Political Studies 2224 — Lecture 14 Wrap-Up

Political Studies 2224 - Lecture 14: Wrap-Up & Review Sean Clark Ph. D Candidate, Dalhousie University Doctoral Fellow, CFPS Summer Session, 2008

Origins of Weapons & War § Weapons as old as life (nature is violent). § 1. Intraspecies violence often enjoys effective constraints. § Establish community mastery w/out mortality (ie deer, rattlesnakes, humans). § 2. Predation mitigated only by fear & satiation (choose weak & helpless prey). § Humans are capable of both, but different in that we select our weapons (instruments to damage or protect). § Humans don’t just react to, but also learn from environment (= 1 st weapons likely learned from animals).

Origins of Weapons & War, II § Modern humans emerged w/ a weapon in hand. § Origins approaches: § Genetic research: science still infant. § Anthropology: learn from analogies w primates & preciv societies (prob: fallacy of contemporary ancestor). § Archeology: recovered fragments are strong evidence (sparse record = need imagination). § Walking upright is the critical sever from apes. § Australopithecus was small, yet unafraid of living & hunting on (predator-filled) savannah grasslands. § Vegetarian origins, but hunger & fear likely drove weapons. § Tools + hands + bipedalism = formidable hunter. § Ingenuity & cooperative cleverness critical, but weapons made the killing possible.

Origins of Weapons & War, III § Weapons perhaps not 1 st tool, but most successful. § Is beginning of culture (artificial adaptation over pure physiology: clothes, boats, etc now possible). § Late Australopithecus & (subsequent) Homo habilis 1 st w/out perpetual fear & hunger (= health & confidence at cost of neighbouring species). § 1 st weapons likely conveniently shaped rocks & sharp sticks. § Sometime later (perhaps 2 mil yrs ago), were sharpened purposefully. § Hunting = more types available (bone clubs, horn daggers). § Bola of Habilis 1. 5 mil yrs ago (1 st w no natural template; 1 st standoff wpn). Followed by sling, bow.

Origins of Weapons & War, IV § Standoff missiles (distance = safety; ie bow) vs inclose ‘shock’ (great strength of blow; ie club, dagger) --> 1 st arms debate. § Humans’ relative weakness also overcome by group hunting. § Skills for war 1 st honed thru group hunting. § Concerns of stomach > concerns of neighbours. § (Yet intraspecific violence common to most primates). § Intraspecific & predation pt of same continuum (either/or dominates, but never disappear). § Evidence of early violence (from archeology): § Lorenz: humans (& chimps) lack genetic constraints on killing (unlike other predators, began killing late). § Dart, Roper: early man violent (33% show wounds).

Origins of Weapons & War, V § Evidence of early tranquility (from anthrop): § Most hunter-gather societies very cooperative. § Wars restricted to external bands (& lack of surplus = diminished incentive & short wars). § Early world relatively empty of humans. § Prey migration = constantly moving. § Too much land for 20 -40 people to defend. § If in feud w neighbour, could always just leave to new place (unlike today). § ==> Early fighting therefore sporadic, personalized (revenge, disputes & theft) & probably not very effective. § Ambushes & raids likely favoured. Pitched battle = failure (seeking to steal, not crush enemy). § Poor organization, weak motivation = low casualties & indecision (though this would soon change).

Dialogue with the Sphinx § Early life more about hunting than fighting. § Yet as weapons improved, so did deadliness of intraspecific combat (though still no agriculture surplus as incentive for serious war). § Proficiency & intelligence = wpns improvements. § Flint shaped, spear tips hardened in fire, lashings = effective hand axes and spears. § Upper Paleolithic (40, 000 yrs ago). § Humans reach modern form (& probably speech). § Technical takeoff (throwing stick, spear thrower, harpoon, sling, bow). § Bow is perfect weapon for harassment. § 50 m range & lethality velocity = safe & deadly. § Morela la Vella: 1 st image of combat (men w bows).

Dialogue with the Sphinx, II § Even w/out true warfare (in era of hunting & not agriculture), the tools were ready. § Hunting taught men how to kill in groups. § Hunting nurtured the mechanisms of death. § Are weapons found within our genes? § Physical & behavioural defence mechanisms commonly transmitted thru animal genes. § Arms development assisted dexterity, powers of observation (natural selection b/c vital to survival). § Near universality of arms (only Phi Tong Luang w/o). § Humans aren’t mindlessly driven like bumble bees, yet while conditioned by environment, inherent predispositions likely exist (‘interactionist paradigm’). § Fascination w war toys common, as are useless arms races.

Dialogue with the Sphinx, III § True war (organized violence to conquer neighbour) is a late cultural adaptation. § Weapons, however, more deeply rooted. § Perhaps if discover what is genetic & what is culture, arms control & peace research could be advanced. § O’Connell: “If we came into this world armed, it was not necessarily as soldiers. ” § Cows & grass = Ag Rev (~8, 000 BC) in Mid E. § Slow urbanization followed by 1 st civs (~4, 000 BC). § 3, 500 BC Bronze Rev = superior tools & wpns. § Ag Rev = serious war now possible. § Surplus permits complex societies & sustained military campaigns. § Organization (religion solidifies beyond kin; permanent govt = irrigation projects & permanent armies).

Dialogue with the Sphinx, IV § Ag Rev = incentive for war. § Accumulated, sedentary wealth (gold, resources, cities) requires protection, but also provide opportunity to steal or conquer. § Rise of militaries therefore followed. § 4, 000 -2, 000 BC era of great change. § Previously: war in infancy (rare, chaotic, unorganized, w/ not much to steal = low mortality). § W/ 1 st civs = resources, organization, & incentive necessary to fight true battles of political conquest. § Even if not want war, neighbour might. § By 2, 000 BC, wars similar to modern incarnations (proportionate size, admin, technological development, frequency, & destruction).

