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Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 1 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 1 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Historical Perspective Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved Historical Perspective Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Historical perspective • Ever since people have been able to express their views about Historical perspective • Ever since people have been able to express their views about anything, they have expressed concerns about privacy: -British common law: “A man’s home is his castle” -the U. S. Constitution: protections against “search and seizure” - “Gentlemen don’t read each other’s mail” (President Harry Truman) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Historical perspective • Ever since people have been able to express their views, they Historical perspective • Ever since people have been able to express their views, they have expressed concerns about privacy (continued): -attorney/client, doctor/patient, and priest/parishioner…. protections of information discussed from legal discovery -penalties for tampering with U. S. mail - “wiretapping” laws Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Historical perspective • Ever since people began competing for power, territorial control, physical assets, Historical perspective • Ever since people began competing for power, territorial control, physical assets, and money they have recognized the importance of timely and accurate information -lifting the “fog of war” -understanding the enemy’s intentions - “getting inside the enemy’s decision cycle” - “loose lips sink ships” (continued on next slide) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Historical perspective • Ever since people began competing for power, territorial control, physical assets, Historical perspective • Ever since people began competing for power, territorial control, physical assets, and money they have recognized the importance of timely and accurate information (continued) -Understanding the customer’s needs -Understanding the competition (industrial espionage as well as legal industrial intelligence activities) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Historical perspective • Ever since people began competing for power, territorial control, physical assets, Historical perspective • Ever since people began competing for power, territorial control, physical assets, and money, they have attempted to gain more information through whatever means is at their disposal; and they have also tried to disrupt their adversary’s information flows • Likewise, they have tried to protect their information and their information infrastructures Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Historical perspective • . . . they have also tried to intercept and/or disrupt Historical perspective • . . . they have also tried to intercept and/or disrupt their adversaries’ information flows - “steaming” open envelopes -electronic eavesdropping -cutting communication lines between enemy commanders and troops -jamming radio communications -sending intentionally misleading messages -code breaking (e. g. , in WWII) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Historical perspective • . . . they have tried to protect their information and Historical perspective • . . . they have tried to protect their information and their information infrastructures -wax “seals” -cryptography -signatures -notarized documents -LPI (low probability of intercept) communication systems - “hardened” satellite communication systems Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Historical perspective • In recent decades, thought leaders have recognized to combined power of Historical perspective • In recent decades, thought leaders have recognized to combined power of computers and communications to change they way we run our businesses, and conduct our lives: e. g. , NTT’s “C&C” vision e. g. , “…any time, anywhere, and in any medium. . . ” Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 2 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 2 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The Present Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved The Present Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • More and more people and organizations Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • More and more people and organizations are becoming dependent upon computers, networks, and network-based applications (e. g. , electronic commerce moving toward $1 T/year very rapidly) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • There is a growing concern with Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • There is a growing concern with regard to: -Privacy (unauthorized access to personal/sensitive/proprietary/classified Do. D information) -Theft (e. g. , using stolen credit card numbers) -Reliability (i. e. , will my network-based applications work when I need to use them? ) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • If a single new virus, worm, Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • If a single new virus, worm, or Trojan horse attack causes each of 100 million computer users to spend 1 hour learning about the new threat, downloading software to defend against the threat, taking other actions… … and if an hour of each person’s time is, on average, worth $50. 00… …then each new “event” produces a societal cost of $5 B Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • Examples of network-based applications -Air traffic Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • Examples of network-based applications -Air traffic control, control of the power grids, control of other “critical infrastructures” [PDD-63] -Electronic commerce: business-to-business, business-to-consumer -Access to patient records in healthcare -Access to information via the Web Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • Examples of network-based applications -E-mail -Financial Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • Examples of network-based applications -E-mail -Financial transactions (e. g. , inter-bank transactions, stock trading) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • Recent examples of information assurance problems Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • Recent examples of information assurance problems -Major loss of paging systems in the US (single satellite failure) -Increasing numbers of virus/worm/Trojan horse incidents -Intrusions into government/Do. D systems -E-bay outage for ~24 hours Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present -Incorrect data downloaded into the Internet’s Domain Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present -Incorrect data downloaded into the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS) root servers disrupted conversion of Internet “names” like [email protected] drexel. edu into Internet addresses like 144. 118. 31. 