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Moving Forward with (Coastal) Design and Management 2009 CSCE-ASCE-ICE Triennial Conference, St John’s J. Moving Forward with (Coastal) Design and Management 2009 CSCE-ASCE-ICE Triennial Conference, St John’s J. W. Kamphuis Queen’s University Kingston, ON, Canada K 7 L 3 N 6 kamphuis@civil. queensu. ca June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 1

Conference Statement International scientific consensus agrees that increasing levels of man-made greenhouse gases are Conference Statement International scientific consensus agrees that increasing levels of man-made greenhouse gases are leading to global climate change. Possible consequences of climate change include rising temperatures, changing sea levels, and impacts on global weather. These changes could have serious impacts on the world’s organisms and on the lives of millions of people, especially those living in areas vulnerable to extreme natural conditions such as flooding and drought. Royal Society, London, UK June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 2

☺ Some Compelling Evidence Thank you Susan Torrence, Quilter June 2009 Moving Forward (2) ☺ Some Compelling Evidence Thank you Susan Torrence, Quilter June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 3

☺ Communicative Intermission We'll rant and we'll roar like true Newfoundlanders We'll rant and ☺ Communicative Intermission We'll rant and we'll roar like true Newfoundlanders We'll rant and we'll roar on deck and below Until we strikes bottom inside the two sunkers When straight through the channel to Toslow we'll go Courtesy Great Big Sea June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 4

☺ We Face 1. Very Large changes in design conditions (sea levels, global weather ☺ We Face 1. Very Large changes in design conditions (sea levels, global weather patterns, higher population concentrations) 2. Very Large changes in design concepts (failure, living with failure, resilience) 3. Very large changes in social context (decision making – participatory democracy) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 5

But… 1. With some careful thought 2. Discarding some “Accepted” Values 3. With some But… 1. With some careful thought 2. Discarding some “Accepted” Values 3. With some innovation We can move forward June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 6

Companion Paper Moving forward with (Coastal) Practice and Education CSCE Meeting St John’s, May Companion Paper Moving forward with (Coastal) Practice and Education CSCE Meeting St John’s, May 2009 J. W. Kamphuis Queen’s University Kingston, ON, Canada K 7 L 3 N 6 kamphuis@civil. queensu. ca June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 7

Outline of this Presentation 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. The System Contemporary Decision Outline of this Presentation 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. The System Contemporary Decision Making Failure Resilience Introducing Resilience Moving Forward W E N ? ! 7. Addenda are not presented; the complete presentation will be on www. civil. queensu. ca June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 8

1. The System (As we should design it) (Details in Addendum 1) June 2009 1. The System (As we should design it) (Details in Addendum 1) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 9

Hi-Ya ! June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 10 Hi-Ya ! June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 10

The System Loading - Water Levels, Waves Resistance - Structures + Environment (PES) Base The System Loading - Water Levels, Waves Resistance - Structures + Environment (PES) Base of Support - Governments, Economy, Stakeholders (SES) PES – Physico-Environmental Subsystem SES – Socio-Economic Subsystem June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 11

The System § The system = PES + SES § Not just any combination The System § The system = PES + SES § Not just any combination of PES and SES; SES must form the Base of Support for the PES PES + SES PES – Physico-Environmental Subsystem SES – Socio-Economic Subsystem June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 12

2. Contemporary Decision Making June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 13 2. Contemporary Decision Making June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 13

Contemporary Decision Making • Contemporary: Based on Democratic Principles; relevant to countries with democratic Contemporary Decision Making • Contemporary: Based on Democratic Principles; relevant to countries with democratic governance, e. g. Canada, US, EU. There are still many jurisdictions with different (often simpler) rules and processes, based on their particular cultures. • Decision Making: Can refer to projects that are basically non-engineering (e. g. studies, policy formulation, ICM strategies) or to engineering projects, involving design of works. Emphasis in this presentation will be on the more difficult and controversial engineering design projects. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 14

Early Decision Making Coastal Issue Decision Makers Coastal Engineers Project Formulation Project Design Coastal Early Decision Making Coastal Issue Decision Makers Coastal Engineers Project Formulation Project Design Coastal Scientists (Used Ad hoc) Implementation All early projects were essentially design projects June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 15

Contemporary Decision Making Regulation ? ? ? Coastal Issue Decision Makers Government Coastal Project Contemporary Decision Making Regulation ? ? ? Coastal Issue Decision Makers Government Coastal Project Management Law Coastal Engineers Problem Formulation Alternatives Knowledge Coastal Scientists Physics Chemistry Theoretical and Empirical Relationships Biology Geology Approvals Implementation Monitoring Modelling (uncertainties) Public Input Judgment Governments Solution Non-Gov’t Orgs Socio-Economic Input from Stakeholders June 2009 Others Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis Interest Groups Citizens 16

Contemporary Decision Making Engineering Projects SES Stakeholders Government Public Design Pre-Design Knowledge Concepts Resilience Contemporary Decision Making Engineering Projects SES Stakeholders Government Public Design Pre-Design Knowledge Concepts Resilience Definitions Requirements Opportunities PES Design System Design Decision Timeline Communication Decision Makers (often Government) Resilient System Difficult June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 17

