PLAAF ORGANISATION • BASED ON SOVIET PATTERN • 12 AIRCRAFT PER SQN • 03 SQN PER REGIMENT • 03 REGIMENTS PER AIR DIVISION
ROLES ASSIGNED • AIR DEFENCE • GROUND ATTACK • TACTICAL BOMBING
PLA AF HOLDING • 03 AIRBORNE PARA DIV • 16 DIV AD ARTY
PLA AF • FIGHTERS HOLDING 4100 ( F-6, A-5, F- 7, F-8, Q-5) • BOMBERS 400 • TRANSPORT 400 • RECCE 290 • HEPTRS 210
MODERNISATION • • • AIRCRAFT SU-27 LONG RANGE INTERCEPTORS LICENSE PRODUCTION OF MIG 31 AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT OF MULTIROLE AGILE AIRCRAFT • MOU WITH INDIA AND KOREA FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
FORCE MULTIPLIERS • AVIONICS FOR SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE • ASI-5 MULTIMODE RADAR FIRE CONTROL • DAY/NIGHT IMAGING PODS
STRATEGIC MISSILES • DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBM/MIRV NUCLEAR 15000 KM • DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBM 7000 KM NUCLEAR • DF-5 (CSS-2) IRBM 2700 KM NUCLEAR • JL 1 SLBM NUCLEAR 2200 -3000 KM • DF-31 ICBM >8000 KM NUCLEAR
LEGEND AIRFIELD ROAD
CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY E S U A IN ? ” H B C M T O H B IG M M O W AT O E “H H T
NUCLEAR POLICY • NUCLEAR DETERRENCE • PROGRESS ON THEIR OWN • POSSESS SEVERAL HUNDRED NUCLEAR DEVICES AND MISSILES
OBJECTIVES OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY • NATIONAL SECURITY BY DETERRING AN ATTACK BY A SUPER POWER • ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING POSITION FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH
OBJECTIVES OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY • TO BREAK THE NUCLEAR MONOPOLY OF WORLD SUPER POWERS
NUCLEAR PROGRAMME • BEGAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN 1950 s • DECIDED TO GO AHEAD ON HER OWN • NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY STOLEN FROM THE USA
NUCLEAR ARSENAL • 400 WARHEADS • SECOND ARTY CORPS HANDLES NUCLEAR WEAPONS • DELIVERY BY FIGHTER/BOMBER AIRCRAFT
CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY • AMBIGUOUS IN CONTRAST WITH THAT OF RUSSIA AND USA • FINAL AUTHORITY FOR THE USE RESTS WITH THE PARTY
CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY • BELIEVES IN ‘FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY’ • RETAIN THE OPTION OF SELECTIVE DETERRENCE
CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY • TO FORCE NUCLEAR INACTION BY FRIGHTENING THE ADVERSARY • PLEDGES NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY • USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN OWN TERRITORY NOT A VIOLATION OF THE PLEDGE
TRI-POLAR DETERRENCE • TWO PRONGED STRATEGY TO DETER RUSSIA AND US • MATERIALLY INCREASE NUMBER OF TARGETS IT CAN ATTACK
CATEGORISATION OF THREAT • INTERNAL • MINORITIES • LIBERALISATION • CHANGING CULTURAL VALUES
CATEGORISATION OF THREAT • EXTERNAL • USA - OPEN ADVERSARY • JAPAN - POWERFUL RESURGENT ADVERSARY • VIETNAM - UNPREDICTABLE ACE HITMAN
CATEGORISATION OF THREAT • EXTERNAL • RUSSIA - POWERFUL THREATENING FORCE • INDIA - NEO-NUCLEAR WITH ADVANCING MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
CHINESE GEOPOLITICAL FACETS • EXTREME POSSESSIVE ATTITUDE TO HER TERRITORIES • SENSITIVENESS TO SECESSIONERY TENDENCIES