The Ancient World § 1 st (recorded) organized battle at Megiddo in 1469 BC (indications of Sumerian fighting ~2500 BC). § Palestine & Syria revolt vs Egypt, but Thutmosis’ chariots smashed thru Pass & surrounded rebels. § Even early war was contest of brute force, technology, & cunning. § Wpns: discovery--> improvement --> adoption--> use. Accompanied by tactics for their employment. § Shock (ie club) & missile (ie rocks) origins lost. § Slings = > distance, > strength. Baleraric famous. § Bow: since late Stone Age. 1 st in Mid E, India, China. § § Horse & bow by 1500 BC (lethal & mobile). Requires much practice. Composite bows much stronger. Turkish bow 5 ft, 300 yrds, penetrate mail by 15 th C.

The Ancient World, II § Chariots. § Earliest were mobile platforms & command posts. § Shock value demonstrated at Kadesh (1275 BC), Assyrian 7 th. C BC empire. § Probs: draft animals vulnerable, require flat terrain. § Horses & elephants (from 1000 BC & 600 BC). § Elephants shocking, but dangerous to own troops, too. § Early combat was a messy affair. § Either crash & struggle or crash & flee (strategy ltd). § Slingers & archers out front, spearmen tightly packed in centre, cavalry (for exploiting gaps) at head or flanks. § 1. Harassing fire from missiles. 2. Shock troops charge. § Innovation: imagination applied to men & wpns.

The Ancient World, III § Assyria (Tiglath-Pileser): 1 st all-pro army (700 BC). § § Military paid for by plunder (war was self-sustaining). 1 st to use iron over bronze. Training & wpns improvement systematic. Skillful bureaucracy (field armies of 50 k: 45 k inf, in a mass 2. 5 km long x 100 m deep). § Used terror (wanton murder) to great effect. § Phoenicians develop 1 st warships (700 BC). § Longer, narrower, faster than regular merchant galleys. § 5 th. C BC Athenian trireme (for boarding, but also 10 ft metal beak) is template for 2, 000 yrs. § Tactics developed pre-500 BC. § Surprise, envelopment, disruption from missiles valued.

The Ancient World, III § Greek phalanx almost unstoppable. § Sumerian origins (2000 -3000 BC), in Greece by 7 th C BC (poor cavalry country, except Macedonia). § Hoplites: 6 -9 foot pike, short sword, breastplate & helmet. Dense mass to smash through enemy lines. § Psiloi: light troops (missileers often mercenaries) for front skirmishing & flank protection. § Greeks literate, free, proud (indp, thinking soldiers). § Philip II of Macedon (359 BC) to power. § 14 ft Sarissa adopted. Companies by region. Kept Macedon cavalry (‘Companions’). Wpns dev & training. = finest ever. § Chaeronea (338 BC): Thebans & Athenians drawn into trap, surrounded, annihilated. § Unprecedented maneuver, complexity, & confidence. § Arbela (331 BC): Alexander defeats Darius. § Pulls open Persian line, then cavalry & inf smash thru.

The Ancient World, IV § Rome’s inexorable rise. § Began w Greek phalanx, covered by light troops. § Battlefield experience & 2 wpns = rise of manipular legion (battle fought by indp maniples) by 300 BC. § First time mass army fought as indp individuals. § Gladius: 2 ft Spanish thrusting sword; more fatal, but needs room to use (need citizen motivation to keep from fleeing). § Pilum: 7 ft (1/2 wood, 1/2 metal). Soft tip & max distance of 60 feet. By 1 st. C BC 2/per legionary. § Together, Romans virtually unable to stop. § Legion ~5, 000 tps (10 cohorts; incl 300 cav). § Consular army: 2 legions, 2 = sized allied armies; 2. 5 km front. § Maniples (~200 ea) deployed like checkerboard (1. Easily move around gaps, 2. Reinforce or retreat is easy). § Defensive formations: line (when fortified), square & circle (vs cav).

The Ancient World, V § Attack: 1 st 2 lines fire pila, attk. Retreat when tired thru gaps. § Constant replenishment of lines = ‘buzzsaw. ’ § Preference for high ground, attk enemy’s flanks. § Cav screens 20 miles ahead; ballistae, catapults, engineers accompanied. § Even Macedonian phalanx failed to stop. § Roman success & stable tech = little change from 50 BC - 300 AD § Legions supported by complicated mil & econ sys. § § Augustus: 10 k Praetorians, 25 legions, 25 = auxiliaries. Severus: 40 legions, 34 munitions factories. Superb road network covered entire continent. Rigid frontier defences (Limes in Germ, Wall in UK). § Enduring wealth & stability a crowning testament.

Rise of the Horsemen § 3 rd-5 th. C AD: infantry-centric W joins cavalrycentric E. § Romans needed >er mobility, speed, & maneuverability in open desert & steppe. § Increased use of missiles = battlefield diffusion = vulnerable to cavalry. § Decreased morale & discipline = >er fear of horse charge. § Cavalry easier to dash from 1 crisis to the next. § Underlain by technology. § Saddle w stirrups (from 1 st. C BC India) = stability & firm base to multiply speed x weight of horse & rider. § By 4 th. C AD strong horses from Persia & Central Asia adopted (= mail armour for both = near invulnerability).

Rise of the Horsemen, II § Roman cavalry jumps from 10% to 25%, but not good enough to win Adrianople (378 AD). § Incautious Valens is surprised. Unprepared Romans surrounded & annihilated. Roman Era is now over. § Mobility, surprise, flank attacks, & power of the lancers’ charge = basis of cavalry tactics for next 1000 yrs. § Western Europe: end of Rome = Dark Ages. § Vigorous & violent force applied w/o doctrine (masses of men hurled at masses of men). § Franks admired Roman discipline & logistics, yet successes would not outlast innovators. § Poor tech. Focus on local militia & local works. Cower until invading force runs out of plunder. § Everyone could (& did) fight, though nothing was settled (hope w prof, hvy cav & castles--but took time).