Contemporary Decision Making Policy Formulation, ICM, etc. SES Stakeholders Government Public - Project Initiation Contemporary Decision Making Policy Formulation, ICM, etc. SES Stakeholders Government Public - Project Initiation Project Development Project Completion Decision Timeline Communication Decision Makers (often Government) Resilient System Still Difficult June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 18

Contemporary Decision Making Notes on Coastal Project Management (CPM) 1. Coastal Project Management is Contemporary Decision Making Notes on Coastal Project Management (CPM) 1. Coastal Project Management is central to success of a project 2. Communication skills are vital. 3. Coastal Engineers are not well trained in communication and usually not very much involved in social issues; therefore they are not properly prepared to take on the whole CPM portfolio. 4. Coastal Managers also are not trained to manage the whole CPM portfolio, particularly technical aspects. 5. So ? ? ? Let’s get this right ! June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 19

3. Failure June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 20 3. Failure June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 20

Failure Here is What Happen can, does, may be predicted to ? ? ? Failure Here is What Happen can, does, may be predicted to ? ? ? re ilu Fa June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 21

Failure What to Do ? Loading Resistance (PES) Base of Support (SES) Typical Engineering Failure What to Do ? Loading Resistance (PES) Base of Support (SES) Typical Engineering Solution Increase the Strength of the PES (Structures) (Mitigation) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 22

Failure What Else ? Loading Resistance (PES) Base of Support (SES) § Rethink “Failure” Failure What Else ? Loading Resistance (PES) Base of Support (SES) § Rethink “Failure” § Live with Failure. This means building Resilience into the System (PES + SES) (Adaptation) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 23

Failure Rethinking Failure § We have traditionally defined failure in a narrow probabilistic sense Failure Rethinking Failure § We have traditionally defined failure in a narrow probabilistic sense by the limit state equation (as for the structures). l l When the loading exceeds the structural resistance (strength) we have Failure Design Criterion: Probability of Failure (PF) as low as possible June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 24

Failure Rethinking Failure New Definitions: • R≤S is not Failure • Call R≤S “PES Failure Rethinking Failure New Definitions: • R≤S is not Failure • Call R≤S “PES Failure” • (Real) Failure is when SES cannot bear the consequences (damage, $, deaths, etc) Designing for real failure involves the concept of “Living with (PES) Failure” June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 25

Failure Living with PES Failure § Involves Resilience § Simple definition: What is the Failure Living with PES Failure § Involves Resilience § Simple definition: What is the potential of the system (PES + SES) for recovery from damage after PES Failure? § In practical context resilience is difficult to define. It is regularly defined incorrectly § More in Section 4 “Resilience” June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 26

Failure Risk § Along with probability of failure PF , we must now consider Failure Risk § Along with probability of failure PF , we must now consider the consequence of PES failure § This has introduced a new design criterion: Minimum Risk. § Definition: l R = ∑ PF * C • R = Risk, • C= Consequence of PES Failure June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 27

Risk Caveats on Risk § The methodology of designing for minimum risk for a Risk Caveats on Risk § The methodology of designing for minimum risk for a system (consisting of PES + SES), was simply and without much thought transferred from structural design. § It is useful for design of structures where PF and C refer to the same (limited scope) structures. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 28

Risk Caveats § But there are Problems using Risk as a design criterion for Risk Caveats § But there are Problems using Risk as a design criterion for a complete system (PES+SES) ; for example: 1. 2. June 2009 How do you combine $ damage with lives lost? PF is by design; C is mostly by historical evolution e. g. development and population growth in urban areas, often in flood prone areas. Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 29

Risk Caveats 3. June 2009 PF concerns individuals for whom the consequence of a Risk Caveats 3. June 2009 PF concerns individuals for whom the consequence of a PES failure is fairly fixed - they want lowest PF; C (and R) concerns the collective (governments, communities). They want the minimum total cost. These are opposing expectations Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 30

Resilience Caveats on PF We assume we know all about PF, but do we? Resilience Caveats on PF We assume we know all about PF, but do we? 1. PF is a statistical quantity that must be based on an appropriate data base. 2. There is no data base for direct hits by large cyclones and tsunamis at a location. 3. Basing PF for major disasters (but also for regular designable projects) on 100 years of (quiet) records is wrong – the wrong data base June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 31

Resilience More caveats on PF 4. Basing PF for major disasters on a synthesized Resilience More caveats on PF 4. Basing PF for major disasters on a synthesized data base can be dangerous with inappropriate and largely unverified data. 5. Using an inappropriate PF makes any design or risk analysis meaningless. 6. What is PF for “non-standard” design projects, such as nature reserves, designs involving impact of projects on fauna, etc? June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 32

Minimum Total Cost (Details of minimum total cost calculations are found in Addendum 2) Minimum Total Cost (Details of minimum total cost calculations are found in Addendum 2) § Since the collective (community, government) normally ends up paying for the protection and any disasters, it expects to be able to minimize its TOTAL COST = (PES + R) § The following points stand out. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 33

