Regional Perspective on Global Disarmament Treaties By Dr. Sameh Aboul. Enein Professor for Disarmament and Security Studies, School of Global Affairs, AUC, Cairo
I. Arab Revolutions: Their Impact • The “Arab Spring” will without a doubt change existing fundamental dynamics. • It will have significant implications on the political and security settings in the Middle East. • Public opinion will play a more significant and prominent role in the formulation of disarmament and security issues. • The parliament with its foreign affairs, Arab affairs and National Security committees will be at the forefront of foreign policy issues in the Arab world. • Disarmament is central to the security and stability of the Middle East.
1. Important Issues for the Middle East • Nuclear issues are expected to receive considerable attention: • Israel’s non adherence to the NPT, Dimona Nuclear hazard. • The establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East. • Other WMD Treaties are also expected to surface within the 20120 Middle East Conference. • The unfolding of the Iran file and its complexities. • Peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
II. WMD: Regional Perspective Geneva Protocol BWC CWC NPT Egypt Party without reservation Signatory Non Party State Party Israel Party with reservation Non Party Signatory Non Party Iran Party without reservation State Party Syria Party with reservation Signatory Non Party State Party
1. NPT: Regional Perspective • Israel remains the only State in the region as a Non-Member of the NPT. • Universality of the Treaty. • Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again is the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. • Nuclear Weapon States should undertake further efforts to reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons (commitments and obligations under Article VI). • Respecting the balance between all three pillars of the Treaty. • Implementation of 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. • Inalienable right for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and opposition to additional restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
2. BWC: Regional Perspective • The BWC is the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. • In the Middle East, all states are party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of such Weapons in war • The 1972 BTWC does not prohibit use but possession of such weapons. • Egypt, Syria and Somalia are signatories of the BWC. • Israel, Mauritania, Djibouti and Comoros remain the only States in the Region as Non-Members of the BWC. Universality of the Biological Weapons Convention. • Promote international cooperation, assistance, and exchange in the field of biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article X of the Convention. • Strengthen the effectiveness of the implementation of the Convention. • Implementation Support Unit (ISU) (launched August 2007) role crucial for the Biological Weapons Convention and its implementation.
3. CWC: Regional Perspective • In the Middle East, all states are party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of such Weapons in war, except Oman and the UAE. • In the Middle East, only Egypt and Syria did not sign the CWC and Israel did not Ratify it. • Iran declared and destroyed production facilities. • Iraq’s stockpile and production facilities had been destroyed by the United Nations before 2003. • The CWC prohibits or regulates the transfer of the most toxic chemicals to non-parties. • Egypt, Syria and Somalia remain the only 3 Arab States Non-Members of the CWC. • Regional Perspective is that Israel should Join the NPT before other countries in the region join other WMD treaties. • The convention is administered by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which acts as the legal platform for specification of the CWC provisions (the Conference of State Parties is mandated to change the CWC, pass regulations on implementation of CWC requirements etc. ). The organizations furthermore conducts inspections at military and industrial plants to ensure compliance of member states.
III. The Specific Challenges Posed by Chemical and Biological Weapons to the International Process aiming to achieve nonconventional weapon disarmament in the Middle East • The Proliferation risks stemming from the trade in dual-use materials: The dual-use nature of chemical warfare technology, and dual-Use Production Capacity. • The contradiction in national interest among states concerning the goals from WMD regimes, norms, and treaties. • Lack of Reliable “Data” information and trustable WMD information that are received from countries as clandestine CW programs data is hard to obtain, so open-source data should be viewed with skepticism. • The difficulty to handle the Israeli nuclear question and its non adherence status to the WMD treaties. • Due to continued growth of industries such as the pharmaceutical industry in developing countries, the number and geographic distribution of industrial facilities that employ these technologies is expanding, as well as, the increasingly intervention of Stakeholders and Businesses such as individuals, E-commerce, industries in the field of WMD, which means the easy access to sensitive information. This expansion may lower the barriers that non-state actors face when attempting to acquire CBW.
