554f73496a2aa531cf2eacf3c1924c5a.ppt
- Количество слайдов: 34
Mozambique Floods and Cyclone Real Time Evaluation
The Context: Mozambique
The context: Previous natural disasters In 2000 Cyclone Eline caused 700 deaths and extensive flooding in the southern half of Mozambique and Baby Rosita was born in a tree. This was followed by flooding in the Zambezi valley in 2001, the worst since 1978. Floods in the lower Zambezi cause displacement every 5 to 10 years.
The context: The floods and cyclone
The context: Clusters
The clusters: objectives ranked by fulfilment
The cluster: national coordination The national disaster management institute (INGC) performed very well both in preparedness and in the coordination of the response. Pre-flood work by INGC helped reduce the scale of the emergency. The INGC’s coordination added value to the cluster coordination and vice versa.
The cluster: field level coordination
The clusters: strong leadership Some cluster leads offered strong inclusive leadership of their clusters. Others did not. Cluster leadership is quite demanding on agencies, no only in terms of the demands on funding, but also on resources, and the willingness to priorities short-term humanitarian goals over longer term ones. The two strongest clusters were seen as being:
Factors contributing to strong leadership WFP was cash-strapped but was still able to play an effective role due to its large investment in preparedness – this was seen by WFP’s large surge capacity. Unicef was able to base its cluster leadership not only on surge capacity but also on its very extensive programme base in Mozambique. Both agencies had invested in their own disaster preparedness and had supported the development of local DRR capacity.
The clusters: weak leadership
The clusters: accountability
The clusters: Lead responsibilities ranked
The clusters: leadership
The clusters: OCHA’s surge capacity
The clusters: OCHA’s role
The clusters: Partnership
The clusters: co-leads
The clusters: Inclusion
The clusters: information management
Clusters: involvement of the population Beneficiary participation quite low – although local government structures were involved. Aid was supply driven to some extent – communities are still receiving goods that are not needed while critical needs are not being addressed. Donated aid was not managed by the community. Community did play a large role in managing the assistance that they provided themselves, such as temporary sites.
The clusters: quality of needs assessments Assessment of needs was questionable – it was often based on interviews with community leaders. Assessments were rudimentary, but the needs of the population are fairly obvious. However many needs here flowed from poverty rather than from disaster.
The clusters: cross-cutting themes
The cluster approach has an overhead cost that is not present when agencies plug into existing government coordination structures, or where coordination is multisectoral. The floods in Mozambique are at the bottom end of the scale of disasters at which using a cluster approach is justified in a country with a functioning government. Even is small emergencies, use of the cluster approach may be justified in terms of preparing humanitarian actors to response to large-scale emergencies.
Financing: Without a CERF The government never declared an emergency, nor appealed for funds, but merely stated its needs This lack of an appeal was a problem for some agencies and donors. The IFRC appeal was the largest other appeal – this has been poorly supported (appeal for $6. 0 mn on 16 Feb – upped to $16. 9 mn on 14 Mar – 12% funded by mid April.
Financing: The CERF permitted the response With out the CERF, UN agencies would have had great difficulty in responding, and the response would have been smaller. The CERF facilitated a faster response.
Financing: the CERF
Financing: the CERF supported by self-financing Agencies drew on their own emergency financing mechanisms (reprogramming, emergency response funds, contingency funds) prior to the CERF). WFP made clever use of unspent logistics funds to start air ops. Unicef made good use of emergency funds Agencies without reserves found it difficult to lead clusters while waiting for CERF
Financing: the flash appeal
Financing: CERF quality control
Conclusion The response to the 2007 floods in Mozambique was more coordinated than previous similar emergency responses. Humanitarian reforms including both the cluster approach and the CERF contributed to the quality of the response. However further work is needed at global level to improve both of these. The strong performance of the INGC was also a critical factor. The HCT did a good job.
554f73496a2aa531cf2eacf3c1924c5a.ppt