Minimum Total Cost § When risk (consequence of PES failure) is high (e. g. Minimum Total Cost § When risk (consequence of PES failure) is high (e. g. urban areas), the minimum total cost solution yields a low value of PF. § When risk is small (e. g. rural areas), the minimum total cost solution yields a higher value of PF § For mixed urban/rural areas, minizing the cost of PES failure unfortunately implies lower design values of PF for urban areas and higher values of PF for rural areas. § This results in very difficult stakeholder meetings, long discussions about resilience, compensation, etc. – why should one group suffer more ? June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 34

4. Resilience June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 35 4. Resilience June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 35

Resilience § Hot Topic l Indian Ocean Tsunami, New Orleans, Bangladesh and Burma Cyclones Resilience § Hot Topic l Indian Ocean Tsunami, New Orleans, Bangladesh and Burma Cyclones § Simple Definition*: Potential (of the system) to recover from damage § Opposite of fragility: little or no recovery * Diamond (2005) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 36

Resilience Why Sudden Interest? § Traditionally components of coastal systems have been designed for Resilience Why Sudden Interest? § Traditionally components of coastal systems have been designed for “suitably low PF” § But PF is often based on dubious or inappropriate statistics § Low PF may not be affordable § Thus, as recent disasters show, failure, even for low design PF, does happen. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 37

Resilience Other Concerns re Resilience § There are other major concerns: l “Secondary” Processes Resilience Other Concerns re Resilience § There are other major concerns: l “Secondary” Processes (“negligible” processes such as climate change, sea level rise, subsidence, “low probability” tsunami and storm surge) Infrastructure Concerns l Rampant and Unsafe Development l More detail in Addendum 3 l June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 38

5. Introducing Resilience June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 39 5. Introducing Resilience June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 39

Introducing Resilience § There are Three Stages of resilience design l l l Stage Introducing Resilience § There are Three Stages of resilience design l l l Stage 1: Design of a resilient PES Stage 2: Design of resilient government interface (explained below) Stage 3: Design of a resilient Base of Support (SES) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 40

Introducing Resilience Difficulty Stage 1 << Stage 2 << Stage 3 Usually the only Introducing Resilience Difficulty Stage 1 << Stage 2 << Stage 3 Usually the only stage considered June 2009 Usually not considered – thought to be too difficult Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 41

Introducing Resilience Stage 1: Resilient PES Loading Resistance (PES) Base of Support (SES) Resilience, Introducing Resilience Stage 1: Resilient PES Loading Resistance (PES) Base of Support (SES) Resilience, like Rubber June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 42

Introducing Resilience Translation § Structure does not collapse and can be repaired § Ecosystem Introducing Resilience Translation § Structure does not collapse and can be repaired § Ecosystem recovers from impacts § Usually the discussion on resilience stops here; resilience is mostly thought of as a technical problem ! June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 43

Stage 1: Design of Resilient PES § Traditionally in design of structures the Benefit/Cost Stage 1: Design of Resilient PES § Traditionally in design of structures the Benefit/Cost Ratio (BCR) was maximized § This criterion is no longer valid, since environmental impacts (EI) must be minimized § Instead of designing structures we must now design PES (structures + impacts) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 44

Stage 1 Design of PES § In the design of (PES), BCR and EI Stage 1 Design of PES § In the design of (PES), BCR and EI are equally important l Unfavorable BCR is rejected by the client l Unfavorable EI is rejected by the regulators, the public and stakeholders. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 45

Stage 1 Design of PES § Designing a PES instead of just structures is Stage 1 Design of PES § Designing a PES instead of just structures is a paradigm shift in design philosophy. § Incorporating Resilience in the PES is: l A second, necessary shift in design philosophy l Results in more costly structures l Carries large additional socio-economic costs June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 46

Example: Resilient PES for New Orleans (Presented in Addendum 4) June 2009 Moving Forward Example: Resilient PES for New Orleans (Presented in Addendum 4) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 47

Introducing Resilience But We Can Do (Much) Better § Introduce resilience throughout the complete Introducing Resilience But We Can Do (Much) Better § Introduce resilience throughout the complete system (PES + SES) § Within the SES, we must consider Governments - their powers and provisions – separately from the individuals and the public: l Governments are collective; the public consists of individuals l Governments have a different focus from the rest of BOS (e. g. minimum total cost vs low PF). June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 48

Introducing Resilience § We will think of Government and its services as an interface Introducing Resilience § We will think of Government and its services as an interface between the PES and the (rest of) the SES June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 49

Introducing Resilience Stage 2: Resilient Government Interface Loading Resistance (PES) Base of Support (SES) Introducing Resilience Stage 2: Resilient Government Interface Loading Resistance (PES) Base of Support (SES) Resilience, e. g. Rubber Government Provisions June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 50