Rise of the Horsemen, III § While West in chaos, was Islamic Explosion. § Begun w Mohammed’s flight from Mecca (622 AD). § Landes: ‘New men on old horses’ (not material, but ideational power). § Light cavalry constantly harass, look to draw out & exploit openings w charges heedless to casualties. § Byzantium & Persia exhausted & bickering = their rapid defeats (Mid E, Africa, Spain all fell). § Victories at Yarmuk (636), Fustat/Cairo (640), Cordoba (712); Mosul (641), Kabul (664), & Samarkand (710). § Halted by geog (distance + Pyrenees, Taurus, &Caucasus mtns) & toughness of Khazars, organization of Byzantines & Chinese, discipline of Frankish infantry (ie Tours in 732 AD). § Eventually recognize limitations of élan = movement to defensive tactics & adopt some Byzantine organization. § Internal political divisions = no longer unified post-850 AD. § Abu Bakr becomes Caliph (political successor to Prophet) in 632. § However, Ali (Mhd’s cousin) & supporters were rivals to throne (is cause of Sunni. Shia split, even though Ali spent time as Caliph). § Civil war ends w Umayyads winning & ousting Ali’s family & Shi’a supporters (~661). Capital in Damascus. § Abbasids take power 750 (also Sunni). Move capital to Baghdad, Umayyads fleet to Spain. Yet in 150 yrs Persian emirs take local control &N African empire slips away. § Yet still powerful (steadily eroded Byzantines).

Rise of the Horsemen, IV § Byzantium (E Roman Empire). § City rebuilt by Constantine in early 4 th. C AD. § Huns & Persians teach need for heavy cavalry. § By 6 th. C AD cataphract mainstay of army. § Combines firepower (bow, lance, broad sword), discipline, (thoroughly professionalized, loyal) mobility, & shock-action capability (armoured battering rams). § Anatolian heartland survived for 1000 yrs, despite being surrounded by enemies. § Constant learning, combined cav & inf (light missileers & heavy shock), kept Roman system (training, signals, engineers, artillery, medical) = best tps of Middle Ages. § Greek fire assists in defence. § Belisarius & Narses (527 AD-565) recapture W for Justinian. § Tactics: inf holds off enemy, cav counters, while reserves exploit. § Resort to trickery if necessary (vs. enemies & boost own tps).

East Meets West § Byzantium. § Above all, are pragmatic. § Slow erosion of borders (700 AD-1000). § 11 th C decline apparent with Manzikert (1071) disaster. § Unprepared forces exposed by impatient Romanus IV & deceitful rearguard. § Loss followed by civil war & insufficient resources. Byzantium would never recover. § Manzikert & Seljuk conquest of Jerusalem = Christendom clamours for war (Crusades). § Both religion and politics at play. § 1 st, 2 nd, 3 rd (1096 -1099, 1147 -1149, 1189 -1192), by French, German, & English most important. § Militarily superior (but disorganized) W vs. ferocious (but squabbling) E.

East Meets West, II § Mobile Islamic light cav harasses & tries to lure W into trap, while Crusader heavy cav seeks massed target. § Dorylaeum (1097): armour holds Turkish arrows at bay. Surprise from Crusader relief column = W wins. § More tenacity & fortune than gifted tactics. § Constant war = (slowly) weapons improvement. § Crossbow reintroduced in 11 th. C. § Chinese invention (200 BC), used in 1 st. C AD by Romans. § Mechanical strength = high speed = 150 yrd range w > killing power (ie metal-piercing quarrels). § Subject to 1139 Vatican Edict. § Halberd (pike & axe in one). § Fine Damascus & Toledo scimitars. § European metal suits. Infantry wears leather jackets.

East Meets West, III § Armour (man & horse) = 150 lbs = poor mobility for European cav. § Fallen knights can’t get up again. § Victory = light casualties, defeat = massacre. § Key military lessons learned: § 1. Saw how Byzantines constructed fortresses (even if Europeans viewed as singular, not part of a system). § 2. Infantry matters. Crossbow screens best way to keep Turkish cavalry at bay. § Close inf-cav (combined arms) coordination necessary. § Saladin brilliant at separating Crusader horse from foot. § Europe benefits most from Crusades. § Are most backward, thus have most to learn (including culture, science, economics--ie tariffs, accounting).

East Meets West, IV § No one is prepared for the Mongol whirlwind. § Smash China (from 1211), Persia (from 1221), Russia (from 1223), E Europe (from 1241) = >est land empire. § Hordes (‘field army’) usually smaller than enemy. § 240 k tps to conquer Persia, 150 k for Russia. § Quality, not quantity = success. § Characterized by simplified brilliance (ie silk shirts for arrows). § Horde = 3 toumans (10 k each; all units div into 10 s). § 40% hvy cav (for shock; leather or mail armoured; carry lance & scimitar or mace). § 60% light cav (harass, screen; helmet but no armour; carried 2 -300 yd bow & scimitar or mace, javelin). § Trained from 4 in Gobi Desert. Ruthless, obedient, lived off of Mare’s milk. Horses similarly sturdy.

