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Lessons from Internet voting during 2002 FIFA World. Cup Korea/Japan. TM International Research center Lessons from Internet voting during 2002 FIFA World. Cup Korea/Japan. TM International Research center for Information Security (IRIS) Information and Communications University (ICU) May 27, 2004 Prof Kwangjo Kim kkj@icu. ac. kr

Contents n Introduction n System Design n Implementation Details n Voting Result n Concluding Contents n Introduction n System Design n Implementation Details n Voting Result n Concluding Remarks May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 2

Introduction (1) n A project “VOTOPIA” carried out by effective collaboration among some of Introduction (1) n A project “VOTOPIA” carried out by effective collaboration among some of the prominent Korean and Japanese IT firms and research institutes l l n Korea: IRIS, KISTI, KSIGN, LG CNS, SECUi. COM, STI, VOCOTECH Japan: NTT, University of Tokyo IRIS, affiliated to ICU, Korea - initiated, managed, and coordinated the project May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 3

Introduction (2) n Korea/Japan teams initiated the idea of VOTOPIA(*) in 2000, in order Introduction (2) n Korea/Japan teams initiated the idea of VOTOPIA(*) in 2000, in order to show their strong support to the most prestigious mega event "2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan(TM)". n Korea PKI l l 10 M broadband Internet users at home 3 M certificate holders for Internet banking, e-auction, etc. n Verify secure Internet system using cryptographic primitives and show its usefulness as replacement of paper voting. * VOTOPIA is in no way associated with FIFA and does not intend to violate international legal issues and digital copy rights. May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 4

System Design (1) n Remote Internet voting based on blind signature under PKI for System Design (1) n Remote Internet voting based on blind signature under PKI for large scale election n Anyone registered once can cast a vote n 2 times voting to select MVP and Best GK l l l Preliminary vote (period. candidates, notification) : (Jun. 1 ~14, 32 teams, June 15 10 AM) Main vote(period. candidates, notification) : (Jun. 16 ~ 30, 16 teams, June 30 12 PM) one team has 20 players and 3 GKs n Meet basic cryptographic requirements ü Privacy : All votes must be secret ü Completeness : All valid votes are counted correctly ü Soundness : The dishonest voter cannot disrupt the voting ü Unreusability : No voter can vote twice ü Eligibility : No one who isn’t allowed to vote can vote ü Fairness : Nothing can affect the voting May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 5

System Design (2) n Client side Fast and easy, user-friendly web interface • No System Design (2) n Client side Fast and easy, user-friendly web interface • No tamper-proof device provided • Consider various kinds of platforms, OS browsers, and Internet speed • Allow as many voters can cast n Server side • • Highly secure network and computer system • • Anti-hacking such as DOS attack, etc Large DB handling Fault-tolerance and high reliability Reasonable processing when registering and voting May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 6

Paper Voting Registration Counting Voting at Booth Poll list Observer/ Administrator Voters Secret voting Paper Voting Registration Counting Voting at Booth Poll list Observer/ Administrator Voters Secret voting Voting office Tallying Identification by poll list May 27, 2004 Voting Sheet DIMACS Workshop # slip 7

Internet Voting Voters Web servers R 1. After setting up secure session, download registration Internet Voting Voters Web servers R 1. After setting up secure session, download registration form R 2. Send encrypted public key & registration information with session key CA server R 3. Request certificate R 4. Issue certificate nload. Dow g votin t apple R 5. Save certificate V 1 C 2 . R V 3. Request Schnorr blind signature V 4. Receive Schnorr blind signature Admin server V 5. Verify admin’s blind signature . S C 3 V 2. Encrypt the ballot with counter’s public key in El. Gamal encryption en ec dq eiv ue ry et he DB server fo rt fin al all yin re su g lt V 6. Send encrypted ballot & admin’s digital signature V 7. Verify admin’s signature & decrypt ballot using counter’s private key Counter server May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop V 8/C 1. Save all decrypted ballots 8

