Oral Comps Slides Major Ben Zweibelson Seminar 4, SAMS Lesson D 316
Question 1: theory of war Each student likely needs their own stuff here.
However, pleasure and pain are only root motives for decision to act. They would not fully explain much of human behavior in and out of war. Schopenhauer: German Philosopher (1788 -1860) PL P The Will to Survive (Live) S E G R WTS All human action relates to a core desire to survive, reproduce, and prosper. Nietzsche: German Philosopher (1844 -1900) The Will to Power WTP PA All human action relates to a core desire to increase one’s power. This overrides survival in terms of risk.
Special Theory on Actors and Organized Conflict; The ODARR Cycle and Origin of Decisions to Act. Includes enemy and friendly COG analysis. Adjust forces, values, and contextual factors Orientation Phase P L adjust Reflection Phase S P Decision Phase WTS E G adjust WTP R adjust Re-Orient Phase All actions are directed against critical vulnerabilities in the most recent observed enemy COG. Enemy COGs CC, CR, CV. COGs are open systems Action Phase P A Actions are also taken to protect friendly COG vulnerabilities in the most recent observed friendly COG. Friendly COGs CC, CR, CV. COGs are open systems Our COGs are linked to our pain/loss of prosperity concepts as well as our WTS/WTP gravitational pulls. The enemy is linked the same.
Question 2: Gaddis and ‘continuity/contingency with history’
Gaddis: Why and How should Historians Think? (metacognition) Continuity: historians (unlike scientists) represent what they can never duplicate. History requires a level of consistency that is closer to objective truth than subjective interpretation (histiography explains how this often occurs, and why). History objectivity Gaddis: “distillation”- not every detail is critical; historians decide what gets relayed in narratives. More Accurate/ Relevant History Contingency Debatable/quasi. Relevant History Counter-Factual Arguments (what if Barbarossa…) PRESENT Inaccurate/ irrelevant History Gaddis: “path dependency”Hitler kicked out of art school caused WWII Gaddis: constructed memories: Churchill’s youthful portrait language event Gaddis: historians hide their methods FUTURE Change in Historical Perspectives (Hatch’s Wheel) Gaddis: “weighing concepts. Theories in science are Hitler’s love of dogs and reproducible; history does not children is irrelevant. ” repeat (but themes occur) information PAST Continuity unknown (exteriority) Gaddis: no time-traveling for history- no changing it. Linear Time; Space Contingency: historians must think critically about how they represent history- flawed processes produce faulty expectations of what the future is. If historians follow too abstract a path (or too detailed/pedantic), or if they give into social biases and faulty logic, they will misinterpret history. subjectivity Values Tenets Culture Identity Human Limitations in Cognition Known (interiority) Histiography Hayden White: The Content and the Form Peter Novack: That Noble Dream Mary Jo Hatch: Operational Theory Deluze/Guitari: A Thousand Plataeus
Question 3: theories of Herbst, Kalyvas, Brinton, and Parsa
Herbst: States and Power in Africa Follows Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel thesis that biological and geographic determinism shaped Africanot the traditional Euro-centric theory of technological/genetic determinism. Low densities of people over massive tracts of land- this generated a different set of values in African leaders (use Mary Jo Hatch wheel). 3 x African costs for state expansion: 1. Cost of expanding domestic power infrastructure. To rule a distant location, you needed to control military out there and transmit info over roads. 2. The nature of national boundaries. capitals build container/distribution points out from central power; colonial “new capitals” were coastal; pre-colonial ones were not. 3. The design of state systems. – winning wars brought slaves; there was little organizational infrastructure to gain. Thus, post-conflict Africa differed from European conflicts over land. Africans had different agriculture and industrial/economic structures; trading for guns, mining minerals, limited farming (migrant). Colonial imposed boundaries remain. Africa struggles with post-imperialism. Brinton: The Anatomy of Revolution Brinton covers American, French, English, and Russian revolutions and acknowledges that his thesis on revolutionary cycles does not synch with all of them. Brinton argues that revolutions end the worst abuses and inefficiencies of the old regime while bringing greater uniformity and equality to the state system. While man changes his mind on many issues (hereditary monarchy, aristocracy, classes, civil rights, land property ownership, slavery) man does not change his habits. Originally radical ideas transition in the revolutionary cycle into state propaganda and national self-identity for posterity within the post-revolution society. Finally, successful revolts create a tradition of revolution within that society. Parsa’s: States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions Parsa uses states as his unit of analysis (realism perspective). He studies Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines revolutions by exploring social versus political factors. Variables used: Popular opposition to regime Type of political regime Class coalition- present or absent Level of state intervention Iran: centralized state power with extreme repression of moderate opposition; class structure transformation was moderate, and radical theocrats were in the power structure. Outcome: social revolution. Nicaragua: Same as Iran in power and repression; popular opposition was high, and class coalition was present. Revolutionary challengers were initially weak- class structure transformation was high. Socialists in power structure; outcome: social revolution. Philippines: centralized power with moderate repression of opposition. Class coalition was absent, and revolutionary challengers were initially strong; no transformation in class structure, reformist bourgeois were in the power structureoutcome: political revolution. Kalyvas: The Logic of Violence in Civil War Kalyvas asks the question “why are civil wars so violent- or perceived as such? ” He defines civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the onset of the hostilities. ” Five factors of Civil War bias: 1. Partisan bias (taking sides); 2. Political bias (equating war with peace); 3. Urban bias (overlooking bottom-up processes; emphasis on top-down hierarchy); 4. Selection bias (disregarding nonviolence); 5. Over-aggregation bias (working at too high a level of abstraction- “the will of the people”).
Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution “A Theory of Revolt”
Question 4: JP 3. 0, 5. 0 - does current doctrine reflect systems thinking?
Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur. Systems Thinking: a Logic of Positivism, Reductionism, Mechanistic and Linear Procedures • Reverse engineer termination criteria to objectives, COGs, and DPs along a LOO. Identifying desired and undesired effects with a systems perspective –IV-8(3) JP 3 -0. Effects: describe system behavior JP 3 -0 LOGIC: the nature of warfare is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nationstates…IW is a violent struggle between state and non-state actors. JP 3 -0 FM 3 -0 • • • Operational and Mission Variables: FM 3 -0 warns of “precise binning” but the positivist and reductionist procedures are lost. PMESII-PT centric. Echoes JP 3 -0’s definition of ‘Unified Action. ’ Quotes Clausewitz on uncertainty, chance, and friction. (when your logic creates abnormalities, you can categorize them under these catch-alls). • Traditional war and irregular war defined within Clausewitzian concept. • 12 principles of war use Jominian systems thinking that use mechanistic, reductionist, and positivist constructs Joint Operation Planning Process Centers of Gravity • • JP 3 -0 Foundation: Joint operations doctrine is built upon the bedrock principles of war and associated fundamentals of joint warfare. 1. Objective 2. Offensive 3. Mass 4. Economy of Force 5. Maneuver 6. Unity of Command 7. Security 8. Surprise 9. Simplicity 10. Restraint 11. Perseverance 12. Legitimacy JOPP: Step 1: Initiation Step 2: Mission Analysis Step 3: COA Dev Step 4: COA Analysis and wargaming Step 5: COA Comparison Step 6: COA Approval Step 7: Plan/Order Development JP 3 -0 Unified Action: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of the governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.
Centers of Gravity: Using Systems Thinking in a Positivist, Reductionist, and Mechanistic Logic FM 3 -0 Quotes Clausewitz also. The loss of a COG ultimately results in defeat. –this is linear causality and reverse engineering on a positivist logic base. FM 3 -0 goes beyond JP 3 -0 and states “COGs are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral; eliminating them requires holistic integrated efforts of all national IOPs. ” 6 -8. Supports JP 3 -0 and sees a single COG at each level of war. The Army does not have a COG at the tactical level either (just USMC). As Kem says, it is semantics- a tactical COG equals a decisive point. Clausewitz: A COG comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight. Dr. Kem: the COG is the thing you fear most; it is the actual power. Also uses the Strange CC/CR/CV modeling. Dr. Strange: CC/CR/CV modeling. - Critical capabilities: crucial enablers for COG to function. - Critical requirements: essential resources for CCs to work. - Critical vulnerabilities: CRs that are vulnerable to attack or exploitation. * JP 3 -0: the essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or otherwise exploit it…to achieve military objectives. Dr. Reilly: ‘Cognitive Map’ that reverse engineers end-states, COGs, and lines of effort backwards in time. JP 3 -0 Quotes Clausewitz: A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance. A COG is singular in nature- JP 3 -0 wants one at each level of war. In conventional fights, JP 3 -0 prefers strategic COG to be government or leader; and operational COG as the fielded forces. No tactical COGs. LOOs, PLOs- no LOEs. Linear causality. Baseball makes the runner go to 1 st, then 2 nd base; war might require us to run to 3 rd, then 1 st, then 2 nd… Garandagangi makes the distinction between nonminded, uni-minded, and multi-minded systems; COGs work for uniminded (EBO systems based) logic.
Elements of Operational Design JP 3 -0 FM 3 -0 does not use ‘termination’ in doctrine. It does use ‘strategic end state’ in 6 -8. The POTUS translates national interests and policy into a national strategic endstate. FM 3 -0 ties ‘end-state’ to JP 3 -0 same term. Operational objectives are linked to COGs, and tactical OBJs are linked to decisive points (which follow LOEs to target COG CVs. Very systematic process. FM 3 -0 does not use ‘effects’ in JP format; D-2 states that “Army forces DO NOT use joint systems analysis…or effects assessment. ” Army forces conduct operations according to Army doctrine. JP 3 -0 1. Termination: military operations terminate when they achieve and preserve military objectives linked to the national strategic end-state. 3 x approaches: imposed (threatened or actual occupation of enemy territory) or negotiated settlement (coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions), and the indirect approach (when gaining legitimacy and influence over the relevant population; this employs IW to erode an enemy’s power, influence and will over the population. 2. End State and Objectives: developed after the termination criteria are established (Reilly reverse engineering). The military end-state is the point after which the President does not require the military IOP in the lead. 3. Effects: “Combined with a systems perspective, the identification of desired and undesired effects can help commanders and their staffs gain a common picture. An effect is the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, set of actions, or another effect. 1. Objectives: prescribe friendly goals. 2. Effects: describe system behavior. 3. Tasks: direct friendly action. 4. COGs: see previous slide. 5. Decisive Points: a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success. -IV-12, JP 3 -0. Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur. Positivist logic; Clausewitzian. Termination criteria lend to linear causality and reverse-engineering within a neo-realism logic. Linear causality: effect occurs when A+B equals C. Implies reverse engineering and positivism. Positivist logic; Describing instead of explaining. This deals with interiority instead of exteriority! “This holistic understanding helps commanders and their staffs identify COGs, critical factors, and decisive points to formulate LOOs and visualize the CONOPs. ” –IV-12 JP 3 -0.
