Скачать презентацию Lijphart C 7 Exec-legislative relations C 8 Electoral Скачать презентацию Lijphart C 7 Exec-legislative relations C 8 Electoral

50c41db8df7f85ae169dbec6f1088a4f.ppt

  • Количество слайдов: 46

Lijphart C 7: Exec-legislative relations C 8: Electoral Systems Lijphart C 7: Exec-legislative relations C 8: Electoral Systems

Presidential V. Parliamentary o Major Differences n n n o Separation and confidence Nature Presidential V. Parliamentary o Major Differences n n n o Separation and confidence Nature of election Collegial v. noncollegial Other Differences n n n Separation of powers means that executive officers cannot serve in the legislature (there are some exceptions in some parliamentary systems) Presidents cannot dissolve the legislature Head of State v. Head of Government

Simple Models: Parl v. Pres Source: http: //dss. ucsd. edu/~mshugart/semi-presidentialism. pdf Simple Models: Parl v. Pres Source: http: //dss. ucsd. edu/~mshugart/semi-presidentialism. pdf

Veto Gates: UK v. US o UK: One veto gate: House of Commons (ignoring Veto Gates: UK v. US o UK: One veto gate: House of Commons (ignoring House of Lords, which is not powerless, but is definitely weaker than House of Commons) o US has three elected veto gates n n n Presidency House of Representatives Senate

Veto Gates: UK v. US US: n Separate origin and survival of each institution: Veto Gates: UK v. US US: n Separate origin and survival of each institution: n --must transact n Inter-branch transactions, even if the same party has presidency and congressional majorities

Parliamentary Systems with Minority or Coalitional Governments o o Still hierarchical relationship of cabinet Parliamentary Systems with Minority or Coalitional Governments o o Still hierarchical relationship of cabinet to parliament …cabinet survives only so long as it does not lose the “confidence” of the legislative majority But absence of a majority means interparty transactions (i. e. , among multiple veto players)

Presidential Systems: US v. Brazil Compared to the US, Brazil’s presidency is “stronger”: Decree Presidential Systems: US v. Brazil Compared to the US, Brazil’s presidency is “stronger”: Decree power And “weaker”: Veto can be overridden by 50%+1 (not two thirds) Note: Lula’s PT won 19. 2% of the vote for Senate in 2006, electing 6 of the 27 senators up for election and 15% of the vote for deputies, winning 83 out of 513 seats

Hybrid/Semi-Presidential/Mixed Systems o o President elected by the public Appoints a PM and Cabinet Hybrid/Semi-Presidential/Mixed Systems o o President elected by the public Appoints a PM and Cabinet Subject to Parliamentary Approval “Cohabitation” Examples: France, Russia (many others)

Semi-Presidential Systems Semi-Presidential Systems

On Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism On Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism

France (a Premier-Presidential System) o o France 1981: François Mitterrand, Socialist Party, elected President France (a Premier-Presidential System) o o France 1981: François Mitterrand, Socialist Party, elected President in May, 1981 But National Assembly (474 seats, five-year term), elected in 1978: Mitterrand’s alliance: Socialists Communists Opposition Gaullists UDF 102 86 178 124

France 1981: President Mitterrand exercised his constitutional authority to dissolve parliament 1978 1981 (14 France 1981: President Mitterrand exercised his constitutional authority to dissolve parliament 1978 1981 (14 June) 102 86 268 43 142 124 80 59 Mitterrand’s alliance: Socialists Communists Opposition Gaullists UDF …able to appoint a Socialist premier and cabinet (Pierre Mauroy)

1986 National Assembly election Mitterrand’s alliance: Socialists Communists 198 32 Opposition Gaullists UDF 146 1986 National Assembly election Mitterrand’s alliance: Socialists Communists 198 32 Opposition Gaullists UDF 146 128

Cohabitation! Mitterrand had to appoint a premier from the Gaullist–UDF alliance (Jacques Chirac) Cohabitation! Mitterrand had to appoint a premier from the Gaullist–UDF alliance (Jacques Chirac)