East Meets West V § An unparalleled gift for war. § Carried own baggage. Siege engines from local res. § Spy networks. Screens 100 mi in advance. § Tactics = conquest w ease. § Toumans advanced on broad front. Converge (behind screens), surround, destroy enemy on contact. § No set pattern: attk flanks, rear, feign retreat. § Any trick or cruelty permitted: cattle as lures, prairie fires, human shields, terror campaigns. § 1241: 4 hordes under Sabotai & Batu devastate E Eur. § Apr 1241: 60 k Mongols surprise, surround, feint an escape for 90 k Hungarians (70 k killed) at Sajo River. § 1242: before Vienna, yet stop after Ogatai dies (Eur is saved). § Mongol contact too fast, to short for deep, long-lasting impact. § Ain Jalut (1260): Ottomans (barely) halt Mongols (b/c logistics & political fracturing).

The Gunpowder Revolution

Nations in Arms § 1763 -1815: 2 revs, endless wars, & > change. § Emergence of ‘nations in arms’ = everyone expected to = loyalty of officers. § US War of Indp validates French reforms. § Tactical flexibility (both columns & lines okay). § More open movt & skirmishing by light troops. § ‘Gribeauval system’ (more mobile horse arty, bored barrels & better training). § Now citizen-soldier (driven like 650 AD Arabians). § French Revolution (1789). § Public rises up. Army mutinies. Ancien régime melts. § England, Prussia, Austria, & Russia seek to crush = war on all sides. § Volunteer cohorts followed by 1793 levée en masse: entire nation called to arms (750, 000 armed by 1794).

Nations in Arms, II § Revolution = further reform. § Need & vacancies = merit, not purchase of rank. § Ie Napoleon. Officer corps: from 85% aristocrats to <3%. § Commissars sent out (backed by guillotine). § Newspapers & song sheets as propaganda. § April 1792 greeted by war. § Revolutionary armies disorganized. Allies afraid of importing democracy. § After loss of Verdun (in vital NE), Dumouriez & Kellermann recover at Valmy vs Prussians & Austrians. § Outmaneuver, win arty duel, while inf holds firm. § Goethe: ‘new era’ in history begins. § 1793 frontiers again besieged. § Cntr-rev=‘Reign of Terror’ by Cmttee of Public Safety. § Carnot mobilizes everything for war.

Nations in Arms, III § By 1794, foreigners thrown back. § North stabilized. Toulon retaken from British. § Yet logistics corrupt = pillaging necessary. § Army is discontented (1795 Directory makes worse). § Sees itself as revolutionary ideal, but treated shabbily. § Napoleon, after brilliant 1796 -7 N Italy campaign (& 1798 Egyptian disaster) seeks to exploit. § Overthrows Directory (November 1798), Emperor by 1804. § Napoleon: one of history’s most brilliant captains. § Enjoyed earlier reforms, talent-based, battle-tested generals, & 2 mil patriotic soldiers (from Jourdan conscription law) = origins of modern mass army. § Divs (inf, cav, & arty in 1) & corps simplify control. § Nationalism allows foraging (troops will return).

Nations in Arms, IV § Yet Napoleon’s genius still stood out. § Sought not to win, but to shatter enemy by attacking, w massed reserve, flank or rear (while they fixed at front). § 1805 is Napoleon’s crowning achievement. § Can’t cross Channel to strike UK, so heads E. § Outflanks (& outnumbers) Austrians at Ulm. § Austerlitz: draws in Russians on right, then smashes thru Russians’ weakened centre & into rear. § One of history’s >est victories, yet never enough. § Outdone by: strategic greed, growing resentment towards Fr occupation, improvements of enemies, UK. § 1806 Continental System a failure. § Tariffs & UK industry = black markets & exceptions. § Iberian Peninsula (France invades in 1808). § British army & Spanish irregulars = costly ‘ulcer. ’

Nations in Arms, V § Invasion of Russia dooms France. § Borodino: costly frontal assault = French win, but not overwhelm Russians (who continue to fall back). § Moscow burned down. No food = French retreat. § Harassed by hunger, cold, & partisans. § June 1812: French = 600, 000. December: 93, 000. § 1813: French pushed to brink (ie Leipzig). § Allied cooperation, learning (ie Scharnhorst & General Staff) & German nationalism (now citizen-soldier too). § Napoleon’s old brilliance in 1814 is insufficient. Outnumbered & w Paris captured, Napoleon abdicates. § Waterloo (1815) closely run, but 450 k Austrian & Russian reserve would have finished Napoleon. § Napoleonic Wars killed 20% of all Frenchmen born 1790 -95 (forerunner of the bloody 20 th C).

The Industrialization of War § 1815 a lenient, but conservative, peace. § Everyone tired by war. UK content w econ power. § Congress of Vienna: Russia gets Poland, Prussia gets Ruhr, E Eur stays colonized (Metternich the architect). § ‘The Long 19 th C. ’ § Century of unprecedented peace & prosperity. § Interrupted by 1830 Fr Revol & Belgian partition. § 1848 democracy & nationalism riots widespread, but unorganized & (in Austria) put down by Russian tps. § 1854: Russia moves vs Ottomans = Crimean War. § UK & Fr tps to Constantinople (not want Russian outlet to the sea), but Tsar halted by Austrian threat. § UK & Fr still want to ‘teach a lesson’ = limited war. § Sci & tech important. § 1. ‘Minie’ rifled bullet. 2. Steamships. 3. Telegraph (= transoceanic strategy & powerful media).

Industrialization of War, II § Siege of Sebastopol, 1854 -5. § Haphazard (though unopposed) Sept 1854 landing. § Russian columns devastated by rifled muskets of British lines at Alma river. § French caution = port defences organized. § Balaclava & Inkerman relief attempts fail (even w ‘Charge of the Light Brigade’). § Winter destroys British army. French left to take Malakoff fortress next Sept (synchronize watches 1 st). § Technology overwhelms (ie 4: 1 casualty balance), but media powerful now too (British army forced to reform). § US Civil War. § Ties popular (uncompromising) enthusiasm of French Rev to industrial technology = harbinger of future. § Industrial N (25 mil) vs agrarian S (9 mil).