Registration Stage Voters (After setting up secure session) R 1. Download registration form R Registration Stage Voters (After setting up secure session) R 1. Download registration form R 2 -1. Fill out the registration form R 2 -2. Generate private/public key pair R 2 -3. Save private key in safe R 2 -4. Encrypt the registration information & public key with session key R 2 -5. Send encrypted message (public key & registration information) Web servers R 3 -1. Decrypt encrypted message R 3 -2. Generate request for certificate CA server R 3 -3. Send request for certificate R 4. Issue certificate R 51. info Save rma regi tion stra & c tion ert ific ate R 5 -2. Registration completed DB server May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 9

Voting Stage Web servers Voters V 1. Download voting applet V 2. Encrypt the Voting Stage Web servers Voters V 1. Download voting applet V 2. Encrypt the ballot with counter’s public key in El. Gamal encryption V 3 -1. Request Schnorr blinding factor V 3 -2. Save Schnorr blinding factor V 3 -3. Receive Schnorr blinding factor DB server V 3 -4. Blind the encrypted ballot using received blinding factor V 3 -5. Generate voter’s Schnorr signature on the ballot V 3 -6. Send voter’s Schnorr sig. & blinded info V 3 -7. Request & receive voter’s certificate V 3 -8. Request & receive voter’s blinding factor V 4 -2. Receive admin’s blind signature Admin server V 3 -9. Verify voter’s digital signature V 4 -1. Generate admin’s blind signature V 5. Verify admin’s blind signature V 6. Send encrypted ballot & admin’s digital signature Counter server May 27, 2004 V 7 -1. Verify admin’s digital signature V 7 -2. Decrypt the ballot using counter’s private key V 8. Save all decrypted ballots DIMACS Workshop 10

Counting Stage Counter server C 1. Save all decrypted ballots Voters Web servers DB Counting Stage Counter server C 1. Save all decrypted ballots Voters Web servers DB server C 2. Send query for tallying C 3 -1. Ballot counting C 3 -2. Receive the final result C 3 -3. Post the final result C 3 -4. Look up the final result May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 11

Configuration of Servers (1) KISTI Backbone Network Cisco 6506/opal http: //mvp. worldcup 2002. or. Configuration of Servers (1) KISTI Backbone Network Cisco 6506/opal http: //mvp. worldcup 2002. or. kr VLAN 1 Firewall SECUi. Wall Compaq Proliant ML 530 L 4 Switch CSS 11800 VLAN 10 Gb. E mvp 01 SUN V 880 May 27, 2004 Gb. E mvp 02 SUN V 880 Gb. E mvp 03 mvp 04 SUN Enterprise 3000 SUN Enterprise 6500 Web Servers ADMIN Servers DIMACS Workshop Gb. E mvpsvr Compaq DB Server 12

Configuration of Servers (2) May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 13 Configuration of Servers (2) May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 13

Implementation n Client • Java 1. 2, JLOCK+ • MS Explorer 4. 0 on Implementation n Client • Java 1. 2, JLOCK+ • MS Explorer 4. 0 on Windows 98 /ME/XP/2000 • Korean, Japanese, English and Chinese n Web, DB, Admin, and Counter Servers l Solaris 2. 5. 4 (SUN OS 5. 8), Oracle DB 8. 0. 6 , JDBC l Tomcat 3. 1, Apache 1. 3. 12, JSSWEB+ n Encryption and Certificate • El. Gamal encryption & Schnorr (blind) signature • Simplified X. 509 v 3 certificate issued by CA server May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 14

Homepage(http: //mvp. worldcup 2002. or. kr) May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 15 Homepage(http: //mvp. worldcup 2002. or. kr) May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 15

Registration Page May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 16 Registration Page May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 16

Voting Page May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 17 Voting Page May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 17