1 for ~24 hours -others that can’t be discussed in public Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • Some of these problems are associated Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • Some of these problems are associated with things which we “do to ourselves”. I. e. , no malicious intent • Some of these problems are the result of intentional acts, ranging from mischief to criminal activities to state-sponsored terrorism Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • Some of these problems are associated Information Assurance and Network Integrity: the Present • Some of these problems are associated with violations of privacy, unauthorized access to information, providing false identities, or unauthorized modification of information • Some of these problems are associated with “denial of service” (disrupting systems and applications) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The shifting view of the IA & NI Problem • Industry and government moving The shifting view of the IA & NI Problem • Industry and government moving (sometimes slowly) to put in place mechanisms and policies and procedures to defend networks and systems against attacks for which there are well established defense mechanisms • Still a lack of widespread awareness of the full scope of the problem Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The shifting view of the IA & NI Problem • Rapidly emerging awareness (in The shifting view of the IA & NI Problem • Rapidly emerging awareness (in some communities (e. g. , DARPA, NSA, …) of the very difficult problems of defending against (latent) “malicious code”, and “insider” attacks • The Y 2 K problem was a self-inflicted “wake up call” regarding the magnitude of the challenges ahead Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The shifting view of the IA & NI Problem • Moving from a paradigm The shifting view of the IA & NI Problem • Moving from a paradigm of (unachievable) absolute security to a paradigm of “defense in depth”: “protect, detect, respond” • Increasing emphasis on new research initiatives at DARPA: both specific nearer term defense technologies, tools and methodologies…as well as on underlying science for the design of systems and networks that are secure Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 3 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 3 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Review of Typical Network and Network Infrastructure Architecture and Design Copyright 2000 S. D. Review of Typical Network and Network Infrastructure Architecture and Design Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

A Typical Networked Information System “Enclave” PC Server To “the Internet” PC Server GW A Typical Networked Information System “Enclave” PC Server To “the Internet” PC Server GW Server Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Issues • How, and to what extent can we protect the enclave using a Issues • How, and to what extent can we protect the enclave using a gateway machine? • What penalty does this protection cause for legitimate users? Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Enclaves connected via Internet Enclave C Enclave A “the Internet” Enclave B Enclave D Enclaves connected via Internet Enclave C Enclave A “the Internet” Enclave B Enclave D Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Issues • Since each Enclave is not perfectly protected by its gateway, is it Issues • Since each Enclave is not perfectly protected by its gateway, is it “safe” to use the public Internet to connect the enclaves? • What about “denial-of-service” attacks? Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Enclaves connected using an “intranet” Enclave C Enclave A “intranet” Enclave B Enclave D Enclaves connected using an “intranet” Enclave C Enclave A “intranet” Enclave B Enclave D Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Issues • Can we afford to build an “intranet” to reach all of our Issues • Can we afford to build an “intranet” to reach all of our enclaves? • How do our users interconnect with the “outside world”? • If we don’t provide a means to interconnect with the “outside world”, will our own users defeat our security mechanisms by providing such connections themselves? Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Enclaves connected using an intranet imbedded within “the Internet” GW Enclave A Enclave C Enclaves connected using an intranet imbedded within “the Internet” GW Enclave A Enclave C “intranet” Enclave B “the Internet” Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved Enclave D

Issues • How well can we protect our embedded intranet (virtual private network) from Issues • How well can we protect our embedded intranet (virtual private network) from “off net” intruders? • What about denial-of-service attacks? • VPN analogy: My safe deposit box at my local bank is a “virtual private bank”. Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Enclaves connected using an “intranet” that is connected to “the Internet” Enclave A Enclave Enclaves connected using an “intranet” that is connected to “the Internet” Enclave A Enclave C GW “intranet” Enclave B Enclave D Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Issues • Can we afford to build an “intranet” to reach all of our Issues • Can we afford to build an “intranet” to reach all of our enclaves? • How much protection will the gateway to the larger Internet provide? Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 4 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 4 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Attacks Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved Attacks Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Types of attacks • Eavesdropping: - I read your message while it is passing Types of attacks • Eavesdropping: - I read your message while it is passing through a network - I listen in on your conversation with one or more other person(s) - I monitor which Web pages you are accessing - I monitor how many messages you send, and to whom they are sent (traffic analysis) - I monitor where you are, by looking at your messages Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Types of attacks • Eavesdropping (continued): Eavesdropping is a passive, read-only activity, in the Types of attacks • Eavesdropping (continued): Eavesdropping is a passive, read-only activity, in the sense that I don’t change anything about your messages. Eavesdrop: To secretly listen in on a private conversation Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Types of attacks • Unauthorized “read” access I read a file that is stored Types of attacks • Unauthorized “read” access I read a file that is stored on one of your servers or other computers This requires that I obtain access to your computer, either via a network, or by some other means. E. g. , I physically access your computer; I loan you a floppy disk that contains a malicious application, that copies your files on to the disk…which you return to me (Trojan horse attack) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Types of attacks • Content tampering -I change the content of a message passing Types of attacks • Content tampering -I change the content of a message passing through a network, or I change the contents of a database (e. g. , I change the information on one of your Web pages) Tampering with a message in transit can be done by substitution Tampering with the contents of a computer requires