France 1988: Mitterrand reelected, dissolved parliament again 1986 Mitterrand’s alliance: Socialists 198 Communists 32 France 1988: Mitterrand reelected, dissolved parliament again 1986 Mitterrand’s alliance: Socialists 198 Communists 32 Opposition Gaullists 146 UDF 128 1988 260 24 123 130 …Mitterrand able to appoint a Socialist premier again (Michel Rocard)

France 1997 o o President is now Jacques Chirac, elected 1995 Chirac dissolved parliament France 1997 o o President is now Jacques Chirac, elected 1995 Chirac dissolved parliament in 1997

France 1997 1993 Chirac’s alliance Gaullists UDF Left opposition Socialists Communists 1997 243 209 France 1997 1993 Chirac’s alliance Gaullists UDF Left opposition Socialists Communists 1997 243 209 132 161 67 24 244 35 …Chirac must appoint a Socialist premier (Lionel Jospin). Cohabitation again!

Semi-Presidentialism in Poland is Confusing President Lech Kaczyński PM Jarosław Kaczyński Semi-Presidentialism in Poland is Confusing President Lech Kaczyński PM Jarosław Kaczyński

Electoral Formula: Plurality/Majority Systems v. PR o Types of Plurality/Majority n n SMD/FPTP True Electoral Formula: Plurality/Majority Systems v. PR o Types of Plurality/Majority n n SMD/FPTP True majority systems o 2 -Round run-off systems n n o o often used in presidential races like in AL primaries French System Alternative Vote

Electoral Formula: Plurality/Majority Systems v. PR o PR Systems n List PR o o Electoral Formula: Plurality/Majority Systems v. PR o PR Systems n List PR o o n n lists are closed (signif? ) differing PR formulae Mixed Member Proportional STV

Political Effect of Electoral Rules o o Mechanical Effects: how do the rules impact Political Effect of Electoral Rules o o Mechanical Effects: how do the rules impact the translation of votes into seats? Psychological Effects: how do those impacts influence the choices of voters?

Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis o o Duverger’s Law: “Plurality rule tends to reduce the Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis o o Duverger’s Law: “Plurality rule tends to reduce the number of parties to two, regardless of the number of issue dimensions” (Taageperga and Shugart 1989: 65) Duverger’s Hypothesis: “PR rules tend not to reduced the number of parties, if the number of issue dimensions favors the existence of many parties” (ibid. , 65).

Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis (Source: Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 143) Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis (Source: Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 143)

Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis (Source: Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 144) Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis (Source: Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 144)

Source: Lijphart 1994: 154 -155 Source: Lijphart 1994: 154 -155

Source: Lijphart 1994: 154 -155 Source: Lijphart 1994: 154 -155

Ballot Example: Closed List-PR Source: http: //www. mtholyoke. edu/acad/polit/damy/Beginnning. Reading/PRsystems. htm Ballot Example: Closed List-PR Source: http: //www. mtholyoke. edu/acad/polit/damy/Beginnning. Reading/PRsystems. htm

Ballot Example: Open List-PR Source: http: //www. mtholyoke. edu/acad/polit/damy/Beginnning. Reading/PRsystems. htm Ballot Example: Open List-PR Source: http: //www. mtholyoke. edu/acad/polit/damy/Beginnning. Reading/PRsystems. htm

STV Example: Ireland Source: Mair 1986: 292 STV Example: Ireland Source: Mair 1986: 292

Ireland STV o See: http: //electionsireland. org/counts. cfm? election =2002&cons=57&ref= Ireland STV o See: http: //electionsireland. org/counts. cfm? election =2002&cons=57&ref=

Mixed Member Systems Source: http: //www. gnb. ca/0100/Doc/fact 7 mixed-e. pdf Mixed Member Systems Source: http: //www. gnb. ca/0100/Doc/fact 7 mixed-e. pdf

Mixed Member Systems o German elections: http: //www. electionresources. org/de/ Mixed Member Systems o German elections: http: //www. electionresources. org/de/

A MMP Sample Ballot A MMP Sample Ballot

German Bundestag Ballot German Bundestag Ballot

Source: Lijphart, et al. 1986: 160 Source: Lijphart, et al. 1986: 160

Sources Note: material on veto gates and France via Matthew Shugart (personal correspondence) Sources Note: material on veto gates and France via Matthew Shugart (personal correspondence)