Elements of Operational Design JP 3 -0 FM 3 -0 shares LOO with JP 3 -0, but introduces Lines of Effort: the LOE helps planners link multiple tasks with goals, objectives, and end-state conditions; LOE follows LOO systems approach in linear causality and uniminded systems (COGs). FM 3 -0 uses JP 3 -0’s operational reach; the limit of a unit’s operational reach is it’s culminating point (6 -74). FM 3 -0 uses similar terms as JP 3 -0 with simultaneity and depth; and introduces ‘phases’ as a planning/execution tool to synchronize an operation. FM 3 -0 does not use JP 3 -0’s phrasing of moral failure; it does paint a more holistic approachwithin a systemic framework. Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur. 6. Direct versus Indirect: “In theory, direct attacks against enemy COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory. ” IV-12, JP 3 -0. 7. Indirect: the indirect paths are used when a JTF cannot conduct a direct attack; they still indirectly target COG CVs in order to set the conditions for successful direct attacks. Once again, this uses positivist logic and linear causality. 8. Lines of Operations: a LOO describes the linkage of various actions on nodes and or decisive points with an operational or strategic objective. 9. Operational Reach: the distance and duration over which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. Reach is fundamentally linked to culmination; geography may limit it- but technology offers methods for bypassing barriers and limitations. 10. Simultaneity and Depth: 1. Simultaneity: the application of military and nonmilitary power against enemy key capabilities and sources of strength; (JP 3 -0 implies operational shock in a Naveh-style here; even talks about moral and or physical failure in cohesion. Simultaneity also refers to concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 2. Depth: overwhelming the enemy in multiple domains - depth applies to time as well as space; this goes into Boyd’s OODA Loop. JP 3 -0 Positivist logic; Clausewitzian. Termination criteria lend to linear causality and reverse-engineering within a neo-realism logic. Linear causality: effect occurs when A+B equals C. Implies reverse engineering and positivism. Direct paths imply linear causality again; not adaptive complex systems. Very EBO centric thoughts here; that simultaneity in action against appropriate enemy forces results in a ‘moral failure’ echoes some of the British and USAAF’s flawed ‘morale bombing’ in WWII.
Elements of Operational Design JP 3 -0 FM 3 -0 Positivist logic; in FM 3 -0 as well here. Tempo: used in 6 -80; FM 3 -0 ties tempo to enemy specifically. FM 3 -0 uses ‘culmination’ where there is a point in time when a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current form of operations. This is a land-centric logic that differs with JP 3 -0 (Air, Sea Power). FM 3 -0 includes RISK as well. This is Clausewitzian logic that addresses the fog, friction, and “luck” – risk relates to time and space; “it is a potential catalyst that fuels opportunity. ” 19. Arranging Operations: sounds like synergy, tempo, forces and functions, and balance. Not sure why JP 3 -0 even uses this one… Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur. 11. Timing and Tempo: “With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react. ” IV-16 JP 3 -0. 12. Tempo: the rate of military action. Tempo has military significance only in relative terms. “information superiority facilitated by a net-centric environment enables the JFC to dictate tempo. ” 13. Forces and Functions: JFCs focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both. 1. Attacking Functions: destroys/disrupts enemy’s ability to employ its forces; 2. Attacking Forces: self-evident. 14. Leverage: gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all domains and the information environment. Can be achieved through asymmetrical actions and concentration and integration of joint force capabilities (IV-17). 15. Balance: the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. 16. Anticipation: JP 3 -0 emphasizes description and volume of information as the means to understanding and anticipating what Taleeb calls ‘Black Swan’ eventsunknown-unknowns. This does not work with Design’s logic of interiority and exteriority with complex adaptive systems. 17. Synergy: combining military forces and capabilities so that their sum is greater than individual totals. Or, 1+1+1=5. 18. Culmination: has both an offensive and defensive application; essentially when your chess opponent and you have the same number of pieces… JP 3 -0 Positivist logic; Clausewitzian. Termination criteria lend to linear causality and reverse-engineering within a neo-realism logic. Description over explanation represents the systems thinking approach of Positivists. We had tons of information in Iraq, yet we did not dictate tempo in 2004 -2005 at all. There is a difference between tons of description and the right explanation. How can you anticipate this with a complex adaptive system if your planning logic requires you to reverse engineer within linear causality and uni-minded system logic such as EBO?
Question 5: Jomini versus Clausewitz, Steel Cage Match
Positivist Logic Mechanistic Logic Clausewitz “War is an extension of Politics. ” -KVC “In total war, politics become an extension of war”- D/G, A Thousand Plateaus (they flip the maxim). Warfare is complexapplying reductionist mathematics and procedures does not work well in complex war. Clausewitz was not read outside of Prussia until the late 1880 s- it arrived to West Point only then and Jomini still had a huge hold upon the US military. Similarities in Warfare Theories • Both Clausewitz and Jomini see military conflict as a perpetual behavior by societies (nation states)- they do not subscribe to what Anatol Rapoport (On War intro, 1968 edition) terms ‘eschatalogical war theories. ’ • Clausewitz goes mechanistic in some parts of ‘On War’ by arguing procedures and formulas for field artillery and relative troop strengths. • Jomini follows Machiavelli's ‘The Prince’ by crafting a process, a checklist of war principles and formulas for a military general to follow. Doing this in ANY conflict will deliver them victory- this is pure mechanistic linear logic. • Clausewitz does not follow principles of war, but he does take a positivist leap in logic by designating the ‘enemy’s fielded forces’ as the primary thing (COG) that must be destroyed to win. Differences in Warfare Theories • Jomini remains tactical. He does not go operational level as Clausewitz does. Jomini wants the politicians to get out of the way of the military in war- Clausewitz sees the “trinity” between government, military, and violent passions of the masses. • Jomini applies geometry, lines, and linear causality in a highly mechanistic fashion- Clausewitz goes further conceptually and avoids many of the pitfalls of prescriptive procedurizing that Jomini craves. Jomini Follow these rules exactly regardless of future conflict, and you will win. If not- you are an idiot. The enemy is predictable and does not adapt. Seek the Napoleonic victory- tactical wins that accomplish strategic goals. This ignores the operational level of war. Jomini was widely read prior to the American Civil War; probably carried by most officers- geometric considerations continued with artillery, engineering, and naval applications in the 19 th century.
Anatol Rapoport’s non-Clausewitzian War Philosophies (editor and wrote the intro to the 1968 Penguin Classic “On War” There is a final war. Eschatological (final war) Philosophies of War Divine Eschatological (religious final battle) Religious movements that feature an “Armageddon plot” or the return of a savior with the destruction of all non-believers follow this logic. A final war will, God Willing, end human conflict; this is predetermined (linear causality), and the chosen people will reign supreme. Example: Iran launching WMD at Israel to trigger emergence of 12 th Imam. Natural Eschatological (planet extinction; human extinction) Extreme environmentalism movements; antihuman movements (by humans, oddly). Nonhuman events such as planet destruction, asteroid event, or disease epidemic that ends human (or all) life. Example: the dinosaurs did not wage “war” but their existence was terminated this way. Humans waging limited war while an asteroid hurtles towards us makes a similar example…. Prevent all war. Human (messianic) Eschatological (people here now) A group of people already on the planet that will bring about the final battle- the Nazis, early Soviet Party, and other extreme nonreligious groups followed this logic. The Proletarian Revolution where workers of the world unit. American Manifest Destiny during the Great Plains Indian Wars has components of this logic also. Example: Soviet Party of the early 20 th century followed this logic, according to Rapoport. Cataclysmic (world destruction) Philosophies of War Ethno-centric Cataclysmic War Theory Rapoport claims the Soviets switched to this during the Cold War- the chief difference is: 1. War is NOT a tool. 2. The outside world wants to destroy the unique ethnic identity of the select people. 3. Protective measures such as the Berlin Wall are not for keeping people in, but keeping outsiders out. 4. The world will end in a final show-down. Example: MAD in the Cold War fueled this logic; Soviets sought to preserve their state versus Capitalist westerners. Global Cataclysmic War Theory Rapoport calls this a system-theoretical approach. The principles are: 1. War is NOT a tool. 2. ALL war is bad. 3. Global government is the answer to ending conflict. 4. International systems will aid in preventing global cataclysmic war. 5. The nuclear age advanced this logic. Example: The United Nations pursues international systems and a form of weak global governance with the general position that all war is bad…NATO is not an example of this; NATO is an alliance under Clausewitzian logic.
Question 6: Explain relationship between conceptual and detailed planning
FM 5 -0 Design Doctrine (Teaching Artistry via. “Paint By Numbers”) Step 1 Initial guidance; end state; time Starting with an ‘End State’ and working backwards does not work with illstructured problems. Step 2 Create Environmental Frame Create Problem Frame Narrative and graphical description Relevant actors; interrelations. PMESII-PT Refinement of tensions environmental frame Areas for action to achieve end state ‘Environment’ bounds. ‘Ecology’ conceptually allows distant yet relevant inclusion into the system. PMESII-PT bounds the ‘known’ and goes descriptive and deconstructive. Avoid descriptionseek explanation. Doctrine is static. Theory is flexible. Step 3 Problem statement Deliverables Operational Approach (design frame) 1. 2. 3. Broad actions to achieve end state Resources and Risks There is a problem with the word ‘problem. ’ 4. 5. Problem Statement Initial CDR’s Intent CDR’s Initial Planning Guidance Mission Narrative Other Products Decisive Points* LOOs, LOEs* Transformation requirements exceed military capabilities; cultural change requires extensive time and resources. Phenomenon persist through feedback loops and ‘retention. ’ Transformation requires emergence and anticipation (not prediction). Detailed Planning Methodology: Linear Causality and Short Term Targets Step 3 Execute action. Collect information and reflect upon action. Make adjustments and continue towards end-state. Step 2 Build COAs and “war-game” scenarios to decide upon the preferred action to undertake. Build detailed integrated instructions (OPORDs, graphics) to direct forces. Step 1 Frame your environment with knowns (facts), known unknowns (assumptions and PIR/CCIR), and force influence the future of your world as a goal (end-state) to aim against.
Conceptual Planning: Holistic Approaches (Design Theory) Naveh (In Pursuit of…, other works also) Kuhn’s Paradigm Shifts Betanafly’s General Systems Theory Organizational Theory (insert authors) Michael Foucote “Problematization” Lectures Linking understanding to action… Detailed Planning: Positivist/Mechanistic Approaches (Systems Logic) Clausewitzian (On War) Jominian (principles of war) Historic Vignette Metaphor Preference Scientific Deduction (Kuhn, Capra, Taleeb, Laszlo, Bosquette) Rivals are phenomenon within a complex system. “This is like that” Historical Precedence Fighting the Last Conflict (Linn) Weigley’s American Way of War The enemy is a state, group, actor, or super powered individual. Adaptive Metaphors (creation and destruction) “Learning to Learn” –Naveh, Garandagangi, Foucote “Reflective Practitioner”- Shoen Interiority and Exteriority- Deluze and Gutari Unknowns- Black Swans (Taleeb) Design Deliverables FM 5 -0: operational approach with graphic and CDR’s intent. Narratives in theory convey EXPLANATION not description. Each logic uses different vocabulary, theoretical concepts, narratives, and metaphor construction to make sense of the world (holistic in tension with positivist reductionism) Detailed Planning Deliverables MDMP, JOPP, MCPP all follow procedures that create precise and detailed OPORDs, FRAGOs, and other actionable products. Military doctrine comes out of this logic, as does AAR and historical products.
