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Latent Prints: Aftermath from Mayfield Erroneous Identification Stephen B. Meagher FBI Laboratory Forensic Analysis Latent Prints: Aftermath from Mayfield Erroneous Identification Stephen B. Meagher FBI Laboratory Forensic Analysis Section stephen. meagher@ic. fbi. gov

Process • International Review Team - 2004 • FBI Internal Review Teams – Eight Process • International Review Team - 2004 • FBI Internal Review Teams – Eight teams – August 2004 – April 2005 – Action Items • DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG) Investigation – 2004 – 2006 – Recommendations • Re-Engineering of FBI Latent Print Operations – Key Issues – Impact on latent print community • Implementation

International Review Teams • Results outlined in paper published in IAI Journal of Forensic International Review Teams • Results outlined in paper published in IAI Journal of Forensic Identification • FBI Internal Review Teams tasked with assessing International Review Team recommendations • Topics from International Review Team were combined for FBI internal review project • Int’l Review Team reports and FBI Internal Review Teams reports were provided to OIG investigation

FBI Internal Review Teams • Eight teams – internal LD examiners and supervisors (not FBI Internal Review Teams • Eight teams – internal LD examiners and supervisors (not from LPUs), and some external LP experts (on some teams) – Policies for Examining and Reporting Cases with “Less than Original Evidence” – Documentation and Case Notes Practices – Technical and Administrative Review Policies – Management Structure of the Latent Print Units – Training Practices – Corrective Action Reports – Standard Operating Procedures and Review – Scientific Basis of Latent Print Examinations (team added 11/04)

FBI Internal Review Teams • Reviewed International Review Team reports and recommendations • Reviewed FBI Internal Review Teams • Reviewed International Review Team reports and recommendations • Reviewed LPU policies, procedures and practices – Evaluated against LD requirements and guidelines • Reviewed relevant LP quality assurance guidelines • Reviewed documented LP policies and procedures from several laboratories • Interviewed/spoke with outside LP experts

FBI Internal Review Teams • • • List of recommendations from each team Reviewed FBI Internal Review Teams • • • List of recommendations from each team Reviewed with LPU management for factual accuracy Reviewed with all team leaders to ensure consistency Approved by LD management April 2004 Presented to LPU staff April 2004 Publication of summaries and list of recommendations in IAI Journal of Forensic Identification

Key Issues • • Confirmation Bias Case Acceptance Documentation SOPs Cluster Identifications Blind Verification Key Issues • • Confirmation Bias Case Acceptance Documentation SOPs Cluster Identifications Blind Verification Training Re-Organization

Approach • Address the key issues via… – LPU SOPs, Quality Manual, Training Manual Approach • Address the key issues via… – LPU SOPs, Quality Manual, Training Manual and communication • Form LPU teams to address each issue (Review Team Action Committees) – Teams made up of LPU supervisors, senior examiners and newer examiners

Confirmation Bias • Those involved in the error recognized its impact • Addressed in Confirmation Bias • Those involved in the error recognized its impact • Addressed in our SOP for Friction Ridge Examination – Verification and Blind verification • Also included in our Training Manual and training – manual comparisons – IAFIS comparisons

Case Acceptance • More rigid acceptance policy for electronically transmitted images or those received Case Acceptance • More rigid acceptance policy for electronically transmitted images or those received on magnetic media – No more latent comparisons of “Xerox” copies or facsimiles – Electronic images must… • • • Have a scale or other measurable item Be the original capture Be a minimum of 1, 000 ppi for latents Be a minimum of 500 ppi for knowns Indicate the source –This includes lifts

Documentation • Of analysis – On photograph with pointer marks and, if necessary, notations Documentation • Of analysis – On photograph with pointer marks and, if necessary, notations – Value / no value decision made before leaving analysis • Of individualizations – On photograph with pointer marks and, if necessary, notations – Verifier must use a different photograph and document their ACE – Each photograph must be individual to the examiner • Dates and initials

