Nuclear Terrorism Assessment and Prevention and Mitigation Strategies

Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment and Prevention and Mitigation Strategies June 11, 2004 Teaching Nonproliferation Summer Institute University of North Carolina, Asheville Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Scientist-in-Residence Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies Supported by the John D. and Catherine T. Mac. Arthur Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative

Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism Acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon n Crude nuclear weapon or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) n Attack against or sabotage of a nuclear power plant or other nuclear facility n Radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb” n

Assumptions § Unlike Cold War, today the main nuclear threat comes more from non-state actors, i. e. terrorists. § Terrorists could not launch multiple numbers of nuclear weapons at U. S. , but if they had one, we cannot rule out them having many. § Most likely terrorists, if nuclear capable, would only be able to build low-yield device, but cannot rule out acquisition of intact nuclear weapon from a state.

Elementary, My Dear Watson n Motive n Means n Opportunity

Assessing Risk = Probability X Consequence ØLarge uncertainties ØLack of data Alternatively: Risk = Motivations X Intentions X Capabilities X Consequence ØNeed to understand terrorist group motivations, capabilities, and dynamics

Key Security Principles n Understanding and Reducing Risks n Practicing Defense-in-Depth or Multi-layered Security Approach n Leveraging Assets Both Nationally and Internationally n Understanding the Chain of Necessary, but not Sufficient, Conditions to Terrorist Acquisition and Use of Nuclear Assets

How to Become a Nuclear Terrorist? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Highly-Motivated Terrorist Group Desiring Extreme or Unconventional Levels of Violence Technically Skilled or Can Hire Such Skills Acquire Needed Materials Smuggle Materials to Safe Haven Build/Acquire or Hire Other Group to Build or Acquire Deliver Weapon to Target Detonate/Use Weapon at Target

Terrorist Motivations n Why haven’t there been any RDD or crude nuclear weapon terrorist attacks? n Those who study terrorist motivations are “underwhelmed by the probability of such an event [radiological or nuclear terrorism] for most – but not all – terrorist groups. ” – Jerrold Post, IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001 n Psychological and political constraints are great for most groups

Terrorist Motivations (Cont. ) n Post identified two groups that might engage in large scale radiological dispersal: Ø Non-traditional religious extremists (closed cults) Ø Religious fundamentalists* [politico-religious] q Several groups might be motivated to use limited radiological attacks or attempt credible hoaxes: Ø The above two, and Ø Social-revolutionary* Ø Nationalist-separatist* Ø Right-wing *Would not want to alienate their constituencies.

Worst-Case Nuclear Threat: Terrorists with Nuclear Weapons n n n Even a crude nuclear weapon could destroy the heart of a city. 100, 000 or more could die immediately. Devastating political and economic effects. $2 Trillion or more in immediate costs. Global economic depression?

Terrorist-Constructed Nuclear Weapon (Improvised Nuclear Device) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Terrorists must be motivated to conduct extreme violence using nuclear weapons. They must have or hire the technical expertise to build an IND. They must acquire the necessary amounts of fissile material (HEU or plutonium). They must be able to transport the material without being detected and caught. They must deliver the IND to a target.

Ease of Building Guntype IND? “With modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate is so low that terrorists, if they have such materials, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half. Most people seem unaware that if separated HEU is at hand it’s a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion … [and] even a high school kid could make a bomb in short order. ” -- Luis Alvarez, Adventures of a Physicist

Required Skills to Build an IND n n n Schematic drawings – widely available Detailed drawings – not available Large number of man-hours required to prepare Need team skilled in: Ø Physical, chemical, and metallurgical properties Ø Material characteristics affecting fabrication Ø Neutronics and radiation effects Ø High explosives and chemical propellants Ø Hydrodynamics Ø Electrical circuitry Unlikely that an individual would possess all these skills and knowledge even after years of training Need a team. Source: Mark et al. (1986)

Gun-type vs. Implosion-type IND n Gun-type: – Simplest design Ø Cannot use plutonium; must use HEU n Implosion-type: – More sophisticated, but still first generation weapon Ø Can use either plutonium or HEU

Gun-type IND

Implosion-type IND

Major Hurdle: Acquisition of Fissile Material Type Global Inventory (metric tons) Military plutonium (Pu) 250 Civil Pu, unirradiated 205 Civil Pu, irradiated 1, 065 Military HEU 1, 670 Civil HEU Ref: David Albright and Mark Gorwitz, ISIS, 1999 20

HEU First Strategy n Large stockpiles of HEU plus relative ease of construction of gun-type device Need to prioritize securing, consolidating, and eliminating HEU. Eliminate by down-blending into a lowenriched (non-weapons usable) form.