Question 7: The relationship between Design and Battle (Mission) Command
Holistic Approach Design Metacognition/problematization Naveh: Persistent Creativity Design Theory differs from Army Design Doctrine. Do not confuse the two. Design Theory seeks explanation, not description. Mary Jo Hatch’s Cycle of Cultural Change is a good foil for illustrating why Design doctrine and Battle Command as procedures do not really ever challenge any core structures or logics of the military institution. Battle Command borrows from Boyd’s OODA Loop- a cycle of leading and assessing the process while continuing to try to out-think and out-act the enemy. Design theory is not so proceduralized- complex systems are not susceptible to such linear causality. Design operates on a different logic than MDMP and detailed planning. Battle Command acts as an overarching conceptual framework for detailed planning - but it uses the same Clausewitzian and Positivist logic unlike Design. Mechanistic Logic Positivist Logic Linear Causality Mission (Battle) Command Battle Command is the art and science of: Similarities between both Understanding - • Both Design and Battle Command consider the enemy (or rival) an adaptive and critical thinking (learning) actor instead of a static (mechanistic Jominian) opponent. • Design doctrine and Battle Command place the Commander at the center (the architect) of both processes. • Design doctrine (not theory) does suggest PEMESII-PT and METT-TC to support environmental framing and LOEs… • Both Design doctrine (not theory) and Battle Cmd combine analytic and intuitive thinking…but Design theory does not limit thinking to within interiority of system and within positivist/reductionist logic with institutional biases. Differences in logics • Design Theory seeks EXPLANATION over description. Battle Command wants description- this reinforces the positivist, reductionist, and linear causality logic. • Battle Command recommends PMESII-PT to understand, and METT-TC to visualize…Design Theory avoids proceduralization. • BC relies on ‘pattern recognition’ for anticipation; this potentially follows Taleeb’s ‘Black Swan’ fallacy of only considering the knowns; Deluze/Guatari and the interiority/exteriority. Visualizing Describing Directing Leading Assessing Forces In order to impose a CDR’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Analytic Decision making: “approach the problem systemically” Intuitive Decision making: the act of reaching a conclusion emphasizing pattern recognition, experience, knowledge” Battle Command returns to the reverse engineering logic of positivism: the CDR “visualizes a desired end-state…and then a broad concept of how to reach it.
Question 8: FM 6 -22 Army Leadership: Informal Leadership
Informal Leadership: Getting someone that is higher in rank than you (or position of authority) to see things your way (IF you are right) without getting a beat-down. ” Problematize towards Cognitive Synergy See Design. “My Big Fat Greek Wedding” Transfer of Creative Ownership p Sua-Sponte d Passive Aggressive a m for n a Le l I of e Contrast in Logic g din i cal S Sl Confrontational General Mac. Arthur’s actions during the Korean War over which he got fired by the POTUS; Mc. Crystal’s actions during OEF 2011. A ip h ers s e ch roa p Turning your idea into “what the boss was saying all along” and having him take ownership of the “creation” of his idea. General Benedict Arnold at Saratoga; he took off without explaining to his boss what he was doing, and directed the battle to an upset victory over Gentleman Johnny. COL xxxx and his position on COIN versus guerilla warfare in OEF 2010 -2011. XXX was investigated (and cleared) of any insubordination. IDF and their problems with SOD and the Hezbollah 2006 War. Subordinate leaders like Naveh used logic arguments on why SOD was superior to detailed planning- they all got sacked by senior leadership.
Question 9: complicated versus complex
• Simple problem: Completing my six year-old’s math homework. • Intricate problem: Completing a tough crossword puzzle. There is only 1 x right solution. • Complicated problem: Normandy Amphibious Assault on D-day. • Complex Problem: Accomplishing vague strategic goals that change under limited conditions (no troops on ground) with NATO and the Arab League in Libya while waging 2 x other wars. Complex: Intricate: Simple: -Closed systems - Known knowns - clear actors - linear causality - reduction friendly - mechanistic friendly - principles/procedures - reverse engineerable - predictable - one solution - many steps - time consuming - precise - reverse engineerable - mechanistic - 100% predictable Complicated: -Closed systems -Known unknowns - many actors - often linear - description rich - reduction friendly - interiority - mechanistic prone (COGs) - open systems - unknowns - exteriority - adaptive actors - innovation - holistic approaches - dynamic - explanation over description - reduction does not explain - mechanistic resistant
Question 10: function and utility of narrative in Design; relation to discourse.
unknown Narrative: Narrative is defined by doctrine (FM 5 -0) as: “mission narrative”- the expression of the operational approach for a specified mission. It describes the intended effects for the mission, including the conditions that define the desired end-state. ” It represents the articulation of the CDR’s visualization of the mission (echoes battle command). known emerging current language Information Problematize! metacognition New vocabulary Discourse occurs here: metaphoric processes to fuse new understanding and convey to others. Discourse: Design Theory: post-modern philosophy such as Deluze and Guatari’s A Thousand Plateaus devote a chapter to the tension between information (exteriority and interiority) and language (flawed, humanassociated with thoughts, but not information). This is a tough concept- needs five more slides to really explain. Discourse is mentioned in FM 5 -0 Design Chapter 3 where the CDR fosters an environment where ‘problematization’ occurs- this is the critical thinking portion of seeking explanation (WHY questions and BECAUSE answers) instead of just description (WHAT questions with HOW, WHERE, WHEN answers). Narrative in Design Theory: Naveh discusses “codification of doctrine” and “planners are shackled while designers create. ” Hayden White: The Content and the Form: history versus histiography; Peter Novak: That Noble Dream: narratives are incomplete- historians are biased in writing them. Humans (feminist movement, civil rights movement) try to take ‘ownership’ of some narratives- the military may do the same (“We do amphibious assaults, not you…We do FIDyou do SFA…”) extinct Narrative is a product of the system logic: empirical material explained with metaphor and language (flawed) and organized in theoretical concepts which publish into narratives. FM 5 -0 Design does imply some critical thinking benefits of Design: “Design enables commanders to view a situation from multiple perspectives”- this supports the logic that complexity requires organizational intelligence- not a lone Napoleon.
Question 11: Define Adaptive Work and describe how one leads to this effort.
Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the World; a Holistic Vision for Our Time. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life Jeff Conklin, Wicked Problems and Social Complexity (Cog. Nexus Institute, 2008. http: //cognexus. org/wpf/wickedproblems. p df Last accessed 05 January 2011) 4 -5. “This is the pattern of thinking that everyone attempts to follow when they are faced with a problem…this linear pattern as being enshrined in policy manuals, textbooks, internal standards for project management, and even the most advanced tools and methods being used and taught in the organization. ” Problem: Unclear Positivism Reductionism Mechanistic Linear Procedures Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999) 140 -141. Liang and Ziangsui argue that over the last 20 years, the world has grown more complex, yet the military ignore the increased complexity of war and instead focus “on the level of weapons, deployment methods and the battlefield, and the drawn-up war prospects are also mostly only limited to the military domain and revel in it. ” Emergence Innovation Learning Positivist, mechanistic Approaches Flexible Problematizing Metacognition Creation/destruction Process Persistent Adaptation Gerald M. Weinberg, Rethinking Systems Analysis and Design (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982) 12. “If our previous experience with systems analysis proves anything, it proves that anyone who tries to use all the information- even about the simple systems existing today- will be drowned in paper and never accomplish anything…The synthesist is someone who makes very specific plans for action, and more often than not stays around during the execution of those plans to adjust them to ongoing reality. ” r inea L Making Sense Linear Causality Solution: Unclear Reframe Predetermined END STATE lity usa Ca nist a ech t, m itivis Pos oaches r App ic Predetermined END STATE Alex Ryan, The Foundation For An Adaptive Approach; Australian Army Journal For the Profession of Arms, Volume VI, Number 3 (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2009) 70. “With the industrial revolution, the planning and decision-making process gradually built up a well-oiled machine to reduce reliance on individual genius. ”
Question 12: How do you build organizational learning to facilitate integrated planning?
Examples of learning while in conflict: 1. US Army in Philippines 1899 -1901 (Linn’s The Philippines War 2. British in Malaya in 1956 versus US Army in Vietnam (Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife) 3. Israeli military in 1973 war with Egyptadaptation becomes necessity. 4. Washington at Battle of Trenton (raid tactic achieved operational and strategic requirements) Rigid and Non. Learning Organization (Traditional, Proceduralized) Positivism Reductionism Mechanistic Linear Procedures Adaptive and Critical Thinking Organization Flexible Problematizing Metacognition Creation/destruction Process Persistent Adaptation Examples of resistance to changing an organization while in conflict: 1. US Army in Cold War (Carl Builder’s Masks of War) 2. Linn’s Echo of Battle- peacetime strategists reinvent themselves with emergent technology to reinforce worldviews. 3. Egyptian military in 1973 war with Israel- planning phase 1 works, but what about phase 2?
Question 13: ANP- relationship between strategy and operational art
Clausewitzian Theory Neo-Realism Strategy Gaddis: Surprise, Security, and the American Experience – Gaddis sees post 9 -11 where Powell and Weinberger doctrines (nation-state centric) are irrelevant. Mc. Dougall’s Promised Land, Crusader State explains US foreign policy as our assumption (Hatch’s model) that we can, should, and must reach out to help other nations share in the ‘American Dream. ’ American values and tenets of democracy, freedom from government and military intrusions (see Leach’s Roots of Conflicts) do not equal the military hierarchical process and institutionalism logic. Carnes Lord’s Crisis Management, A Primer. Lord presents Pearl Harbor as a political, not a military failurethe US enacted the 1941 oil embargo and Roosevelt sent mixed diplomatic messagesthis drove Japan to make their move (just as they did against Russia in 1908). Mechanistic Logic Liberalism Positivist Logic Humanism Cohesive Elements • As Gaddis notes, western strategic form follows the hierarchy that operational art uses. “The White House is a necessary hierarchy because no one is the President’s equal. ” • Gaddis explains how Eisenhower built a large military industrial complex with more hierarchy and procedures. • Mc. Dougall implies that Americans apply western values of democracy and the American Dream to all other societies- this is similar to how western militaries apply Clausewitzian logic to other rivals and enemies universally. • Hew Strachan’s The Lost Meaning of Strategy: modern war is no longer the ‘golden era’ of Clausewitzian state-on-state total war. It is with nonstate actors, failed states or rogues. European states now view war as a peacekeeping requirement (Rapoport’s global cataclysmic war theory, not Clausewitzian). Tensions • Operational art (western logic) relies upon hierarchy of control and procedures for uniformity and repetition- although Eisenhower increased this on the political side (strategy) after WWII, some components of American Strategic culture (Weigley) are in tension with this. Peacetime: small military; • NSC-68 represents a tension between traditional American strategic culture (we pick our fights) and Cold War ‘containment’ that follows a military systems-process of ‘they pick were we fight. ” • B. Liddell Hart, Strategy. Hart sees indirect strategy as superior in the nuclear age- this is in tension with Clausewitzian logic (destroy the enemy directly). Operational Art links tactical action to the pursuit of strategic objectives. Clausewitzian logic guides operational art towards destroying the enemy to compel a nation to obey our will. Strachan in The Lost Meaning of Strategy says that now, non-state actors initiate conflict, they are fought by civilians, and principle victims are not soldiers but noncombatants. FM 3 -0 chapter 3, FSO: “Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative…” the goal of FSO is to apply landpower as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land. FM 3 -0 uses ‘operational variables’ to describe the operational environment in terms that describe military aspects of the system, but the population’s influence on it. This means that FM 3 -0 doctrinal logic uses reductionism for PMESII-PT- they do consider strategic (DIME) factors.
Question 14: ANP- What is deterrence? What is the military’s role?
