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OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE: EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW Robert David Steele President, OSS Inc. <bear@oss. net> 1 OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE: EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW Robert David Steele President, OSS Inc. 1

PRESENTATION PLAN I n t r o Overview of Open Sources, Software, and Services PRESENTATION PLAN I n t r o Overview of Open Sources, Software, and Services I n t Src SW Svcs Over view C M A n a l y s is C o a l i t i o n O p e r a t i o n s C e l l O v e r v i e w C o n c l u s i o n s 2

DEFINITIONS • DATA: raw report, image or broadcast • INFORMATION: collated data of generic DEFINITIONS • DATA: raw report, image or broadcast • INFORMATION: collated data of generic interest and usually widely disseminated • INTELLIGENCE: concisely tailored answer reflecting a deliberate process of discovery, discrimination, distillation, and delivery of data precisely suited to need 3

TIMELINE NEXT SEVEN YEARS: A Very Hard Road LAST SEVEN YEARS: OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS TIMELINE NEXT SEVEN YEARS: A Very Hard Road LAST SEVEN YEARS: OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Inc. (4000 trained) Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (6000 members) Community Open Source Program Office (USA) Eighteen governments doing one thing or another WWII AND COLD WAR: Special Librarians Association (14, 000 members) External Research & Analysis Funds Lloyd’s and Jane’s BBC & FBIS Churchill adept at correspondence LONG AGO: “Legal travelers” 4

OSINT AND THE IC “The Intelligence Community has to get used to the fact OSINT AND THE IC “The Intelligence Community has to get used to the fact that it no longer controls most of the information. ” The Honorable Richard Kerr Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (USA) 5

OSINT DEFINED • From Open World – Open sources – Open software – Open OSINT DEFINED • From Open World – Open sources – Open software – Open services • From Closed World – – – Requirements analysis Collection Management Source Validation Source Fusion Compelling Presentation 6

WHAT OSINT IS NOT I “…nothing more than a collection of news clippings”. “…the WHAT OSINT IS NOT I “…nothing more than a collection of news clippings”. “…the Internet. ” “…a substitute for spies and satellites. ” 7

WHAT’S MISSING? SIGINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters IMINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters HUMINT: ALL-SOURCE WHAT’S MISSING? SIGINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters IMINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters HUMINT: ALL-SOURCE ANALYST Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters MASINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters OSINT: ? ? ? 8

THE ALL-SOURCE SOLUTION Broadcast Monitoring Subject-Matter Experts Commercial Geospacial OSINT HUMINT SIGINT IMINT MASINT THE ALL-SOURCE SOLUTION Broadcast Monitoring Subject-Matter Experts Commercial Geospacial OSINT HUMINT SIGINT IMINT MASINT Classified Collection Targeting Support 9 All-Source Analysis Answers

NEW INTELLIGENCE GAP I N F O R M A T I O N NEW INTELLIGENCE GAP I N F O R M A T I O N Available Information Actionable Intelligence GAP BETWEEN WHAT YOU CAN KNOW AND WHAT YOU CAN USE TIME 10

INFORMATION ARCHIPELAGO Business Information Brokers & Private Investigators Intelligence Mass & Niche Media Schools INFORMATION ARCHIPELAGO Business Information Brokers & Private Investigators Intelligence Mass & Niche Media Schools & Universities Defense Government 11

MORE COMPLEX THREAT PHYSICAL STEALTH, HIGH TECH PRECISION (MIC / HIC) ECONOMIC WAR HIGH MORE COMPLEX THREAT PHYSICAL STEALTH, HIGH TECH PRECISION (MIC / HIC) ECONOMIC WAR HIGH TECH CYBER STEALTH, DATABASE TARGETING MONEY--RUTHLESSNESS POWER BASE KNOWLEDGE--IDEOLOGY SEERS (C 3 I WAR) NATURAL LOW TECH STEALTH, BRUTES TARGETING GUERRILLA WAR RANDOM (LIC) TARGETING TERRORISM LOW TECH SEERS CULTURAL WAR IDEO - (JIHAD) STEALTH, MASS TARGETING 12