access and “write” privileges Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Types of attacks • Impersonation -I send you a document or a message that Types of attacks • Impersonation -I send you a document or a message that appears to have been sent by someone else The ability to prove that a message is “authentic” : the sender is who he or she claims to be, and the content has not been modified since it was created by the authentic sender is called “non-repudiation” Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Types of attacks • “Denial-of- service” attacks -I prevent your messages from being delivered Types of attacks • “Denial-of- service” attacks -I prevent your messages from being delivered by attacking one or more routers or by attacking the domain name system -I cause congestion your network that prevents you from doing what you want to do (e. g. , I send you a gigantic E-mail file, and clog your mail server) -I bombard you with junk messages -I disable your network’s password authentication system Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Prognosis • Of all of these attacks, denial-of-service attacks are the most problematic, on Prognosis • Of all of these attacks, denial-of-service attacks are the most problematic, on a forward-looking basis • The attacker has the advantage. He or she only has to find one vulnerability to exploit. The defender needs to anticipate all possible attacks. Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 5 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 5 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Basic Cryptography Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved Basic Cryptography Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Cryptography • Using mathematically-based methods to protect information from being read and/or modified by Cryptography • Using mathematically-based methods to protect information from being read and/or modified by unauthorized persons Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The concept of a cipher Four score and seven years ago … Gpvs tdpsf The concept of a cipher Four score and seven years ago … Gpvs tdpsf boe tfwfo zfbst bhp. . . Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Cryptography • The simple substitution cipher is easy to “break” • We need a Cryptography • The simple substitution cipher is easy to “break” • We need a much more secure approach for real-world applications Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Cryptography • The most secure approach to cryptography is to use a “one time Cryptography • The most secure approach to cryptography is to use a “one time pad”… • However, in most applications it is not practical to use the “one time pad” method Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Cryptography • Most cryptographic methods are based on -A cryptographic algorithm that is assumed Cryptography • Most cryptographic methods are based on -A cryptographic algorithm that is assumed to be widely known (the algorithm itself is not secret) -A secret cryptographic “key” that is known only to those who are authorized to have the secret key Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Cryptography Secret Key Encrpyt Decrpyt Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved Cryptography Secret Key Encrpyt Decrpyt Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Desired Properties of an Encryption Algorithm • It should be very difficult (computationally) to Desired Properties of an Encryption Algorithm • It should be very difficult (computationally) to decrypt a message without having the secret key • It should be reasonably easy to encrypt and decrypt a message, if you have the secret key Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Details • The secret key is usually a binary sequence (1 s and 0 Details • The secret key is usually a binary sequence (1 s and 0 s) that is at least 56 bits long, and preferably 128 bits long (or longer) • Key management. . . E. g. , distributing secret keys to people who are authorized to have them, without making them accessible to unauthorized persons … is always a challenge Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Details • Nobody knows for sure how “hard” it is to “break” modern encryption Details • Nobody knows for sure how “hard” it is to “break” modern encryption methods … however mathematicians are able to make statements about the comparative difficulty of breaking one method vs. another • Increasing computing power makes brute force methods feasible… leading to the need for longer keys Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Details • The ability to break many encryption methods is closely related to the Details • The ability to break many encryption methods is closely related to the ability to “factor” a large number … thus you may read about competitions among people working in the field of cryptography to come up with efficient computational schemes for factoring large numbers Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Public-key Cryptography • In the 1970’s cryptographic researchers came up with some amazing results/concepts Public-key Cryptography • In the 1970’s cryptographic researchers came up with some amazing results/concepts that have had a remarkable impact on the ability to build practical cryptographic systems • These results/concepts helped address the key management problem Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The concept of a 1 -way function • A one-way function is one for The concept of a 1 -way function • A one-way function is one for which it is easy to compute y = f(x), where y and x are sequences of binary digits (1 s and 0 s) … … but it is very “hard” to compute what x is, given that you have access to y • A one way function is analogous to a padlock: I can easily snap it shut, but I can’t open it (without a key or a combination) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The Concept of Public-key Cryptography • Public key encryption Public Key Private (secret) Key The Concept of Public-key Cryptography • Public key encryption Public Key Private (secret) Key Encrpyt Decrpyt Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The Concept of Public Key Encryption • A public key is a sequence of The Concept of Public Key Encryption • A public key is a sequence of binary digits (1 s and 0 s) that is accessible to anyone who wishes to know what it is (I. e. , its published in a publicly accessible directory) • The corresponding private (secret) key is only known to authorized persons Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The Concept of Public Key Encryption • A public key is used to apply The Concept of Public Key Encryption • A public key is used to apply a one-way function, I. e. to encrypt the red information. Anyone with a message to send to a particular recipient, or set of recipients can use the recipient’s public key to do this • The corresponding private (secret) key is used by the authorized recipient(s) to decrypt messages that have been sent to them Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Details • It is computationally difficult (and correspondingly slow) to utilize public key cryptography Details • It is computationally difficult (and correspondingly slow) to utilize public key cryptography • Therefore, in practice, public key cryptography is often used as a secure method for exchanging private keys; and then private key cryptography is used to exchange information Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