Introducing Resilience Translation § Resilient Government Provisions (they keep going or recover quickly) l Introducing Resilience Translation § Resilient Government Provisions (they keep going or recover quickly) l Research and Development l Advance Warning Systems l Laws, Regulations, Zoning and Permitting l Communication, Transportation Networks l Utilities (electricity, water, sewage, garbage collection) l Rescue, Evacuation and Emergency Provisions June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 51

Introducing Resilience Stage 3: Resilient BOS Loading Resistance (Structure) Resilient BOS, e. g. Rubber Introducing Resilience Stage 3: Resilient BOS Loading Resistance (Structure) Resilient BOS, e. g. Rubber June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 52

Introducing Resilience Translation § All Stakeholders l l l Have been consulted and involved Introducing Resilience Translation § All Stakeholders l l l Have been consulted and involved from the beginning of the project Understand the project, benefits and impacts Are comfortable with designs and decisions Are aware of risks involved (before design is completed) All stakeholders are in agreement June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 53

Introducing Resilience Well… (Perhaps more likely) We have done our best to inform and Introducing Resilience Well… (Perhaps more likely) We have done our best to inform and discuss with all stakeholders and have been partially successful to obtain agreement. But we can justify our positions in any meetings of stakeholders, regulating bodies and the courts. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 54

Introducing Resilience Note on Innate Resilience of the BOS (Very important but hardly considered) Introducing Resilience Note on Innate Resilience of the BOS (Very important but hardly considered) § No-one wants to die or loose everything in a disaster § Most people will attempt anything to improve their dire situation (and hopefully to help others) § Afterward, people want get on with life ASAP § In resilience design, we must fully incorporate any innate resilience June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 55

Introducing Resilience Two Examples of the Innate Resilience of the BOS § Red River Introducing Resilience Two Examples of the Innate Resilience of the BOS § Red River flood of 1997 (Manitoba) l Gov’t officials + farmers + volunteers + army + contractors, were all resilient § Hurricane Charley, 2004 l Peace River Quilters’ Guild of Punta Gorda, FL June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 56

Red River Typical Rural/Urban mix 100 km Minimum total Cost means: Winnipeg: high risk, Red River Typical Rural/Urban mix 100 km Minimum total Cost means: Winnipeg: high risk, therefore low PF Valley: lower risk, therefore higher PF Tiresome in 2009 !! 1997 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 57

Red River Thanks to J. Doering June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis Red River Thanks to J. Doering June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 58

Reflecting on THE flood Emerson Grande Pointe Rosenort Ste. Agathe June 2009 Moving Forward Reflecting on THE flood Emerson Grande Pointe Rosenort Ste. Agathe June 2009 Moving Forward (2) Thanks to J. Doering J. W. Kamphuis 59

Red River Z dyke 34 km extension of west dyke Roughed out in 3 Red River Z dyke 34 km extension of west dyke Roughed out in 3 days Completed in 6 days Cost: ~7 M$ Excavated: 825, 000 m 3. 381 pieces of equipment Thanks to J. Doering June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 60

“Tropical Beauty” Peace River Quilters Guild’s Response to Hurricane Charley Shown with thanks to “Tropical Beauty” Peace River Quilters Guild’s Response to Hurricane Charley Shown with thanks to the Peace River Quilters Guild June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 61

6. Moving Forward With coastal design and management June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. 6. Moving Forward With coastal design and management June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 62

Moving Forward 1. Learn to make decisions within a cumbersome, complex contemporary decision-making process Moving Forward 1. Learn to make decisions within a cumbersome, complex contemporary decision-making process § § Work the process. Improve Coastal Project Management § § June 2009 train coastal engineers to be able to communicate and facilitate discussions; and get them involved in political and social issues train coastal managers to be able to manage and coordinate the whole CM portfolio (including technical aspects) Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 63

Moving Forward 2. Learn to think in terms of (and design) complete coastal systems, Moving Forward 2. Learn to think in terms of (and design) complete coastal systems, consisting of a PES supported by SES. 3. Learn to define and use PF properly 4. If the system can be designed with a “suitably low PF”, agreement and approvals will be easier since all parties are satisfied with this solution. Learn to design and examine this alternative carefully (mitigation). June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 64

Moving Forward 5. PES Failure (exceedence of the design conditions) happens, because often we Moving Forward 5. PES Failure (exceedence of the design conditions) happens, because often we cannot build to a “suitably low PF” or we do not have a data base to define PF properly; Learn to incorporate PES Failure in design (adaptation) 6. Adaptation means learning to design Resilience into the System. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 65

Moving Forward 7. Resilience design involves conflicting expectations, for example: § Individuals want low Moving Forward 7. Resilience design involves conflicting expectations, for example: § Individuals want low PF while the Collective wants minimum total cost. § Minimum cost involves higher PF in rural areas Learn how to deal with the implications 8. Resilience Design also involves fully incorporating SES and its innate resilience. 9. Learn to incorporate and evaluate consequences of PES failure and re-examine the concepts of Risk and Minimum Cost. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 66

Moving Forward 10. Resilience design is like a coin made up of two (very Moving Forward 10. Resilience design is like a coin made up of two (very different) sides. Learn how to: § Design resilient Physico-Environmental Subsystems (PES) § Facilitate the matching of the resilient PES with the Socio-Economic Subsystem (SES) within the complete system June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 67

