Open Source Intelligence OSINT The Way Ahead Presented

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): The Way Ahead Presented to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Robert David Steele (Vivas) 22 November 2006

Plan of the Brief • • Global Reality—Context for Intelligence Strategic Failure of Secret Intelligence Status of OSINT Today What You Can Do Now to Improve Intelligence & Information Operations (I 2 O) Where We Need to Go as a Nation GO NAVY: 450 -Ship Navy, Peace from the Sea

GLOBAL REALITY

Conflict Facts for 2002 23 LIC+, 79 LIC-, 175 VPC Source: PIOOM (NL), data with permission © 2002 A. Jongman

Ethnic Fault Lines 2000 18 Genocide Campaigns On-Going Today Source: Dr. Greg Stanton

Water & War Hyper-Arid 1 3 4 Arid 5 Semi-Arid 6 Sub-Humid Water Pollution 2 Source: The State of the World Atlas (1997), chart 54, 53

Global Threats to Local Survival Complex Emergencies 32 Countries Water Scarcity & Contaminated Water** Refugees/Displaced 66 Countries Ethnic Conflict 18 Genocides Today** Food Security 33 Countries Resource Wars, Energy Waste & Pollution** Modern Plagues* 59 Countries & Rising Corruption Common 80 Countries Child Soldiers 41 Countries Censorship Very High 62 Countries *State of the World Atlas (1997), ** Marq de Villier (Water), John Heidenrich and Greg Stanton (Genocide), Michael Klare et al (Resources), all others from PIOOM Map 2002

Taxpayer Dollars Focused on Just 10% of the Threat

Presidential Trade-Offs $100 million will buy: 1 Small Navy Platform or Ground Unit or 1, 000 Potential George Kennan’s or 10, 000 Peace Corps Volunteers or 1, 000 cubic meters of desalinated water or One day of war over water (or oil)

We’re in a Six-Front 100 -Year War of Our Own Making. America is losing/has lost the moral high ground.

ter Wa c. Se c. So y rit cu Se e nu ve Re ce sti Ju n tio gra mi ly Im mi Fa gy er En ion at uc y Ed om on Ec y ac m plo Di bt De Policy/ Threats Poverty Disease Ecology State War Civil War For each Al Qaeda $1, US Spends $500 K. Badly. They can do this forever. Any Questions? Do. D Focus Genocide Oth. Atroc. Proliferation Terrorism Trans. Crime GWOT

ter Wa c. Se c. So rity cu Se e nu ve Re ce sti Ju n tio gra mi ly Im mi Fa gy er En ion at uc y Ed om on Ec y ac m plo Di bt De Policy/ Threats Poverty Big Dogs Disease Brazil Ecology State War Civil War In Grand Strategy terms, Al Qaeda shrinks to zip. China India Indonesia Genocide Oth. Atroc. Proliferation Terrorism Trans. Crime Iran Russia Venezuela Wild Cards

ter Wa c. Se c. So rity cu Se e nu ve Re ce sti Ju n tio gra mi ly Im mi Fa gy er En ion at uc y Ed om on Ec y ac m plo Di bt De Policy/ Threats Poverty Big Dogs Disease Can't Fix Stupid! Brazil Ecology China State War India Civil War Indonesia Genocide Oth. Atroc. Proliferation Terrorism Trans. Crime From left : Larry the Cable Guy , Bill Engvall , Jeff Foxworthy and Ron White. Iran Russia Venezuela Wild Cards

STRATEGIC FAILURE OF NATIONAL SECRET INTELLIGENCE

Global Intelligence Failure Breakdown in Collection and Understanding Digital English Language Oral/Unpublished NRO NSA Foreign Languages* Analog FBIS UN/STATE CIA/DO Cascading Deficiencies: 1) Don’t even try to access most information 2) Can’t process hard-copy into digital 3) Can’t translate most of what we collect *31 predominant languages, over 3, 000 distinct languages in all.