A key exchange protocol Server Client Obtain server’s public key Use server’s public key A key exchange protocol Server Client Obtain server’s public key Use server’s public key to send ID info to server ----Receive/decrypt message Obtain client’s public key Send session key to client Receive/decrypt session key - Use session key Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Digital Signatures • Problem -How can I be sure that a message with your Digital Signatures • Problem -How can I be sure that a message with your name associated with it: really came from you hasn’t been altered since you sent it Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Digital Signatures Sender’s private key Message Hash Signature Encrypt Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. Digital Signatures Sender’s private key Message Hash Signature Encrypt Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Digital Signatures • The hash is a summary of my message • Given the Digital Signatures • The hash is a summary of my message • Given the message, anyone can compute the hash • When I encrypt the hash and my signature, using my secret key, anyone can decrypt it using my public key Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Digital Signatures • However, no one can change the message without producing a mismatch Digital Signatures • However, no one can change the message without producing a mismatch between the hash derived from the changed message, and the hash that I sent in my encrypted hash/signature file • Furthermore, no one can create a fake hash/ signature file that will decrypt properly with my public key Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Certificates • When I send you a message claiming to be Prof. Stewart Personick Certificates • When I send you a message claiming to be Prof. Stewart Personick of Drexel University, encrypted with my private key, and it decrypts properly with my public key …how do you know that the public key you obtained from the public key directory really belongs to Prof. Stewart Personick of Drexel University? Who certifies this? Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Certificate Authority • A well known/trusted “certificate authority” can provide me with an electronically Certificate Authority • A well known/trusted “certificate authority” can provide me with an electronically signed certificate (encrypted with the certificate authority’s private key) vouching for the fact that a particular public key has, in fact, been issued to Professor Stewart Personick of Drexel University • One can create a hierarchy of certificate authorities Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 6 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 6 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Access Control: Passwords, Biometrics, Tokens & Smart Cards Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All Access Control: Passwords, Biometrics, Tokens & Smart Cards Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Access Control • Control access using some combination of: -what you know (e. g. Access Control • Control access using some combination of: -what you know (e. g. a password) -who you are (e. g. , your fingerprints) -what you have (e. g. , a smart card) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Passwords • A basic method of protecting individual files or information systems from unauthorized Passwords • A basic method of protecting individual files or information systems from unauthorized access is through the use of passwords. A password can be a surrogate for an encryption key [How? ]. • There are numerous pitfalls associated with the use of passwords in real-world applications Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Passwords • A basic method of protecting individual files or information systems from unauthorized Passwords • A basic method of protecting individual files or information systems from unauthorized access is through the use of passwords • There are numerous pitfalls associated with the use of passwords in real world applications…e. g. , Guessing passwords Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Guessing Passwords • ID/Password pairs: ID guest sdp mlp Password guest Feb 22 fgy&3 Guessing Passwords • ID/Password pairs: ID guest sdp mlp Password guest Feb 22 fgy&3 W 72 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Guessing Passwords • A basic problem with passwords is that we can’t remember them Guessing Passwords • A basic problem with passwords is that we can’t remember them unless they are also relatively easy to guess Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Password Sniffing • If you log on to a computer system via a network, Password Sniffing • If you log on to a computer system via a network, and you send your ID and password “in the clear”, someone who is monitoring that network can steal your ID/password combination Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Lost Passwords • A lost or forgotten password, like a lost or forgotten secret Lost Passwords • A lost or forgotten password, like a lost or forgotten secret key, could create a big problem; or at least a minor/temporary one. • A solution to the above is to either have a way of placing passwords “in escrow” with a trusted escrow service (equivalent to placing the password in a safe deposit box at a bank) or using a password system that incorporates a master password Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Lost Passwords • A solution to the above is to either have a way Lost Passwords • A solution to the above is to either have a way of placing passwords “in escrow” with a trusted escrow service (equivalent to placing the password in a safe deposit box at a bank) or using a password system that incorporates a master password. . . e. g. , I can place all of my ID-password pairs in a master file on my PDA, with access to that file controlled by a master password Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Stealing Password Files • Hackers will often attempt to steal files that contain combinations Stealing Password Files • Hackers will often attempt to steal files that contain combinations of IDs and passwords by accessing computers that may contain these files • Sometimes, careless system administrators place these files in unprotected areas within a computer Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Passwords What is my Drexel Financial System ID/Password pair? Escrow Agent Client Here it Passwords What is my Drexel Financial System ID/Password pair? Escrow Agent Client Here it is: xyz/1234 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

System Passwords What is my Drexel Financial System ID/Password pair? Escrow Agent Client Here System Passwords What is my Drexel Financial System ID/Password pair? Escrow Agent Client Here it is: xyz/1234 Teams: How could we automate this? Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