IRREDENTISM • TAIWAN • MACAU
SUPPORT TO SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT • HAS LARGE ETHNIC POPULATION OF – KAZAKHS – KYRGHYS – TAZIKS – UIGHURS
SUPPORT TO SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT • MOSTLY MUSLIMS AND SHARE CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS LINKS WITH CARs • RISE OF TALIBAN – ALARMED THESE STATES
SUPPORT TO SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT • LESS LIKELY TO SUPPORT THESE MINORITIES • SHANGHAI TREATY – STOP SPONSORING THESE GROUPS
TIBET • CONQUERED BY MONGOLS IN 13 TH CENTURY • CAME UNDER “MANCHU” CONTROL IN 18 TH CENTURY
CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF CHINA • EQUIPMENT 10 -20 YEARS BEHIND THAT OF THE WEST • MILITARY COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT OUTDATED
CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF CHINA • LACKS INTEGRATED AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (AWACS) FORCE • UAVs ARE UNDER DEVELOPMENT
CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF CHINA • SYSTEMS - INTEGRATION SKILLS ARE POOR • INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES AND NON-EXISTENT INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT
PROGRESS MADE • SOME AREAS OF COMMAND CONTROL • CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
BAY OF BENGAL • NAVAL CONFLICT IN BAY OF BENGAL LESS LIKELY • SLOCs IN THIS REGION ARE IMPORTANT FOR WESTERN POWERS
LAND THREAT • INTEGRATED WAR IN THREE DIMENSIONS – AIR LAND BATTLE • INTEGRATED AIR, HELIBORNE, AIRBORNE AND SPECIAL FORCES • TRAINING IN NBC SCENARIOS, BOTH IN OFFENCE AND DEFENCE
MARITIME THREAT • REGARDS INDIA AS A POTENTIAL COMPETITOR • INDIA PRINCIPLE ADVERSARY ACROSS MALACCA STRAITS • HER INTERESTS IN INDIAN OCEAN ARE LONG-TERM AND STRATEGIC
POLICY IN THE BAY OF BENGAL • TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH MYANMAR - LAND BASED ACCESS IN BAY OF BENGAL • TO DEVELOP A BLUE-WATER CAPABILITY • TO LIMIT INDIAN NAVAL FORCE PROJECTION TO THE WEST OF SINGAPORE
MILITARY COUNTER MEASURES • INDIAN ARMED FORCES UNDER CONSTRAINTS OF BUDGETING • UNLIKELY TO GROW IN SIZE
MILITARY COUNTER MEASURES • CHINA RECOGNISED THE NEED TO REDUCE MANPOWER • PLA HAS LESS ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS • INDIAN ARMED FORCES RESTRUCTURE ITSELF TO SUIT POLITICAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
INDIAN RESPONSE TO CHINESE ST CENTURY THREAT IN 21 • RESTRUCTURING AND DOWNSIZING THE ARMY • DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL FORCE MULTIPLIERS – INTEGRATED STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL C 4 I 2 SYSTEMS
INDIAN RESPONSE TO CHINESE ST CENTURY THREAT IN 21 • DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL FORCE MULTIPLIERS – BETTER RADARS, SAMS, SSMS, UAVS, – AIR-TO- AIR REFUELLING – INTEGRATED LOGISTICS
INDIAN RESPONSE TO CHINESE ST CENTURY THREAT IN 21 • DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIBLE RAPID DEPLOYMENT AND AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY OF A DIVISION EACH • DOCTRINAL SHIFT TO ‘INFO-AGE WARFARE’