Industrialization of War, III § N: politically astute (Lincoln), vs S: tough to invade (broad geography) & not need to ‘win. ’ § Both sides new to large-scale military operations--yet willing to endure incredible losses (ie Gettysburg). § Shiloh, 1862: shows tactics not kept pace w tech. § Johnston (S) surprises Grant (N). Rifled muskets = bloodbath for open lines. N wins when Buell relieves. § Antietam, 1862: again battle of brutal attrition. § Mc. Clellan (N) too slow vs brilliant Lee (S). 3 N waves beaten back = bloodiest day in US history (20 k cas). § Afterwards, increasingly resort to trenches (ie WWI). § N wins by >er resources & devastation. § Sherman burns path to the sea (left ‘chimneyvilles’). § Sheridan rampages thru Virginia (left a ‘barren waste’). § Modern war is ruthless. 625 K total soldiers left dead.

Industrialization of War, IV § Bismarck’s wars: exactly opposite lessons learned. § 1806 Jena-Auerstadt defeat = unparalleled officer class from Kriegsakademie & general staff. § Emphasis on strategic planning & railway construction. § Breech-loading ‘needlegun’ 3 -4 x faster, can reload lying down. § Bismarck brilliant diplomat (knew how to gamble). § Knew Prussia underestimated, Europe uncoordinated. § Recognized nationalism, but also power of ‘blood & iron. ’ § Schleswig-Holstein quickly taken in 1864. § Austrians overwhelmed at Koniggratz (1866). § Poor Austrian staff work, rapid Prussian rail movement, needlegun = accept Bismarck’s (calculated) generous terms. § Franco-Prussian War (1870 -1). § France unwilling to accept Austrian settlement = Bismarck orchestrates diplomatic incident. § Moltke enjoys honed planning, rapid rail movement.

Industrialization of War, V § …steel, breech-loading artillery, & superior generals. Overcomes French chassepot rifle & tactical gifts. § French trapped at Metz & Sedan. Napoleon III falls. § WWI approaches. § French do not forget loss of Alsace & Lorraine. § Europe convinced well-managed wars are brief & relatively painless (war can pay). § Missed brilliance of Bismarck & ineptitude of enemies. § Reinforced by heroic professionalism winning colonial wars. § Most dangerous result was impact on Germany. § New German empire (proclaimed 1871) believes military prowess = victory (dangerous b/c Bismarck’s less-qualified political successors could not keep control). § Economic expansion fueled world-wide empires, but also greater war potential. § Political sophistication doesn’t keep pace w mil & econ power. § Technology developed at dizzying pace (ie oil dreadnoughts, smokeless cartridges, nitrate explosives, machine guns).

The Great War § WWII born from the First. § Instigated a century of change (pol, econ, women). § Ended secular religion of progress (& followed by profound crisis of faith). § New weapons shattered belief wars can be cheap. § Arms over courage (mocked warrior ethic). § Huge price (10 mil deaths) paid for little gain--all while in pursuit of ltd aims. § Everyone wanted short, decisive war--but nobody got it. § Poor tactics = blundering, experimental corpse factory. § Typified by Verdun (1916): purpose merely to kill. § Cult of offensive dominated. § Germany (Schlieffen Plan), France (Plan 17), Russia (into E Prussia) all attack--yet tech favoured defence. § Railways & French 75 s stopped Germans at the Marne (1914).

The Great War, II § Germans retreat to trenches along R. Aisne. § Wall of wire & MGs extended during ‘Race to the Sea. ’ § 4 years of trench warfare followed. § Ypres demonstrates how difficult to break thru. § Falkenhayn sends volunteer youths to be shot down by UK professionals (‘kindermord bei Ypern’). § Oct‘ 14 - Mar‘ 18 front moves not even 10 mi either way. § Aug-Oct ‘ 14 cas: Fr & UK 940 k, Germ 677 k. § Kitchener: “this isn’t war!” § 1915: Germans stick to defence in W (hvy guns, trench mortars, grenades, periscopes, mining equipment). § Chemists convince generals to use Cl gas (overcome military’s opposition w argument that Entente cannot develop own). § Sept ‘ 15 breech opened at Ypres, but too few reserves to exploit (generals not trust). § Countermeasures quickly developed, plus winds change.

The Great War, III § Followed by phosgene & mustard, but neither really effective. § Gas = widespread revulsion: though actually lower casualties, no one who was gassed ever forgot. § ‘Total war’ meets its modern apex. § Entire nation coalesced into “single national firm for waging war. ” § Family life, property rights, consumption patterns, & social & geographic mobility all reshaped for war production. § Miracles achieved: France builds new industrial base, Russia explodes, Germany overcomes much of blockade. § Height of perpetual death machine in 1916: § 302 days & 1 mil cas at Verdun (simply to ‘bleed the French white’). § The Somme: UK believed increase men & explosives = victory. Yet insufficient (60 k lost on 1 st day alone). § Germans suffer equally in fruitless counterattacks. § 600 k cas each for 6 -7 miles of strategically useless ground.

The Great War, IV § War stretched limits of endurance. § Shell shock common (though mutiny rare). § Internal combustion engine = ‘tank’ now possible. § Churchill & RN sponsors. Ready by 1916. § Swinton was ignored: in first battles, used in dribbles. § Cambrai (1917) & later demonstrate potential (even if not yet decisive). § Germans slow to respond (short on metal & industry). § End comes from exhausted armies giving up. § 3 yrs of successive strain (defeats & industrial growth) + weak govt = Russian Rev (1917). Army dissolves. § Bolsheviks stall & Germany swallows huge territory w Brest. Litovsk Treaty (1917)--prob: takes huge #s to garrison. § Italian defeat balanced vs. US entering war (provoked by unrestricted U-boat attacks trying to starve the UK).