One Time Password Generators (Tokens) • If we are willing to carry around a One Time Password Generators (Tokens) • If we are willing to carry around a small electronic password generator, we can greatly mitigate password guessing, password sniffing and lost password problems • The password now becomes a combination of a memorized password and the “randomly” generated password produced by the password generator Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Secur. ID Password Generator 607385 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved Secur. ID Password Generator 607385 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Secur. ID Password Generator sdp Feb 22 607385 Internal clock, secret key, and random Secur. ID Password Generator sdp Feb 22 607385 Internal clock, secret key, and random number generator Data base of “secret keys” associated with ID’s, and recently used one time passwords; master clock, and random number generator Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The S-key System Public key seed Encrypt (1) Encrypt (2) Encrypt (n) Encrypt (3) The S-key System Public key seed Encrypt (1) Encrypt (2) Encrypt (n) Encrypt (3) D(n)=EEE…E(seed) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The S-key System • The server starts out with the value: D(n) = EEE…E The S-key System • The server starts out with the value: D(n) = EEE…E (seed) in storage, associated with my log-on • I use the public key to produce D(n-1) from the seed. I send D(n-1) to the server when I want to log on. The server uses the public key on D(n-1) to produce D(n). If it works, I am allowed to log on • The next time, I generate D(n-2) to log on • etc. Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Biometric Access Controls • • • Voice recognition Fingerprint scanning/recognition Face scanning/recognition Iris scanning/recognition Biometric Access Controls • • • Voice recognition Fingerprint scanning/recognition Face scanning/recognition Iris scanning/recognition DNA analysis Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Iris Scanning sdp Feb 22 scan parameters Iris Scanner Data base of Iris Scan Iris Scanning sdp Feb 22 scan parameters Iris Scanner Data base of Iris Scan parameters associated with ID’s Iris Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Iris Scanning • Interesting facts [from SENSAR®] -Number of people that ever lived: 10**10 Iris Scanning • Interesting facts [from SENSAR®] -Number of people that ever lived: 10**10 -Age of the universe in years: 10**11 -Grains of sand on the world’s beaches: 10**19 -Probability of a false accept with iris scanning (impostor): 1 in 10**19. 42 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards ABC Bank Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved Smart Cards ABC Bank Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards ABC Bank Microprocessor, memory, I/O, secret key, OS, applications, private data, other Smart Cards ABC Bank Microprocessor, memory, I/O, secret key, OS, applications, private data, other data Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce ABC Bank Transaction data (from merchant) Encrypted output (to bank) Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce ABC Bank Transaction data (from merchant) Encrypted output (to bank) Microprocessor, memory, I/O, secret key, OS, applications, private data, other data Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • Issues to be addressed -the merchant wants a confirmation Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • Issues to be addressed -the merchant wants a confirmation from the bank that this purchase is authorized by the bank, and will be paid by the bank Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • -the customer wants to protect his or her credit Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • -the customer wants to protect his or her credit card number from being seen by the merchant (or anyone else). The customer wants to ensure that only his or her authorized purchases are charged to his or her account -The customer may also wish to retain some degree of anonymity Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • -the bank wants to ensure that this purchase is Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • -the bank wants to ensure that this purchase is being made by the authorized holder of the smart card Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • Example of a protocol -the merchant asks the bank Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • Example of a protocol -the merchant asks the bank for a transaction number -the bank sends the merchant a transaction #, encrypted with the merchant’s public key [Why do we need a transaction number? ] Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • Example of a protocol -the merchant decrypts this message, Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • Example of a protocol -the merchant decrypts this message, and sends the customer’s smart card the following: transaction #, $ amount, merchant ID#, date, time Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • Example of a protocol (cont’d) -the customer’s smart card Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • Example of a protocol (cont’d) -the customer’s smart card incorporates the merchant’s message into an encrypted message (encrypted with the bank’s public key) that contains: the customer’s credit card number plus the transaction number encrypted with the customer’s private key [Why do we need to include the transaction number encrypted with the customer’s private key? ] Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • Example of a protocol (cont’d) - The bank issues Smart Cards: Electronic Commerce • Example of a protocol (cont’d) - The bank issues an authorization to the merchant encrypted with the bank’s private key; and then encrypted with the merchant’s public key [Why do we need both of these encryptions? ] Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Smart Cards: Identification • Issues: -Protect against eavesdropping (password sniffing) -Protect against “playback” attacks Smart Cards: Identification • Issues: -Protect against eavesdropping (password sniffing) -Protect against “playback” attacks [Teams: solution? ] Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 7 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 7 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Malicious Code Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved Malicious Code Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Malicious Code • What’s the problem we are trying to address? How do we Malicious Code • What’s the problem we are trying to address? How do we keep people from inserting harmful computer code into our computers? Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Malicious Code • Categories of malicious code: Nuisance code (e. g. , unwanted messages) Malicious Code • Categories of malicious code: Nuisance code (e. g. , unwanted messages) Harmful code (erases files, clogs up systems, changes system configuration) Latent harmful code (time bombs) Trojan Horses (e. g. , containing back doors that provide unauthorized access) Spying applications (e. g. , keystroke monitors) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Malicious Code • How can malicious code enter a system -Comes on a trusted Malicious Code • How can malicious code enter a system -Comes on a trusted disc with an application; downloaded or otherwise received from a trusted source -Comes from an an untrusted source Applications downloaded from servers Applications attached to E-mail Exploitation of network-based applications -Inserted by someone with access to the system Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Protecting Against Malicious Code • Applications from Trusted Sources -Trusted sources can use digital Protecting Against Malicious Code • Applications from Trusted Sources -Trusted sources can use digital signatures or other means to protect against unauthorized changes to their software But… how does the trusted source ensure that its own, authorized employees and contractors have not inserted malicious code into its products? Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Protecting Against Malicious Code • Possible alternatives for dealing with applications from untrusted sources Protecting Against Malicious Code • Possible alternatives for dealing with applications from untrusted sources -Don’t accept applications from untrusted sources -Check the application for malicious code -Run the application in a “sandbox” (e. g. , one of the underlying concepts of Java) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Protecting Against Malicious Code • Finding non-specific malicious code within an application -A very Protecting Against Malicious Code • Finding non-specific malicious code within an application -A very difficult, unsolved problem. . . e. g. , malicious code could be activated by its combination with specific data that is entered at a future date Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Protecting Against Malicious Code • The concept of a “sandbox” Create a virtual machine Protecting Against Malicious Code • The concept of a “sandbox” Create a virtual machine on which the code executes (runs). Ensure that the code can only have access to tightly controlled and monitored (e. g. , level of usage) resources. Securely save the machine’s configuration information. Don’t allow the code to leave behind any remnants, other than data stored in carefully controlled memory locations. Restore the rest of the machine/system to its original state Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 8 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 8 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Denial-of-Service Attacks and Other Network-Application. Based Attacks Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All Network Denial-of-Service Attacks and Other Network-Application. Based Attacks Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Denial-of-Service Attacks • Attacker’s objective To interrupt or reduce the quality of services…as Network Denial-of-Service Attacks • Attacker’s objective To interrupt or reduce the quality of services…as experienced by legitimate users • Many attacks have innocent counterparts (e. g. , someone sends me a very large E-mail attachment, and blocks my access to other messages) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Denial-of-Service Attacks • The “SYN” Flooding attack: -In TCP, one establishes a connection Network Denial-of-Service Attacks • The “SYN” Flooding attack: -In TCP, one establishes a connection by sending a synchronization (SYN) message to the host one wishes to communicate with -The attack: send a large number of SYN messages (with phony source addresses) to a host. This overloads the buffer in the host that keeps track of TCP connections (and half-connections) in progress Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

TCP SYN Flooding Attack SYN(500) SYN(1024), ACK(501) No acknowledgement of prior SYN segment…. More TCP SYN Flooding Attack SYN(500) SYN(1024), ACK(501) No acknowledgement of prior SYN segment…. More SYN acknowledgements. . . More new SYN segments Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Denial-of-Service Attacks • The “SYN” Flooding attack: -Some protection can be gained by Network Denial-of-Service Attacks • The “SYN” Flooding attack: -Some protection can be gained by configuring networks so that they will not accept IP packets from external (to the network) sources whose source addresses are internal to the network; and which will not allow internal sources to send IP packets to external destinations if the source addresses used are not internal addresses Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Sequence Number Attacks • Disable a host that is trusted by the target (intended Sequence Number Attacks • Disable a host that is trusted by the target (intended victim) machine • Initiate a TCP connection by impersonating the disabled host (I. e. , use it’s IP address) and sending a SYN message. • Guess the initial sequence number that the target system will use; and respond with an acknowledgement. Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

TCP Sequence Number Attack SYN(500) SYN(800), ACK(501) ACK(801), data ACK(801), FIN(1012) ACK(1013), FIN(800) ACK(801) TCP Sequence Number Attack SYN(500) SYN(800), ACK(501) ACK(801), data ACK(801), FIN(1012) ACK(1013), FIN(800) ACK(801) Ref: “Firewalls and Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All. Internet Security” rights reserved

Other Network-based Attacks • See Cheswick and Bellovin Chapter 2 • Many network-based attacks Other Network-based Attacks • See Cheswick and Bellovin Chapter 2 • Many network-based attacks are caused by the lack of strong authentication of sources (e. g. , it is easy to impersonate another machine by using its IP address) and lack of encryption on IP network links Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 9 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 9 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Firewalls Ref: Firewalls and Internet Security, W. R. Cheswick and S. M. Bellovin Copyright Firewalls Ref: Firewalls and Internet Security, W. R. Cheswick and S. M. Bellovin Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Firewall • A firewall is a mechanism through which we can attempt to protect Firewall • A firewall is a mechanism through which we can attempt to protect a collection of computers and networks within an enclave from attacks launched from outside of the protected enclave • Firewalls can also be used to provide barriers between subsets of computers and networks within an enclave Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Firewalls Gateway computer The rest of cyberspace ENCLAVE Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All Firewalls Gateway computer The rest of cyberspace ENCLAVE Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Firewalls The rest of cyberspace Subnet 1 Subnet 2 Enclave Copyright 2000 S. D. Firewalls The rest of cyberspace Subnet 1 Subnet 2 Enclave Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Packet Filter ref: Firewalls and Internet Security action ourhost port theirhost port comment block Packet Filter ref: Firewalls and Internet Security action ourhost port theirhost port comment block * * spigot * block these guys our GW’s mail allow our GW 25 * * allow * * * 25 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved ? ? ?

