Missile Defence: Background and Issues Dr Larry Chasteen 2000 IEEE Congressional Fellow currently at University of Texas at Dallas THE IEEE 125 th YEAR CELEBRATION, IEEE South Africa Section
Presentation outline § § § 2 Engineering Education Current Missile Defence Program Video Proposed EU Missile Defence Q&A Operational MD Video
Future Engineering Education Key to Success 3
10 Global Mega-Trends – – – Globalization Energy Terrorism Environmental Disruptive Change – – – Demographics Regulation Government Research Science & Technology The Workplace What does this mean for university students? 4
Preparation of Engineers for the Future Adapt to flexible working conditions – Work in multilingual, multicultural, multigenerational teams – Collaborate when not collocated and across time zones Must be innovative and entrepreneurial – Able to deal with dilemmas, risks and uncertainties Broad knowledge of global issues & societal implications Able to combine diverse domains & disciplines – Adapt to rapid technology changes – Must be life-long learners Engineers must be even more flexible, agile and resilient. 5
The Evolution of Engineering Engineer of 1960 (hero) Engineer of 1980 (nerd) Engineer of today (technologist) Engineer of 2020 (global citizen) • “Technology is cool” 6 • “I am a citizen of the world” --Socrates
Presentation outline § § § 7 Engineering Education Current Missile Defence Program Video Proposed EU Missile Defence Q&A Operational MD Video
Missile Defence (1) Warfare = battle of offense and defence – Spears versus walled cities – Machine guns versus tanks – Aircraft versus anti-aircraft guns – Ships versus Submarines – Aircraft versus surface-to-air missiles – ICBM’s versus ? ? § Had no counter - so have relied on Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) – you don’t attack me because my counter attack will destroy you! 8
Missile Defence (2) Missile defence History – 2 eras – Nuclear-armed interceptors § Started in the 1950’s § Ended with the closing of America's first missile defence system (Safeguard) in 1976 § Decided that MAD would work better – Non-nuclear missile defences – hit-to-kill § Started with Reagan’s SDI in the 1980’s § Continued with TMD and NMD in 1990’s § Combined as MD in 2000’s 9
Missile Defence (3) 10
Missile Defence (4) The Clinton Limited Missile defence Program – Pressured by Congress (1996) to increase program – New threats – North Korean 3 stage rocket Clinton’s plan – Upgrade existing early warning radars (EWR) – Develop ground based X-band radars (GBR) – Develop “hit-to-kill” interceptor (GBI) Series of flight tests to prove technical feasibility – Failure of key test on July 8, 2000 – Clinton postponed production decision to Bush 11
ABM Treaty Issues Signed in 1972 between U. S. and Soviet Union. – An obstacle to pursuing technically feasible and affordable missile defence – really didn’t want an effective MD due to reliance on MAD. – But no longer appropriate to U. S. -Russian relations. President Bush announced withdrawal on 13 Dec. 2001 – effective 14 June 2002. – Can have a layered system that leverages land, air, sea, and space-based sensors for global coverage of missile threats. – Theater systems can now participate in a defence against ballistic missiles of all ranges, and all phases of flight. 12
Missile Defence (5) The Bush Missile defence program – Bush expanded the scope of Clinton’s limited MD and increased the funding – Added sea-based component (Aegis ship) – Investigated space based components – Added new testing capabilities – Summary – not define specific architecture or milestones but rather pursue a broad, flexible RDT&E program (spiral development) 13
Missile Defence (6) 14
Missile Defence (7) The UEWRs performance improved in the following areas: Acquisition- Ability to acquire RV- sized objects at long range based upon satellite cues Tracking- Precision track estimates to allow interceptor commit and update with improved accuracy and extremely high probability of intercept Object Classification- Identify threatening (RV-like) versus nonthreatening objects Command Control - Provide real-time, low latency command control interface in addition to current interfaces 15
Missile Defence (8) • Characteristics 16 and Measurement Capabilities of Current and Planned Radars