The Great War, V § Ludendorff & Hindenburg in final (1918) gamble. § Leading units trained in ‘Hutier’ tactics (infiltrate, bypass resistance, short barrages). § Strike Mar 1918 at junction of UK & Fr troops. § Tactics & numerical strength = make 20 km in few days. § Successive attacks bring Germans to just outside Paris. § Problem: running out of steam (men, guns), while Entente supported by fresh American troops (2 mil by Nov 1918 --& eager to die, ie Belleau Wood). § July Entente counterattacks. August 8 ‘Black Day’ for German Army (begin surrendering in droves). § Sept: Ludendorff breaks down & advises surrender. § Army Nov 11, 1918: armistice called. § Treaty of Versailles (1919) like 1815. § Prob: Germans not convinced militarily defeated = some willing to do again--yet w modern tech, moderate war no longer possible.

The End of Days § WWII a bloodbath of unprecedented proportions: 55 mil directly killed. § Yet limited indp meaning (a continuation of WWI--both in cause & manner). § 1920 s-’ 35: sincere arms control efforts. § Efforts both for both land & sea. § Supported by war-weary society. § Early progress = hope for enduring disarmament. § However, military preparations also. § Ie Washington Naval Conference of 1921 -22 popular, yet only limited old, unsuccessful Dreadnoughts, gave high ceilings to new aircraft carriers, & ignored useful subs (too valuable to give up). § Both peace & military realism at play. Simultaneous quest for disarmament & better weapons.

The End of Days, II § ‘Feel good’ diplomacy a serious problem. § 1928 Treaty of Paris: outlawed war by fiat alone. § 1932 Geneva Conference: aimed to abolish ‘offensive weapons, ’ but could not define. § Small victory: 1925 Geneva Protocol. § Banned use of poison gas in combat (though neither production nor enforcement). § Was adhered to in war (despite all WWII’s excesses). § Rise of Germany & Japan = militarism to the fore. § von Seeckt & Reichswehr maintain German military professionalism. Weapons built in other countries. § By 1922, Germans R&D & training in Soviet Russia. § Japanese navy experiments & expands (ie carriers). § Hitler was product of WWI. § Missed radar & nukes, but understood potency of tanks.

The End of Days, III § Hitler knew Allies could out-produce = plans for a quick war. § 88 mm, panzers, strike aircraft (ie Stuka) developed. § Allied versions often better (& much more easily produced), but German knew exactly what they wanted to do with them. § Allies slow, but did prepare for war. § UK: Tizzard = integrated radar network (C 3), plus bombers (to save having to fight another ground war). § France: 7 bn Frf, impregnable ‘Maginot Line. ’ Solid, but incomplete (b/c cost & alliance politics). § WWII as barbaric as any predatory struggle. § Germans ruthless, Britain bombed Germany to rubble, Russians vengeful, US & Japan filled w racist hate. § Hitler bent on pure conquest & genocide (legacy is ‘final solution). A man ‘if not inevitable, hardly inappropriate’ for the times.

The End of Days, IV § USSR & US distinguished by tremendous industrial production. § 1941 German arms production only 1/4 of 1918, vs US shipbuilding & entire new (moved) Russian industries. § Germans aggressive, well-trained troops until end-just buried under avalanche of weapons. § Early western successes undone by Russian colossus. § ‘Barbarossa’ about a new social order. § However, Russian army not all trapped in 8 weeks. § 136 German divs not enough for 200 Red Army; 3, 550 vs 12, 000 tanks = 4 years of attrition. § T-34 best weapon of war. Soviet soldier ferocious. § Hitler orders sidestep to resource-rich Donets Basin (while High Command wants to destroy army outside Moscow). § Central Crisis: Moscow, Dec 1941. § Zhukov throws 1 mil troops at exhausted Germans.

The End of Days, V § Hitler correct outside Moscow, but wrong at Stalingrad (& many times after). § Plus, German savagery united Soviet empire (3 mil+ Soviet POWs died in captivity, 5 mil in battle, 20 mil+ citizens from deprivations). § Soviet (hatred-fuelled) courage & endless weapons supply drives Germans back (ie Kursk). § WWII: USSR produced 110, 000 tanks & self-propelled guns vs Germany’s 23, 000. § Hitler sustained by fantasy of ‘superweapons. ’ § V 1 & V 2 rockets, Me 262 ineffective or too late (though form basis for post-war developments). § Total, predatory struggle = ‘unconditional surrender. ’ § Nazi Germany ended w complete pulverization. Peace not to be a repeat of Versailles.

The Atomic Revolution § Dec ‘ 38: Hahn & Strassman split atom w neutrons. § § Meitner: E=mc 2 = 1 lbs split Ur = 7 mil lbs coal. Bohr-->Fermi-->Szilard: prove bomb is possible. Einstein to Roosevelt: we have to beat Nazis. Pearl Harbour = ‘Manhattan Project’ by summer ‘ 42. § US did not believe Japan would develop bomb. § Yet after Germany defeated, still continued dev. § Bomb therefore not to deter vs another bomb, but to be used. § June 1 ‘ 45: kamikaze attacks at Iwo Jima & Okinawa = Truman approves ‘demonstration’ use. § Aug 6: Ur bomb (‘Little Boy’) dropped by B-29 (Enola Gay) on Hiroshima. § 15 kt bomb = 15, 000 tonnes of TNT. Of 300, 000 citizens, 144, 000 cas (68, 000 deaths). 67% of buildings damaged. § Firestorm finished off city.