HEU Stocks of Biggest Concern n n n Russia – about 500 metric tons outside of weapons Pakistan – smaller stocks, but turbulent region Research facilities – dozens of sites in some 40 countries; about 20 tons of HEU Naval and maritime use North Korea and Iran? United States?

Accumulation of Pu Some states such as France, Japan, and Russia continue to separate tons of plutonium per year n Even reactor-grade Pu can be used in nuclear bombs n

Acquisition of Intact Nuclear Weapon n Theft n Purchase n Gift? n Coup

Arsenals of Nuclear-Armed Nations Ref: NRDC, “Nuclear Notebook, ” 2002 Nation United States Russia France Britain China Israel India Pakistan North Korea Total Active Weapons 9, 650 8, 380 288 200 400 75 -200 30 -35 24 -48 1 -3? Total Inactive Weapons 2, 700 8, 000 -10, 000 0 0 0

Greatest Risks of Terrorist Acquisition n Russia – ØLarge numbers of forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons n Pakistan – ØPresence of al Qaeda ØUnstable political system ØParts of government (ISI) sympathetic to terrorist causes ØNascent nuclear command & control system

Highest Priority Efforts to Prevent Terrorist Acquisition of Intact Nuclear Weapons n n n Press Russia to bring forward deployed TNWs into central storage – in general the most portable weapons are the most vulnerable. U. S. -Russia need to work toward mutual and transparent nuclear weapons dismantlement Provide security assistance to Pakistan contingent on constraints of NPT

Attacks on or Sabotage of Nuclear Power Plants and Other Nuclear Facilities n Commercial nuclear power plants n Research reactors n Spent fuel storage pools n Reprocessing facilities

Attacks on Nuclear Facilities – Worst consequence n Major consequence of successful attack: release of radioactivity off-site Ø Soviet-designed plants without containments, e. g. , Chernobyl-type plants (RBMKs) Ø 13 are still operating. Ø Also, many reactors in the UK do not use containments.

U. S. Nuclear Power Plants Good News: n All U. S. NPPs have reactor containments. n All employ defense-in-depth safety systems. n NRC responded quickly after 9/11 to enhance security.

U. S. NPPs (Continued) Bad News: n Vulnerability to airplane attack? n Control rooms and most nuclear spent fuel pools are outside containment structures. n External power supplies and water intakes could be vulnerable.

Research Reactors Good News: n Small inventory of radioactivity compared to commercial NPPs. Bad News: n Spent nuclear fuel here could be portable. n Many research reactors located in or near universities. n Many do not use or have weak containments. n Many still use HEU for fuel or have it on-site. Ø Mainly concern foreign research facilities.

Priorities for Protecting Nuclear Facilities n n Ensure that design-basis-threat accounts for 9/11 -type attack and need to factor in beyond -design basis threats. Take quick fix actions to upgrade protections around control rooms and spent fuel pools. Make sure that research facilities also are employing defense-in-depth security measures. Need performance-based, not compliancebased security system.

RDDs: A Rising Concern RDD = Radiological Dispersal Devices such as “dirty bombs” Heightened Concern: Are radioactive materials secure? Attacks of September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda has expressed interest in RDDs Widespread news reporting

Characteristics of RDDs n RDDs are NOT Weapons of Mass Destruction – Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDD n RDDs can be Weapons of Mass Disruption Major effects: n n Panic (psychological and social effects) Economic costs (decontamination and rebuilding)

Components of Radiological Weapons n Radioactive materials: Ø Radioactive sources: Used in medicine, food irradiation, research, industrial gauging, oilprospecting, etc. Ø Spent nuclear fuel Ø Nuclear waste § Means of dispersal: Ø Conventional explosives Ø Fizzle-yield improvised nuclear devices Ø Aerosolized particles Ø Contamination of water supplies