Data Size & Voting Time n Data Size l Applet for SSL Connection at Data Size & Voting Time n Data Size l Applet for SSL Connection at R 1 n l Voting Client Applet at V 1 n l 215 KB Voter’s Registration Information at R 2 -1 n l 207 KB Avg 50 Bytes Key Size : Security / Performance Trade-off n n n Voter : 256 bit El. Gamal Encryption & 512 bit Schnorr Signature Administrator : 256 bit Schnorr Blind Signature & 512 bit Schnorr Verification Counter : 256 bit El. Gamal Decryption n Voting Time (V 1 - V 6) l Avg 2 (or 3) min. under Pentium III 100 M LAN (or 56 K modem) l Including Admin’s & Counter’s Server Computation Time : avg 195 msec May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 18

Sample Vote (1) Voter's ID : tank 02's private key Private Key x: 9 Sample Vote (1) Voter's ID : tank 02's private key Private Key x: 9 fa 840 a 6974 fc 04810 db 89 b 73461 bb 8 d 561 a 20 bd Security Parameters: p: c 16 cbad 34 d 475 ec 5396695 d 694 bc 8 bc 47 e 598 e 23 b 5 a 9 d 7 c 5 cec 82 d 65 b 6827 d 44 e 95 378484730 c 0 bff 1 f 4 cb 56 f 47 c 6 e 51054 be 89200 f 30 d 43 dc 4 fef 9624 d 4665 b q : b 7 b 810 b 58 c 0934 f 642878 f 360 b 96 d 7 cc 26 b 53 e 4 d g: 4 c 53 c 726 bdbfbba 6549 d 7 e 731939 c 6 c 93 a 869 a 27 c 5 db 17 ba 3 cac 589 d 7 b 3 e 003 fa 735 f 290 cfd 07 a 3 ef 10 f 35155 f 1 a 2 ef 70335 af 7 b 6 a 5211 a 1103518 fba 44 e 9718 Admin's public key Public Key y: c 0 ace 983 c 8 c 4346 b 99 b 54 e 96505 f 94 b 7 b 2 ba 25 d 6764 c 16 fcb 9 f 239 cbc 447402 f Security Parameters: p : f 668 a 94 f 0 ce 284 e 30776 b 59 b 319 fec 12 ba 069 d 10 c 56498 e 2 bd 0 cb 42 f q : e 3109 c 1 fd 13 c 8 d 637 f 6 c 39 e 6 c 0 a 6 e 9 df g : a 7688634018 f 161 c 62 de 5014 ca 99 e 983759 fb 4 f 67 b 575 bbc 4 b 51 d 32392177 a 40 May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 19

Sample Vote (2) Counter's public key Public Key y: b 6 fbabc 9259 a Sample Vote (2) Counter's public key Public Key y: b 6 fbabc 9259 a 1267 fcde 3 a 82 ebc 060781 c 9404 b 7 caf 4 c 07837 fb 86 b 1054207 fb Security Parameters: p : e 204679 a 6 b 62 fe 440 c 0 bfea 01223 d 98 b 7 b 65 a 6 b 1095962 b 41 d 502 d 21 q : ad 9 c 0 afead 1 c 2 e 24900 e 4799 ddcade 6 b g : 329 d 730 dea 5 e 5 cff 79 b 9 a 46968414 e 16 ec 610 dbdd 3 e 1 b 7 d 090 aec 0 bdef 310411 Message from Admin 1(tilde. A): 2004 d 4 c 5 ff 693 b 20 ad 4574 a 062 c 1 eb 80 d 6 e 2 e 0 d 79639 f 755 cd 9 e 4 de 14593 f 9 ceec Vote : 10000001431000000160 Tag : 4277 bb 955 fad 5 f 86 Encoded vote(vi) : 31303030313433313030303136304277 bb 955 fad 5 f 86 Message for El. Gamal encryption : 31303030313433313030303136304277 bb 955 fad 5 f 86 May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 20