SINO RUSSIA • SITUATION CHANGED WITH THE FORMATION OF THE CIS • RUSSIA APPRECIATED THAT CHINA COULD BECOME AN IMPORTANT ALLY • CHINA HAD MONEY POWER AND RUSSIA HAD THE TECHNOLOGY
HISTORICAL AGREEMENT • ALL CONTROVERSIES AND BORDER DISPUTES BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS • CEDING OF TERRITORIES TO EACH OTHER AND REDUCTION OF TROOPS
HISTORICAL AGREEMENT • MODEL TREATY FOR SETTLING BORDER DISPUTES BETWEEN VARIOUS NATIONS
SINO - JAPAN • HISTORICALLY JAPAN HAS BEEN A THREAT TO CHINA • 1978 TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP • 1996 JAPANESE RIGHT WING GROUP LANDED ON SENKAKU ISLAND
STEPS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS • PRESIDENT HASHIMOTO MET PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN IN 1996 • IN 1997 JAPAN ANNOUNCED LIFTING OF THE FREEZE OF GRANTS IN AID
STEPS TO NORMALISE RELATIONS • UNDERSTANDING REACHED TO EXPAND CO-OPERATION IN THE AREAS OF – HIGH TECHNOLOGY – INFORMATION
STEPS TO NORMALISE RELATIONS • UNDERSTANDING REACHED TO EXPAND CO-OPERATION IN THE AREAS OF – ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION – AGRICULTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE • PROMOTE SECURITY DIALOGUES • 33 ITEM CO-OPERATION PLAN
REASONS FOR TENSIONS • VISIT TO CORNELL UNIVERSITY IN 1995 BY TAIWAN PRESIDENT LEE TENG HUI • SHIFT FROM THE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON
TAIWAN’S REQUIREMENTS • VOTERS ON THE ISLAND FOR INDEPENDENCE • INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF ITS SOVEREIGN STATUS
RESULTS OF INTERNET SURVEY CARRIED OUT FOR SOVEREIGNTY – 70. 17% SAID "YES" NO – 20. 28 % SAID "NO” YES
CHINESE CLAIM OVER TAIWAN • SOVEREIGN STATE HAS RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS UNITY AND INTEGRITY • TAIWAN HISTORICALLY BELONGS TO CHINA
CHINESE CLAIM OVER TAIWAN • PROCLAMATION ISSUED AT CAIRO CONFERENCE IN 1943 STATES THAT TAIWAN BE RETURNED TO CHINA • TAIWAN IS CONSIDERED A PART OF CHINA BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
WORLD POSITION ON TAIWAN • NO PERMISSION REQUIRED FROM CHINA TO – TRADE WITH TAIWAN – TRANSIT PEOPLE, AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS TO AND FROM TAIWAN
WORLD POSITION ON TAIWAN • CHINA’S CLAIM OVER TAIWAN IS FACTUALLY WEAK • NO IMMEDIATE ANSWER
SINO-US RELATIONS • DECISION OF THE US TO SUPPORT CHIANG KAI SHEK • KOREAN CONFLICT OF 1950
SINO-US RELATIONS • EISENHOWER'S THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPON • US SUPPLY OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO TAIWAN
RELATIONS NOW • RICHARD NIXON REALISED THE IMPORTANCE OF CHINA • MILITARY TIES WERE STRENGTHENED IN THE LATE 70 s
RELATIONS NOW • CHINA CONSIDERS USA MORE AS A FRIEND THAN AN ALLY • USA SEES CHINA AS AN EMERGING MARKET FOR HER GOODS
AMERICAN POLICY • BASED ON 1979 TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT • BEIJING OPPOSED INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS • LIKELY DANGER TO SINO-US RELATIONS
SINO –EU RELATIONS • CHINA IS THE THIRD LARGEST NONEUROPEAN TRADING PARTNER FOR EU • ACCOMMODATING CHINA IN 21 st CENTURY -A BIG ISSUE FACING EUROPE • EU SUPPORTS – TRANSITION TO OPEN SOCIETY – RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