Missile Defence (9) Surveillance & targeting is a combination of systems • Satellites notify of launch • EWR’s identifies as a threat and the potential target • X Band radar finalizes target location/intercept • Missile seeker allows the “hit-tokill” 17
Missile Defence (10) At the end of 2009, US MD system will have: – About 25, 3 -stage, ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. – About 550 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles. – About 20 Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) sea-based interceptors. – Three Aegis Cruisers and seven Aegis Destroyers, armed with these SM-3’s. – Seven Aegis Destroyers configured for the Long-Range Surveillance and Track mission. – Upgraded early warning radars in California and the UK and an upgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska. – A Sea-Based X-Band radar located in the Pacific. – Two Forward-Based X-Band Radars (one in Japan, one in Israel). – A Command Control, Battle Management and Communications system. – Provides adequate protection against North Korea 18
Presentation outline § § § 19 Engineering Education Current Missile Defence Program Video Proposed EU Missile Defence Q&A Operational MD Video
Presentation outline § § § 20 Engineering Education Current Missile Defence Program Video Proposed EU Missile Defence Q&A Operational MD Video
A New Strategic Environment Today’s threat is more complex, less predictable, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology North Korea and Iran threaten regional stability and challenge global non-proliferation objectives Traditional deterrence (MAD) may not be adequate to deter these new threats Missile defence can contribute to deterrence, as well as provide insurance should deterrence fail 21
Iranian Missile Threat Range 22
Original Elements for European Missile Defence System Up to 10 silo-based, 2 -stage, long-range interceptors located in Poland (by 2017) • Re-location/upgrade of a narrow-beam, X-Band, midcourse tracking radar previously used at our Pacific test range to the Czech Republic (2017) • Field a forward based X-band radar focused on the Iranian threat to provide detection, cueing, and tracking information (date- tbd) • 23
Coverage w/o European Site 24
Coverage with European Site 25
Revised US Proposal for Europe 4 Phases Install just the elements needed to counter near term Iran threats – short and medium range missiles – Aegis ships in Mediterranean by 2011 – If Iran develops longer range missiles, install additional land versions of SM-3 in Europe by 2015 (Poland being considered) – Improved versions of SM-3 by 2018 if required – Final version of SM-3 by 2020 if required 26
Summary: New Roles for Missile defence ü Reduce use of nuclear weapons and missiles for coercion and blackmail. ü Create disincentives to develop, acquire, or use ballistic missiles. ü Provide insurance against accidental or unauthorized launch. ü Install only the equipment required to counter current or near term threats. 27
Presentation outline § § § 28 Engineering Education Current Missile Defence Program Video Proposed EU Missile Defence Q&A Operational MD Video
Presentation outline § § § 29 Engineering Education Current Missile Defence Program Video Proposed EU Missile Defence Q&A Operational MD Video
Extra Slides 30
Issues Cost, complexity, technical risks – With enough funding, engineers can solve the technical issues – But can we afford MD, the war on terrorism, wars in the middle-east, and the economic bail -out? 31
Responding to Russian concerns The US has no interest in an arms race with Russia. Ten interceptors in Poland will not affect the strategic balance or pose a threat to Russia. The US has consulted with Russia frequently, and is considering Russian proposals on alternate radars. However, President Obama has reopened bilateral missile defence talks to address Russian concerns. – Possible mobile interceptors instead of silo-based “One Cold War was quite enough. ” 32
Ineffectiveness of European-based BMD Against Russian ICBMs 33
Presentation outline § § § § 34 Engineering Education Current Missile Defence Program Video Proposed EU Missile Defence Countermeasures Q&A Operational MD Video
Missile Defence Impact of countermeasures on the system – One of the major concerns – Details are classified – Testing, thus far, has not included realistic countermeasures – Video 35
Don’t Forget to visit ieee 125. org www. ieee. org. za 36
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