Figure 1 a: Zweibelson Political Science Theory on 21 st Century Irregular Warfare Trends Regarding Nuclear-armed Nations = victory = undetermined = failure Super-power nations Large complex militaries Conflict in the Q 1 is not direct; Nuclear nations use proxy conflicts in Q 4 for indirect action Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Japan 1945 Germany 1945 Berlin Air Lift 1947 Q 1 Conflict in the Q 2 is the golden era for most western military cultures- Q 2 Korean War Limited War Low Intensity Conflict Vietnam War (RNA) Afghanistan 1988 (USSR) Vietnam War (Viet Cong) Afghanistan 2001 present Conflict in the Q 4 is where weaker nations and actors seek to exploit super-power nations on terms that are better than in Q 3. Total war High Intensity Conflict Q 4 Panama 1989 Iraq 1990 Q 3 Iraq 2003 Iran-Iraq War 1988 (Iraq) Bosnia 1999 Libya 1985 Iraqi Civil War 2004 present Lebanon 2006 (Israel) Failing nations Rogue state Conflict in the Q 3 is between non-nuclear nations or with one nuclear (usually superior) power.
Advanced Nations Complex Military IOPs USSR (Cold War) Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Berlin Air Lift 1947 Germany 1945 Japan 1945 e Q 1 us ith ns in w Natio n Q 2 clear not fight i u Q 1: N nce to ns. eterre clear natio d nu other Korea 1953 Q 1 Q 2 Vietnam 1974 (Chinese & Low Intensity Conflict Soviet Aided) Vietcong Irregular Forces French in Algeria 1956 French utilized D 2 DE for air power with tactical success (strategic failure) Q 4 Iraq 2003+ North Vietnam (subpar military IOP) Iraq 2003 Somalia 1994 Afghanistan 2001+ Failing or Failed States Non-State Actors; Weak military IOPs Q 3 High Intensity Conflict Iraq 1991 Libya 1985 Kosovo 1999 Panama 1989 Haiti 1994 Planned; not executed US Victory Undetermined Outcome US Failure French Example 1
Figure 1: D 307 Cold War Arms Escalation Gravity Pipe U. S. now looks from atop the nuclear gravity pipe; from here it attempts to prevent other nations from rising up. GDP ratio USSR obsolete. Russian Federal Republic rises from ashes and secures existing nuclear infrastructure. Attempts to maintain nuclear superpower status. GDP ratio Post-Cold War: U. S. downsizes nuclear arsenal while maintaining first strike capability for hostile actors. GDP ratio Cold War ending; USSR unable to fund their nuclear military IOP. Efforts now towards nuclear non-proliferation and reduction. START Treaty 1980 s: President Reagan begins ‘Star Wars program. SALT 2 Treaty Soviets challenged to match MIRV quality; react with IBCM quantity for MAD. SALT 1 Treaty 1970 s: U. S. begins MIRV warheads. GDP ratio 1969: First man on moon; space race won by United States 1957: Sputnik: first space satellite Soviet military maintains large ground forces; closed market economy (Socialist) does not grow as rapidly as U. S. free market; USSR spends higher ratio to balance. U. S. reframing: NASA and space race increased due to Soviet satellite success Smaller ground forces; USAF SAC takes lead on nuclear option; NASA space race. GDP cost ratio acceptable. 1950 s perceived missile gap with Moscow. GDP ratio Reframe: expand nuclear delivery to IBCM, bomber, and submarine capabilities. GDP ratio 1940 Manhattan Project; 1945 Hiroshima/Nagasaki 1945+ secret atomic program; 1949 atomic bomb USSR WWII Nazi missile technology/scientists United States
Question 15: ANP- American Foreign Policy Traditions:
American Foreign Policy: U. S. Strategic Culture over 300 years (1711 -2011) Conventional War against China Uni-polar 21 st Century Gulf War I Panama Final Soviet Battle in Western Europe Military Industrial Complex Air Power, Nuclear Age Total War (global threat) End of Imperialism Clash of Ideologies America= defender of democracy World “Policeman” Peacetime small army Fear of European invasion Coastal forts and navy Monroe Doctrine foreign policy Avoid European wars JIB/JAB for democracy American Civil War Entering the World Stage WWI Span-Amer. War Civil War Cold War WWII Golden Era Colonial Period Leach’s Roots of Conflict Paine’s Common Sense Locke, Hume, Age of Enlightenment Kennan’s Long Telegram NCS-68 UN resolutions Brinksmanship Proxy Wars Détente Glasnost Builder’s Masks of War Weigley’s American Way of War Somalia Mex-Amer. War Isolationist Early America Impressment War 1812 Colonial ‘sub-status’ Amer. Revolution Troop quartering Taxes, economics French Indian War Korea Jomini’s Principles of War Teddy Roosevelt and the navy Linn’s Guardians and Heroes (Echo of Battle) Mahan and Naval strength equals economic strength Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny (messianic eschatological) PME establishment (West Point) Berlin Airlift Philippines 1899 Vietnam Cuba Iraq? Libya? Discarded Conflicts Contras Afghanistan? Triggering Powell Doctrine: we need an exit strategy. Blackhawk Down: send enough combat power with right mission. Avoid COIN. “Training tomorrow’s enemies to help us Today”
Question 16: Historical Example of Military Force and Diplomacythe American Civil War
Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War) Clausewitz Prussian Staff Napoleon (Legacy) Jomini Mass Armies Defensive superiority Mexican War Army requires resources Frontal Assault West Point Smaller population Crimean War Confederate Army Doctrine Rifled muskets Steam engines Trains Telegraph Armor Screw propellers Balloons Artillery Logistics Union Naval Blockade Tactics Winfield Scott Mahan Slave based agricultural economy History Geography in Mississippi Southern fixation on States Rights State-centric ‘gentlemen’ caste Union Army New Technology Siege mentality Confederate prosperity Tobacco and Cotton Trade Resources Hagerman (The American Civil War) Political nepotism and corruption Vicksburg Politics Mississippi- key waterway South lacked infrastructure South lacked international trade Confederacy divided President Davis in Richmond South unable to industrialize faster than North Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts) Wiegley (American Way of War) Linn (Echo of Battle) Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective)
Divergent Cognitive Diagram for Confederate Commander Problems 1861 -1863 Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War) Clausewitz Prussian Staff Jomini Centers of Gravity Union organized some staff specialization Napoleon (Legacy) Napoleonic Wars Offensive frontal assaults Napoleonic tactics must adapt with paradigm shift in technology Defensive advantage Tactics History Hagerman (The American Civil War) Theory Forces Outdated Army (active) Inter-war period discourse on tactics Rifled Muskets Industrialization Naval Armor Steam Engine Constitution 3/5 slave votes Screw propellers Telegraph Military’s Role JIB/JAB Mexican War Artillery dominates Doctrine Manifest Destiny Winfield Scott Mahan Small Officer Corps Pre-industrial Warfare (tactical) Post-Industrial Warfare (multiple campaigns) New technology Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts) Terrain Western Territories Infrastructure in North and South Speed and Mass increased Increased casualties Post Mexican War standdown US distrusts large standing army State Rights Defensive advantages Inter-war theorists unable to discourse new technology vs old tactics Wiegley (American Way of War) Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective) Inability to C 2 Linn (Echo of Battle)
Figure C: Fishbone Diagram for Confederate Commander Problems 1861 -1863 Confederate supply lines lack rail Various caliber firearms require munitions Confederate supply dispersed across states President Davis lacked influence and leadership Logistics Dependent on water transit Telegraph vulnerable Confederates interior lines critical Spies littered message couriers Confederacy organized around states Davis was removed from local environment South lacked international trade partners State-centric mindset hamstrung strategy C 2 & ISR Calvary sent north Mexican War given too much credit; Clausewitz and Crimean War not enough. Siege mentality lacked recon American value on life; militia factor Failed Discourse (tactics vs. emerging technology) South lacked industrial base of North Jomini and Napoleon favored frontal assaults Vicksburg isolated by river; a strength was also a weakness Rifled muskets Steam engines Trains Telegraph Armor Screw propellers Balloons Artillery 1 Armies too large to maneuver quickly without signal conditions optimal Mahan led West Pointers but Jomini and Mexican War veterans steered tactics Artillery of 1820 s outranged by muskets of 1860 s Problem: failure to supply forces 2 Problem: failure to coordinate tactics and strategy 3 Problem: failure to apply violence effectively to accomplish ENDS.
Question 17: How Economic Theory can Influence Military Operations
Figure 1 a: Musings on Political Science Theories Anarchy is not the cause of conflict. Free trade and interdependent democracies will reduce conflict. Legitimacy in tension with cost to act. Liberalism Nation-state primary actors Humans are anarchistic naturally; individual liberty is trumped by state survival Zero-sum game for power; balance of power Statism, Survivalism, Self-Help Q 1 Compatible in some aspects Q 2 Realism Compatible in some aspects Implicitly Peaceful World Implicitly Chaotic World Compatible in some aspects Q 4 Social Constructivists Changing values and perceptions will change government and society; meta-cognition and game theory works here. Q 3 Compatible in some aspects Individuals comprise actors Ideology not compatible with others. Marxists; Communists; Socialists Ideological; counter-capitalist; individual worker is the power- the state serves the worker; final battle vs. capitalism; Non-marxist nations will always threaten Marxist ones.
Economy: Capitalist (realism; Smith) or liberal (global trade) Anatol Rapoport’s non-Clausewitzian War Philosophies (editor and wrote the intro to the 1968 Penguin Classic “On War” There is a final war. Eschatological (final war) Philosophies of War Divine Eschatological (religious final battle) Economy: Islamic (ideological) Religious movements that feature an “Armageddon plot” or the return of a savior with the destruction of all non-believers follow this logic. A final war will, God Willing, end human conflict; this is predetermined (linear causality), and the chosen people will reign supreme. Example: Iran launching WMD at Israel to trigger emergence of 12 th Imam. Natural Eschatological (planet extinction; human extinction) Prevent all war. Human (messianic) Eschatological (people here now) Economy: Marxist Socialist Extreme environmentalism movements; antihuman movements (by humans, oddly). Nonhuman events such as planet destruction, asteroid event, or disease epidemic that ends human (or all) life. Example: the dinosaurs did not wage “war” but their existence was terminated this way. Humans waging limited war while an asteroid hurtles towards us makes a similar example…. A group of people already on the planet that will bring about the final battle- the Nazis, early Soviet Party, and other extreme non-religious groups followed this logic. The Proletarian Revolution where workers of the world unit. American Manifest Destiny during the Great Plains Indian Wars has components of this logic also. Example: Soviet Party of the early 20 th century followed this logic, according to Rapoport. Cataclysmic (world destruction) Philosophies of War Ethno-centric Cataclysmic War Theory Global Cataclysmic War Theory Economy: Marxist Socialist Economy: Capitalist Liberal Rapoport claims the Soviets switched to this during the Cold War- the chief difference is: 1. War is NOT a tool. 2. The outside world wants to destroy the unique ethnic identity of the select people. 3. Protective measures such as the Berlin Wall are not for keeping people in, but keeping outsiders out. 4. The world will end in a final show-down. Example: MAD in the Cold War fueled this logic; Soviets sought to preserve their state versus Capitalist westerners. Rapoport calls this a systemtheoretical approach. The principles are: 1. War is NOT a tool. 2. ALL war is bad. 3. Global government is the answer to ending conflict. 4. International systems will aid in preventing global cataclysmic war. 5. The nuclear age advanced this logic. Example: The United Nations pursues international systems and a form of weak global governance with the general position that all war is bad…NATO is not an example of this; NATO is an alliance under Clausewitzian logic.
