Regional Nuclear Challenges South Asia Sharad Joshi Monterey

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Sharad Joshi Monterey Institute of International Studies November 13, 2009

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Introduction Ø Why is this such a crucial issue? Nuclear weapons on both sides + deep rooted conflict Ø Prospect of horizontal proliferation Ø Nuclear weapons Terrorist groups Ø Ø Rationale for nuclear weapons ØSecurity threat perceptions ØIndia vis-à-vis Pakistan and China Jammu & Kashmir ØPakistan vis-à-vis India Ø Nationalistic, domestic, scientific-bureaucratic reasons

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Ø Stability/Instability Paradox Ø Strategic stability ØIncreased violence at sub-strategic level Ø Strategic instability ØIncreased violence at sub-strategic level Ø Helps link non-state violence and nuclear postures in South Asia

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Ø Currently Nuclear weapons deployed by both Ø Deterrence posture (stable/unstable? ) Ø Periodic crises situations (e. g. 2001/02) involved nuclear threats Ø ØNonproliferation regime positions Ø Both India and Pakistan outside Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ØDebate in India over CTBT Ø Varied positions on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) ØPakistan’s problems with FMCT

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Ø Expansion of specific capabilities Ø Continued production of fissile material Ø Continued development of more lethal delivery systems Ø Introduction of cruise missiles, longer-range ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles Ø Consideration of missile defense systems

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia n Capabilities and Strategies Ø India Tests in 1974, 1998 Ø Estimated 40 -50 nuclear devices Ø Ballistic missile capability – Prithvi, Agni I&II Ø Acquisition of cruise missiles (Brah. Mos) Ø Deterrence strategy Ø Ø No first use doctrine Prithvi (India)

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia n Capabilities and Strategies Ø India Ø Quest for ‘credible minimum deterrent’ Ø Agni III long range ballistic missile Ø Submarine launch capability sought Ø Nuclear submarine (INS Arihant) launched in July 2009 Ø Approval for Agni-V Ø Restricted increase in range-5, 000 km Ø Launch of Sagarika/K-15, Feb. ‘ 08 Testing of missile defense systems Agni-III test, May ‘ 08

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia n Capabilities Ø Pakistan Tests in 1998 Ø Refusal to adopt a no-first use policy Ø Ø Put forward a “No War pact” Credible minimum doctrine Ø Estimated material for 50 -110 nuclear devices. Ø Missile capability covers most of India – Ghauri, Shaheen Ø November 16, 2006 photo showing then Pakistani PM Shaukat Aziz in front of the Ghauri V (Hatf) missile just before it was test fired. Ø Development of cruise missiles – Babur nuclear delivery role Ø F-16 deal with U. S.

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Source: CNS Source: Dept. of Atomic Energy, Government of India

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia n Capabilities and Strategies Ø Pakistan Ø Concern over security of nuclear weapons ØBoth countries: Ø Development of cruise missiles Babur cruise missile (Pakistan) Ø Pakistan – Babur, Ra’ad (nuclear capable) Ø India – Brah. Mos, Nirbhay Ø Implications for military strategy Ø How do cruise missiles fit into broader thinking on security and deterrence issues in South Asia? Brah. Mos cruise missile (India)

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia n Capabilities and Strategies Ø Missile defense Ø Ø Ø Two tests by India in 2006/2007 Quest for cruise missile defense India’s Endo-atmospheric interceptor test, Dec. 2007 Nuclear Confidence Building Measures ØMissile test notification Ø no cruise missiles Ø Agreement for reducing risk of nuclear accidents Ø Exchange of nuclear facilities lists

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Ø U. S. -India Nuclear Agreement ØCurrent situation IAEA safeguards agreement approved in August 2008; signed in March 2009 Ø NSG approval in September 2008 Ø Ø Nuclear Deal with France – Sept. 30, 2008 Ø IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna on August 1, 2008, to consider the Indian safeguards agreement. U. S. Congressional approval for bilateral pact in October 2008 ØBenefits for India Ø Ø Nuclear technology, materials from external suppliers Domestic sources of uranium can be diverted to military Enhanced energy supply De facto approval of nuclear status

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia ØU. S. -India Nuclear Agreement Ø U. S. goals Ø Strategic partnership with India Ø Some regulation of India’s nuclear facilities Ø Business incentives for U. S. nuclear industry Ø Will lessen India’s dependence on fossil fuels Ø Unstated objective: Building India as a regional counterweight to China

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia ØU. S. -India Nuclear Agreement Ø Negative Consequences ØBreaks the nonproliferation regime Ø Bad precedent Ø More difficult to stop DPRK and Iran ØPakistan’s quest for similar agreement ØChina’s proposed nuclear assistance to Pakistan ØAllows India to produce more fissile material Ø Could actually stabilize India’s nuclear capabilities? Ø Indian argument ØIndia needs to be part of nuclear energy trade ØRegime ineffective anyway

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia ØProliferation From South Asia Ø A. Q. Khan network ØEvolution from an import role to an export role also Ø Lingering questions ØHas the network (or similar networks) been rounded up? ØPakistan political and military establishment involved? Ø Important implications ØWhat all was transferred? Ø Introduction of more stringent export controls by Pakistan

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Export side of the A. Q. Khan proliferation network Period In exchange for Agreement on training scientists, transfer of P 1 centrifuge and enrichment plant diagrams, P 1 machine components Diagrams of P 1, P 2 centrifuges, 500 used centrifuges; manual related to fabrication of nuclear weapons components 1987 Possible agreements on oil supplies, conventional weaponry, political support, and cash. 20 L 1 centrifuges; components for 200 other centrifuges L 2 centrifuges; 1. 7 tons UF 6 Nuclear weapon design manuals, blueprints L 2 centrifuge components 1997 Transfers of P 1 centrifuges and technology and possible P-2 centrifuges Training of personnel 1994 -95 Possibly till 2002 Offers from Khan to help establish enrichment program and provide nuclear weapon designs 1991 Country Transfers or negotiations for transfers Iran 1. 2. Libya 1. 2. 3. 4. North Korea Iraq 1. 2. 1994 -95, possibly till 2003 Cash 2000 2001 -02 2002 In exchange for missile components at a later stage (earlier missiles had been procured from NK for cash)

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Ø Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear weapons ØGrowing Pakistani nuclear arsenal + expansion of delivery systems ØPolitical instability and violence ØImplications for security of nuclear weapons and materials. Ø E. g. , meetings in 2001 between Pakistani scientists and Al Qaeda leadership Source: Mc. Clatchy ØTechnological hurdle towards a workable nuclear device, i. e. , intent does not necessarily equal capability But, dirty bomb possible Ø Psychological effect of nuclear materials use Ø

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Ø Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons ØStriking at ungoverned spaces and weak states ØIncreasing attacks in vicinity of nuclear facilities ØInstances of kidnapping of nuclear personnel ØUnclear about motivations ØSignifies potential inadvertent or deliberate access to nuclear personnel and facilities Source: The New York Times

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia Ø Conclusions Ø Expansion of nuclear capabilities and changes in Indian position in nonproliferation system Ø South Asian proliferation also has to be seen in context of Asia-Pacific power dynamics, especially the rivalry between China and the U. S. Ø India-Pakistan nuclear stalemate leading to changes in conventional strategies? – e. g. , Brah. Mos Ø Importance of Confidence Building Measures in other areas of contention, e. g. , Siachen glacier. Can facilitate Nuclear CBMs. Ø Security of nuclear materials and facilities from terrorist and proliferation networks remains a key problem.