FAILING OVERALL A-/B+ SIQ OBVIOUS MILITARY WE DO WELL ENOUGH CRIME AND TERROR WE FAILING OVERALL A-/B+ SIQ OBVIOUS MILITARY WE DO WELL ENOUGH CRIME AND TERROR WE DO BADLY C-/D+ CIVILIAN CYBERSPACE WE HAVE DECADES TO GO IDEOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT WE DON’T DO AT ALL D-/F+ 13

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS STRATEGIC Integrated Application Military Sustainability Geographic Location Civil Allies OPERATIONAL Selection LEVELS OF ANALYSIS STRATEGIC Integrated Application Military Sustainability Geographic Location Civil Allies OPERATIONAL Selection of Time and Place Military Availability Geographic Resources TACTICAL Application of Finite Resources Military Reliability Geographic Terrain TECHNICAL Isolated Capabilities Civil Stability Civil Psychology Military Lethality Geographic Atmosphere Civil Infrastructure Over time and space Channels & Borders Of strategic value Quantities & Distribution Internally available for use Volatility of sectors Training & Maintenance Mobility implications Cohesion & Effectiveness Military Systems One by One Climate Manipulation Civil Power, Transport, Communications, 14 & Finance

FAILING IN DETAIL Military Sustainability Geographic Location F- STRATEGIC: What to Build D- OPERATIONAL: FAILING IN DETAIL Military Sustainability Geographic Location F- STRATEGIC: What to Build D- OPERATIONAL: When to Fight Military Availability Geographic Resources C- TACTICAL: What to Use Military Reliability Geographic Terrain B- TECHNICAL: How to Use It Civil Allies Civil Stability Civil Psychology Military Lethality Geographic Atmosphere Civil Infrastructure 15

MIXED REPORTS • Allen Dulles (DCI): 80% • Gordon Oehler (D/NPC): 80% • Ward MIXED REPORTS • Allen Dulles (DCI): 80% • Gordon Oehler (D/NPC): 80% • Ward Elcock (DG/CSIS): 80% • Joe Markowitz (D/COSPO): 40% 16

COSTS OF SECRECY • CLIENT ACCESS: too much, too late, too secret--doesn’t get due COSTS OF SECRECY • CLIENT ACCESS: too much, too late, too secret--doesn’t get due attention • TRANSACTION COSTS: 10 -100 X OSINT • OPPORTUNITY COSTS: classification of system deficiencies gives original contractors a lifetime system monopoly • FUNCTIONAL COSTS: noninteroperability, operational disconnects 17

PURPOSES OF SECRECY “Everybody who’s a real practitioner, and I’m sure you’re not all PURPOSES OF SECRECY “Everybody who’s a real practitioner, and I’m sure you’re not all naïve in this regard, realizes that there are two uses to which security classification is put: the legitimate desire to protect secrets, and protection of bureaucratic turf. As a practitioner of the real world, it’s about 90 bureaucratic turf; 10 legitimate secrets as far as I’m concerned. ” Rodney B. Mc. Daniel Executive Secretary, National Security Council Senior Director, (White House) Crisis Management Center 18

VALUATION METRICS I • TIMING: Is it “good enough” NOW • CONTEXT: Is it VALUATION METRICS I • TIMING: Is it “good enough” NOW • CONTEXT: Is it “good enough” over-all, that is, does it provide a robust contextual understanding or is it a “tid-bit” in isolation? • CONTENT: Is it “good enough” to improve the decision at hand? Can I share it? 19

VALUATION METRICS II • RETURN ON EXPOSURE: Does this information, openly available, attract other VALUATION METRICS II • RETURN ON EXPOSURE: Does this information, openly available, attract other information that is equally useful? (10 X) • INCLUSIVENESS: Does this information, openly available, reach those who have a “need to know” that would not otherwise have been included in distribution? (20%) 20

OSINT AND REALITY I “If it is 85% accurate, on time, and I can OSINT AND REALITY I “If it is 85% accurate, on time, and I can share it, this is a lot more useful to me than a compendium of Top Secret Codeword material that is too much, too late, and needs a safe and three security officers to move it around the battlefield. ” U. S. Navy Wing Commander Leader of First Flight Over Baghdad Speaking at TIG-92, Naval War College 21