Fuzzy Cognitive Map on Kirkpatrick Victory Plan Problem 1941: national prosperity vs. entropy Resources available to nation vs. global resources Training a military requires Environment Economic Factors USSR population and time/resources/technology U. S. possesses massive resources and industry. UK was losing resources and troops at a rapid rate. Limited Time (NLT 1943) U. S. has a large military age population pool. Soviet Union as a German buffer. UK as a German buffer. U. S. National resources T=time Threat to world (WW 2) Current (1941) US military inadequate to achieve goals America located across oceans from WW 2. Z= goals U. S. national goals in WW 2. inter-war military for U. S. downsized Pro-German lobby. Pro-Allies lobby Ethnic/Social Ethnic and social national identity seeks prosperity and power American independence American Democracy Global trade empowered US economy Technology advancements empowered military action X (means) + y (ways) = z (ends) How to get x= t (time) / r (resources)/ enemy R= s (society) + e / p (political structure) Military decisions require political and public discourse American Isolationism resources mobilized slowly. Failure of League of Nations U. S. democracy will function with 10% population draft Fascism diametrically opposes Democracy Political Structure Political threat (internal and external) German fascism resulted from WWI and Lo. N failures.
Question 18: American Foreign Policy Traditions and Small Wars
Figure 1 a: Zweibelson Political Science Theory on 21 st Century Irregular Warfare Trends Regarding Nuclear-armed Nations = victory = undetermined = failure Super-power nations Large complex militaries Conflict in the Q 1 is not direct; Nuclear nations use proxy conflicts in Q 4 for indirect action Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Japan 1945 Germany 1945 Berlin Air Lift 1947 Q 1 Conflict in the Q 2 is the golden era for most western military cultures- Q 2 Korean War Limited War Low Intensity Conflict Vietnam War (RNA) Afghanistan 1988 (USSR) Vietnam War (Viet Cong) Afghanistan 2001 present Conflict in the Q 4 is where weaker nations and actors seek to exploit super-power nations on terms that are better than in Q 3. Total war High Intensity Conflict Q 4 Panama 1989 Iraq 1990 Q 3 Iraq 2003 Iran-Iraq War 1988 (Iraq) Bosnia 1999 Libya 1985 Iraqi Civil War 2004 present Lebanon 2006 (Israel) Failing nations Rogue state Conflict in the Q 3 is between non-nuclear nations or with one nuclear (usually superior) power.
Question 19: Operational Art Development from 18 th to 21 st Centuries- theories, doctrine, tech, politics, culture.
Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War) Clausewitz Prussian Staff Napoleon (Legacy) Jomini Mass Armies Defensive superiority Mexican War Army requires resources Frontal Assault West Point Smaller population Crimean War Confederate Army Doctrine Rifled muskets Steam engines Trains Telegraph Armor Screw propellers Balloons Artillery Logistics Union Naval Blockade Tactics Winfield Scott Mahan Slave based agricultural economy History Geography in Mississippi Southern fixation on States Rights State-centric ‘gentlemen’ caste Union Army New Technology Siege mentality Confederate prosperity Tobacco and Cotton Trade Resources Hagerman (The American Civil War) Political nepotism and corruption Vicksburg Politics Mississippi- key waterway South lacked infrastructure South lacked international trade Confederacy divided President Davis in Richmond South unable to industrialize faster than North Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts) Wiegley (American Way of War) Linn (Echo of Battle) Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective)
JIB/JAB refinement Global Middle Class Politics International Law/Governance GRIN tech Complexity Resource Competition Post Cold-War y ur t Gay Rights Theory Civil Rights II Naveh Pentamic Army n Ce th 21 Design Deterrence Urban Populations biometrics Unrestricted Conflict UAVs Kennan Limited Conflict worms Post-Imperialism Sayid Qtub y r Cyberspace tu TH Lawrence n th American Exceptionalism Manifest Destiny Mahan Imperialism Clausewitz Colonialism Jomini ICBMs Stealth Tech ry tu en Marx th Airplanes Submarines C Assembly Line Rifled barrel Military Industrial Complex Tanks Combustion Engine Steam Engine Industrial Revolution Machiavelli satellites Information Revolution Schliffen 19 democracies Space Lenin Civil rights (race) Monroe Doctrine 20 Ce Scientific Revolution (17 -18 th century) Resources Technology
Question 20: Element of Operational Art- explain with historic example (COGs) Koniggratz
Centers of Gravity: Using Systems Thinking in a Positivist, Reductionist, and Mechanistic Logic FM 3 -0 Quotes Clausewitz also. The loss of a COG ultimately results in defeat. –this is linear causality and reverse engineering on a positivist logic base. FM 3 -0 goes beyond JP 3 -0 and states “COGs are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral; eliminating them requires holistic integrated efforts of all national IOPs. ” 6 -8. Supports JP 3 -0 and sees a single COG at each level of war. The Army does not have a COG at the tactical level either (just USMC). As Kem says, it is semantics- a tactical COG equals a decisive point. Clausewitz: A COG comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight. Dr. Kem: the COG is the thing you fear most; it is the actual power. Also uses the Strange CC/CR/CV modeling. Dr. Strange: CC/CR/CV modeling. - Critical capabilities: crucial enablers for COG to function. - Critical requirements: essential resources for CCs to work. - Critical vulnerabilities: CRs that are vulnerable to attack or exploitation. * JP 3 -0: the essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or otherwise exploit it…to achieve military objectives. Dr. Reilly: ‘Cognitive Map’ that reverse engineers end-states, COGs, and lines of effort backwards in time. JP 3 -0 Quotes Clausewitz: A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance. A COG is singular in nature- JP 3 -0 wants one at each level of war. In conventional fights, JP 3 -0 prefers strategic COG to be government or leader; and operational COG as the fielded forces. No tactical COGs. LOOs, PLOs- no LOEs. Linear causality. Baseball makes the runner go to 1 st, then 2 nd base; war might require us to run to 3 rd, then 1 st, then 2 nd… Garandagangi makes the distinction between nonminded, uni-minded, and multi-minded systems; COGs work for uniminded (EBO systems based) logic.
Austria-Hungary Prussia Strategic Level Bismark Operational Level Moltke Tactical Level Moltke was brilliant, but his General Staff operated quickly and efficiently. Strategic Level xxx Operational Level Benedek No staff- Benedek made all decisions- C 2 was chaotic. Tactical Level DP: Battle of Koniggratz Moltke splits his force and conducts double envelopment of enemy. Operational COG Operational Center of Gravity: - Prussian Fielded Forces (250, 000 troops) Critical Requirements: - Supplies; log train - Accurate intelligence - Superior Terrain - Maneuverability - Fires support (cannon) Critical Capabilities: - General Staff Model - Breach-loading needle guns - common language (troops) - Excellent education level - Home region units (homogeneity) - Not tied to line formations of old (breach rifle advantage) Critical Vulnerabilities: - Artillery corps less experienced with rifled cannon than Austrians - Austrians in position on terrain first - Austrians field artillery were more experienced and accurate Austrians compressed into 8 square mile area with 1 x good road. Operational COG Critical Capabilities: - Rifled cannon (artillery corps) - Muzzle loading rifles - 9 x languages and cultures fused - Line formations and traditional tactics Critical Vulnerabilities: - Muzzle loading guns (rate of fire) - Many languages and cultures (9) - Poor education level - No general staff- Genius of CDR only- chaotic C 2 climate - Relied on muzzle-centric line formations for infantry Operational Center of Gravity: - Austro-Hungarian Fielded Forces (240, 000 troops) Critical Requirements: - Supplies, log train - Accurate intelligence - Superior Terrain - Maneuverability - Fires support (cannon)
Question 21: Historical Example of Mission Command- how CDR/staff developed and conducted a successful campaign.
Mission Command Applied to xxx CDR’s intent Subordinates’ Initiative Mission Orders: Resource Allocation Concept of operations Successful Action Minimum control measures xxx Insert info
Question 22: Challenges of CMD at Operational Level- how do they differ from Tactical CMD?
Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur. Operational CMD FM 3 -0 • Reverse engineer termination criteria to objectives, COGs, and DPs along a LOO. Identifying desired and undesired effects with a systems perspective –IV-8(3) JP 3 -0. • • • Effects: describe system behavior JP 3 -0 LOGIC: the nature of warfare is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nationstates…IW is a violent struggle between state and non-state actors. JP 3 -0 Unified Action: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of the governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Tactical CMD MDMP Operational and Mission Variables: FM 3 -0 warns of “precise binning” but the positivist and reductionist procedures are lost. PMESII-PT centric. Echoes JP 3 -0’s definition of ‘Unified Action. ’ Quotes Clausewitz on uncertainty, chance, and friction. (when your logic creates abnormalities, you can categorize them under these catch-alls). • • • TPPs, SOPs JP 3 -0 • • • 12 principles of war use Jominian systems thinking that use mechanistic, reductionist, and positivist constructs Joint Operation Planning Process Centers of Gravity 12 principles of war still used; Relies upon procedures, uniformity, and repetition of effect Linear Causality Reductionismemphasis on description (PIR, MCOO, DPs) End-States; LOOs, DPs- linked • • Tactical Unit specific Institutionalism is strong at tactical level Naveh uses the term “tacticization” Tactical CMD- battle centric; decisive points, there are no tactical COGs in Army doctrine. Operational CMD: Joint, and interagency; Tactical CMD can be “groundcentric” and avoid some DIME and IGO/NGO/OGA considerations. “Stay in your lane” and “that is someone else’s problem” come to mind as comments made by BDE CDR individuals. Vas De Sege: SWJ Article on Operational Level of War- uses metaphor of explorer in unknown lands. Tactical Level of War: violence or threat of violence in action to pursue strategic objectives as orchestrated and synergized by the Operational CDR’s vision.
Question 23: Operational CMD relationship in conventional and COIN conflicts
Operational Command Relationships in Conventional Conflicts Using Mission Command Clear linear logic. Clausewitzian and Jominian: destroy the enemy force. CDR’s intent Conventional Conflict Detailed Planning logic provides procedures and uniformity/repetition that works. Subordinates’ Initiative Mission Command PLOs, LOEslinked to COG CVs and DPs. Doctrine suited for conventional task/purpose and reverse-engineered ENDs-ways -means Mission Orders: Resources tied to traditional employment of troop/equipment. Units do their METL tasks the way they train for. Resource Allocation Concept of operations Minimum control measures COIN Conflict The enemy is unclearillusive. Clausewitz alone fails- Sun Tzu and Design provide additional understanding. Considerations: hierarchical (top-down) may be cumbersome. Air power (penny packets vs. CCDE) -Div. resistance of Awakening Movement Linear logic may be problematic. C 2 needs decentralization and self-organization that tailors to SPECIFIC areas; populationcentric. Many units perform roles they are unfamiliar with or untrained on. New resources neededadaptation and innovation is critical. Conventional conflicts feature distinct military termination criteria often associated with clear national goals- defeating a nation-state; unconditional surrender; or an enemy force retreating from contested territory. Conventional conflicts place the military IOP as the uncontested lead element. Successful Action COIN and IW conflicts are more ambiguoustermination criteria are illusive and often shift as conditions change. Nonstate actors intermingle with nation states and groups; successful UW morphs into COIN or IW- and populations are generally key. The military IOP may not be the lead element even when combat occurs.
Question 24: Is operational art relevant for COIN/small wars or just MCO?
Answer: Yes. Next Question. Just kidding. See next slide.
