Oh I almost 800 mm It s about forgot

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Oh, I almost 800 mm It’s about forgot, Here’s one with Let’s about– the It’s start this itlong USof an to ispacks a 300 mm a by 150 size W 80 -1 a modern thermonuclear diameter and 170 kiloton nuclear weapon office trash weighs 130 kg warhead nuclear punch can

Here’s a button, let’s see if it works!

Let’s click through that sequence!

So, basically, There is the trick is to another way to compress a achieve a fissile material critical mass down to its but it requires critical mass a different very quickly fissile material

100 mm 950 mm 110 kg

This baby is the US W 79 with dial -a-yield of 2 to 10 kilotons – wanna see it go nuke ? and it converts with a tritium boost to an enhanced radiation or neutron bomb

So, Iran’s nuclear weapon development relates to its procurement of these IAEA SAFEGUARDED materials

Tritium Only. No No Zirconium Low Depleted This is forplutonium its So what. Enriched let’s. Nothing polonium uranium Iran for Uranium to much Bushehr examine from. Bushehr those claims to the speak fuel IAEA BUTand Tehran the reactor of have areas where found several fabrication fuel BUT the reactor capacity the IAEA and. IAEA milligrams plans found traces development enrichmentof of for plutonium nitrate Only LEU Iran polonium in 1993 are in BUT the IAEA from extraction dispute during found activities several particles of 1988 and 1992 HEU in cascades in 2003 – this led to the current IAEA -IRAN crisis.

Iran claims its If so, that’s a lot enrichment of trouble and programme is mining expense from solely for to fuel innuclear the civil the reactor at Bushehr reactor

From the cooling capacity you can backtrack to the size of the enrichment cascades which, here, is about 30, 000 centrifuge units

So, if the This is what IAEA caused the cannot IAEA-Iran access the spat in 2003 Natanz when the plant it IAEA found looks at the >36% HEU The IAEA’s radioactive particles at concern is that Kalaye HEU can bewaste for diverted at traces of Natanz HEU

Now we can fill in DU IRAN’s HEU say by 2007 and capacity 100 kg/y - 2009 small scale

Now let’s look at Iran’s progress with materials for the compression weapon

RUSSIAN FEDERATION For this route, fissile So. Iran IAEA has thisbe the could require the plutonium do to by reprocessing the natural Bushehr from uranium extracted fuel to be fuel fromby and supplied Bushehr uranium U-238 irradiated RETURNED to Russia in a reactor

So, to overcome this, The ARAK Heavy Water To builds a new, this separate Iranplant was startedhigh the plutonium A plant to capacity research to year, it produces ~10 from tonnes thereby year provide the reactor, fuel per 15 the HW a the RD-40 Heavy Water reactor and small bypassing Bushehr requires an initial 60 -80 reprocessing for the tonnes – so 4 to 5 years plant reactor before it is commissioned

say by 2007 Now can we fill in IRAN’s plutonium capacity 10 kg/y - 2010 100 kg/y - 2009 small scale

say by 2007 The RD-40 will reactor also provide a Polonium 210 generator 10 kg/y - 2010 100 kg/y - 2009 small scale

say by 2007 10 kg/y - 2010 And the water heavy moderator is a rich source of tritium now TRCR by 2010 100 kg/y - 2009 small scale

Let’s compare the Bushehr and Tehran Iran, North are reactors Korea and Israel nuclear safeguarded under Iran’s programmes IAEA is dual-role and complex

Economy Model No Frills One Track Military

One Track Military Sophisticated Thermonuclear

Iran has experimented with and is now building the technology – so when will it break out?

WAIT TEHRAN TAKE FOR ARAK TROUBLE AT RD-40 REACTOR OUT NATANZ OF SAFEGUARDS TO WITH OR WAIT FOR COMMISSION MULTIPLE RD-40 AT ARAK CASCADES MUCH OF THIS MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY IN PLACE AT COULD BE PROCURED AND POLISHED AT ESFAHAN

Whatever, a one it Is. Or is is there IRAN on outcome confused civil is now to be UN a dash for nuclear power Security Council nuclear programme? sanctions against weapons Iran Well, what’s it to be ? Remember what the US and Brits concluded about Iraq’s WMD !

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It may be that the risk is not be directly with Iran’s nuclear weapons programme but, because of UN sanctions, a breakdown of nuclear safety at Bushehr!

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