Documentation • Complex Analysis – Determined by the Team Supervisor • Documented photographically, as Documentation • Complex Analysis – Determined by the Team Supervisor • Documented photographically, as outlined before, with text in the case file and/or on marked enlargements • All documentation retained in the case file • IAFIS searches – Screen print-outs as attachments • Digital images – Resolution, compression, source, original capture

SOPs • Documents with more details • SOPs most affected – Friction Ridge Analysis SOPs • Documents with more details • SOPs most affected – Friction Ridge Analysis • • Documentation Blind verification Complex analysis “Cluster Impressions” vs. “Simultaneous Impressions” –Comm. Of Mass. v. Patterson – IAFIS/Digital • Image acceptance • Documentation

Cluster Impressions • We will note placement if forensically relevant and requested by contributor Cluster Impressions • We will note placement if forensically relevant and requested by contributor – Probative, exculpatory • At least one of the impressions must stand alone • Research and Validation studies will be conducted to establish simultaneity and whether characteristics can be cumulative in cluster impressions. – Determining simultaneity (analysis phase only)= 88% accuracy; does not infer a 12% error rate, but more of an undeterminable assessment (J. Black study on simultaneous impressions as presented at IAI conference. )

Blind Verification • Difficult issue to get our arms around – How can we Blind Verification • Difficult issue to get our arms around – How can we implement without bringing production to a standstill? – When do we do it? • Several scenarios discussed • Determined single conclusion examinations represent greatest occurrence of error, therefore, risk

Blind Verification • In each case where there is a single conclusion, it is Blind Verification • In each case where there is a single conclusion, it is to be blind verified – One individualization, one exclusion, one inconclusive • Applies to IAFIS as well • The examiner never knows which conclusion type their getting • Supervisor picks the verifier and hands them clean, unmarked photograph(s) of the latent and known prints and asks them to reach a conclusion • Verifying examiner documents process on the photograph – Becomes part of case documentation

Training • Our manual has been completely rewritten to account for the policy and Training • Our manual has been completely rewritten to account for the policy and cultural changes – Our ACE-V module and IAFIS modules were microscopically scrutinized • David Ashbaugh has provided 40 hour training course to the entire staff in ridgeology • Bill Babler has provided an 8 hour training session on anatomy, physiology and embryology of friction ridge skin development

Implementation • Surprisingly, this has been the easiest part of the project • Because Implementation • Surprisingly, this has been the easiest part of the project • Because of the makeup of the RTACs, buy-in from the staff was a consensus and fairly painless

Moral of the Story • Don’t Screw-up Moral of the Story • Don’t Screw-up

Keeping the Perspective • All reviews concluded that the Mayfield error was a practitioner Keeping the Perspective • All reviews concluded that the Mayfield error was a practitioner error – International Review team – FBI Internal Review Teams – DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG) • FBI Past Performance – Erroneous Identifications – FBI Latent Print Units: on average, one erroneous identification every eleven years (since 1933) • On average, approx. one million comparisons per year = 1 erroneous identification every 11 million comparisons

Keeping the Perspective • FBI Internal Review, Team 8 Report entitled “Review of the Keeping the Perspective • FBI Internal Review, Team 8 Report entitled “Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge Comparisons as a Means of Identification: Committee Findings and Recommendations, ” and published in the Forensic Science Communications (Jan. 2006 Vol 8, No. 1) states: – “There is indisputable evidence supporting that such practices [latent prints] can be carried out reliably and that the general process should not be rejected. ” (page 2) – “This committee’s review found overwhelming evidence that latent print examinations can be carried out and that reliable identifications can be made. ” (Conclusions, page 10)

Keeping the Perspective • The intent of all reviews to date after the Mayfield Keeping the Perspective • The intent of all reviews to date after the Mayfield error was to preclude making another error. – Can we totally eliminate the chance of making an error in the future? NO – Can we reduce the risk of making errors in the future? YES