Packet Filters • In the previous slide, we filter packets on the basis of Packet Filters • In the previous slide, we filter packets on the basis of which of “our hosts” (inside the firewall) and which our “their hosts” (outside the firewall), and which ports are involved in a TCP connection, independent of which end established the connection • The first rule keeps spigot from participating in TCP connections with our hosts (we block packets to/from spigot) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Packet Filters • The second rule allows any host to establish a connection to Packet Filters • The second rule allows any host to establish a connection to port 25 (SMTP =mail) on our gateway machine • The last rule says that any of our hosts can participate in a port 25 (SMTP =mail) TCP connection with any other host. This is dangerous, because an exterior host could use its port 25 to initiate a connection to one of our hosts for a purpose other than mail Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Packet Filter ref: Firewalls and Internet Security action allow source port {ourhosts} * dest Packet Filter ref: Firewalls and Internet Security action allow source port {ourhosts} * dest port * flags * allow * * * >1023 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved ACK

Packet Filters • In the previous slide, we implement filtering based on which host Packet Filters • In the previous slide, we implement filtering based on which host has originated the TCP session • In particular, if a packet is a initial request to open up a TCP session, it does not have the TCP “ACK” bit set. All other packets have the “ACK” bit set. Therefore, we can block TCP connections that are initiated by “their host” (outside of the firewall) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Packet Filters • We assume that our hosts will reject packets with the ACK Packet Filters • We assume that our hosts will reject packets with the ACK bit set, if the corresponding TCP connection has not been initiated • Thus a host that is not one of our hosts cannot establish a TCP connection under either of the first two rules • The last rule allows external hosts to establish a TCP connection to our hosts if the target port number is higher than 1023 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Where to put the filters The rest of cyberspace Subnet 1 Subnet 2 Enclave Where to put the filters The rest of cyberspace Subnet 1 Subnet 2 Enclave Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Where to put the filters • The location of the filters is critical for Where to put the filters • The location of the filters is critical for -catching problems as close to the source as possible -identifying the link on which a packet has arrived Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Comments • The lack of authentication of packet sources and of routes taken by Comments • The lack of authentication of packet sources and of routes taken by packets…as well as opportunities to modify packets in transit make the packet filtering problem much harder Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Application Level Gateways • This type of gateway acts as an intermediary between outside Application Level Gateways • This type of gateway acts as an intermediary between outside hosts and inside hosts (their hosts and our hosts) by accepting packets associated with a specific application (e. g. , Email) and scrutinizing the contents of those packets (or sets of related packets) at the application level. • An application level gateway can also provide useful functions, such as mail forwarding and reformatting Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 10 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 10 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Viruses (and Worms) references: William Stallings-Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 15. 2 Copyright 2000 Viruses (and Worms) references: William Stallings-Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 15. 2 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Viruses and Worms • Virus: “A program that can “infect” other programs by modifying Viruses and Worms • Virus: “A program that can “infect” other programs by modifying them; the modification includes a copy of the virus program, which can then go on to infect other programs” (ref: Stallings p 504) • Worm “Network worm programs use network connections to pass from system to system” (ref: Stalling p 504) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Viruses and Worms • Virus: extraneous executable code that attaches itself to a file Viruses and Worms • Virus: extraneous executable code that attaches itself to a file or an application, and that can reproduce itself to infect other files or applications • Worm: a stand-alone executable program that can replicate itself, and that can utilize system resources to spread to multiple systems Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Simple Virus Structure (ref Stalling p 506) Program V: = {goto main; 1234567; subroutine Simple Virus Structure (ref Stalling p 506) Program V: = {goto main; 1234567; subroutine infect executable : = {loop: file : = get random executable file if (first-line-of-file = 1234567) then goto loop else prepend V to file; } main: main-program : = {infect-executable; goto next; } next: } Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Polymorphic Viruses • Change with each new infection • Are (for example) comprised of Polymorphic Viruses • Change with each new infection • Are (for example) comprised of two parts – A decryptor – An encrypted virus file • Both the decryptor and the encrypted file change each time the virus replicates…so that neither one has a fixed signature Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Infected application Decryptor Encrypted virus file App. 1 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All Infected application Decryptor Encrypted virus file App. 1 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

How does it work? Infected app. Executing 1 Decryptor Encrypted virus file Virus version How does it work? Infected app. Executing 1 Decryptor Encrypted virus file Virus version xyz Mutator Engine App. 1 . 1 The decryptor executable will decrypt the encrypted virus file Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