OSINT AND REALITY II • Post-Cold War political-military issues tend to arise in lower OSINT AND REALITY II • Post-Cold War political-military issues tend to arise in lower Tier (per PDD-35) nations where U. S. classified capabilities are least applicable or largely unavailable. • Warning of these largely Third World crises has not required classified collection. • Approach and resolution has required increased reliance on international organizations and non-traditional coalition partners with whom information must be shared and who are not “cleared” for sensitive sources & methods. 22

THE BURUNDI EXERCISE • COMMISSION ON INTELLIGENCE (USA) • ONE MAN, ONE ROLODEX, ONE THE BURUNDI EXERCISE • COMMISSION ON INTELLIGENCE (USA) • ONE MAN, ONE ROLODEX, ONE DAY – Flag/CEO POL-MIL Briefs (Oxford Analytica) – Journalists on the Ground (LEXIS-NEXIS) – World-class academics (Inst. Sci. Info. ) – 1: 100, 000 combat charts (Soviets via Eastview) – Tribal OOB and historical summary (Jane’s) – 1: 50, 000 combat imagery (SPOT Image) 23

OPEN SOURCE MARKETPLACE SOURCES SOFTWARE SERVICES Current Awareness Internet Tools Online Search & Retrieval OPEN SOURCE MARKETPLACE SOURCES SOFTWARE SERVICES Current Awareness Internet Tools Online Search & Retrieval Individual Inc. ) (e. g. Net. Owl, Copernicus) (e. g. NERAC, Burwell Enterprises) Current Contents Data Entry Tools Media Monitoring ISI CC Online) (e. g. Vista, BBN, SRA) (e. g. FBIS via NTIS, BBC) Directories of Experts Data Retrieval Tools Document Retrieval (e. g. Gale Research, TELTECH) (e. g. Retrieval. Ware, Calspan) (e. g. ISI Genuine Document) Conference Proceedings Automated Abstracting Human Abstracting British Library, CISTI) (e. g. Net. Owl, DR-LINK) (e. g. NFAIS Members) Commercial Online Sources Automated Translation Telephone Surveys (e. g. LN, DIALOG, STN, ORBIT) (e. g. SYSTRAN, SRA NTIS-JV) (e. g. Risa Sacks Associates) Risk Assessment Reports Data Mining & Visualization Private Investigations (e. g. Forecast, Political Risk) (e. g. i 2, MEMEX, Visible Decisions) (e. g. Cognos, Pinkertons, Parvus) Maps & Charts Market Research (e. g. East View Publications) Desktop Publishing & Communications Tools Commercial Imagery Electronic Security Tools Strategic Forecasting SPOT, Radarsat, Autometric) (e. g. SSI, PGP, IBM Cryptolopes) (e. g. SIS, Fuld, Kirk Tyson) (e. g. Oxford Analytica) 24

CURRENT AWARENESS BASICS • • • DOW JONES INTERACTIVE (Media, BBC) DIALOG (Periodicals, Books, CURRENT AWARENESS BASICS • • • DOW JONES INTERACTIVE (Media, BBC) DIALOG (Periodicals, Books, Conferences) BRITISH LIBRARY (Conference Papers) World News Connection (FBIS) COPERNICUS (Internet Profiles) LEXIS-NEXIS (Legal/Criminal/Personality) 25

GEOSPACIAL SHORTFALLS AFRICA ASIA & PACIFIC EUROPE & MED WESTERN HEMISPHERE Algeria Bangladesh Greece GEOSPACIAL SHORTFALLS AFRICA ASIA & PACIFIC EUROPE & MED WESTERN HEMISPHERE Algeria Bangladesh Greece Argentina Angola China Turkey Bolivia Djibouti Indonesia Brazil Ethiopia Kazakhstan Colombia Ghana Kyrgystan Ecuador Kenya Malaysia Grenada Liberia Myanmar Jamaica Madagascar New Caledonia Mexico Mozambique Papua New Guinea Paraguay Namibia Russia Peru South Africa Sri Lanka Suriname Sudan Viet-Nam Uraguay Uganda 4 Key Island Groups Venezuela For each of the above countries, less than 25% available in 1: 50, 000 form, generally old data. 26