The Atomic Revolution, II § Aug 9: Nagaski, by plutonium ‘Fat Man. ’ § 59, 000 casualties (of whom 38, 000 were deaths), out of a population of 200, 000. 40% of buildings damaged. § Casualties worsened by hot, cloudless weather, thin garments, & poor medical care. § 70% of casualties from blast, 65% burns, 30% radiation. § Basic Cold War intellectual division: 1. Deterrence: Brodie (The Absolute Weapon). § War now so destructive, military’s job no longer to win, but to prevent (birth of deterrence). § Power of nukes to awe enemy into peace. 2. Warfighting: Nitze (Strategic Bombing Survey). § Evacuation plans, shelters, & industrial decentralization would have reduced Japanese losses. § If costs not so excessive, old rules apply (war remains).

The Atomic Revolution, III § Warfighters’s core assumption: cities & militaries can be separated, thus society can survive nukes. § Cities need to survive war if war is to be useful. § Prob: nukes becoming more deadly, not less. § 1. Fusion bomb (use 100 mil heat from fission to fuse H atoms) far more powerful--like sun. § Nov ‘ 52: ‘MIKE’ exploded in Marshalls. Test island disappears (1 mile in diameter). § Was 10 megatons (10 million tons of TNT), or roughly 1000 x Hiroshima. Entire societies now threatened. § 2. Radiation (by ‘ 50 s, begin to realize it matters). § Atmospheric tests contaminated great distances away. § Nukes take on nefarious light (affect even those who aren’t fighting). § Goodbye military-only targeting.

The Atomic Revolution, IV § 3. ICBMs almost unstoppable. § Bombers can be defended against (ie UK, Germany), but rockets fly 17, 000 mph. § By mid-’ 50 s, ICBMs can (accurately) fly across continents. § Early ‘ 60 s: SLBMs from silent subs offshore (now warning time of only a few minutes). § Defending against nuclear attack now almost impossible = rise of MAD. § So long as have enough warheads to retaliate vs enemy cities, no one will attack you. § Security through triad (nukes on land, sea, & air) & effective communication. § Paradox: hold each other hostage = peace. § Yet warfighting sticks around. § Accuracy greatly improves (= < nukes = < radiation).

The Atomic Revolution, V § MIRVs: multiple, accurate warheads on each missile (1 missile = many targets). § What if so many nukes = ‘decapitate’ b/4 they can respond? § Response to MIRVs is BMD. § Need to keep deterrence mutual (protect vs 1 st strike). § Warfighters want to limit damage (so can fight nuclear war & still have something to win). § Plus: moral unpalatability of MAD (ie Reagan & ‘Star Wars’). § However, problems have consumed previous attempts (ie since Soviet ‘Griffon’ in mid-50 s). § § Small size, speed, decoys = difficult to intercept. Control radars are vulnerable to attacks. Can ‘flood’ BMD system (& ‘leakers’ are painful). Danger of upsetting strategic balance (end of MAD).

The Atomic Revolution, VI § B/c of cost & danger, is political demand for perfection (though impossible). § Is major war now obsolete? § In nuclear age, goal of international primacy is not worth it. § Remorseless gamblers no longer allowed into positions of high power. § Hitler may not have preferred MAD, but his associates would have. § The result: 75 years of periodic crisis, but great power stability. § Yet, unlike hegemony, deterrence peace comes from strength negated, from potential violence finely balanced against each other. § Unfortunately, then, potential for violence remains (as underlying causes have not been solved, only stymied).

The Postwar World § US & USSR ‘natural enemies’ = ‘Cold War. ’ § Lots of nukes by ‘ 50 s = crises, but no direct war. § Great power stability does not = global peace. § Algeria: French lose Vietnam, only to fight again. § Nov ‘ 54: Algerian rebels (FLN) initiate struggle. § Arab nationalism stirred, but 10, 000 s of French settlers not want to leave. Struggle is brutal. § ‘ 56: conscripts sent. Face difficulty & FLN hits cities. § Late ‘ 56: Arab districts controlled by FLN. European districts brought to standstill by terror attacks. § Jan ‘ 57: paratroopers take over cities from police. § Massu ruthless, dirty. Arrest, search, torture. FLN collapses. § 4 yrs of relentless suppression. Helos, jeeps hunt FLN bases. § Brutality wins, yet outrages urban France (ie Sartre). § Won military, but lost political war: De Gaulle grants indp ‘ 62.

The Postwar World, II § Britain had easier decolonization, but still some violence. § Feb ‘ 48: communists in Malaya rebel. § Feb ‘ 51: UK begins serious military effort. § Played Malays vs Chinese w nationalism ‘carrot. ’ § Military ‘stick’ w relentless special forces (ie SAS). § ‘ 54: UK defeats communists, grant Malaysian indp. § US: Vietnam not worth effort, yet still stumble in. § Capitalist ally (South) a dictatorial kleptocracy. US advisors thinking of Korea (conventional, not guerilla). § ‘ 59: North attacks. Build ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail. ’ § Kennedy: we will stop advance of communism. § Prob: US army not ready, nor good at learning. Mc. Namara thinks in equations & stats, not politics of winning a war. § By ‘ 64, South is collapsing. Johnson wants neither to fight nor be defeated by this ‘piss-ant’ country.

The Postwar World, III § ‘ 64: Gulf of Tonkin ‘incident’ = excuse for direct air raids. § Communists refuse to halt (already have overcome French firepower). § ‘ 65: ‘Rolling Thunder’ (ltd) air raids. § Also fail, = ground troops sent. South is saved. § US Congress, public initially enthusiastic. No reserves called up & many exemptions for draft. § Westmoreland about helicopters, firepower & attrition, not about local control or training South. § ‘ 68: North gambles on Tet (boldly attack cities). § Military disaster for NVA & Viet Cong, yet US public shocked--while govt could not explain reason for war. § (New) Gen. Abrams focuses on ‘Vietnamization, ’ but is too late: US public demands an end.