How does it work 2? Decryptor New Decryptor Virus version xyz Mutator Engine Virus How does it work 2? Decryptor New Decryptor Virus version xyz Mutator Engine Virus version xyz+1 Mutator Engine App. 1 2 4 3 New Decryptor Encrypted virus file . 2 Virus 1 finds the victim(App. 2(. 3 Mutator Engine creates a new Decryptor, a new virus file, and encrypts the new virus file. 4 Virus 2 is prepended to App. 2 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Detecting Viruses ref: Stalling pp 510 -514 • Look for a known virus signature Detecting Viruses ref: Stalling pp 510 -514 • Look for a known virus signature • Heuristic methods: look for structures in a file that look like they may be associated with a virus (e. g. , an decryption loop) • Checksums (easily defeated using compression and de-compression techniques or by changing the checksum) • Digital signatures Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Virus Signature Detection Example: 20, 000 files to check x 30, 000 virus signatures Virus Signature Detection Example: 20, 000 files to check x 30, 000 virus signatures to test against = 600, 000 tests to perform @ 1 test per microsecond => 10 minutes to perform the virus check Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 11 Dr. Stewart Personick sdp@ece. drexel. edu Network Integrity and Information Assurance : Lecture 11 Dr. Stewart Personick [email protected] drexel. edu Commonwealth 420 Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Intrusion Detection Ref: Edward Amoroso Intrusion Detection Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights Intrusion Detection Ref: Edward Amoroso Intrusion Detection Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Intrusion Detection • For the purposes of this lecture, intrusion detection is about detecting Intrusion Detection • For the purposes of this lecture, intrusion detection is about detecting unauthorized, possibly malicious attempts to gain access to networks and computer systems, or to disrupt networks, systems, services and applications of authorized users • To a large extent is is about the synthesis of indications of intrusions from many sources of such indications Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Ethical and Legal Surveillance • Intrusion detection is based on observations of actions that Ethical and Legal Surveillance • Intrusion detection is based on observations of actions that have been taken by, or caused by, network users • The body of law that governs the use of computer networks is evolving rapidly • Monitoring computer usage raises issues and controversies related to privacy rights and protections against arbitrary searches that derive from the U S Constitution Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

The Bill of Rights: U S Constitution Amendment IV The right of the people The Bill of Rights: U S Constitution Amendment IV The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Intrusion Detection • The principal purpose of intrusion detection is to defend against attacks Intrusion Detection • The principal purpose of intrusion detection is to defend against attacks and to recover from attacks • Layered network defense: Defend-Detect-Respond Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Responding • Note that, from the perspective of legitimate network users… an attack-induced outage Responding • Note that, from the perspective of legitimate network users… an attack-induced outage that lasts 20 milliseconds will probably be un-noticeable for most applications. An attack-induced outage that lasts 20 seconds will be noticeable, but not serious, for most users and applications. An attack-induced outage that lasts 5. 5 hours (20, 000 seconds) will generally be very serious for most users Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Responding • How long it takes to recover is very much a function of: Responding • How long it takes to recover is very much a function of: -the nature of the damage done -the cause of the initial damage (e. g. , how to eliminate malicious code from trusted hosts) -the availability, trustworthiness, and accessibility of data that can be used to diagnose the damage and the cause of the damage Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Responding • How long it takes to recover is very much a function of Responding • How long it takes to recover is very much a function of (continued): -the availability of back-up resources: equipment, applications, and trusted data -how the overall network was architected -how good a job was done in planning and implementing recovery processes Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Ref: Amoroso p 17 “The basic principles of intrusion detection are derived from many Ref: Amoroso p 17 “The basic principles of intrusion detection are derived from many sources, many of them having little or nothing to do with computing and networking resources…safecrackers and Internet crackers share a kindred spirit not often obvious because they live in such different worlds…unless, of course, they share a jail cell” Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Analogies from Everyday Life Ref Amoroso p 18 • Network management systems collect data Analogies from Everyday Life Ref Amoroso p 18 • Network management systems collect data from many sources to allow for the efficient assignment and monitoring of resources and their utilization • Monitoring of typical usage patterns to detect fraud (calling cards, credit cards) • Reacting to situations that don’t seem normal (instinct and intuition) Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Analogies from Everyday Life Ref Amoroso p 18 • Constant vigilance: surveillance cameras • Analogies from Everyday Life Ref Amoroso p 18 • Constant vigilance: surveillance cameras • Stealth design: hidden surveillance cameras (trying to reduce the attacker’s advantage) • Incenting adversaries to go elsewhere Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Generic Intrusion Detection System Network System or Network Element Observations Intrusion Detection Engine Data Generic Intrusion Detection System Network System or Network Element Observations Intrusion Detection Engine Data Policies Reports, alerts, autonomous actions Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Generic Intrusion Detection System A critical, but subtle aspect of the intrusion detection system Generic Intrusion Detection System A critical, but subtle aspect of the intrusion detection system strategy is to neutralize the attacker’s advantage by drawing on the concerted resources of large numbers of defenders…both in terms of the data they can provide, and in terms of the defense mechanisms they can conceive Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Intrusion Detection Data • Historical data related to (anonymous) network traffic and usage patterns Intrusion Detection Data • Historical data related to (anonymous) network traffic and usage patterns • Historical data related to specific users or applications • User profiles: including trust levels, access privileges and roles (job descriptions) • Signatures of known attacks • Signatures of patterns considered to indicate a possible attack Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved

Intrusion Detection Data • Signatures of activities or patterns considered to indicate a possible Intrusion Detection Data • Signatures of activities or patterns considered to indicate a possible attack: Politician: “People say I am a crook; do you think I am a crook” Advisor “I don’t know if you are a crook, but I know a lot of crooks who act like you” Copyright 2000 S. D. Personick. All rights reserved