1. The Specific Challenges Posed by Chemical and Biological Weapons to the International Process aiming to achieve nonconventional weapon disarmament in the Middle East • The double standard conduct in the field of WMD that lead to a serious breakdown to several WMD disarmament regimes. • Globalization and industrial developments have resulted in a significant increase in the global trade risk in chemicals, as chemicals are shipped through various transportation means, both within and between countries (further enhance transportation security in the light of terrorist threats by adopting the regulations that apply internationally to the transportation of dangerous goods). • The emergence of the threat of “non-state actors” and the ambiguousness of their intentions and capabilities regarding the potential use of such chemical agents (how and when they will use it), such as Aum Shinrikyo. • The fast pace of developments in science and technology. • How to address compliance and non-compliance status regardless whether the state is NWS or NNWS.
2. The Specific Challenges Posed by Chemical and Biological Weapons to the International Process aiming to achieve nonconventional weapon disarmament in the Middle East • Problems with the verification protocols of the CWC and BWC, the latter lacking a significant verification procedure altogether, undermine the ability of the treaties to prevent users or terrorists from acquiring and using CBW. Hence, if the international community cannot verify that CBW do or do not exist in a given state, it is also likely that cannot target assistance or other efforts aimed at preventing proliferation • Given that the 2012 Conference aims to establish a Nuclear Weapons and all other WMD Free Zone in the Middle east, this means that it will reinforce the Chemical Weapons Convention, as all States Parties to the Zone will be prohibited and must abandon the use of such weapons. • The success of the 2012 Conference by taking practical steps to establish the zone will help in making symbolic progress towards universal adherence to the CWC which prohibits the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, as well as, will contribute to regional and international peace and security.
4. Chemical and Biological Developments in the Region (from open sources) • Recent Developments in the region have increased the risk of proliferation of both chemical and biological weapons, especially in both Syria and Libya in which the situation remains unstable. • A recent UN report from a mission that assessed the impact of the Libyan crisis on the wider Sahel region in North-Africa shows there is reason for concern. • large quantities of conventional weapons and ammunition from Libyan stockpiles are smuggled across the border into the region, including advanced weaponry. • Before the Libyan Revolution 54% of its declared amounts of mustard gas, about 40% of its precursor chemicals for making weapons, as well as its entire stockpile of aerial bombs had been destroyed. • The New Libyan government has committed to fulfill its obligations under the CWC and the fact that the chemical weapon destruction process had begun before the revolution inspires optimism. • Given the lack of internal stability there is a risk of proliferation of such weapons. Although chemical weapons storage facilities remained secure and were not compromised during the war it is imperative that steps be taken to secure and destroy remaining chemical stockpiles.
5. UN Resolution 1540 • UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was passed in 2004 in order to reduce threat that non-state actors will get their hands on CBRN materials. • It imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. • It also encourages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts, in accord with and promoting universal adherence to existing international non proliferation treaties. • On 27 April 2006, the Security Council extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a further two years with the adoption of Resolution 1673 (2006), which reiterated the objectives of Resolution 1540 (2004), expressed the interest of the Security Council in intensifying its efforts to promote full implementation of the resolution, and obliged the 1540 Committee to report again by April 2008.
UN Resolution 1540 • The 1540 Committee released its first report to the United Nations Security Council on implementation of the Resolution in April 2006. The second one was presented in July 2008. A third report was presented in April 2011, as requested in Resolution 1810 (2008). • Only 161 states have submitted their reports to date, and as of May 2010 there were still 29 states yet to submit their reports on the implementation of the resolution 1540.
IV. Egyptian Implementation of 1540 (Regional Workshop 7 -10 December 2009) • Egypt held a regional workshop in Cairo between 7 -10 December 2009 on Egyptian efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 with cooperation from the UNODA. • Egypt established a National Committee to follow up on the Implementation of Egypt’s obligations regarding 1540. • In the context of Egypt's commitment to Security Council resolution 1540; the text of the law regulating the nuclear and radiological activities states in one of its articles the following: "The development, manufacturing, possession, transport, use or threat of use or ownership of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices or any means of radiological dispersal is strictly prohibited. It is also prohibited to provide any assistance in performing the aforementioned actions, as well as attempt to commit or initiate any such actions "(consistent with operative paragraph (1) of the Security Council resolution 1540).