Sample Vote (3) Random number k for El. Gamal encryption : 4 af 1 Sample Vote (3) Random number k for El. Gamal encryption : 4 af 1 c 2911 bd 5 f 59789307 fd 12366436 e 68 dbd 0 ae G(=g^k mod p) : 316 aafb 99 ed 1 a 7565 e 09 d 795 a 1 c 4 bc 1 bc 884 f 5069 b 3 e 3 af 12 c 61976 bd 929 cd 35 M(=m*(y^k) mod p) : 9 f 88 bcf 0128 a 500 c 218 c 8 fbde 13 a 21 ca 8 eae 32 caa 58 ac 9339 d 8 c 3 a 5 eaa 79489 d Encrypted vi(ev) : 4400209 f 88 bcf 0128 a 500 c 218 c 8 fbde 13 a 21 ca 8 eae 32 caa 58 ac 9339 d 8 c 3 a 5 eaa 79489 d 0020316 aafb 99 ed 1 a 7565 e 09 d 795 a 1 c 4 bc 1 bc 884 f 5069 b 3 e 3 af 12 c 61976 bd 929 cd 3 5 Blinding encrypted vi Random commitment tilde. A for blinding given by signer 4 d 4 c 5 ff 693 b 20 ad 4574 a 062 c 1 eb 80 d 6 e 2 e 0 d 79639 f 755 cd 9 e 4 de 14593 f 9 ceec Message to be blinded 4400209 f 88 bcf 0128 a 500 c 218 c 8 fbde 13 a 21 ca 8 eae 32 caa 58 ac 9339 d 8 c 3 a 5 eaa 79489 d 00 20316 aafb 99 ed 1 a 7565 e 09 d 795 a 1 c 4 bc 1 bc 884 f 5069 b 3 e 3 af 12 c 61976 bd 929 cd 35 May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 21

Sample Vote (4) Blinding factor u : 1 a 35 c 544169 b 7 Sample Vote (4) Blinding factor u : 1 a 35 c 544169 b 7 df 3 cde 2488 f 5 ae 6179 ad 3 c 50 ea 7 Blinding factor v : e 1254 df 36 ad 334 dc 92 e 7 f 5 c 75224 f 2 b 77 b 179924 r'(=tilde. A * g^u * y^v) : 8 ac 9 e 4 f 8917 d 0961 a 017 b 0706 bb 2 cc 9145161 dab 9 b 01322849 ce 97878 ffb 67 d 5 e'(=hash(r', msg)mod q) : 2 c 81051411 f 5826 f 47 fa 9825 b 579 bb 6 eb 97 bf 01 d e (= e'-v mod q) : 2 e 6 c 5340785 edaf 6347 edc 4523 fbb 296 ff 0 b 40 d 8 Blinded ev(tilde. C=e) : 2 e 6 c 5340785 edaf 6347 edc 4523 fbb 296 ff 0 b 40 d 8 Message for Schnorr Sig. : 2 e 6 c 5340785 edaf 6347 edc 4523 fbb 296 ff 0 b 40 d 8 random factor k of Schnorr Sig. : b 09 bd 1 ea 81 f 8 f 91 c 2 ec 9 cc 8 a 805 b 4150 ced 8 bf 37 r(=g^k mod p) : a 04164 bfc 61 f 673 d 77 d 29 aae 45 fb 503394823 bbf 96 bb 1407 acdbbf 2 a 76069313204 ae 1 cf 8 e 9 fc 8862 f 3 d 07 c 27 ac 2 f 6 dc 529 d 47 d 5 e 06 f 2450715 a 1 a 5034 c 996 ff voter's sig. (s, e) of message tilde. C Schnorr Sig. factor e (= hash(r, msg) mod q) : 3 b 6226900 a 5333 f 29 f 8 c 0 ca 99 b 1 c 0 c 5 aeee 5 a 1 c 7 Schnorr Sig. factor s (= k - e*x mod q) : 12 ed 689 be 782 fbcae 8 d 8 f 823226997769 fc 469 d 0 May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 22