Figure 1 a: Zweibelson Political Science Theory on 21 st Century Irregular Warfare Trends Regarding Nuclear-armed Nations = victory = undetermined = failure Super-power nations Large complex militaries Conflict in the Q 1 is not direct; Nuclear nations use proxy conflicts in Q 4 for indirect action Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Japan 1945 Germany 1945 Berlin Air Lift 1947 Q 1 Q 2 Operational Art in deterrence is less needed- WMD enabled nations use diplomacy and strategic-level actions or proxy wars through surrogates to accomplish goals. Limited War Low Intensity Conflict Total war High Intensity Conflict Vietnam War (RNA) Vietnam War (Viet Cong) Afghanistan 2001 present Operational Art in COIN or IW is necessary to orchestrate all IOPs efficiently in a limited conflict that will require longer time and domestic long-term support. This is where 21 st century conflict is trending- we need to adapt. Operational Art needed here for threat of violencealthough we won’t fight this way again. Korean War Afghanistan 1988 (USSR) Conflict in the Q 4 is where weaker nations and actors seek to exploit super-power nations on terms that are better than in Q 3. Conflict in the Q 2 is the golden era for most western military cultures- Q 4 Panama 1989 Iraq 1990 Q 3 Iraq 2003 Iran-Iraq War 1988 (Iraq) Bosnia 1999 Libya 1985 Iraqi Civil War 2004 present Lebanon 2006 (Israel) Failing nations Rogue state Conflict in the Q 3 is between non-nuclear nations or with one nuclear (usually superior) power. Operational Art needed here for threat of violence- and the application of it. When mis-matched forces wage war in MCO, the need for operational art remains a given necessity. But- how many more Saddams will fight us like this?
Question 25: Given the EOA course, what is your definition of Operational Art? How would you change FM 3 -0’s definition?
Personal Definition of Operational Art US Army FM 3 -0: Operational Art: the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs- supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience- to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 3 -0) • • • FM definition remains within institutional interiority Ends-Ways-Means reflects linear causality, reverse engineering, positivism, and mechanistic reductionism. Levels of war represents bounding. Choice of words reflects different military logic • • • My definition emphasizes exteriority and interiority Learning and critical thinking are essential Synergy and pursuing strategic aims represents a holistic approach to evolving and emerging national goals as a complex system transforms. My Definition: Operational Art: the application of persistent creativity and innovation by commanders and staffs- supported by their knowledge, experience, and critical thinking- to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art synergizes tactical action with the pursuit of strategic aims for optimum effectiveness and perpetual adaptation.
Question 26: Discuss tension between strategy, operations, and tactics- provide 1 x EOA example from course.
EOA Conflict: The American Revolution (EOA 1) From General Gage and the British Perspective Strategy British government wanted American colonies suppressed and British colonial dominance restored through military force. Economic measures such as the Stamp Act, the Intolerable Acts aka- the Coercive Acts (Gage’s ideas)and economic positioning to ensure colonial dependence on British refined goods (thus maintaining a dependency relationship with the colonies at a disadvantage). Taxation covered expensive European Wars. Sending fielded forces over the Atlantic was expensive- and risky with European enemies maneuvering. Gage only had 3, 000 soldiers- he wanted 10, 000. Tensions Operations Tensions Gage appointed Royal Governor of Massachusetts by King. Boston was viewed as the Colonial strategic “center of gravity” while militia arms and powder mills were considered the operational COGs. Gates echoed a Herbst: States and Power in Africa theory and considered the cheap and available land as part of the problem in the colonies- too many people could move beyond the practical reach of the law. Gates followed the law strictly. Gates’ logic (and the British in general) framed the conflict with the wrong logic. They projected British logic onto an American one. Puritanism, anger over Imperialism (Leach’s Roots of Conflict), and frontier isolationism changed Americans. Tactics Redcoats conducted forced impressment of colonial sailors and citizens into their armed forces. Redcoats on mainland used forts as well as local homes for quartering of troops against colonial wishes. Military patrols in Boston caused tensions- “The Boston Massacre” British naval blockades impacted trade. The Coercive Acts closed the port of Boston by Gage. Seizure of weapon caches and powder mills reduced militia capabilities (in theory). British values over the right to bear arms differed from a frontiersman. DDR was not feasible. Colonial militia were educated and religious men; British troops were from the dregs of society and illiterate.
Question 27: EOA- Moltke said st contact with no plan survives 1 enemy- support or disagree.
On Moltke: Metaphors do not translate into Narratives Moltke espouses Clausewitzian political war theory by embracing the concepts of fog, friction, and chance in warfare. While genius may rise above all other rules and processes, the best efforts (a plan) is no match for real war complexity and uncertainty. Therefore, planning prepares a military organization for thinking about war- but it does not substitute for actual war conduct and execution where plans are discarded as new ones replace them. Moltke says “no plan survives first contact. ” Metaphor: a plan “survives” as a living thing instead of a concept. First contact with the enemy- when first shots fired, the “plan” dies. This implies that the enemy always is more complex than a reductionist plan can anticipate. Moltke takes empirical material and deals with his interiority (known) in tension with exteriority (unknown)as in, military conflicts involve tactical action of forces in environments where violence occurs for political aims. Experience counts, but each new conflict is unique and even the best plan cannot prepare for the chaos of the future battlefield. Moltke’s comment is just a metaphor- an observation, a maxim that explains how fog and friction make any Jominian attempt at being a positivist or mechanistic reductionist in preparation for war is a waste. One cannot predict a conflict and build a plan that covers every contingency- war does not obey principles and mechanistic logic. As a narrative, one should not take Moltke’s comment as dogma any more than Moltke recommends against building a plan that becomes dogma for a future conflict. Like any initial plan, many maxims uttered by wise military men become casualties as well during the first shot of the next conflict.
Question 28: TCC- choose 1 x form of warfare discussed in TCC 505 -511; how does this develop in next 20 -25 yrs, and how will it interact with other forms of future warfare?
How Radical Evolution Impacts Conventional War International Law/Governance Technology Large Aging Populations Multi-polar Environment Politics Global Middle Class JIB/JAB refinement GRIN tech Gay Rights Genetic Modification d- tury i M en Artificial Intelligence th C 21 Urban Populations Integrated Planning Resource Competition GRIN tech will… Complexity Post Cold-War y ly ar ntur E e th C 1 2 Uni-polar Environment Naveh Deterrence biometrics Resources Pentamic Army UAVs Kennan Sayid Qtub Civil Rights II Design th 20 Post-Imperialism Ce Limited Conflict ry u nt EBO worms Cyberspace Space ICBMs satellites Information Revolution Military Industrial Complex Stealth Tech Unrestricted Conflict Theory
On Unrestricted Warfare by Liang and Xiangsui Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999) 19. Liang and Xiangsui take an eastern perspective on western warfare. “We still cannot indulge in romantic fantasies about technology, believing that from this point on war will become a confrontation like an electronic game, and even simulated warfare in a computer room similarly must be premised upon a country’s actual overall capabilities…” P 8. “Technology is like ‘magic shoes’ on the feet of mankind, and after the spring has been wound tightly by commercial interests, people can only dance along with the shoes, whirling rapidly in time to the beat they set. ” Without understanding the importance of metaphor in eastern culture, it is easy to dismiss Liang and Xiangsui’s position on technology and society as ‘mad’ or ‘illogical. ’ When we use our own logic to disregard others, we are using ‘madness’ as an excuse to ignore the alternate methods that their logic employs. P 10. Liang and Xiangsui criticize western emphasis on techno-centric logic with, “people have long been accustomed to blindly falling in love with the new and discarding the old…the endless pursuit of new technology has become a panacea to resolve all of the difficult questions of existence…In this way, the irrational expansion of technology causes mankind to continually lose his goals in the complex ramifications of the tree of technology, losing his way and forgetting how to get back. ” P 13 -14. “Some of the traditional models of war, as well as the logic and laws attached to it, will also be challenged. The outcome of the contest is not the collapse of the traditional mansion but rather one portion of the new construction site being in disorder. ” Liang and Xiangsui present a non-western perspective on how a paradigm shift in military thinking in the 21 st century does not destroy the old entirely, but reorganize an old structure into a new one; some parts remain useful while others go to the intellectual scrap heap. P 140 -141. Liang and Ziangsui argue that over the last 20 years, the world has grown more complex, yet the military ignore the increased complexity of war and instead focus “on the level of weapons, deployment methods and the battlefield, and the drawn-up war prospects are also mostly only limited to the military domain and revel in it. ” P 141. “The enemy will possibly not be the originally significant enemy, and the weapons will possibly not be the original weapons, and the battlefield will also possibly not be the original battlefield. Nothing is definite. What can be ascertained is not definite. The game has already changed, and what we need to continue is ascertaining a new type of fighting method within various uncertainties. ” P 181. Americans “would rather treat war as the opponent in the marathon race of military technology and are not willing to look at it more as a test of morale and courage…they believe that as long as the Edisons of today do not sink into sleep, the gate to victory will always be open to the Americans. ” P 95. “It is not so much that war follows the fixed race course of rivalry of technology and weaponry as it is a game field with continually changing direction and many irregular factors. ”
Question 29: What is the utility of scenario planning for future operations?
Scenario Planning and the Mexico Cartel Design Model Benefits of Scenario Planning: 1. 2. Merges well with Design’s conceptual planning…works as a potential intermediate step between conceptual and detailed planning. Generates options that reflect logicnot just wild speculation about the future; and avoids the cookie-cutter mentality of dealing only with “known-knowns” projected into the future (the economics of carriage companies in 1900 when automobiles entered the market). High Corruption High Violence Legitimate Economy Prosperity This model features an improving Mexican legitimate economy with a booming illicit commodity- violence will increase as Mexico buys more security capabilities while drug cartels can also purchase more lethal hardware and mercenaries/influence. Low Corruption Low Violence This model features an improving Mexican legal economy with a declining illicit economy; positive feed-back loops funnel greater security resources against a diminishing rival criminal enterprise. Best possible future scenario. Illicit Economy Entropy Illicit Economy Prosperity Detriments of Scenario Planning: 1. 2. 3. Easy to misuse this tool. This is not a crystal ball. It generates options for planning- it does not make predictions. Black Swans are notoriously hard to anticipate. Scenario planning probably only captures white and grey swans… Special folks are necessary for this to work. Highly educated personnel can contribute- military organizations generally lack those types. This model features a booming illicit commodity with a declining legal economy. With limited resources for security costs, Mexico will lose legitimacy and face state failure without outside intervention. Cartel growth and robust black markets will hasten this collapse. High Corruption High Violence This model features a declining legal and illegal economy in Mexico. With less legal enterprise options and no rival illicit economy, Mexico will slide into a collapsed state condition where extreme poverty occurs. Violence will be moderate due to limited illicit options. Legitimate Economy Entropy High Corruption Moderate Violence
Question 30: Describe the Concept of Ops our group didwhat implications does this have for future force structure?
More to follow. I need to download our groups’ deliverable on Brazil. In oral comps, I would want to steer this conversation towards Mexico instead and run with some of the Design products from that.
Question 31: What is the difference between war and warfare? What does this matter for the 21 st century and the US?
Question 32: What trends will influence the future operating environment for the next 20 -25 yrs?