Thank You This Presentation is posted on: www. civil. queensu. ca June 2009 Moving Thank You This Presentation is posted on: www. civil. queensu. ca June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 68

Addendum 1 The System June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 69 Addendum 1 The System June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 69

Addendum 1 - The System § Every design involves a system § Even a Addendum 1 - The System § Every design involves a system § Even a small coastal protection project involves a physical construction that impacts physical processes such as erosion/accretion; biological processes such as fish migration; environmental issues such as water quality socio-economic considerations such as local development (parks, houses, hotels) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 70

Addendum 1 - The System § Traditionally we designed structures § Maximum Benefit/Cost Ratio Addendum 1 - The System § Traditionally we designed structures § Maximum Benefit/Cost Ratio (BCR) § This paradigm is no longer valid, since environmental impacts (EI) must be minimized § Instead of designing structures we must now design Physico-Environmental Systems (PES) § Structures + impacts June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 71

Addendum 1 - The System § In the design of (PES), BCR and EI Addendum 1 - The System § In the design of (PES), BCR and EI are equally important l Unfavorable BCR is rejected by the client l Unfavorable EI is rejected by the regulators and the public. § Designing a PES instead of just structures is a paradigm shift in design philosophy. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 72

Addendum 1 - The System § The system we must design = PES + Addendum 1 - The System § The system we must design = PES + SES § Not just any combination of PES and SES; SES must form the Base of Support for the PES PES SES PES – Physico-Environmental Subsystem SES – Socio-Economic Subsystem June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 73

Addendum 1 - The System Loading - Water Levels, Waves Resistance (PES) - Structures Addendum 1 - The System Loading - Water Levels, Waves Resistance (PES) - Structures + Environment Base of Support (SES) - (Governments, Economy, Stakeholders) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 74

Addendum 1 - The System § In modern design, it is not possible to Addendum 1 - The System § In modern design, it is not possible to consider design of structures, etc. without including the environmental impacts in the design. This combination of structures and their environment, which essentially go hand-in-hand we will call the Physico-Environmental Subsystem (PES). June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 75

Addendum 1 - The System § System = Physico-Environmental Subsystem (PES) + Socio-Economic Subsystem Addendum 1 - The System § System = Physico-Environmental Subsystem (PES) + Socio-Economic Subsystem (SES) § PES = Structures + Environment (Impact) § SES = Public + Government + Economy Small system PES SES (mainly permitting) June 2009 Large system SES (government provisions - transportation, health care, research, permitting, etc. - plus stakeholders and the economy) Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis PES SES 76

Addendum 1 - The System Representation June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis Addendum 1 - The System Representation June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 77

Addendum 1 - The System § The system is not just any combination of Addendum 1 - The System § The system is not just any combination of PES and SES, but SES must form the Base of Support for the PES PES SES June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 78

Addendum 1 - The System Loading - Water Levels, Waves Resistance (PES) - Structures Addendum 1 - The System Loading - Water Levels, Waves Resistance (PES) - Structures + Environment Base of Support (SES) - (Governments, Economy, Stakeholders) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 79

Addendum 2 Calculation of Minimum Total Cost June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Addendum 2 Calculation of Minimum Total Cost June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 80

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost (Details of minimum total cost calculations Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost (Details of minimum total cost calculations are found in Addendum 2) § Since the collective (community, government) normally ends up paying for the protection and any disasters, it expects to be able to minimize its TOTAL COST = (PES + R) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 81

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost $, € Risk Total Cost Minimum Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost $, € Risk Total Cost Minimum PES PF June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 82

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost (Exponential) Log $, € 1011 Minimum Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost (Exponential) Log $, € 1011 Minimum 1010 PF 109 =2 x 10 -3 Total Cost Risk ~ 1011 ∙ PF 108 PES ~ 106 ∙ PF-0. 8 107 106 10 -5 June 2009 10 -4 10 -3 10 -2 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 10 -1 Log PF 100 83

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost § This solution results in PF Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost § This solution results in PF ≈ 2 x 10 -3 at minimum total cost § This PF may be higher than individuals are prepared to accept and will lead to difficult stakeholder negotiations in the decision making process § If the cost of Consequences (or Risk) is very high, it is possible that the marginal cost of providing greater protection is small (relative to Risk) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 84

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost (Exponential) Total Cost Log $, € Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost (Exponential) Total Cost Log $, € 1011 Risk ~ PF 5 1010 109 108 PES ~ 106 ∙ PF -0. 8 Minimum 107 PF=4 x 10 -5 106 10 -5 June 2009 10 -4 10 -3 10 -2 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 10 -1 Log PF 100 85

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost (Exponential) Total Cost Log $, € Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Minimum Total Cost (Exponential) Total Cost Log $, € 1011 Risk ~ 1000 (1011 ∙ PF 1010 109 108 Minimum PES ~ 106 ∙ PF-0. 8 PF=4 x 10 -5 107 106 10 -5 June 2009 10 -4 10 -3 10 -2 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 10 -1 Log PF 100 86