MAPS & CHARTS Formerly classified Soviet maps Some 1: 50, global 1: 100 coverage MAPS & CHARTS Formerly classified Soviet maps Some 1: 50, global 1: 100 coverage Contour lines you can hide in…. Digital and printed, very low cost Topographic, Geological, Nautical Gazetteers, Indexes, Translations They got the cable car right…. < www. cartographic. com > 27

COMMERCIAL IMAGERY 10 meter imagery is 1: 50, 000 level and can provide contour COMMERCIAL IMAGERY 10 meter imagery is 1: 50, 000 level and can provide contour lines. Synoptic coverage and two-day revisit available globally on 24 hours notice. Meets critical needs for creating maps, precision targeting, and mission rehearsal. 28

SOFTWARE FUNCTIONALITIES • • Monitor, alert Search, browse, gist Cluster, weight, summarize Translate Index, SOFTWARE FUNCTIONALITIES • • Monitor, alert Search, browse, gist Cluster, weight, summarize Translate Index, extract, stuff Query, view, structure Visualize, catalogue Facilitate, inspire 29

DATA VISUALIZATION Analysts Notebook -- Link Analysis -- <www. i 2 inc. com> 30 DATA VISUALIZATION Analysts Notebook -- Link Analysis -- 30

DATA EXPLOITATION SEARCHING True Total Content Access <www. memex. com> Flexible Retrieval Dynamic Updating DATA EXPLOITATION SEARCHING True Total Content Access Flexible Retrieval Dynamic Updating Significantly Reduced Storage In-Built Security RETRIEVAL: Boolean Synonym Sound-Ex Garbled Searching EXPLOITATION : Ranking Clustering Feedback Analysis 31

DATA-ORIENTED SERVICES • Online Searchers – Source-centric/each system unique – Subject-matter competence/learning curve – DATA-ORIENTED SERVICES • Online Searchers – Source-centric/each system unique – Subject-matter competence/learning curve – Foreign language competence/full access • Document Retrieval – Copyright Compliance – Digitization 32

HUMAN-ORIENTED SERVICES • Human Collection Specialists – Telephone Surveys – Private Investigations – Market HUMAN-ORIENTED SERVICES • Human Collection Specialists – Telephone Surveys – Private Investigations – Market Research • Human Processing Specialists – Commercial Imagery, Maps, Visualization – Data Warehouses, Multi-Source Processing • Human Citation Analysis: World Mind Map 33

INFORMATION BROKERS Highly recommended “Local knowledge” Indexed by location, subject-matter, and foreign language skill INFORMATION BROKERS Highly recommended “Local knowledge” Indexed by location, subject-matter, and foreign language skill www. burwellinc. com 34

GEOSPACIAL VISUALIZATION 1 M 10 M 2 M 30 M 5 M 1 M GEOSPACIAL VISUALIZATION 1 M 10 M 2 M 30 M 5 M 1 M 2 M 5 M 10 M Ikonos KVR-1000 IRS-1 C/D in 3 D SPOT Image 8 -100 M 30 M RADARSAT LANDSAT 35

CITATION ANALYSIS KOBAYASHI Y 87 MASTRAGO A 63 TILAK BV 92 36 CITATION ANALYSIS KOBAYASHI Y 87 MASTRAGO A 63 TILAK BV 92 36

OSINT ISSUE AREAS • Operational Security – Understand requirement in all-source context – Conceal/protect OSINT ISSUE AREAS • Operational Security – Understand requirement in all-source context – Conceal/protect client identity and interest • Copyright Compliance – Get used to it • Foreign Language Coverage • Source Validation – OSINT assures authority, currency, confidence 37

OSINT RULES OF THE GAME • 80% of what you need is not online OSINT RULES OF THE GAME • 80% of what you need is not online – 50% of that has not been published at all • 60% of what you need is not in English • 90% of the maps you need do not exist – but commercial imagery can address overnight • 80% of the information is in private sector – must leverage distributed private knowledge 38

