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Missile Proliferation and Missile Defense in Northeast Asia Daniel A. Pinkston International Crisis Group Missile Proliferation and Missile Defense in Northeast Asia Daniel A. Pinkston International Crisis Group The 8 th ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Issues Sŏgwip’o, Cheju-do, ROK, 17 November 2009

Long live the peerless commander General Kim Jong Il who has established our country Long live the peerless commander General Kim Jong Il who has established our country as one of the world’s nuclear states!

Overview • DPRK Missile Capabilities • Nonproliferation Concerns • DPRK Space Program and Scientific Overview • DPRK Missile Capabilities • Nonproliferation Concerns • DPRK Space Program and Scientific Nationalism • Preemption Doctrine and Rhetoric • ROK Cruise Missile Program • MD • Policy Recommendations

DPRK Missile Capabilities • DPRK began to produce multiple rocket launchers in the 1960 DPRK Missile Capabilities • DPRK began to produce multiple rocket launchers in the 1960 s • Acquired surface-to-ship missiles and FROG rockets in late 1960 s • Produced Scud-B (火星-5; Hwasŏng-5) by mid 1980 s • Developed Scud-C (火星-6; Hwasŏng-6) by late 1980 s • Tested Nodong (光明星? ) in 1993 • Exported Scuds and Nodong to several countries

DPRK Missile Capabilities • Flight-tested Paektusan-1 (白 頭山-1; Taepodong-1) with attempted satellite launch 31 DPRK Missile Capabilities • Flight-tested Paektusan-1 (白 頭山-1; Taepodong-1) with attempted satellite launch 31 August 1998 • Missile exercise 5 July 2006, but Paektusan-2 failed • Failed Ŭnha-2 (銀河-2) SLV launch 5 April 2009 • Has tested and deployed improved anti-ship cruise missile KN-01 based on Chinese “Silkworm” • Tested and probably deployed KN-02 or “Toksa (毒蛇)” based on SS-21 “Scarab”

Ghuari, Hwasŏng, KN-01 Ghuari, Hwasŏng, KN-01

New Missile “Musudan” • In 2003, U. S. satellite imagery detected a new ballistic New Missile “Musudan” • In 2003, U. S. satellite imagery detected a new ballistic missile under development that appears to be based upon the Soviet R-27 (SS-N-6) • liquid-fueled submarinelaunched ballistic missile with a range of at least 2, 500 km; land-based version has a range of 2, 500 -4, 000 km • Reportedly displayed during 25 April 2007 parade, but not on DPRK television • Ŭnha-2 second stage reportedly a modified Musudan

Inventory • About 355 -685 Scud-variants; liquid fueled and road mobile; 27 -40 TELs Inventory • About 355 -685 Scud-variants; liquid fueled and road mobile; 27 -40 TELs • About 220 -320 Nodongs; liquid fueled and road mobile; 27 -30 TELs • Musudan; no flight tests; 20 -30 deployed? 22 -27 TELs? • “Toksa” (KN-02); solid-fueled and road mobile • Paektusan-1 program terminated • Paektusan-2 not operational; launched from tower • Land attack cruise missiles?

Warheads • Hwasŏng, Nodong, Paektusan-2, and Musudan capable of delivering nukes – DPRK probably Warheads • Hwasŏng, Nodong, Paektusan-2, and Musudan capable of delivering nukes – DPRK probably has been able to miniaturize warhead package • HE warheads, but only useful with Toksa (KN-02) • CW warheads likely for all systems, but little known about number and doctrine • BW warheads unlikely; but possible UAV delivery systems unknown

