Nuclear Security Beyond 2012 R. Rajaraman Emeritus Professor, J. N. U. New Delhi Co-Chair, International Panel on Fissile Materials 1
Acknowledgements Ø I would like to thank Drs. Ken Luongo and Alex Toma, as well our Korean Hosts Drs. Jun Bong. Geun and Yoon Wan Ki for giving me this opportunity to participate in this important conference. Ø I recall with pleasure the last such conference that Ken and Alex had invited me to, at Washington, which was specially enlivened by the fact that the big Summit also took place around the same time, just a mile or so away in another building ! 2
Ø Some of my remarks will be of global relevance, but others will be specially related to S. Asia. Ø This is in part because I seem to be the only speaker from that region and should bring to this group the perspective from there. Ø It is also because even from the global perspective, S Asia poses special dangers and problems regarding Fissile Materials (FM) security. Ø Let me start by showing you how much FM 3 India and Pakistan possess
HEU Stocks (1475 ± 125 tons) IPFM Annual Report 2010 4
Global Separated Pu Stocks (485± 15 tons) IPFM Annual Report 2010 5
Realism in nuclear security conclaves Ø India, Pakistan and Israel have much less FM than the P 5 countries but beyond a certain point, “size does not matter”. Ø India-Pak each have about 100 weapons worth of either HEU or Pu--- more than enough for someone to pilfer one weapon’s worth Ø Therefore to not include them in discussions of non proliferation or FM security , just because they are not NPT members, amounts to ignoring the new realities of the nuclear world. Ø It would surely not be the way to encourage their cooperation. Ø This where these Nuclear Security Summits take on 6 special significance
Need for similar Summits in the Future Ø The first Nuclear Security Summit hosted by President Obama in 2010 at Washington was free of this drawback Ø One of the laudable features of the Obama summit was its inclusiveness and acceptance of de facto realism. Both India and Pakistan were invited and were represented by their top most leaders. ( Israel was invited too, but at the last minute Mr. Netanyahu cancelled his participation) Ø Therefore one must continue this series of summits---- both because security of FM is so important and also for continuing to provide such an inclusive forum Ø Participation by the highest level leadership of each nation is also a must, to maintain the importance of nuclear safety and security as a major concern for mankind. 7
FM security and Nuclear strategy Ø An important ingredient for re-assuring the world that all FM are secure, is transparency over the steps being taken. Ø Although some countries (like the US) declare their stock of FM without fearing that such revelation would significantly erode their national security, others do not yet feel free to publicly declare any information about their FM. Ø This is true of India and Pakistan, which are continuing to produce FM and assemble warheads, and also Israel, which is decidedly opaque. Ø There, and perhaps in China too, opacity on nuclear materials is just part of the overall secrecy surrounding nuclear arsenals. It is felt that public disclosure of FM stocks or even measures to keep them secure would compromise their nuclear strategies Ø Similar considerations also apply to potential nuclear powers 8 nurturing such ambitions, even if not publicly.
Ø Some nations may be willing to make voluntary declarations that they are taking full care of their FM, but if others seek verifiability, these countries may not accede to that. Ø Note however that despite their reluctance to declare the amount of FM, or even the security measures they employ, my guess is that all these nations hold their FM very securely. Their FM are among their crown jewels and given the highest levels of protection. This is true of India and, as of now, also of Pakistan Ø Therefore we must distinguish between the actual level of FM security in some given country and transparency or verifiability of their security measures. Ø The latter may happen only when they feel that they have a big enough arsenal and stock of FM for the security needs, Ø And are more or less ready to go into a “disarmament mode”. 9
NM security and Disarmament Ø Hence not only possession of FM, but even its security is coupled to overall nuclear weapon ambitions. Ø Simultaneous with exhorting nations to safely keep their FM, the old campaign against nuclear weapons must be revitalized. Ø This is happening a little, thanks to various new initiatives towards a “World without Nukes” – but only at the level of elite think tanks, and not at the grass root level. Ø That is grossly in sufficient 10
Public education, outreach, Anti nuclear NGOs Ø Nuclear weapons must be de-legitimized in the eyes of the general public, especially in the new and emerging nuclear nations. Ø That will be massive task among peoples that have been accustomed to viewing these weapons as symbols of status and security. Ø Co-opt and encourage anti nuclear activists and NGO s-- at least those who are willing to go beyond merely denouncing nuclear weapons from the sidelines, and make a constructive contribution to reducing nuclear dangers. 11
THANK YOU 12
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