AREAS OF MUTUAL CO-OPERATION • REGIONAL CO-OPERATION • ENVIRONMENTAL AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT • ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION • REDUCTION IN CROSS BORDER CRIME
FOREIGN POLICY • WAS DETERMINED BY THREE MAJOR FACTORS – SRI LANKA'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH UNITED KINGDOM – DOMESTIC POLITICS – SOVIET UNION’S VETO OF SRI LANKA'S ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
SRI LANKA’S VIEW • INTENSE DISLIKE FOR COMMUNISM • IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CHINA WHEN NEW POWER PATTERN EMERGED IN SUBCONTINENT • WELCOMES CHINA AS A COUNTER TO INDIA'S POWER AND INFLUENCE • ECONOMIC AID FROM CHINA
CHINA'S POLICY • MYANMAR PRO-WEST • ACCUSED U NU AS STOOGE OF THE USA • THE WHITE FLAG COMMUNIST MOVEMENT • IN 1969 CHINA RESTORED TIES
MYANMAR’S RESPONSE • WITHDREW FROM NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT • RECEPTIVE TO CHINA’S NEEDS TO WARD OFF THREAT FROM REBELS • CHINESE OBTAINED BASE FACILITIES FROM MYANMAR AT HANGYI ISLANDS AND COCO ISLANDS
BACKGROUND • CHINA NEVER SUPPORTED BANGLA MOVEMENT FOR INDEPENDENCE • RECOGNISED BANGLADESH AS LATE AS 1975
PRESENT SITUATION • ACTIVE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND BANGLADESH • CHINA IS MAJOR SUPPLIER OF ARMS • SINO-BANGLA RELATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO BANGLA-INDIA RELATIONS
SINO – NEPAL RELATIONS • HISTORICAL LINKS • GEO-CONTIGUOUS STATES • LOFTY HIMALAYAS AS INSULATION
CHINA – NEPAL RELATIONS • STRATEGIC LOCATION • NEPAL – A BUFFER STATE
SINO – PAK RELATIONS • FIRST MUSLIM COUNTRY TO RECOGNISE PRC • PAKISTAN GAVE AWAY 2050 SQ KM OF POK • PIA FIRST FOREIGN AIRLINE TO OPERATE SERVICE TO BEIJING
CHINESE ROLE IN THE 1965 INDO-PAK WAR • CHINA HELD INDIA SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR CONFLICT • SUPPORTED KASHMIRI’S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
CHINESE ROLE IN THE 1965 INDO-PAK WAR • ACCUSED UN OF ACTING TO PAKISTAN'S DETRIMENT • OPPOSED MERGER OF SIKKIM WITH INDIA
CHINA'S POLICY ON PAKISTAN • AGGRESSIVE EXPANSION ALTERNATED BY DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRING * DOMINATE SOUTH ASIA * INTEGRATE SOUTH ASIAN ECONOMY WITH HER OWN * SUPPLICATE US INFLUENCE IN ASIA
BENEFITS TO PAKISTAN • DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT • MILITARY EQUIPMENT
BENEFITS TO PAKISTAN • ASSISTANCE IN ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND DEFENCE PRODUCTION • TRANSFER OF INTERMEDIATE BALLISTIC MISSILES
PRESENT RELATIONS • CHINA SHOWN MODERATION ON VIEWS ON KASHMIR • MODERATE VIEWS ON DOWNING OF ATLANTIQUE
SINO – INDIAN RELATIONS • INDIA AND CHINA EMERGED AS POLITICAL ENTITIES AT THE SAME TIME • INDIA – A PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC NON ALIGNED COUNTRY • CHINA – A MODERN COMMUNIST NATION
SINO – INDIAN RELATIONS • NEVER FOLLOWED ANY UNIFORM PATTERN • SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS BEST UNDERSTOOD BY DIVIDING INTO DIFFERENT PERIODS