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost § These figures point to the easy route through Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost § These figures point to the easy route through the contemporary decision making process for high risk areas. § Minimum cost results in a low PF ≈ 4 x 10 -5. § This is the traditional engineering solution “failure” must be prevented at all cost ! § This solution satisfies everyone l Individuals like the high PF l The collective likes the low cost June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 87

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost § We actually discussed two typical regions l The Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost § We actually discussed two typical regions l The solution with the relatively low cost consequences is representative of rural areas; the resulting PF is higher l The solution with the relatively high cost consequences is representative of urban areas; the resulting PF is lower. § Consider one (the commonest type of PES failure – Flooding. For minimum total flood management cost, the cost for all elements in the flood plain must be summed. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 88

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost § To minimize total Flood Management cost of a Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost § To minimize total Flood Management cost of a mixed area, PF has to vary from high in rural areas to low in urban areas, i. e, flood agricultural land to increase the safety of urban areas. § This results in very difficult stakeholder meetings, long discussions of resilience, compensation, etc. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 89

Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Note with respect to flood management: § High PF Addendum 2 – Minimum Cost Note with respect to flood management: § High PF in rural areas decreases the urban PF even more if the rural areas are upstream of the urban areas in a drainage basin! § Politically Correct Decision - Everyone same PF - results in: l l l Raising urban PF, which makes both the urban individuals and the collective unhappy. Lowering rural PF, which makes the collective unhappy. Bad decision! June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 90

Addendum 3 Other Concerns about Resilience June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis Addendum 3 Other Concerns about Resilience June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 91

Addendum 3 – Other Concerns § There are other major concerns: l “Secondary Processes” Addendum 3 – Other Concerns § There are other major concerns: l “Secondary Processes” l Infrastructure Concerns l Rampant and Unsafe Development June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 92

Resilience Other Concerns re Resilience § There are other major concerns: l “Secondary” Processes Resilience Other Concerns re Resilience § There are other major concerns: l “Secondary” Processes (“negligible” processes such as climate change, sea level rise, subsidence, “low probability” tsunami and storm surge) Infrastructure Concerns l Rampant and Unsafe Development l More detail in Addendum 3 l June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 93

Addendum 3 – Other Concerns “Secondary” Processes § They cause p(f) ↑ with time, Addendum 3 – Other Concerns “Secondary” Processes § They cause p(f) ↑ with time, e. g. p(f)=10 -4→ 10 -2 § To return to e. g p(f)=10 -4 is very costly § Since upgrading and maintenance have been delayed, many systems are now vulnerable June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 94

Addendum 3 – Other Concerns Infrastructure Concerns § Much coastal infrastructure has been designed Addendum 3 – Other Concerns Infrastructure Concerns § Much coastal infrastructure has been designed and built over the last 50 years and approaches the end of its useful life. § Much infrastructure was poorly designed and built. § Much infrastructure was built to nebulous and often unrelated standards. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 95

Addendum 3 – Other Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development § In “developing” countries: l Addendum 3 – Other Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development § In “developing” countries: l l l Overcrowding pushes the people toward relatively empty shores (often emptied by recent disasters and therefore vulnerable by definition). Economic migration from the countryside to overcrowded cities, often located along rivers and estuaries and expanding into flood prone areas. There is an economic push to develop tourism facilities close to the shores. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 96

Addendum 3 – Other Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development § In “developed” countries: l Addendum 3 – Other Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development § In “developed” countries: l l Push by developers - the more area they develop, the more money they earn. Much of this real estate expansion has taken place in “empty”, but flood-prone areas (e. g. filled-in wetlands), often in cooperation with government agencies who need the money from • Cost sharing to build flood protection works, • Increased income from property taxes. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 97

Addendum 3 – Other Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development § In “developed” countries (2): Addendum 3 – Other Concerns Rampant and Unsafe Development § In “developed” countries (2): l Much of this real estate development has taken place in the attractive and often overcrowded shore zone, leaving many expensive properties exposed to destruction by high water levels and wave action. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 98

Addendum 4 Design Example: Resilient PES for New Orleans June 2009 Moving Forward (2) Addendum 4 Design Example: Resilient PES for New Orleans June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 99

Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans From IPET (2006) June 2009 Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans From IPET (2006) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 100

Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans Den Haag Arnhem From IPET Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans Den Haag Arnhem From IPET (2006) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 101

Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans From IPET (2006) June 2009 Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans From IPET (2006) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 102

Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Problem 1: The design Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Problem 1: The design of a resilient PBS for New Orleans can not be done in some theoretical vacuum. § New Orleans is a living city. The world did not stop moving for its citizens. § Citizens are understandably impatient with the progress made since the disaster. l They need shelter, housing, clean water immediately. They want to move back in quickly. l They need aid and relief ASAP and government agencies are perceived to be too slow. l They want all government agencies to cooperate and provide for them. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 103

Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Problem 2: “Hope springs Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Problem 2: “Hope springs eternal” – San Francisco, Vancouver, Bangladesh, New Orleans, Netherlands § Property owners want to renovate, rebuild immediately in the same vulnerable location § As a result, many building permits have been issued quickly, which leaves little opportunity for proper planning, new layouts, new zoning, etc. § Many (often stop-gap) measures were initiated soon after the disaster to rebuild existing protection leaving little opportunity for new design. § Planning and design after such a disaster aims at a moving target. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 104

Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Option 1: Reconstruct PES Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Option 1: Reconstruct PES properly § Make all the necessary corrections and improvements in design and construction with benefit of hindsight § This would be a gigantic project § It would be very costly § It would still result in a brittle or rigid (nonresilient) system June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 105

Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Option 2: Resilient New Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Option 2: Resilient New Orleans PES would require all of the above, plus the following: l Large mass earthen dikes instead of the vertical walls l Secondary dikes to subdivide flood-prone areas into smaller sub-basins l Networks of interconnected drainage channels with sufficient pumping capacity to evacuate hurricane rainfall. Pumps should continue to function under all hurricane conditions. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 106

Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Direct cost of such Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Direct cost of such a resilient system would be much greater than simple reconstruction. § But, there is also a large socio-economic cost to provision of this resilience, for example: l l l Design and construction will take much longer Large footprints of the larger and more numerous structures will seriously reduce available real estate area. Systems of dikes and channels will severely impact the city’s communication/transportation systems June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 107

Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Yet, all this only Stage 1 PES Design Example – Resilient New Orleans § Yet, all this only refers to the costs of Stage 1 - constructing a resilient PBS. § Appropriate Stage 1 design of PES will take a long time to plan, design and carry out § The citizens don’t have that time. § Yet Stage 1 is the only sensible alternative to haphazard reconstruction of ineffective protection in this vulnerable location. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 108

Stages 2 and 3 SES Design § Option 3: Much additional resilience can be Stages 2 and 3 SES Design § Option 3: Much additional resilience can be gained through contributions from the Socio -Economic System (SES), e. g: l l l Resilient government provisions such as research, zoning laws, emergency evacuation, health care, social assistance (Stage 2) Citizens’ awareness and involvement (Stage 3) Agreements on Flood Management Practice on the lower Mississippi River. (Stage 3) § These Stages 2 and 3 will take even much longer June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 109

Addendum 5 Design Example: Red River Flood 1997 Material from Prof J. Doering, U. Addendum 5 Design Example: Red River Flood 1997 Material from Prof J. Doering, U. Manitoba ☺! June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 110

Red River Typical Rural/Urban mix 100 km Minimum total Cost means: Winnipeg: high risk, Red River Typical Rural/Urban mix 100 km Minimum total Cost means: Winnipeg: high risk, therefore low PF Valley: lower risk, therefore higher PF 1997 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 111

Red River Floods 1826 – 225, 000 cfs = 6400 m 3 /s – Red River Floods 1826 – 225, 000 cfs = 6400 m 3 /s – 165, 000 cfs 1852 1997 – 162, 500 cfs = 4600 m 3 1861 – 125, 000 /s cfs 1979 – 106, 000 cfs 1826 2 x Rhine 1852 1861 1950 – 104, 000 cfs = 3000 m 3 June 2009 1997 1950 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 1979 112

Red River § § 1826 – Flooded the Red River Settlement 1950 - Winnipeg Red River § § 1826 – Flooded the Red River Settlement 1950 - Winnipeg flooded 1966, 1979, 1997 – Winnipeg in danger 1950 Flood: l l l Q= 3000 m 3/s 100, 000 evacuate, Hospitals evacuate 10, 000 homes flooded City Centre submerged 700 M$ damage (p. v. ) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 113

Red River Winnipeg, 1950 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 114 Red River Winnipeg, 1950 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 114

Red River Winnipeg, 1950 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 115 Red River Winnipeg, 1950 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 115

Red River Winnipeg, 1950 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 116 Red River Winnipeg, 1950 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 116

Primary Dykes § Response: Strengthen the structures § Primary diking system was constructed in Primary Dykes § Response: Strengthen the structures § Primary diking system was constructed in 1950 by Greater Winnipeg Diking Board § Built to: l 15 m width l raise to 1950 level + 0. 6 m l two traffic lanes on dry side § Capacity: ~ 2300 m 3/s (= ½ of 1997 flood discharge) § Length: ~ 111 km § 31 pumping stations built § Cost: 4. 6 M$ June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 117

Subsequent Investigations § Two Investigations l Red River Basin Investigation • 1952 to 1956 Subsequent Investigations § Two Investigations l Red River Basin Investigation • 1952 to 1956 l Royal Commission on Floods • 1956 to 1958 • recommendations: – Winnipeg Floodway – Portage Diversion – Shellmouth Reservoir June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 118

The Infrastructure Recommendati ons Shellmouth Reservoir As b ni si Portage Diversion ne oi The Infrastructure Recommendati ons Shellmouth Reservoir As b ni si Portage Diversion ne oi Winnipeg Floodway Portage Diversion Shellmouth Res. R. Winnipeg Red R. Brandon June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis Winnipeg Floodway 119