INTERNET REALITY I (BAD) • COSPO (USA) Survey: roughly 1% of Internet is real INTERNET REALITY I (BAD) • COSPO (USA) Survey: roughly 1% of Internet is real content, roughly 50 great sites, 500 good sites-the rest is pornography and opinion • Internet is a cream puff in comparison to the kind of rich content/value added represented by commercial online services with editors/filters • MCIA/Other Experience: Internet devours analysts --they get lost or they get addicted, either way their productivity is cut in half 39

INTERNET REALITY II (GOOD) • Internet is exquisite as a collaborative work environment, and INTERNET REALITY II (GOOD) • Internet is exquisite as a collaborative work environment, and for information sharing • Internet has its uses (see OSINT HANDBOOK) – – – Indications & Warning (Tiananmen, Coup vs Gorby) Cultural Context (Bosnia, Islam, Indians in Mexico) Basic Research (card catalogues, lists, web sites) Science & Technology Collection (surprisingly good) Spotting & Assessment (trolling for potential agents) • Internet will explode over time--early days yet 40

OSINT IS A PROCESS • DISCOVERY--Know Who Knows – Just enough from just the OSINT IS A PROCESS • DISCOVERY--Know Who Knows – Just enough from just the right mix of sources • DISCRIMINATION--Know What’s What – Rapid source evaluation and data validation • DISTILLATION--Know What’s Hot – Answer the right question, in the right way • DELIVERY--Know Who’s Who – It’s not delivered until right person understands 41

INTEGRATED OSINT CONCEPT Internet Stream Q A Commercial Online Feeds Commercial Maps & Images INTEGRATED OSINT CONCEPT Internet Stream Q A Commercial Online Feeds Commercial Maps & Images DIRECT ACCESS: OSS-SRA TOOLKIT WITH TAILORED SOURCE ACCESS MEDIATED ACCESS: OSS EXPERTS WITH PROPRIETARY SOURCE METADATABASE CLIENT Offline Stream (“Gray Literature”) Human Experts “On Demand” PROCESSING TOOLKIT PLUS OSS EXPERT ANALYSTS PRODUCTION TOOLKIT PLUS OSS EXPERT ANALYSTS FEEDBACK LOOP OSS INTEGRATED ONE-STOP SHOPPING PROCESS Call Center -- Multi-Level Security -- Umbrella for Unified Billing 42

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT I • TIP-OFF – Wires, Jane’s help more than they know • COLLECTION MANAGEMENT I • TIP-OFF – Wires, Jane’s help more than they know • TARGETING/CONSERVATION – Narrow the field for clandestine/covert assets • CONTEXT/VALIDATION – Ideal for double-checking human assets/story • COVER – Protects classified sources & methods 43

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT II “Do not send a spy where a schoolboy can go. ” COLLECTION MANAGEMENT II “Do not send a spy where a schoolboy can go. ” “The problem with spies is they only know secrets. ” ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS IMINT HUMINT SIGINT MASINT OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION 44

CM III/ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS I OLD “LINEAR” PARADIGM NEW “DIAMOND” PARADIGM Customer Analyst Collector Source CM III/ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS I OLD “LINEAR” PARADIGM NEW “DIAMOND” PARADIGM Customer Analyst Collector Source ACME OF SKILL IN 21 ST CENTURY: Putting Customer with a Question in Touch with Source Able to Create New Tailored Knowledge in Real Time 45

ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS II • All-Source Analyst’s Role Must Change – Manage Network of Overt ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS II • All-Source Analyst’s Role Must Change – Manage Network of Overt Sources – Manage Resources to Fund Overt Sources – Manage Classified Collection in Context – Manage Client’s Incoming Open Sources – Manage Client’s Needs for Open Intelligence • Myopic Introverts Need Not Apply…. 46

ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS III STRATEGIC Integrated Application Military Sustainability Geographic Location Civil Allies OPERATIONAL Selection ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS III STRATEGIC Integrated Application Military Sustainability Geographic Location Civil Allies OPERATIONAL Selection of Time and Place Military Availability Geographic Resources TACTICAL Application of Finite Resources Military Reliability Geographic Terrain TECHNICAL Isolated Capabilities Civil Stability Civil Psychology Military Lethality Geographic Atmosphere Civil Infrastructure Over time and space Channels & Borders Of strategic value Quantities & Distribution Internally available for use Volatility of sectors Training & Maintenance Mobility implications Cohesion & Effectiveness Military Systems One by One Climate Manipulation Civil Power, Transport, Communications, 47 & Finance