The Postwar World, IV § ‘ 72: last US ground forces leave. § North tries 2 x to humiliate US while leaving. § Response is massive precision bombing campaign, which levels Northern infrastructure. § Success drives communists to peace table in ‘ 73. § ‘ 75: North launches final drive on South. § Nixon busy, Congress undercuts US support. South falls quickly w/o active US assistance. § Millions flee communists. CIA fails to destroy files. § US self-esteem trampled. Viet society devastated. § US not recover until ‘ 80 s (officer introspection & Reagan building program, ie Apache & Abrams). § Reagan preparation = Iraq ‘ 90 invasion of Kuwait met w technological fury. § Hussein convinced US not attk--even when 500 k arrive.

The Postwar World, V § ‘ 91 bombing campaign ‘softens’ Iraqis. § Ground campaign only 100 hrs. Iraqis surrender en masse. § US commanders want only win & get out. § Prob: many Iraqi soldiers escaped (incl ‘Republican Guard’) & Saddam left in power. § Embargoes (indirectly) kill 10, 000 s. § Inspectors periodically thrown out. § ‘No-fly’ zones in N & S not prevent Kurd & Shia rebels from being crushed. § Many upset US forces garrisoned on Arabian peninsula. § ‘ 92: 33, 000 UN tps to Somalia (28, 000 from US). § Oct ‘ 93: 2 Blackhawks & 18 US tps killed. Public demands immediate withdrawl. § US (& West) casualty fear = idle re Rwanda, etc. § ~800, 000 murdered in Hutu vs Tutsi genocide. § Reluctance to go to Haiti. US refuses ground troops for Balkans until late. Much of Africa ignored completely.

War Made New § Potential of catastrophic terror recognized throughout ‘ 80 s & ‘ 90 s. § Much of world already exposed to it. § 9/11, however, was leap in lethality. § States have long used terror, & assassination was common, but non-state political violence is recent. § Contingent upon weapons (high explosives & MGs), transport (trains, cars & planes), & commn (telegraph & tv) developments. § Even the small can now seriously damage & get message out (local becomes a national concern). 1) 19 th C Anarchists, 2) Decolonization, 3) ‘ 60 s-’ 70 s ideology/jetliner waves. § WMD is new, dangerous twist. § Airliners don’t threaten entire cities. Nukes do.

War Made New, II § Chemical weapons hated, ineffective = 1925 ban. § Only used by strong vs weak (ie Iraq vs Kurds). § Terrorists have tried (ie Cl trucks in Iraq), but need much material & enclosed space). § Bio weapons potentially deadly (disease kills more than wars). § Include anthrax, plague, Ebola, botulism, ricin, etc. § Danger of engineered immunity-defeated ‘superbugs. ’ § Nukes are 1 st ‘absolute’ weapon--no real way to defend against. § No defence = deterrence, instead of nuclear war. § Prob: terrorists are a) excessively zealous, b) provide no real target for counter-strike (thus cannot be deterred). § Leaves no clear strategy (only hope arrest before strike).

War Made New, III § Central issue: diffusion of capabilities downward. § Chem wpns tech in 100 countries, 20, 000 labs where virus could be synthesized. § Yet biotech revolution is still in its infancy. § 1990 -5: Aum Shinrikyo proved bio & chem wpns difficult to weaponize (expose in concentration). § However, managed 10 bio & 10 chem attacks. § US anthrax attack killed 5, & yet went undetected. § Barrier to nukes: cannot hide enrichment centrifuges (ltd to states). § Terrorists left w ‘dirty’ bombs or purchase. § Result: ‘super-empowered angry’ people matter. § Terrorism is the problem § Reasons may change (ie militant Islam, death cults, Christian millenarianism), but tech challenge to the state will remain.

War Made New, IV § So what to do? § Domestic security measures (ie MI 5 watches 100 s of suspects). § Emergency preparedness (medical drills, vaccine stockpiles). § Post-9/11: attack harbours & potential harbours/WMD allies (Afghanistan & Iraq). § Bin Laden (wealthy, media-savvy scion, & Afghan -USSR vet). § ‘ 92 fatwa vs Western troops in Arabia (is his political project). § Forms al-Qaeda (‘The Base’). $ to Somalia, Chechnya, Bosnia (at first, outsources violence). § ‘ 96: moves to Afghanistan. Begins training 10 -20 k. § Aug ‘ 98: Nairobi & Dar es Salaam bombings. § BL evades Tomahawks sent in response.

War Made New, V § Oct ‘ 00: USS Cole damaged in Yemen. § No response made (b/c US election & fearful of backlash). § Sept ‘ 01: 4 airliners downed. § For <$500, 000 & 19 suicide hijackers, 3, 000 Americans killed, $bns of damage, & end US sense of invulnerability. § Response: (popular) war vs AQ’s patron. § Oct ‘ 01: Afghan War (US firepower, special forces, & local allies to overthrow Taliban). § Kharzai installed by intl coalition. Elected 2004. § Oct ‘ 01 Directive & ‘ 02 NSSS: is a global war, w/ no distinction btn terrorists & their harbours. § $ also cut off (is a big loss for the IRA). § Mar ‘ 03: Iraq invaded (US fears WMD & terrorism). § Apr: Baghdad falls, yet no WMD found. § Too few troops = insurgency grows, as does US (& intl) opposition. Now what? § Today: lots of violence, yet few real answers.

Course Feedback § 1. Structure. § Concept flow, assignments. § 2. Content. § Material covered, text, reader. § 3. Lecture. § Format, delivery, ppts (espec notes).