenda ought not be limited to issues of reproductive or sexual immorality, but broadened to include issues of social justice. A broadened Biblicalpolitical agenda, they argue, is in greater harmony with the DEM party platform. III. The Culture War: The culture war theory (James David Hunter) posits that America is (or soon will be) politically divided along theological lines featuring two “armies, ” one of the religiously orthodox/traditional and the other religiously liberal or irreligious. In 1992, at the GOP convention, Pat Buchanan famously said, “There is a culture war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as the Cold War itself. ” There is significant talk of new Red and Blue state divisions which are supposed to represent entirely different cultural environments manifesting itself in national elections. Is there a culture war going on in America?

A. No: Evidence – if theological orthodoxy mattered, black protestants would be at least moving in the direction of the GOP. Not happening. Most studies show that the masses are not politically polarized along theological lines except with respect to a few issues involving sexuality. Polarization does not go much beyond this (problem here, most of these studies distinguish between faith tradition, but not commitment level). Any movement we have seen in opposite directions has been slow. No reason to expect rapidity. Religion is important force over political behavior but continues to compete with other conventional factors (income, race, gender, etc. ). There is much to divide people beyond religious orthodoxy. B. Yes: The “better” studies of the masses (those distinguishing between committed and non-committed adherents) shows polarizing movement along religious lines. It takes time. We definitely see polarizing among political elites (party activists, party platforms, candidate rhetoric, officeholders, media). Expect a “trickle-down” effect. First goes the parties, then goes the people. Bigger question: Is this good for America?