Police Reform in Mexico’s Municipalities Daniel Sabet Georgetown University September 17, 2009
The need for local police reform The military is a limited tool • Human rights abuses • Too blunt an instrument • Cannot be effective if its efforts are undermined by corrupt police
Current reform and police professionalization efforts • • SUBSEMUN (over US$ 300 million, 2009) Vetting (over 100, 000 tests, 2008 -9) Police civil service Standardization and information sharing Legal reforms National agreement CALEA Judicial reforms
City Percent of officers with a Duration of high school cadet Minimum degree or training education requirement above (months) % of police receiving annual inservice training Guadalajara Secondary 34. 70% 8 Majority Monterrey Secondary 33. 97% 6 All Mérida Secondary 28. 39% 3 All Ahome High School 55. 15% 12 All Secondary 40. 03% 6 Majority High School 35. 27% 8 Majority Secondary - 6 Majority Chihuahua High School 47. 07% 10 All Puebla High School -. . All HS for transit 55. 80% . All Secondary 34. 55% México DF San Luís Potosí Torreón Cuernavaca Zapopan 6 All Source: Survey of municipal police departments. Non-representative sample
City SUBSEMUN Basic Trucks as a percent monthly and patrol of other 2008 salary cars per budgetary (pesos) police sources Internal affairs employees per 100 police Average annual firings as a percent of police? Guadalajara $7, 916 0. 17 24. 55% 2. 94 0. 76% Monterrey $7, 243 0. 20 22. 04% 3. 72 1. 90% Mérida $4, 672 0. 15 59. 82% 0. 64 1. 71% Ahome $6, 269 0. 12 0. 50 3. 12% México DF $8, 186 0. 12 5. 46% 0. 84 3. 09% San Luís Potosí $6, 506 0. 15 33. 65% 1. 35 3. 81% Torreón $6, 625 0. 35 100. 90% 0. 40 16. 05% Chihuahua $8, 745 0. 49 33. 11% 0. 44 0. 97% Puebla $7, 226 0. 25 Cuernavaca $5, 952 0. 20 Zapopan $9, 050 0. 14 . . 5. 40% 0. 43 1. 13 . 1. 40% 1. 14 0. 36% Source: Survey of municipal police departments. Non-representative sample
Many accountability mechanisms but little accountability • • • Vetting Human rights commissions Compstat Citizen services Internal affairs departments – Reactive investigation of individual incidents based on complaints – Few cases of corruption – No complaints from fellow officers – Does not address collusion with organized crime – Focused on rotten apple rather than the rotten barrel
Continued weaknesses • Uneven advances between rural and urban areas • Accountability mechanisms • Merit based promotions • Transparency and civil society oversight
Why don’t good policies work? • Problems of design – Accountability mechanisms • Problems of implementation – Education – Merit based promotion – Vetting • Problems of institutionalization – – – Procedures Selection criteria Training Equipment In-service training Citizen outreach
Procedures in Mexicali Timeline Party in Power Mayor Policy 1998 -2001 -2004 2007 -2010 PRI PAN 2004 -2007 PAN Hermosillo Celada Díaz Ochoa Ramos Flores Valdez Gutiérrez ISO-9001 Japanese quality control Internal CALEA
The importance of a long term approach in Chihuahua Timeline 1998 -2001 Party in power Mayor Police Chief Policy 2001 -2002 -2004 -2007 PRI Reyes Baeza Barousse Moreno 2007 -2009 PAN Cano Ricaud Raúl Grajeda Domínguez Blanco Zaldívar Borruel Baquera Lazaro Gaytán Aguirre CALEA Accreditation
The key questions • Can civil society oversight overcome the continuity problem? – And if it can, is civil society prepared to play this role? • Given the empirical inability to develop effective anti-corruption efforts in the current environment, is it reasonable to presume that accountability is the last step in a sequence of police reforms?
Gracias! Daniel M. Sabet Georgetown University dms 76@georgetown. edu http: //www 9. georgetown. edu/faculty/dms 76/home. html
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