How Radical Evolution Impacts Conventional War International Law/Governance Technology Large Aging Populations Multi-polar Environment Politics Global Middle Class Integrated Planning JIB/JAB refinement GRIN tech Gay Rights Genetic Modification d- tury i M en Artificial Intelligence th C 21 Urban Populations Resource Competition GRIN tech will… Complexity Post Cold-War y ly ar ntur E e th C 1 2 Uni-polar Environment Naveh Deterrence biometrics Pentamic Army UAVs Kennan Sayid Qtub Civil Rights II Design th 20 Post-Imperialism Ce Limited Conflict ry u nt EBO worms Cyberspace Space ICBMs Military Industrial Complex Stealth Tech Unrestricted Conflict satellites Information Revolution GRIN: genetic, robotic, informational, and nano-tech Theory Resources
Question 33: FM 3 -0 does offensive, defensive, and stability ops as a central theme for US operational concept- what is the value of a concept that needs 3 x simultaneous operations?
More to follow.
Question 34: FG officers- explain your future role as a staff officer on a general staff.
Answer: Making coffee and building pretty slides.
Question 35: You are a BDE CDRwhat is your role in MDMP- how do you ensure your staff meets your intent and HHQ’s mission requirements?
MDMP Step 1: Receipt of Mission Step 2: Mission Analysis Step 3: COA Development Step 4: COA Analysis (wargaming) Guidance must get staff looking at the problem from the right perspectives. Analysis must lead to synthesis. Example: what does the weather data mean in relation to time, maneuver, and purpose? COA development should be done without compartmentalizing too much with small staff groups- Step 5: COA comparison War-gaming should not be lock-step; it also should not be without time hacks and a strong ref. Step 6: COA Approval Step 7: Orders Production CDR’s intent Subordinates’ Initiative Mission Command Mission Orders: Concept of operations Minimum control measures Design is not just for the first step of MDMP- it should be continuous and help refine each step of the MDMP process with the CDR as the lead designer. Resource Allocation
Question 36: JP 5 -0 and FM 5 -0 explain a through mission analysis…
More to follow.
Summarize ANP Course: (Applied Elements of National Power)
Applied Elements of National Power Course Outline: Historic Contexts: ANP explains how the US functions in the international arena, how foreign policy and strategy evolved over time, with a focus on the strategic context for operational art. Strategic History (WWI mostly) with B. H. Liddell Hart’s Strategy. Collin Gray’s War, Peace, and International Relations. 1. Analyze strategy and strategic history. 2. Analyze the intellectual foundations of American foreign policy. 3. Apply conceptual campaign planning to historic strategic contexts. 4. Examine the relationships among diplomacy, information, economics, and military force (DIME). Henry Hendrix’s Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy (turn of 20 th century); the importance of Mahan on US strategic culture. Linn’s Echo of Battle would place both Mahan and TR as ‘guardians. ’ Henry Gole’s The Road to Rainbow: this book covered pre. WWII peacetime planning with plans Orange (Japan) and others; UK was an enemy in one; Cold War Era: the Deterrence Age. Mc. Dougall’s Promised Land, Crusader State. Bernard Brodie’s The Anatomy of Deterrence. Kenneth Osgood’s Total Cold War Yergin and Stanislaw: The Commanding Heights Post-Cold War to War on Terror: Mc. Dougall’s Promised Land… Gaddis’ Surprise, Security, and the American Experience David Ucko’s New Counterinsurgency Era Improvements: Leach’s Roots of Conflict: spans the century prior to the Revolutionary War; how American culture grew away from British colonial values and tenets. Cold War Era: the Deterrence Age. Keenan’s The Long Telegram NCS-68 The Berlin Airlift (1957) Cuba Missile Crisis (1963? ) Builder’s The Masks of War: the services fought over relevance and sought golden-era conflicts. Is Mc. Dougall’s book appropriate for SAMS? He is writing history for historians- many folks were lost.
Summarize Design Course:
Applied Elements of National Power Course Outline: Design did… Historic Contexts: Enter readings Improvements: Enter readings
Summarize SDM Course:
Applied Elements of National Power Course Outline: SDM did… Historic Contexts: Enter readings Improvements: Enter readings
Summarize TCC Course:
Applied Elements of National Power Course Outline: TCC did… Historic Contexts: Enter readings Improvements: Enter readings
Process Modeling
Process Modeling Process modeling uses a flowchart format to graphically depict complex interrelationships. This should help understand what Dr. Ryan’s article from D 315 referred to concerning complexity: the variety of actors and the interconnectivity between them reflect complexity in the system. Warning: process modeling lends itself to engineering and a Jominian ‘Industrial Revolution’ mindset. Intricate and complicated processes such as a Model-T Ford assembly plant are not complex, but would plot well in a process modeling diagram. Linn’s Echo of Battle uses the ‘managerial’ guardian concept to help describe this faulty manner of approaching military problems. Process modeling strikes me as a tool that, if wielded dangerously in the conceptual stage of design, will send your framing down a road of description, deconstructionism, and tunnel vision where influencing one actor will “solve the problem. ”
Process Modeling
Process Modeling and Mexico Mexican rival actors (Army, politicians, elites, cartels, majority population, extreme poor, Religious Leaders) are not mechanical. Input and output in a complicated closed system (car plant) exists and lend well to a diagram like the previous slide. Input and output in an open system need to consider positive and negative feedback loops, cooperation and competition between various actors, and sources of difference within the design frame. This makes process modeling “messy” for the Mexican design frame. The following slide attempts to conduct process modeling with Mexico.
Figure 3: Process Modeling in Mexico 2010 Sources: ‘me over us’ ‘Drugs are a Valuable Resource’ ‘corruption is persistent. ’ ‘Elites over poor. ’ Some Change occurs Gradual Erosion of Change Mexican system resists action System Compensation: resist change System resists change. System restored to observed state with corruption cycles and drug problem Stabilization after Military Action Attempt Change LOE Mexican System changed Short Term Changes degrade over time (problem unsolved) Positive Feedback resisting changes Loop Acceptable violence and corruption LOE ENERGY US military enters system Observed System: there is difference between OS and desired state. Drug cycle and corruption continues with restoration of violence and corruption tolerances ‘flooding’ the positive feedback loop to change it Too much violence and/or corruption Corruption exceeds System Carrying Capacity New power structure with new elites. Problem remains; reassignment of actors occurs Civil War Positive feedback loops are fragile. Majority rejects current elite structure of power Rival relevant actors vulnerable
Figure 3: Process Modeling in Mexico 2010 Sources: ‘me over us’ ‘Drugs are a Valuable Resource’ ‘corruption is persistent. ’ ‘Elites over poor. ’ at e Def Mexican System changed d l rte LOE n spo s re Ca itic Pol i ENERGY US military enters system le Drug cycle and hic l ve te corruption car ew N continues with New power structure with restoration of new elites. violence and s corruption lite w. E tolerances Ne Problem remains; reassignment of actors occurs Civil War pte u orr ns c d ia itic Pol System restored to observed state with corruption cycles and drug problem Stabilization after Positive Feedback resisting changes Loop Acceptable Observed System: there is difference between OS and desired state. ep ls r nd o esp ns r a violence and corruption LOE Short Term Changes degrade over time (problem unsolved) ed lac Gradual Erosion of Change Mexican system resists action e LOE p New te Car im d cr ion nize upt rga orr o Military Action al c uce itic Red pol Attempt Change uce Red ans tici oli Some Change occurs System Compensation: resist change System resists change. tel r a ca d pon ‘flooding’ the positive es ls r rte Ca feedback loop to change it Too much icia violence and/orolit P corruption d pon es ns r Corruption exceeds System Carrying Capacity Positive feedback loops are fragile. Majority rejects current elite structure of power Rival relevant actors vulnerable 9 179 0 181 7 191 * 0 200
Rugged Landscapes
MAJOR BEN ZWEIBELSON, SEMINAR 4 SAMS Figure 1 a: Rugged Landscape Information Modeling Improvement (adding the quad chart) A hypothetical Iraqi Model for 2010: Kurdish Prosperity Stable Shiite Sunni Entropy Volatile
Hatch’s Model of Cultural Transformation
Figure 1: Hatch’s Cultural Dynamic Model adapted by Zweibelson with Mexico 2010 11. When Mexican society promotes anti-elitist leadership from outside the political process (religious leaders, Cartel leaders, or other asymmetrical leader), this new value manifests itself by challenging common assumptions about Mexico and elitism/corruption. Values n an ife st at io Mexican society places elites above the law liza 3. Organization (Mexico) begins influencing action by manifesting values opposing elitist corruption. tio n m 12. If alternate leadership valued as a new symbolic artifact in Mexico (a religious leader rises to power), this challenges existing assumptions. rea 10. Mexican society that previously endorsed new political parties for change now realize that the corruption cycle absorbs all elected leaders. For change, society must now value alternate leadership functioning outside the political process. 2. Perceptions of elitist action supporting assumption of Mexican corruption. 1. World expects high levels of elitist corruption and crime in Mexico. • • Judicial reform Artifacts Alternate Political Parties New Leaders Military employed in areas Police are corrupted Assumption 6. Symbols lead to interpretation and questioning assumptions. n tio ta re rp te culture gravitate towards charismatic elites; wealth is given back to masses to absolve sins of the elite. Can some level of elitism remain culturally acceptable in Mexico? 5. Some of these Mexican artifacts gain symbolic meaning in communication with others. in • Mexican history, ideology, and 4. Value-based action produces cultural artifacts concerning corruption and elitism. • Presidents Fox and Calderon represent change. • Capture/killing Cartel leaders demonstrate resolve against elitism. Symbols Interpretation initiates CHANGE. 7. Presidents from new political parties may get elected on platforms of reform; but they also can perform the traditional role of elitist and function above the law. 9. New leaders do not reflect anti-elitism if elected within the established political process. For new leadership artifacts to become symbols of elitist reform, they must gain power in a manner outside the established political process. n io at liz bo m sy 8. Some artifacts in Mexican anti-elitism require refinement because their symbolic interpretation conflicts with rival aspects in Mexican culture and history.
Figure 2: Hatch’s Cultural Dynamic Model adapted by Zweibelson with American Civil War (D 324) 11. When Southern society promotes pro. White Southern leadership that promotes Southern preservation of power in post-war reconstruction, this new value manifests itself by challenging original assumptions that non-whites are unequal, yet preserves white prosperity in a non-slave based economy by valuing political intimidation of black Southern voters. Slaves are unequal to Whites and necessary for southern economic prosperity Values rea ife st at io n concerning continued enslavement of non-whites and tobacco/cotton economy • Slavery Artifacts • Southern Military • Attempts at Sovereignty • Cotton and Tobacco valued by world 5. Some of these Southern artifacts gain symbolic meaning in communication with others. n tio ta re rp te in Interpretation initiates CHANGE. n an 1. Southern continuation of slave-based economy will continue uninterrupted unless militarily defeated. 6. Symbols lead to interpretation and questioning assumptions. ideology, and culture gravitate towards valuing non-whites as sub-human; slave-based economies prosper in the preindustrial revolution era. Why is ethnic inequality so pervasive in the South, and can it change? tio 2. Technological improvements and industrial revolution in 1850 s will not impact slave economies in 4. Value-based action produces cultural artifacts the foreseeable future. Assumption • White Southern history, liza 3. North conducts military action against Southern States in rebellion. m 12. If alternate white Southern value of voter intimidation/blacks are unnecessary in post-war economy as new symbolic artifacts in the South (a change from active military resistance), this challenges existing assumptions. 10. Southern society that previously endorsed military revolt from Union now accept that slaves are unavailable for economic prosperity; the Southern economy (and social castes) will change. For change, society must now value alternate values that accept nonwhite changed status without weakening White Southern values or prosperity. Freedom versus Slavery; Human Rights versus Economic Prosperity • Southern military leadership fights for southern values and southern prosperity; slave-based economy becomes symbolic of rival concepts of ‘freedom’ Symbols 7. The military defeat of the south is only one step in the process of cultural transformation n io at liz 9. Emergent Southern action post-conflict in a loss must adjust Southern values but prevent destruction of Southern identity/culture. For new leadership artifacts to become symbols of human equality and economic reform, slaves must become unnecessary for southern prosperity. bo m sy 8. Some artifacts in Southern values require refinement because their symbolic interpretation conflicts with rival (Northern) values on ‘equal rights’ and economic prosperity.