THREAT ANALYSIS • LIBYAN TANK EXAMPLE (1992) – Technical Level (Lethality): VERY HIGH – THREAT ANALYSIS • LIBYAN TANK EXAMPLE (1992) – Technical Level (Lethality): VERY HIGH – Tactical Level (Reliability): LOW – Operational Level (Availability): MEDIUM – Strategic Level (Sustainability): LOW • We can no longer afford worst-case systems acquisition (and such systems are largely useless against 3 of 4 modern day threats) 48

STRATEGIC GENERALIZATIONS • • Port utility Cross-country mobility Bridge loading limitations Intervisibility Aviation temperature STRATEGIC GENERALIZATIONS • • Port utility Cross-country mobility Bridge loading limitations Intervisibility Aviation temperature averages Naval gunfire challenges Language requirements Half Zip 30 T <900 M HOT 5” dies Heavy 49

COALITION OPERATIONS I “… the concept of UN intelligence promises to turn traditional principles COALITION OPERATIONS I “… the concept of UN intelligence promises to turn traditional principles on their heads. Intelligence will have to be based on information that is collected primarily by overt means, that is by methods that do not threaten the target state or group and do not compromise the integrity or impartiality of the UN. ” Hugh Smith as cited by Sir David Ramsbotham 50

COALITION OPERATIONS II • Assure minimal common appreciation of situation including terrain and civil COALITION OPERATIONS II • Assure minimal common appreciation of situation including terrain and civil factors • Enable information-sharing at unclassified level across national and civil-military lines • Significantly enhance information integration within own forces • Protect sensitive sources & methods 51

COALITION OPERATIONS III JOINT OSINT CELL 52 COALITION OPERATIONS III JOINT OSINT CELL 52

COALITION OPERATIONS IV OSINT “NET” G-2 PROVOST MARSHAL COMBAT ENGINEERS G-3 PSYOP CINC CIVIL COALITION OPERATIONS IV OSINT “NET” G-2 PROVOST MARSHAL COMBAT ENGINEERS G-3 PSYOP CINC CIVIL AFFAIRS PAO POLAD 53

OSINT CELL I • Functions should include – Current awareness briefs/tip-off “bundles” – Rapid OSINT CELL I • Functions should include – Current awareness briefs/tip-off “bundles” – Rapid response reference desk – Primary research – Strategic forecasting • OSINT is a starting point for both the intelligence producer and the consumer 54

OSINT CELL II Click for full text MEXICAN INSURGENCY Wednesday, 3 September 1997 Mass OSINT CELL II Click for full text MEXICAN INSURGENCY Wednesday, 3 September 1997 Mass Media Stories (Commercial Online Services, Edited Content) 01 02 03 Rough translation optional 02 03 Abstract may be online; copy can be ordered via email. CHIAPAS INSURGENCY CONTINUES Associated Press 1500 Words, “The Chiapas Insurgency continues to escalate, with 13 Mexican soldiers CHIAPAS LEADERSHIP VISITS GENEVA Los Angeles Times 1631 Words, “The leaders of the Chiapas insurgencies YUKATAN KIDNAPPING OF U. S. BUSINESSMAN El Tiempo, 764 Words, “Ayer en el sur de Mejico, un empresario Norte Americano fue sequestrado por Journals (Peer Reviewed Journals, Mostly Off-Line) 01 02 03 Click for full list in section EXPAND MOST RELEVANT NEW ARTICLE “A Comparative Approach To Latin American Revolutions” (Wickham-Crowley, INT J COMP, July 19 MOST HEAVILY CITED RECENT ARTICLE “Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Chiapas, Mexico” (Howard, Philip and MOST RELEVANT NEW FOREIGN LANGUAGE ARTICLE “Tierra, Pobreza, y Los Indios: La Situacion Revolucionaria en Mejico” (Gonzalez, Juan Fernando, Internet (Caution: Content Not Subject To Editorial Review) 01 EXPAND NEW SITE MATCHING PROFILE, EZLN INCREASED ACTIVITY, OVER 1000 HITS YESTERDAY New Major Document, “Chiapas—El Pueblo Adelante!” (14 pages) Documents can be provided; sites are pointers for client to access. EXPAND Number of lines per entry can be changed 55