Global Processing Failure Breakdown in Exploitation, Dissemination More Satisfying 50% 0% Less Costly Does Not Exist OSINT HUMINT STATE SIGINT IMINT MASINT 50%

Threats vs. Sources Threat #1: Poverty Threat #2: Infectious Disease Threat #3: Environmental Degradation Threat #4: Inter-State Conflict Threat #5 Civil War Threat #6: Genocide Threat #7: Other Large-Scale Atrocities Threat #8: Nuclear, bio-chemical weapons Threat #9: Terrorism Threat #10: Transnational organized crime Average Importance of “OSINT” 95% 99% 90% 75% 80% 95% 75% 80% 86%

Poverty ter Wa c. Se c. So y rit cu Se e nu ve Re ce sti Ju n tio gra mi ly Im mi Fa gy er En ion at uc y Ed om on Ec y ac m plo Di bt De Policy/ Threats Big Dogs Disease Brazil Ecology China State War India Civil War Indonesia Genocide Oth. Atroc. Proliferation Terrorism Trans. Crime Iran Russia Venezuela Wild Cards

Secret Intelligence Misses 80% of the Relevant Information! ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS HUMINT SIGINT IMINT MASINT 95% of cost 20% of value 5% of cost 80% of value OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION

Baseball Analogy Harnessing the Power of the Crowd OSINT HUMINT SIGINT IMINT MASINT

Policy-Intelligence Failure: Unbalanced Instruments of Power Too much of: • Military heavy metal • Secret satellites Not enough of: The real budget is the real policy. Citizens must vote and provide constant oversight if the taxpayer dollar is to be spent wisely. • • • Humans on ground Human expert analysis Technical processing State & local intelligence Public health, water, etc.

Policy-Intelligence Failure Public is Neither Engaged Nor Informed Why This Matters Nations Inc. Bacteria Citizens Gangs World War III Players • Homeland security--”A Nation’s best defense is an educated citizenry. ” (Thomas Jefferson) • Prosperity--the financial value of ethics, trust, strategic culture • Global security--the long-term value of public intelligence to multi-cultural policy initiatives, the best pre-emption is moral.

STATUS OF OSINT TODAY

OSINT Matters I • "By `intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country-the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations. " Clausewitz, On War, 1832 Emphasis Added. You get no points for just knowing secrets when they are less than 2% of what you need to know.

OSINT Matters II What’s on the other side of the hill? All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavor to find out what you don’t know by what you do; that’s what I called “guessing what was at the other side of the hill”. Duke of Wellington quoted in John Wilson Croker, The Croker Papers (1884)

OSINT Matters III Strategic Planning This is what got General Schoomaker’s attention in 1997. • History • Context Operational Coordination • Current Awareness • Key Personalities/Motivators Tactical Employment • Imagery & Image Maps • Translation Support Acquisition Design • Strategic Generalizations • Critical Technologies

Brief History of OSINT • • Diplomats diminished FBIS in WW II FBIS going, going…. FRD on the margin ER&A cut, cut We do secrets “On your own time…” “Use the Internet”

USMC Intelligence Experience • 1988 MCIC start-up • $10 M on DODIIS • Learned 90% raw info – – Not secret Not online Not in English Not available from DC • No Do. D focal point • No knowledge base

US IC Response • HPSCI Forced the Issue in 1992 • FBIS claimed the turf and promptly blew it • COSPO created, DIA led & screwed it up • Markowitz tried hard, Dempsey blocked NFIP line for years • Tenet June 1997 refused Global Coverage recommendation of $1. 5 M ($10 M/year per 150 lower tier targets) • 2005 DNI appoints ADDNI/OS, never heard from again….

Meanwhile…. • 1994 Steve Emerson got it right on jihad within the US • 1996 Yossef Bodansky got it right on BL’s declaration of war • 1997 Pete Schoomaker established SOCOM OSINT • 2005 Col Vince Stewart USMC does super job for USDI, they offer SOCOM Executive Agency, declined

Do. D OSINT Today • • • OSD POC Back to FMF DIA lip-service to OSINT No Do. D Doctrine (Army contractor wrote garbage) No Do. D Program, Budget, or TO&E Varied parties spending around $25 M in complete disorder & mostly on data mining SOCOM & CENTCOM good but limited funding STRATCOM wasting $65 M on 36 US on-site butts PACOM destroyed VIC, SOUTHCOM 2 bodies… FSMO tries when not diverting funds to MILCON

Data Mining is not Data Capture • Spending $250 M on data mining, and less than $10 M on open source data capture, is not cool. • 80% of what we need is not available to FBIS or anyone else Forget about the letter, which as we are now unled, requires reading the language, un- funded, and I’ve got the stamp…so pretty! untrained.