Sample Vote (5) Message to admin 2 (eai=(s, e)|tilde. C|tilde. A) : 8 e Sample Vote (5) Message to admin 2 (eai=(s, e)|tilde. C|tilde. A) : 8 e 0054001 e 00066 b 6 d 616 e 3232001490 a 9 ab 12 dc 8 f 91 be 844 dc 57575 ff 741 f 6565 bab 300320030002 e 0502001412 ed 689 be 782 fbcae 8 d 8 f 823226997769 fc 469 d 000143 b 6226900 a 5333 f 29 f 8 c 0 ca 99 b 1 c 0 c 5 aeee 5 a 1 c 700142 e 6 c 5340785 edaf 6347 edc 4523 fbb 296 ff 0 b 40 d 8002004 d 4 c 5 ff 693 b 20 ad 4574 a 06 2 c 1 eb 80 d 6 e 2 e 0 d 79639 f 755 cd 9 e 4 de 14593 f 9 ceec Message from admin 2, that is, admin's blind signature (ezc) : 53001 d 000561646 d 696 e 001411 cc 6504 f 02 e 79 e 6811 c 8046 cf 13 ebb 47 d 4 f 6 e 6600320030002 e 05020 0148 bcd 80 bd 228501354422 eacf 5032171 ee 491725000142 e 6 c 5340785 edaf 6347 edc 4523 fbb 296 ff 0 b 40 d 8 Unblinding Admin's blind sig. factor s (= omega-e*x mod q) : 8 bcd 80 bd 228501354422 eacf 5032171 ee 4917250 Admin's sig. factor s' (= s+u mod q) : a 603460139207 f 291205335 eab 182 eb 9 b 85680 f 7 Admin's sig. factor e' (= e+v) : 2 c 81051411 f 5826 f 47 fa 9825 b 579 bb 6 eb 97 bf 01 d Unblinded admin sig. (bs) : 2 e 05020014 a 603460139207 f 291205335 eab 182 eb 9 b 85680 f 700142 c 81051411 f 5826 f 47 fa 9825 b 579 bb 6 eb 97 bf 01 d Message to Bubo(esev=bs||ev) 76002 e 05020014 a 603460139207 f 291205335 eab 182 eb 9 b 85680 f 700142 c 81051411 f 5826 f 47 fa 9825 b 579 bb 6 eb 97 bf 01 d 004400209 f 88 bcf 0128 a 500 c 218 c 8 fbde 13 a 21 ca 8 eae 32 caa 58 ac 9339 d 8 c 3 a 5 ea a 79489 d 0020316 aafb 99 ed 1 a 7565 e 09 d 795 a 1 c 4 bc 1 bc 884 f 5069 b 3 e 3 af 12 c 61976 bd 929 cd 35 Vote Result : 10000001431000000160 May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 23

Daily Access Record May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 24 Daily Access Record May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 24

IIS Attack Monitored in Error. log File at Apache Server [Thu Jul 4 23: IIS Attack Monitored in Error. log File at Apache Server [Thu Jul 4 23: 59: 48 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/msadc/. . %5 c. . /. . %5 c/. . ? . . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Thu Jul 4 23: 59: 48 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/scripts/. . 유. . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Thu Jul 4 23: 59: 48 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/scripts/. . 헃. . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Thu Jul 4 23: 59: 48 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/scripts/. . %5 c. . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Thu Jul 4 23: 59: 48 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/scripts/. . %2 f. . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Fri Jul 5 01: 06: 56 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/c/winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Fri Jul 5 01: 06: 56 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/d/winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Fri Jul 5 01: 06: 56 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/scripts/. . %5 c. . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Fri Jul 5 01: 06: 56 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/_vti_bin/. . %5 c. . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Fri Jul 5 01: 06: 56 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/_mem_bin/. . %5 c. . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Fri Jul 5 01: 06: 56 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/msadc/. . %5 c. . /. . %5 c/. . ? . . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Fri Jul 5 01: 06: 56 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/scripts/. . 유. . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe [Fri Jul 5 01: 06: 56 2002] [error] [client 210. 107. 135. 145] File does not exist: /user/mvp/public_html/scripts/. . 헃. . /winnt/system 32/cmd. exe May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 25