OSINT CELL III REQUIREMENTS OFFICER/ COLLECTION MANAGER INTERNET SPECIALIST PRIMARY RESEARCH SPECIALIST COMMERCIAL ONLINE OSINT CELL III REQUIREMENTS OFFICER/ COLLECTION MANAGER INTERNET SPECIALIST PRIMARY RESEARCH SPECIALIST COMMERCIAL ONLINE SPECIALIST EXTERNAL SERVICES SPECIALIST EDITOR/ANALYST PRESENTATION MANAGER 56

OSINT CELL IV • Must be national in approach – Centralized coordination – Decentralized OSINT CELL IV • Must be national in approach – Centralized coordination – Decentralized processing • Problems will persist – Security, funding, cultural barriers – Training & education vacuum – Concepts & doctrine vacuum – Foreign language inadequacies 57

OSINT BUDGET (GENERIC) Bottom line: 1% of OPS or 5% of INTEL budget Recommended OSINT BUDGET (GENERIC) Bottom line: 1% of OPS or 5% of INTEL budget Recommended national defense OSINT allocations (%): Commercial Imagery Acquisition. 166/Yr JOINT VISION Ground Stations. 033/Yr UN/NATO/Regional OSINT Architecture. 066/Yr Joint, Service, and Command OSINT Cells. 100/Yr Defense OSINT Training Program. 016/Yr Defense Internet Seeding Program. 016/Yr OSINT Analysts at Embassies with Funds. 033/Yr OSINT Direct Support Program. 550/Yr Contingency/Crisis OSINT Surge Program. 016/Yr 58

OSINT BUDGET (USA) Bottom line: 1% of OPS or 5% of INTEL budget Recommended OSINT BUDGET (USA) Bottom line: 1% of OPS or 5% of INTEL budget Recommended national defense OSINT allocations (USA)*: Commercial Imagery Acquisition 250 M/Yr JOINT VISION Ground Stations ([email protected]$5 M) 50 M/Yr UN/NATO/Regional OSINT Architecture 100 M/Yr Joint, Service, and Command OSINT Cells ([email protected]$10 M) 150 M/Yr Defense OSINT Training Program 25 M/Yr Defense Internet Seeding Program 25 M/Yr OSINT Analysts at Embassies with Funds ([email protected]$500 K) 50 M/Yr OSINT Direct Support Program 825 M/Yr Contingency/Crisis OSINT Surge Program 25 M/Yr * Supports 50, 000 SI/TK analysts and 250, 000 action officers 59

CONCLUSION • MILITARY CAN’T DO IT ALONE – Need Resources from Business, Academia – CONCLUSION • MILITARY CAN’T DO IT ALONE – Need Resources from Business, Academia – Need to Integrate Needs of Policy, Police • MILITARY CAN TAKE THE LEAD – Has the Discipline and Command Structure – Has the Budget Flexibility – Has Best Trans-National Relationships 60

IO BIG PICTURE All-Source Intelligence (Spies, Satellites, and Secrets) OSINT as Input Information Warfare IO BIG PICTURE All-Source Intelligence (Spies, Satellites, and Secrets) OSINT as Input Information Warfare INFORMATION OPERATIONS OSINT as Output Information Peacekeeping “Don’t send a bullet where a byte will do…. ” 61

VIRTUAL GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Community Government Knowledge National Distributed Knowledge Global Distributed Knowledge 1 VIRTUAL GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Community Government Knowledge National Distributed Knowledge Global Distributed Knowledge 1 B 100 B 1 TRILLION 62

STRIKING A NEW BALANCE TECHNICAL $$ LIFERS HUMINT $$ MID-CAREER HIRES TS SECRET OSINT STRIKING A NEW BALANCE TECHNICAL $$ LIFERS HUMINT $$ MID-CAREER HIRES TS SECRET OSINT $$ 1 -179 DAY/YR TEMPORARY EXPERTS IC MANNING IC DOLLARS UNCLASSIFIED IC PRODUCTION 63