Institutional Structure • National Defense Commission ultimate authority – Warheads have not been transferred Institutional Structure • National Defense Commission ultimate authority – Warheads have not been transferred to KPA; separate authority with NDC member Chu Kyu-ch’ang probable head – Second Natural Sciences Academy (第 2自然科學院 ) responsible for applied military research – Second Economic Committee (第 2 經濟委員會 ), nominally subordinate to the KWP Central Committee Munitions Industry Department (勞動黨 中央委員會 軍需 業部 ), manages weapons production – Fourth Bureau produces rockets and missiles • Ministry of People’s Armed Forces manages training and operations during peace time • Supreme Commander issues orders to General Staff during war

Youthful NDC Youthful NDC

Nonproliferation Concerns • DPRK views missiles exports as “normal business” • UNSCR 1874 “demands Nonproliferation Concerns • DPRK views missiles exports as “normal business” • UNSCR 1874 “demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology” • Sanctions regime under UNSCR 1695, 1718 and 1874 – – Bans all arms exports Financial sanctions Luxury goods Travel bans

DPRK Space Program and Scientific Nationalism • Building a “Strong and Powerful Country” (强盛大 DPRK Space Program and Scientific Nationalism • Building a “Strong and Powerful Country” (强盛大 國建設戰略) – Ideology/politics – Military – Economics • Missiles and SLVs have high symbolic value – Regime emphasizes S&T for economic recovery and legitimacy – Missiles serve multiple purposes for domestic politics

Modernize and “Informationize” the People’s Economy Modernize and “Informationize” the People’s Economy

Paektusan-1 (白頭山-1) Paektusan-1 (白頭山-1)

Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 (光明星-1) Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 (光明星-1)

Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 Trajectory Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 Trajectory

Ŭnha-2 Launch Ŭnha-2 Launch

New Space Center at Tongch’ang-ri New Space Center at Tongch’ang-ri

Preemption Doctrine and Rhetoric • Increasing rhetoric regarding the right to “preemptive selfdefense” • Preemption Doctrine and Rhetoric • Increasing rhetoric regarding the right to “preemptive selfdefense” • Increasing gap in N-S conventional balance • First strike advantages • 10 November 2009 N -S Yellow Sea battle

ROK Cruise Missile Program • ROK ballistic missile range limited to 180 km by ROK Cruise Missile Program • ROK ballistic missile range limited to 180 km by 1979 MOU with the U. S. • ROK joined MTCR in March 2001 • ROK says no range limits with cruise missile payload under 500 kg • Began to deploy 1, 000 km-range LACMs early this year • Developing 1, 500 km-range LACM

MD and NE Asian Security • Japan has highest threat perception; response will be MD and NE Asian Security • Japan has highest threat perception; response will be more MD • ROK deploying limited MD • China could respond to deployment of robust, layered MD – Weapons could target MD assets, including those in space – Possible missile build-up

Policy Recommendations • Focus on sanctions regime, but… – Negotiated walk-back or erosion through Policy Recommendations • Focus on sanctions regime, but… – Negotiated walk-back or erosion through “sanctions fatigue? ” – Inter-Korean CBMs desperately needed • ROK should disclose CWC compliance • Cool down preemption rhetoric – Engage DPRK • Link economics and security • Test DPRK intentions – Begin serious discussion on peaceful space cooperation – Deploy limited MD, but realize political sensitivities and technological limits—not a substitute for arms control

References • • Crisis Group Asia Report N° 167, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological References • • Crisis Group Asia Report N° 167, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, ” 18 June 2009. Crisis Group Asia Report N° 168, “North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, ” 18 June 2009. Crisis Group Asia Report N° 169, “North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, ” 18 June 2009. Crisis Group Asia Report N° 179, “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea, ” 2 November 2009. Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program (Carlisle, February 2008). Daniel A. Pinkston, “North Korea Displays Ballistic Missiles during Military Parade, Some for First Time, ” WMD Insights, June 2007. Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korea Tests 1, 000 Kilometer Range Cruise Missile and Develops 1, 500 Kilometer-range Version, ” WMD Insights, November 2006. Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korean Response to North Korean July Missile Exercise Includes Unveiling of New Cruise Missile, ” WMD Insights, October 2006.