FAS Study: Cesium Bomb 2 curies Cs-137; 10 lb. TNT X Location of my home Inner ring: 1 cancer death/100 people due to remaining radiation Middle ring: 1 cancer death/1, 000 people Outer ring: 1 cancer death/10, 000 people: EPA recommends decontamination or destruction

Goiania, Brazil, 1987 Cesium-137 Dispersal Incident n n n Scavengers broke into abandoned medical facility Stole 1, 375 curie Cs-137 source Cut into pieces and distributed to friends and family Junk dealer caused further dispersal of powdered source Results: Ø Four deaths and one arm amputation Ø Some 200 people contaminated Ø More than 110, 000 monitored (Fear mongering via news media) Ø Massive cleanup that captured most of the materials (about 1, 200 curie)

High-Risk Materials? HIGH RISK LOW RISK

High-Risk Materials (cont’d) n Finding: Only a small fraction of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks But still large number n High-risk sources are: n n Portable n Dispersible n More radioactive

High-Risk Radioactive Source Examples Radiography Sources Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) Mobile Cesium Irradiators

High-Risk Materials (cont’d) Only 7 reactor-produced radioisotopes present high security concern: • Internal Health Hazards (Mainly): n americium-241 n californium-252 n plutonium-238 • Internal and External Health Hazards: n n cesium-137 cobalt-60 iridium-192 strontium-90 (primarily internal hazard)

Radioactive Source Lifecycle Illegitimate Users Radioisotope Production Source Manufacture Recycling/ Manufacturer Disposal Legitimate Users Disused Sources Orphan Sources Govt. Disposal Site Ref: Greg van Tuyle, Los Alamos National Laboratory; CNS Occasional Paper No. 11

Major Areas of Concern 1. “Disused” Sources 2. “Orphaned” Sources 3. Regulatory Controls in FSU and Developing Countries 4. U. S. Export and Domestic Licensing Rules 5. Consequence mitigation and public education

1. “Disused” Sources n Bad News: n n n Large numbers Vulnerable to theft, diversion Potential safety hazard Could become “orphaned” Inadequate disposal facilities Good News: ”Disused” sources are largely accounted for

2. “Orphaned” Sources n Bad News: Many Thousands of High-Risk Sources – Result of: n n High disposal costs Lack of adequate depositories – Most in FSU – terrorist and illicit trafficking activities cause concern n Good News: Ongoing programs, e. g. , IAEA, U. S. , and Russia efforts focused on FSU

3. Regulatory Controls in FSU and Developing Countries n Bad News: Regulatory controls are weak or non-existent – about half the world’s nations n Good News: Number of high-risk sources outside the FSU is limited → Concentrate security efforts on FSU

4. U. S. Export Licensing Rules n Bad News: Rules are currently inadequate to prevent illicit commerce n n Unlimited, unregulated exports of high-risk sources to most destinations including Syria Exceptions: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan are embargoed but no measures to prevent transshipments. n Good News: Regulatory measures could be implemented quickly if given priority

Consequence Mitigation and Public Education n Bad News: Little apparent effort by the government to prepare the public for a radiological attack. – No apparent stockpiling of decon gear at regional sites – Not apparent that credible spokespeople are being trained n Good News: DHS, NRC, and CDC have useful info on Web sites. – R&D is ongoing in decon technologies. – Also, development of medical treatments, e. g. Prussian Blue

Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System Recommendations: 1. Implement Source Controls 2. Establish Regulatory Measures 3. Manage Security Risks 4. Prepare for RDD Attack

Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System 1. SOURCE CONTROLS a) Safely and securely dispose of disused sources • Example: DOE Off-Site Source Recovery Program needs additional support b) Track down and secure orphan sources, especially those in the NIS, that pose the highest security risk

Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System 2. REGULATORY MEASURES a) Assist nations with weak or essentially nonexistent regulatory controls (buttress IAEA assistance programs) b) Protect against illicit commerce in radioactive sources c) Implement improved U. S. export licensing rules

Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System 3. MANAGE SECURITY RISKS Decrease security risks from future radioactive sources by: a) Encouraging producers to make fewer high-risk radioactive sources b) Promoting use of non-radioactive alternatives

Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System 4. PREPARE FOR RDD ATTACK a) Educate the public, the press, and political leadership b) Equip and train first responders c) Conduct planning exercises