Swarming
Figure 2: Zweibelson Swarming Model Principles of Swarming: 1. Collective Orientation: move in same direction 2. Collective Proximity: remain close to neighbors 3. Avoid Entropy: avoid collision with neighbors 14 19 7 14 and 19 are ‘blitzing’ outside the swarm and will either join a swarm group, or locate a swarm objective (food, enemy, etc). 6 8 2 9 Example of swarm principle: 3 and 2 are within 1’s collision ring; 1 must decide either to move towards grouping 3 -9 -87 or towards larger grouping 4 -5 -10 -1112 -13. 1 moves towards larger grouping (swarm) while a smaller grouping attracts 3 and 2. 1 3 5 11 4 10 15 12 13 18 17 16
Political Science Considerations
Figure 1 a: Musings on Political Science Theories Anarchy is not the cause of conflict. Free trade and interdependent democracies will reduce conflict. Legitimacy in tension with cost to act. Liberalism Nation-state primary actors Humans are anarchistic naturally; individual liberty is trumped by state survival Zero-sum game for power; balance of power Statism, Survivalism, Self-Help Q 1 Compatible in some aspects Q 2 Realism Compatible in some aspects Implicitly Peaceful World Implicitly Chaotic World Compatible in some aspects Q 4 Social Constructivists Changing values and perceptions will change government and society; meta-cognition and game theory works here. Q 3 Compatible in some aspects Individuals comprise actors Ideology not compatible with others. Marxists; Communists; Socialists Ideological; counter-capitalist; individual worker is the power- the state serves the worker; final battle vs. capitalism; Non-marxist nations will always threaten Marxist ones.
Interiority and Exteriority in Design Theory
Black Swans Exteriority Design Ontological Adaptive Innovative Creative System of Logic “Knowing about the Unknown” in tension with “Knowing the Known” Q 1 Middle East Collapse 9 -11 Internet Bubble Burst Housing Collapse Unexpected Threats s Linking Design’s System of Logic with Detailed Planning’s System of Logic Q 2 Unknowns Unknown White Swans Reductionist Mechanistic Positivist System of Logic Q 3 Pa ra d Reducing Tensions igm Sh ift Known Shattering expectations of the future Gray Swans Unconventional Threats Known Unknowns Known knowns Disease Epidemics (AIDs) Energy and Resource Limits Population Growth Geography Q 4 Conventional Threats Interiority Earthquakes occur at fault lines (Japan, Haiti, Chile)
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps
Fuzzy Cognitive Map on Kirkpatrick Victory Plan Problem 1941: national prosperity vs. entropy Resources available to nation vs. global resources Training a military requires USSR population and Environment Economic Factors time/resources/technology U. S. possesses massive resources and industry. UK was losing resources and troops at a rapid rate. Limited Time (NLT 1943) U. S. has a large military age population pool. Soviet Union as a German buffer. UK as a German buffer. U. S. National resources T=time Threat to world (WW 2) Current (1941) US military inadequate to achieve goals America located across oceans from WW 2. Z= goals U. S. national goals in WW 2. inter-war military for U. S. downsized Pro-German lobby. Pro-Allies lobby Ethnic/Social Ethnic and social national identity seeks prosperity and power American independence American Democracy Global trade empowered US economy Technology advancements empowered military action X (means) + y (ways) = z (ends) How to get x= t (time) / r (resources)/ enemy R= s (society) + e / p (political structure) Military decisions require political and public discourse American Isolationism resources mobilized slowly. Failure of League of Nations U. S. democracy will function with 10% population draft Fascism diametrically opposes Democracy Political Structure Political threat (internal and external) German fascism resulted from WWI and Lo. N failures.
Gravity Pipe Metaphors
Figure 1: D 307 Cold War Arms Escalation Gravity Pipe U. S. now looks from atop the nuclear gravity pipe; from here it attempts to prevent other nations from rising up. GDP ratio USSR obsolete. Russian Federal Republic rises from ashes and secures existing nuclear infrastructure. Attempts to maintain nuclear superpower status. GDP ratio Post-Cold War: U. S. downsizes nuclear arsenal while maintaining first strike capability for hostile actors. GDP ratio Cold War ending; USSR unable to fund their nuclear military IOP. Efforts now towards nuclear non-proliferation and reduction. START Treaty 1980 s: President Reagan begins ‘Star Wars program. SALT 2 Treaty Soviets challenged to match MIRV quality; react with IBCM quantity for MAD. SALT 1 Treaty 1970 s: U. S. begins MIRV warheads. GDP ratio 1969: First man on moon; space race won by United States 1957: Sputnik: first space satellite Soviet military maintains large ground forces; closed market economy (Socialist) does not grow as rapidly as U. S. free market; USSR spends higher ratio to balance. U. S. reframing: NASA and space race increased due to Soviet satellite success Smaller ground forces; USAF SAC takes lead on nuclear option; NASA space race. GDP cost ratio acceptable. 1950 s perceived missile gap with Moscow. GDP ratio Reframe: expand nuclear delivery to IBCM, bomber, and submarine capabilities. GDP ratio 1940 Manhattan Project; 1945 Hiroshima/Nagasaki 1945+ secret atomic program; 1949 atomic bomb USSR WWII Nazi missile technology/scientists United States
Design and the MCPP exercise: Applying Critical Thinking to “Indalyasia”
Figure 1: Emergent Propensity for OBSERVED SYSTEM 1. Nationalism over Traditional Island Diversity 2. Conquest over Cooperation/Competition 3. Social Justice to restore Island Traditional Balance 1. Seizing Singapore = Economic Prosperity Economic Disparities VALUES MIOP holds Singapore Capital Straits Wealth ARTIFACTS ASSUMPTIONS 2. UW success in RNI = ethnocentric hegemony 2006: Indonesian Economic Crisis SYMBOLS Democratic Republic of Indolaysia 1. Nationalism of ‘Greater Indalaysia 2. Region Hegemony 3. Economic Broker (Straits) Sources: Jared Diamond (G, G, S; Collapse) Mary Jo Hatch’s Cultural Wheel Deluze/Gutarrai’s ‘A Thousand Plateaus’ Hogbin’s Experiments in Civilization Naveh’s collected readings and writings Clausewitz Anatol Rapaport Ethnic & Cultural Ties Conventional ATTACK GO ALS UW and indirect ATTACK 1985: Malaysia and Indonesia merger Republic of Northern Indolaysia Republic of Singapore 1. Regional Hegemony 2. Nationalism beyond Interiority island boundaries 3. Anti-Western (Rival) position of COMPETITION over COOPERATION. 4. Social Justice restores wealth balance to ‘islandism’ cycle of tradition.
Figure 2: Explanation of Observed System (WHY) Beginning Mainland Civilization Advancement Metallurgic Revolutions limited to Island Resources and Specialization Limits Middle End Mainland Civilization Advancement Imperialism Industrial Revolution Tension Globalization Native Island Sociological Development ‘islandism’ Mainland Parity Native Island Sociological Development Tension islandism: Design requires operational vocabulary and new terminology to convey deep understanding. In this open system, this term covers the sociological development of micro-civilizations bounded by the topographic realities of island formations. Naveh: “When doing design, you are in a process of creating and inventing new things…things that old words are incapable of explaining. You must invent new words, new things, to explain what you gain in understanding…. ” (personal interview Jan 2011) Hybrid Island Nationalism and State Parity ‘de-islandism’ De-islandism: While ‘islandism’ explains the beginning and middle of this design narrative for the environmental frame, it does not explain the rival phenomenon in the observed system (why we are looking at it). This term explains how the exteriority of island micro-systems transforms and is in tension with the global ecological frame.
Sources: Jared Diamond (G, G, S; Collapse) Mary Jo Hatch’s Cultural Wheel Deluze/Gutarrai’s ‘A Thousand Plateaus’ Hogbin’s Experiments in Civilization Naveh’s collected readings and writings Clausewitz Anatol Rapaport Figure 3: Explanation of ‘islandism’ By departing ‘interior’- decedents of new colony form separate interiority distinct from parent. Smooth versus Striated Exterior versus Interior Nomad versus Farmer/Merchant Nomadism and Colonization Faction departs island (interior) to find more smooth space to striate. Emergent rivals Physical Boundaries of Islands islandism continues cycle with origin element Competition and Cooperation Patterns Tension Warring Raids against ‘rivals’ on island or neighboring island; returning prosperity to source tribe Define interiority and exteriority for artifacts and symbols based on cultural VALUES Smooth-Striated Tension of Islands Cooperation and competition Selforganization adaptation Interiority of Tribe through values and structure Magic explains; No science. Trade with rivals to prosper when conflict produces entropy Self Organization and Seek Prosperity Group Collective is superior to individual Wealth equated to family and food sources Decentralized Power Structure; no nationalism; local ‘man of importance’
Figure 4: Explanation of ‘De-islandism’ 1. 2. Renaissance Scientific Revolution 3. Imperialism 4. Industrial Revolution War Raids and Nomadism replaced by Permanent Conquests Tension Smooth Space of Ocean boundaries now striated. Conceptual Boundaries of Nationalism 5. Globalization Nomadism and Colonization Competition and Cooperation Patterns Competition with non-neighbors drives adaptation of ‘mainlandism’ National Leader disrupts decentralized ‘local man of importance’ concepts Tension Centralizing over Decentralizing Tension Physical Boundaries of Islands islandism Cycle Interiority of Tribe through values and structure Who is interior? ‘Us’ is nationalized. Interiority Flexible; Self. Identity Threatened Tension Self Organization and Seek Prosperity Tension Exteriority threatens nonadaptive Interiority The war-machine of globalization (and predecessors) threatens the prosperity of noncompliance
Occupation of capital island of rival mirrors their own actions with Singapore; promotes “swap. ” War Raids and Nomadism replaced by Permanent Conquests Tension Blockade in straits; filter nonaggressor trade until compliance Competition with non-neighbors drives adaptation of ‘mainlandism’ Figure 5: Exploiting the Environment to Accomplish Goals 3. Imperialism 4. Industrial Revolution Conceptual Boundaries of Nationalism 5. Globalization Nomadism and Colonization Competition and Cooperation Patterns Tension Centralizing over Decentralizing Tension Physical Boundaries of Islands islandism Cycle Interiority of Tribe through values and structure Self Organization and Seek Prosperity Tension Blockade and threaten National Capital defines Nationalism of deislandisation. Exteriority threatens nonadaptive Interiority Flexible; Self. Identity Threatened Tension Rival expects Coalition to attempt to regain Singapore; anticipates Amphibious Ops/Air/Naval.
Скачать презентацию Oral Comps Slides Major Ben Zweibelson Seminar 4
1890c90e464818509345f5528a4eb816.ppt