Red River Floodway: § § § § § Cost: 63. 2 M$ (1960’s) • Red River Floodway: § § § § § Cost: 63. 2 M$ (1960’s) • 9 m deep • 200 – 300 m wide • 47 km long • Started: Oct ‘ 62 / Completed: March ‘ 68 • Excavation: 100, 000 m 3 - 40% of Panama Canal excavation - more than Suez Canal - required most of Manitoba’s equipment June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 120

Red River Floodway: § § 2400 m 3/s is practical capacity of floodway 1997 Red River Floodway: § § 2400 m 3/s is practical capacity of floodway 1997 Flood (1900 m 3/s in floodway) 2300? June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 121

1997 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 122 1997 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 122

Red River § § § The 1997 Flood 6, 608, 000 sandbags 24/7 cartage Red River § § § The 1997 Flood 6, 608, 000 sandbags 24/7 cartage of clay for secondary dykes (360, 000 m 3) 8, 500 armed forces personnel Built 34 km west dyke extension (72 hrs) “countless” volunteers Resilient Population: people + equipment June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 123

Red River June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 124 Red River June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 124

Red River June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 125 Red River June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 125

Red River Z dyke 34 km extension of west dyke Roughed out in 3 Red River Z dyke 34 km extension of west dyke Roughed out in 3 days Completed in 6 days Cost: ~7 M$ Excavated: 825, 000 m 3. 381 pieces of equipment June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 126

Ring Dykes Post 1966 Flood Ring Dykes: Cost: 2. 7 M$ Completed: 1972 1997 Ring Dykes Post 1966 Flood Ring Dykes: Cost: 2. 7 M$ Completed: 1972 1997 Post Flood Ring Dykes: Lowe Farm (☻) Rosenfeld (☻) Gretna (☻) Riverside (☻) Ste Agathe (i. p. ) Grande Pte (i. p. ) June 2009 Niverville (x) Brunkild Rosenort Morris St. Jean Letellier Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis Ste. Adolphe Dominion City Emerson 127

Red River § The 1997 Flood The area experienced a flood of 7. 5 Red River § The 1997 Flood The area experienced a flood of 7. 5 m in 1997; 28, 000 people were evacuated and there was $500 Million in damage to property and infrastructure, even with the flood protection measures Environmental implications were: § l l l Water Quality of the Red Sea and Lake Winnipeg Chemicals were released in the floodplain Wells and groundwater were contaminated June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 128

Reflecting on THE flood Emerson Grande Pointe Rosenort Ste. Agathe June 2009 Moving Forward Reflecting on THE flood Emerson Grande Pointe Rosenort Ste. Agathe June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 129

Red River Winnipeg, 1950 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 130 Red River Winnipeg, 1950 June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 130

The Options after 1997 1. Expand the Floodway June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. The Options after 1997 1. Expand the Floodway June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 131 Source: KGS Group, Nov. 200

The Options 2. Ste. Agathe Detention Structure l l June 2009 Moving Forward (2) The Options 2. Ste. Agathe Detention Structure l l June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis Open except when flow exceeds floodway capacity Otherwise it is passive (no influence on water levels) 132 Source: KGS Group, Nov. 200

The Options (Summary) Limit to Level of Protection Options No. 1 § expand floodway The Options (Summary) Limit to Level of Protection Options No. 1 § expand floodway § raise west dyke § raise primary dykes § upgrade city flood protection infrastructure No. 2 § Ste. Agathe detention structure § upgrade city flood protection infrastructure June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis P. V. of Cost [M$] 1 in 250 yrs. (natural) 658 1 in 700 yrs. (emergency) 1 in 1, 000 yrs. 543 133 Source: KGS Group, Nov. 2001

Red River § The best choice is clearly the second option - the Ste Red River § The best choice is clearly the second option - the Ste Agathe structure because: l l § § The Choice Most economical Safest Provides most resilience Minimises Risk (not flooding Winnipeg). Ideally, parts of both schemes should be implemented for maximum resilience (through (redundance) and least impact upstream. The economics for this look very good: the total cost of $ 1. 2 B for the combination vs the social and economic disruption of flooding Winnipeg (provincial capital – 700, 000) June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 134

The Choice Yet, Floodway Expansion was Preferred l l l l June 2009 No The Choice Yet, Floodway Expansion was Preferred l l l l June 2009 No legal agreements required (no delays!) No Environmental assessments required Incremental benefits for incremental work Visibility (used 2 out of 3 years vs. 1 in 90 yrs) Could be expanded in the future No upstream flooding This choice obviously made to circumvent a lengthy decision making/approvals process Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 135

Red River Missed Opportunity § § After the 1997 Flood, there was time to Red River Missed Opportunity § § After the 1997 Flood, there was time to do proper pre-engineering and engineering design. With early involvement of all (particularly rural) stakeholders, starting immediately after the flood, with excellent communication, the combination solution (Ste Agathe dam + Floodway could have been achieved. June 2009 Moving Forward (2) J. W. Kamphuis 136