PERIOD FROM 1947 -50 • PT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU DESCRIBED CHINA AS "A MIGHTY COUNTRY WITH A MIGHTY PAST" • INDIA RECOGNISED THE PRC IN DEC 1949
PERIOD FROM 1950 -54 • CHANGES IN RELATIONS FROM IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE TO STATE OF FRIENDSHIP • KOREAN WAR • TAKE OVER OF TIBET BY THE PLA
PERIOD OF HINDI-CHINIBHAI-BHAI • SOCIO-CULTURAL EXCHANGES • CHINESE INCURSIONS INTO NORTHERN FRONTIERS • 1956 – 57 : ROAD ACROSS AKSAI CHIN
PERIOD FROM 1959 - 62 • IN JAN 1959 CHOU EN LAI CHALLENGED ESTABLISHED BOUNDARY • IN SEP 1959 CLAIMED 50, 000 SQ MILES OF INDIAN TERRITORY
PERIOD FROM 1959 - 62 • IN 1962 CHINA MOUNTED A FULL FLEDGED ATTACK ON INDIA • CHINA MOVED CLOSER TO PAKISTAN • SUPPORTED PAKISTAN IN 1965 AND 1971 WARS
PERIOD SINCE 1976 • IN 1976 DIPLOMATIC TIES RESUMED • MODEST LINKS IN TRADE, BANKING AND SHIPPING RE-ESTABLISHED • IN 1988 JOINT WORKING GROUP SET UP TO SOLVE THE BORDER DISPUTES
JOINT WORKING GROUP • CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES • REDUCTION OF TROOPS
HURDLES IN RELATIONS • CHINA DOES NOT RECOGNISE Mc MAHON LINE • SIKKIM AND ARUNACHAL NOT RECOGNISED BY CHINA AS PARTS OF INDIA • AKSAI CHIN STANDS IN THE WAY
HURDLES IN RELATIONS • OVERT AND COVERT SUPPORT BY CHINA TO PAKISTAN • CHINA SEES INDIA AS A MAJOR RIVAL IN SE ASIA
HURDLES IN RELATIONS • JOINED HANDS WITH PAKISTAN TO INTERNATIONALISE THE KASHMIR ISSUE • CHINA'S MILITARY MYANMAR AND TIBET BASES IN • INDIA'S NUCLEAR TESTS NOT LIKED BY CHINA
HURDLES IN RELATIONS • INDIA MUST SIGN THE CTBT AND THE NPT UNCONDITIONALLY • INDIA'S SUPPORT TO THE DALAI LAMA
WAY AHEAD • INDIA HAS A PLACE IN SE ASIA • STATEMENTS OF DISTRUST FROM INDIA MUST STOP • CHANGING CHINESE STAND MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
A first- rate theory predicts; a second- rate theory forbids; and a third- rate theory explains after the event. Alexander Isaakovich Kitaigordskii
PRO DEMOCRACY * ELECTIONS AT VILLAGE AND LOCAL LEVELS * KEEN INTEREST IN INDIAN DEMOCRACY * DEMOCRACY AN ACCEPTABLE FORM OF GOVERNMENT * TINANMEN SQUARE INCIDENT AND COLLAPSE OF ERSTWHILE USSR
ANTI DEMOCRACY • COMMUNISM MORE SUITED TO MANAGE LARGE COUNTRIES LIKE CHINA • COMMON MAN NOT INTERESTED IN DEMOCRACY
FINAL ANALYSIS • PRO DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS GAIN STRENGTH AS INFORMATION ERA CREEPS IN • DEPENDENT ON SUCCESS OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY • MAY ADOPT DEMOCRACY TO GAIN MORAL ASCENDANCY
POLITICAL SCENARIO • EMERGING MULTI-POLAR WORLD • INDIA SHOULD MAINTAIN EQUIDISTANCE • INDO-RUSSIAN-CHINA AXIS
POLITICAL SCENARIO • INDIA IS IN THE PERIPHERAL VISION OF CHINA • SINO-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP--THE ‘POWER FOR ASIANS’ THEORY’ • LIKELY ADMISSION IN G-8 AND THE WTO
FUTURE • DREAM OF GREATER CHINA • GREAT MILITARY POWER • BEFRIEND PAKISTAN • CONFRONTATION WITH ASEAN
The 17 th century has been described as the age of reason; the 18 th as of progress and enlightenment; 19 the 20 th as one of anxiety and extremes My hunch is that 21 st century would be a century of uncertainty KR NARAYANAN
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