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Network Layer Security Network Systems Security Mort Anvari 9/30/2004 Network Layer Security Network Systems Security Mort Anvari 9/30/2004

Security in Network Layer n n n Implementing security in application layer provides flexibility Security in Network Layer n n n Implementing security in application layer provides flexibility in security policy and key management Problem is need to implement security mechanism in every application individually To reduce the overhead, implement security in network layer to provide security for all applications between selected pair of computers 9/30/2004 2

IPSec n Two protocols n n n Provide general security services for IP n IPSec n Two protocols n n n Provide general security services for IP n n n Authentication Header (AH) Encasulating Security Payload (ESP) Authentication Confidentiality Anti-replay Key management Applicable to use over LANs, across public and private WANs, and for the Internet 9/30/2004 3

Scenario of IPSec Uses 9/30/2004 4 Scenario of IPSec Uses 9/30/2004 4

Benefits of IPSec n n n Provide strong security to all traffic crossing the Benefits of IPSec n n n Provide strong security to all traffic crossing the perimeter if installed in a firewall/router Resistant to bypass IPSec is below transport layer, hence transparent to applications Can be transparent to end users Can provide security for individual users if desired 9/30/2004 5

IP Security Architecture n n Specification is quite complex Defined in numerous RFC’s n IP Security Architecture n n Specification is quite complex Defined in numerous RFC’s n n n RFC 2401/2402/2406/2408 many others, grouped by category Mandatory in IPv 6, optional in IPv 4 9/30/2004 6

Security Association (SA) n n n A unidirectional relationship between sender and receiver that Security Association (SA) n n n A unidirectional relationship between sender and receiver that affords security for traffic flow Each IPSec computer maintains a database of SA’s Defined by 3 parameters n n n Security Parameters Index (SPI) IP Destination Address Security Protocol Identifier 9/30/2004 7

SA Parameters n n n n Sequence Number Counter Sequence Number Overflow Anti-Replay Window SA Parameters n n n n Sequence Number Counter Sequence Number Overflow Anti-Replay Window AH and ESP information Lifetime IPSec Protocol Mode Path MTU 9/30/2004 8

Authentication Header (AH) n Provide support for data integrity and authentication of IP packets Authentication Header (AH) n Provide support for data integrity and authentication of IP packets n n n Based on use of a MAC n n end system/router can authenticate user/app prevent address spoofing attacks by tracking sequence numbers HMAC-MD 5 -96 or HMAC-SHA-1 -96 Parties must share a secret key 9/30/2004 9

Authentication Header 9/30/2004 10 Authentication Header 9/30/2004 10

End-to-End vs End-to-Intermediate Authentication 9/30/2004 11 End-to-End vs End-to-Intermediate Authentication 9/30/2004 11

Scope of AH Authentication 9/30/2004 12 Scope of AH Authentication 9/30/2004 12

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) n n n Provide message content confidentiality and limited traffic Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) n n n Provide message content confidentiality and limited traffic flow confidentiality Can optionally provide the same authentication services as AH Support range of ciphers, modes, padding n n n DES, Triple-DES, RC 5, IDEA, CAST etc CBC most common pad to meet blocksize, for traffic flow 9/30/2004 13

Encapsulating Security Payload 9/30/2004 14 Encapsulating Security Payload 9/30/2004 14

Transport vs Tunnel Mode ESP n Transport mode is used to encrypt and optionally Transport vs Tunnel Mode ESP n Transport mode is used to encrypt and optionally authenticate IP data n n data protected but header left in clear can do traffic analysis but is efficient good for ESP host to host traffic Tunnel mode encrypts entire IP packet n n add new header for next hop good for VPNs, gateway to gateway security 9/30/2004 15

Scope of ESP Encryption and Authentication 9/30/2004 16 Scope of ESP Encryption and Authentication 9/30/2004 16

Combining Security Associations n n SAs can implement either AH or ESP, but each Combining Security Associations n n SAs can implement either AH or ESP, but each SA can implement only one To implement both, need to combine SAs n n form a security bundle Have 4 cases 9/30/2004 17

Combining Security Associations 9/30/2004 18 Combining Security Associations 9/30/2004 18

Key Management n n Handle key generation and distribution Typically need 2 pairs of Key Management n n Handle key generation and distribution Typically need 2 pairs of keys n n Manual key management n n 2 per direction for AH & ESP sysadmin manually configures every system Automated key management n n automated system for on demand creation of keys for SA’s in large systems Oakley and ISAKMP 9/30/2004 19

OAKLEY n n n A key exchange protocol Based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange Add OAKLEY n n n A key exchange protocol Based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange Add features to address weaknesses of Diffie. Hellman n n cookies to counter clogging attacks nonces to counter replay attacks key exchange authentication to counter man-inthe-middle attacks Can use arithmetic in prime fields or elliptic curve fields 9/30/2004 20

Usage of Cookies n Three basic requirements n n Must depend on specific parties Usage of Cookies n Three basic requirements n n Must depend on specific parties Impossible for anyone other than issuing entity to generate cookies that will be accepted by issuing party Cookie generation and verification must be fast To create a cookie, perform a fast hash over src and dst IP addresses, src and dst ports, and a locally generated secret value 9/30/2004 21

ISAKMP n n Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol Provide framework for key ISAKMP n n Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol Provide framework for key management Define procedures and packet formats to establish, negotiate, modify, and delete SAs Independent of key exchange protocol, encryption algorithm, and authentication method 9/30/2004 22

ISAKMP 9/30/2004 23 ISAKMP 9/30/2004 23

Next Class n n Denial-of-Service (Do. S) attack Hop Integrity 9/30/2004 24 Next Class n n Denial-of-Service (Do. S) attack Hop Integrity 9/30/2004 24