Meanwhile…. • 2003 Sec. Def quotes Bin Laden training manual as saying Al Qaeda gets 80% of its intelligence from OSINT but… • Ramps up OPSEC (good) but does not establish Do. D OSINT

ADDNI/OS & OSS CEO ADDNI/OS View of OSINT Masint Imint Sigint Humint FI Osint Humint Sigint OSS CEO View of OSINT Imint Masint OSINT is both a supporting discipline, and an all-source discipline.

WHAT YOU CAN DO TO IMPROVE ON YOUR OWN

WWW. OSS. NET • • • www. oss. net/BASIC See especially the Context & Practice sections See the briefings, especially New Rules www. oss. net/LIBRARY See especially the Training section (this is Word table, can sort by columns, search) • www. oss. net/HISTORY • Believe it or not, CIA & DIA and the Services have fought me on this since 1988.

New Craft of Intelligence China, Islam, Ethnic, Etc. Narrowly focused! I IV Lessons of History Spies & Secrecy II III Global Coverage National Intelligence Cost-Sharing with Others-Shared Early Warning Harness distributed intelligence of Nation

Focus of Global Effort Top Secret Tribal Secret Partial Sharing Shared Among Tribes Strategic Forecasting 10% Need, 40% Cost Primary Research & Experts on Demand 20% Need, 30% Cost Help Desk (Tell Me More Right Now) 30% Need, 20% Cost Daily/Weekly Reports 40% Need, 10% Cost

Creating the World Brain: Web-Based Virtual Intelligence Teams Expert Forum Shared Calendar Distance Learning Shared Rolodex OPG VPN Shared 24/7 Plot Virtual Library Virtual Budget Weekly Review

Internet Competency Now a serious source • “All-source” means all sources--the Internet is now a major source • Search engines vary. • Find images and maps. • Find experts and groups. • Limit to 1 -hour efforts. • Need an Internet specialist on call.

Commercial Online Competency 100 X more important than Internet Italian intelligence chief puts Al. Qa'idah's assets at 5 bn dollars BBC Monitoring, 05/16/2002, 142 words. CIA 'Probably' Helps Italian Subversive Groups. Xinhua News Agency, 03/20/2001, 268 words. • Google rapidly displacing, but still need foreign language monitoring that OSC/FBIS simply will not do for the military. • Need a specialist.

Gray Literature Competency Limited edition, must know to ask • Pre-prints, technical reports, company telephone books, university yearbooks, “niche” references. • Generally requires human access and special knowledge of availability. • Unique and useful.

Primary Research Competency Knowing Who Knows, Direct Contacts • Citation Analysis is key to finding top experts across different nations. • Using the telephone (and the Internet) to reach top experts yields powerful results.

Citation Analysis Example DIALOG, SSCI, $1000 = Savings • DIALOG access to Social Science Citation Index • Use OSS methodology • $500 in access charges + $500 in analyst time = list of top experts on any country or topic • Then you call them. . .

Analytic Toolkit Competency Software can be a curse or a help • Digital conversion, storage, visualization, and retrieval tools • Geospatial tools • Structured analysis and detection tools • Multi-media publication and presentation tools

Geospatial Competency Maps & images make a difference Such as plotting ships on Google Earth…. • Commercial imagery cheaper than ignorance • Russian military maps of Third World vital • Post-processing support from private sector • Desktop tools for plotting information in time & space context

Analytic Tradecraft Emerging appreciation for its value • CIA University trying • Moving away from “cutting and pasting” • Moving away from hard-copy files • Focus on learning how to think, and how to structure digital data • Still not there.