1. Egyptian Implementation of 1540 (Regional Workshop 7 -10 December 2009) • Take effective measures to tighten controls on the movement and handling of hazardous and chemicals materials that are classified under explosive materials in accordance with the ministerial decision No. 2225 of 2007, which includes specific detail of these materials and prohibits their circulation. • The Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority is carrying out a project for integrated management of sealed radioactive sources. This project includes the preparation of a database of all radioactive sources present in Egypt, whether still in use or out of service. As well as review physical security systems for radioactive sources and ensure that these systems conform to international standards in coordination with the Ministry of Health and other agencies using such sources. • Ministerial Decrees 419, 420, 421 of 2006 take further steps to strengthen the functions of the regulatory Body and tighten the control over nuclear materials and any other related activities.
2. 2010 Achievements • The Egyptian Nuclear and Radiation Law was issued (Law no. 7 for the year 2010) • Establishment of the independent Regulatory Body and its Egyptian System of Nuclear Security. • Hosted a Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of Research Reactors (7 th June- 17 th June, 2010) for 25 candidates from 11 AFRA Member States including Egypt (5 Egyptian Candidates). • Participated in different International/regional training courses, workshops and technical meetings (7 candidates) in the field of Nuclear Security Culture, SSAC, Physical Protection and Draft Document on Nuclear Security Fundamentals (objective and Essential Elements of Nuclear Security) • Conducted Local training for Egyptian candidates from RB, NM holders, Customs, Civil defense, Petroleum sector, Universities, Research Institutes and Import and Export Companies (53 candidates).
3. Egyptian System of Nuclear Security • The Egyptian Law established the Egyptian System of Nuclear Security within the RB, The System deals with all nuclear security related activities for: • Physical Protection. • Design Basis Threat (DBT). • Import and Export Control. • Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear & Radioactive Material. • The Nuclear Materials were protected adequately when the revolution took place on 25 January 2011 (No single Case Recorded).
4. Egyptian System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ESAC) • By the Presidential Decree (No. 152, 19 -10 -2006) • Prime Minister Decree (No. 242 and 243, 2012) • The Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority shall supervise the implementation of ESAC. • Represents the point of contact between the Government and local and international bodies. • The RB is the responsible body for the implementation of the ESAC.
• V. Middle East Free Zone (2012 Conference) Achieved: ▫ Selecting the facilitator ▫ Determining the host government • Partially Achieved: ▫ Facilitator visited capitals ▫ Facilitator conducting regional visits • Remaining Procedural Tasks: ▫ Determining date of Conference. (sometime in December 2012) ▫ Financing: From host government Other interested states (some Arab states have already pledged). Operationalizing the financial mechanism. United Nations Fund. ▫ Background Documentation: Starting background documentation taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained: By IAEA, OPCW. Need to identify and contact the other relevant international organizations. Possible contribution
1. Middle East Free Zone (2012 Conference) ▫ Participants: Participating regional states as referred to in Para 7 b of the Action Plan. Determining the geographic scope in accordance to the Middle East definition used by the IAEA. Israel – Iran. Turkey? ▫ Other Participants: Nuclear Weapon States. Relevant international organizations. European Union. Representatives of other regional verification models (EURATOM & ABACC). Representatives from other regional WMD free zone treaties (Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Bangkok, Central Asia). NGO’s: There is a possible role and contribution from research and academic centers and think tanks such as BASIC (Malta) – Landau Network (Como, Italy) – Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Vienna)- Wilton Park (London).
2. Regional Challenges and Obstacles • A continuing perceived utility of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. • Deep enmity and distrust among states whose participation in bringing a zone into force is essential. • Uncertainty due to internal transitions in key Middle Eastern states. • Complex, de facto linkages between issues in need of resolution to bring a zone into force. • No existing regional institutions for verification and WMD dismantlement Process.