# of Typical Hacking (Filtered by IDS) (1) Type of Hacking Date May 27, # of Typical Hacking (Filtered by IDS) (1) Type of Hacking Date May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 26

# of Typical Hacking (Filtered by IDS) May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop (2) 27 # of Typical Hacking (Filtered by IDS) May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop (2) 27

Packet Control(by Firewall) (1) n Allowed Packet (Jun. 7 th , 2002) Allowed Packet Packet Control(by Firewall) (1) n Allowed Packet (Jun. 7 th , 2002) Allowed Packet May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 28

Packet Control(by Firewall) (2) n Disallowed Packet & Session (Jun. 7 th , 2002) Packet Control(by Firewall) (2) n Disallowed Packet & Session (Jun. 7 th , 2002) Disallowed Packet May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop Allowed Session 29

Statistics of Preliminary voting n. Age: l. Below 10 yrs: 9 (1. 0%), 11~ Statistics of Preliminary voting n. Age: l. Below 10 yrs: 9 (1. 0%), 11~ 20 yrs: 200 (22. 1%), 21~30 yrs: 454 (50. 3%), 31~40 yrs: 176 (19. 5%), 41~50 yrs: 49 (5. 4%), 51~60 yrs: 7 (0. 8%), Above 61 yrs: 8 (0. 9%) n Continents: l. Asia: 863 (95. 6%), Europe: 16 (1. 8%), North America: 10 (1. 1%), Oceania: 4 (0. 4%), South America: 6 (0. 7%), Africa: 4 (0. 4%) May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 30

Top 10 MVP’s after Preliminary Voting May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 31 Top 10 MVP’s after Preliminary Voting May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 31

Statistics of Main Voting n. Age: l. Below 10 yrs: 13 (0. 4%), 11~ Statistics of Main Voting n. Age: l. Below 10 yrs: 13 (0. 4%), 11~ 20 yrs: 1, 725 (47. 1%), 21~30 yrs: 1, 551 (42. 4%), 31~40 yrs: 270 (7. 4%), 41~50 yrs: 85 (2. 3%), 51~60 yrs: 13 (0. 4%), Above 61 yrs: 5 (0. 1%) n Continents: l. Asia: 3, 604 (98. 4%), Europe: 23 (0. 6%), North America: 20 (0. 5%), Oceania: 8 (0. 2%), South America: 4 (0. 2%), Africa: 3 (0. 1%), n List of nations more than 5 voters : l. Korea: 3, 474. Japan: 90, Vietnam: 18. China: 14, Canada: 8, USA: 7, India: 6 , Australia: 6, France: 5, Netherlands, Brazil, Denmark, England, Germany, Russia, Peru, Taiwan, Indonesia, Finland, Spain, etc. May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 32

Top 10 MVP’s May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 33 Top 10 MVP’s May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 33

Concluding Remarks n Lessons we learned l Need Performance/Security Trade-off l Proper anti-Hacking mechanisms Concluding Remarks n Lessons we learned l Need Performance/Security Trade-off l Proper anti-Hacking mechanisms due to double screening n l S/W Portability n l l Firewall (H/W) , Intrusion Detection System(S/W) Platform independent by Java Impossible to meet all the security requirements Multiple voting by different ID’s due to weak identification n Further Works l More secure and practical Internet voting system to FIFA World. Cup 2006™ in Germany shared with our code n l Extensions n n l Against DDOS Strong authentication (bio-identification), Mobile Internet voting Absence voting, I-polling Trial Overcome Non-technical Problems(Digital Divide, Political Consensus, legal issue, etc. ) May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 34

Thank you for your attention Q&A May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 35 Thank you for your attention Q&A May 27, 2004 DIMACS Workshop 35