Four Threats, Four Defense Forms SOLIC/LEA UNCONVENTIONAL LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND GANG WARFARE HIC/MRC Four Threats, Four Defense Forms SOLIC/LEA UNCONVENTIONAL LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND GANG WARFARE HIC/MRC STRATEGIC NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL MILITARY WAR INFOWAR/ ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IW/ECON INFORMATION WAR/ CRIME & ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE PROLIFERATION/ MIGRATION JIHAD/ GREENPEACE TERRORISM/ GLOBAL CRIME MINDWAR RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES 64

INFORMATION STRATEGY • Military must work with rest of Nation • Four elements of INFORMATION STRATEGY • Military must work with rest of Nation • Four elements of information strategy: 1) 2) 3) 4) Connectivity Content access & validation nodes Coordination of standards & investments C 4 security across the board • OSINT, at root, is about creating a “smart nation” within which “smart organizations” can thrive and be effective at their mission--OSINT is the enabling net. • OSINT impacts national security and competitiveness. 65

OSINT BUILDING BLOCKS Policy Intelligence Law Enforcement Intelligence Coalition Intelligence Military Intelligence Business Intelligence/OSINT OSINT BUILDING BLOCKS Policy Intelligence Law Enforcement Intelligence Coalition Intelligence Military Intelligence Business Intelligence/OSINT Mass & Niche Media Intelligence Citizen Intelligence--Intelligence “Minuteman” Basic, Advanced, & Corporate Education Robert Steele, OSS NOTICES 31 May 1995, with Alvin Toffler; the concept of “Intelligence Minuteman” was developed by Alessandro Politi at OSS ‘ 92, and independently put forth and enhanced by Anthony Fedanzo in OSS READER. 66

NEW GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE National Economic Council Transnational and Domestic Law Enforcement Operations Civilian NEW GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE National Economic Council Transnational and Domestic Law Enforcement Operations Civilian Leaders Conventional Military (High. Tech) Information Driven Government Operations Diplomatic and Other Information Peacekeeping National Electronic Security & Operations Counterintelligence Program Special Operations (Low-Tech) Information Warfare Corps 67

REFERENCES I “Open Source Intelligence: Private Sector Capabilities to Support Do. D Policy, Acquisitions, REFERENCES I “Open Source Intelligence: Private Sector Capabilities to Support Do. D Policy, Acquisitions, and Operations" (Defense Daily Network, 4 March 1998) at Open Source Intelligence: HANDBOOK (Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, October 1996) at Open Source Intelligence: READER (OSS Inc. , 1997) at Concept Paper: Creating a Bare Bones Capability for Open Source Support to Defense Intelligence Analysts (OSS Inc. , 18 August 1997) at “Open Source Intelligence: An Examination of Its Exploitation in the Defense Intelligence Community” (Major Robert M. Simmons, Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1995) 68

REFERENCES II “Virtual Intelligence: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Avoidance Through Information Peacekeeping”, Proceedings of REFERENCES II “Virtual Intelligence: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Avoidance Through Information Peacekeeping”, Proceedings of the Virtual Diplomacy Conference of 1 -2 April 1997 in Washington, D. C. (U. S. Institute of Peace) at Intelligence and Counterintelligence: Proposed Program for the 21 st Century (OSS Inc. , 14 April 1997 at ) “Information Peacekeeping: The Purest Form of War” in CYBERWAR: Myths, Mysteries, and Realities (AFCEA, 1998) at Other references including self-study OSINT lessons at . 69

OSINT TRAINING Pac. Info ‘ 98 OSINT and Complex Peacekeeping Ops 7 -9 December OSINT TRAINING Pac. Info ‘ 98 OSINT and Complex Peacekeeping Ops 7 -9 December 1998, Monterey, California Euro. Intel ‘ 99 OSINT and Terrorism, Crime, & Proliferation 9 -11 March 1999, The Hague, The Netherlands OSS ‘ 99 OSINT Sources & Methods -26 May 1999, Washington, D. C. 24 70

A LITTLE FUN Baaaa* *Sheep Lie…the official motto (and button) of CIA Mid-Career Course A LITTLE FUN Baaaa* *Sheep Lie…the official motto (and button) of CIA Mid-Career Course 101 71