Creating an OSINT Cell Central discovery, distributed exploitation Senior All-Source Collection Manager Internet Specialist Commercial Online Expert Primary Research External Contracts All-Source Analyst/ Presentation Manager • Six people can leverage global OSINT for an entire Ministry or Service or Command • This eliminates need for duplicate open source infrastructure • Also saves money

INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION OPERATIONS (I 2 O)

7 th Generation Warfare First Generation Low Tech Attrition Second Generation Relatively Higher Tech Attrition and/or Maneuver Third Generation From Hard to Soft Power From Force to Brain Power Fourth Generation Non-State Threats Asymmetry Fifth Generation Information and High-Tech Knowledge & Technology & Organization Sixth Generation Military-Technical Revolution Bio-Informational Seventh Generation Belief Systems & Global Accountability All Information, All Languages, All the Time

GRAND STRATEGY: Understanding Ways, Means, and Ends

Reference • www. oss. net – IOP ’ 07 Portal Page – Link dated 17 Nov 06: I 2 O Draft 3. 4 – Includes table for monitoring & predicting revolution, levels of analysis figure

WHERE WE NEED TO GO AS A NATION

New Strategy: 1 + iii: Need better balance 1 i i i CINCWAR CINCSOLIC CINCPEACE CINCHOME Strategic NBC Small Wars State/USIA Intelligence Big War(s) Constabulary Peace Corps Border Patrol Reserve Ground Truth Economic Aid Port Security Reserve Environment Electronic Peace Navy Public Health 45% 248 B vs. 550 B 20% 110 B vs 20 B 20% 110 B vs. 20 B 15% 82 B vs. 36 B

Modern Presidential Leadership Congress President Judiciary Chief of Staff Director-General for National Policy Director-General for Global Strategy Director-General for National Intelligence Director-General for National Research Director of Classified Intelligence (DCI) Chairman, National Intelligence Council Director, Global Knowledge Foundation

Modern Strategic Governance Director General Global Strategy Deputy Director Global Strategy Associate Directors • Strategic Council • Leadership Retreats • Global Reserve • Special Projects Deputy Director Response Management Associate Directors • Response Center • Public Liaison • Civilian Reserve • Non-State Actors

GO NAVY

450 -Ship Navy • 6 Slides -- Global, local, OOTW -- Navy Message: Must be able to put force on target within 24, 48 hours; must do sustained littoral ops in multiple languages; and instream Humanitarian Assistance.

Global Reach, Local Service • Must be able to put air -ground team anywhere – 24 hrs: Platoon/Cobra – 48 hrs: Company/Harrier – 72 hrs: BLT “Swarm” – 7 days: MAGTF (-) • Increase Littoral capabilities to 31% • Create Humanitarian Assistance Fleet

Big Decks • Fence subs at 15 ballistic & 50 attack • Fence carriers at 12 but dedicate four to littoral/VSTOL ops • Restore 2 battleships for low-cost naval gunfire support and big stick diplomacy

Heavy Duty Platforms • Protect cruisers/ destroyers. • Create 25 new Expediters, air-capable SPRUANCEs. • Increase WHIDBEY ISLAND class LHDs • Create 25 three-ship squadrons of brown water fire, air, troop interdiction platforms

Mine Warfare & Port Security • Distribute helo-borne antimine capabilities throughout the fleet • Devise comprehensive new port security concepts with USCG • Consider Port of Houston as a CIO-Intel testbed for global information aspects.

Humanitarian Fleet • 16 roll-on, roll-off bulk carriers with integrated engineering, police, and hospital spaces--half ready to do instream ops only • Protect two large hospital ships, create five small hospital ships

Global Reach, Local Service Blue Water Carrier Brown Water Carrier Big Amphibs Small Amphibs Patrol Squadron Humanitarian Fleet

References • www. oss. net/BASIC – Has the article on the 450 -ship Navy (EE 21) – Has MCIA model for expeditionary analysis – Has 67+2 country summaries of WF factors • www. oss. net/LIBRARY – Over 600 speakers, 15 years, 30, 000 pages • www. oss. net – Watch the portal pages, updated daily – Use the Public Daily Brief, check the weekly summaries of 30 factors, bookmark the threat, policy, and challenger forecasts and cummulative weeky summaries for each factor.

WWW. OSS. NET bear@oss. net 703. 266. 6393 Will speak for sushi. Tell others.