VI. Other NWFZ/WMDZ • There are five zones covering continental or sub continental groups of countries (including their territorial waters and airspace). • Beneficial to reflect on these treaties such as the Antarctic, Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Bangkok Treaties. Treaty Region Land Covered (km²) States Date in Force Antarctica 14, 000 Tlatelolco Latin America, Caribbean 21, 069, 501 33 25 -04 -1969 Rarotonga South Pacific 9, 008, 458 13 11 -12 -1986 Pelindaba Africa 30, 221, 532 53 15 -07 -2009 Bangkok ASEAN 4, 465, 501 10 28 -03 -1997 23 -06 -1963
1. Other NWFZ/WMDZ • The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) is a regional approach to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. • Article VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states: “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories”. • Guidelines and Principles for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: § Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. § The initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate exclusively from States within the region concerned and be pursued by all States of that region. § The nuclear-weapon States should be consulted during the negotiations of each treaty and its relevant protocol(s) establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in order to facilitate their signature to and ratification of the relevant protocol(s) to the treaty, through which they undertake legally binding commitments to the status of the zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty. § A nuclear-weapon-free zone should not prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes and could also promote, if provided for in the treaties establishing such zones, bilateral, regional and international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the zone, in support of socio-economic, scientific and technological development of the States parties.
2. EURATOM (Example 1) • Established on 25 March 1957 (Euratom treaty) • • Effective 1 January 1958 Administrative Center: Brussels, Belgium Membership: 27 European Union Members Acts in several areas connected with atomic energy, including research, the drawing-up of safety standards, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. • One of the fundamental objectives of the Euratom Treaty is to ensure that all users in the EU enjoy a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels (source materials and special fissile materials).
3. South African Dismantlement Experience as a Model (Example 2) The example of South Africa, the first country to voluntarily abandon a fully developed nuclear weapons program should serve as a model. It took 5 years to build the country’s first nuclear device and a total of 16 years to construct its 6 weapon arsenal. Ending and fully dismantling the program and all the facilities, however, took less than 24 months. South Africa’s decision to become a non nuclear weapon state shows that it is possible in principle to roll back a nuclear capability. Subsequently, South Africa implemented integrated IAEA safeguards and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is implementing its guidelines.
South African Dismantlement Experience as a Model (2) Technical Steps • Dismantled the six completed gun type devices at Armaments • • • Corporation of South Africa Ltd (ARMSCOR) under controlled and safe conditions; Melted and recast the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from these six devices as well as the partially completed seventh device and return it to the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) for safe keeping; Decontamination of the ARMSCOR facilities fully and to return severely contaminated equipment to the AEC (such as a melting furnace); Conversion of the ARMSCOR facilities to conventional weapon and non-weapon commercial activities; Destroyed all hardware components of the devices as well as technical design and manufacturing information; The Government joined the NPT, signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and submitted of a full and complete national initial inventory of nuclear material and facilities, as required by the Safeguards Agreement; and the first IAEA team came in Nov. 1991 Completing the termination of the Pelindaba Y Plant at the earliest moment.
VII. Important Global Disarmament Treaties Countries NPT BWC CTBT Egypt Ratification Signatory Non-Member Signatory Sudan Ratification Accession Ratification Algeria Accession Ratification Iraq Ratification Accession Signatory Morocco Ratification Saudi Arabia Accession Ratification Non-Member Yemen Ratification Signatory Syria Ratification Signatory Non-Member Tunisia Ratification Israel Non-Member Signatory Iran Ratification Signatory Somalia Ratification Signatory Non-Member UAE Accession Ratification
Important Global Disarmament Treaties Countries NPT BWC CTBT Libya Ratification Accession Ratification Jordan Ratification Accession Ratification Lebanon Ratification Accession Ratification Mauritania Accession Non-Member Ratification Oman Accession Ratification Kuwait Ratification Qatar Accession Ratification Bahrain Accession Ratification Djibouti Accession Non-Member Ratification Comoros Accession Non-Member Ratification Signatory Palestine
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Middle East Free Zone • The free zone in the Middle East could contain the following technical provisions: Dismantling and destroying existing or remaining nuclear weapons capabilities, facilities, and devices under international verification mechanisms. Renouncing nuclear weapons through refraining from conducting indigenous development and activities related to nuclear weapons. Prohibiting stationing of any nuclear explosive devices on the zone. Prohibiting nuclear explosive testing in the zone. Using nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes only. Placing all nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Establishing the necessary relevant institutions and mechanisms/entities to uphold such a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and address the issue of verification to identify the role of the IAEA and other relevant organizations within such a zone.
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