LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Introduction to IAEA Safeguards Applied

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Introduction to IAEA Safeguards Applied Antineutrino Physics workshop Sponsored by LNL Wente Vineyards • Livermore, CA September 24 – 26, 2006 Brian D. Boyer, Ph. D. Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Nonproliferation Division, N-4 September 25, 2006 UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED IAEA Safeguards Introduction Topics • Basic concepts of IAEA Safeguards • LWR Safeguards • Issues in LWR Safeguards • Needs in LWR Safeguards – Opportunities for Anti-Neutrino Detector and other new concepts UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Definition of Safeguards INFCIRC 66 • INFCIRC/66 - limited agreement • Only Israel, India, Pakistan have this agreement in place • Technical Aim - “. . . that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information are made available by the Agency……and are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. ” UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Definition of Safeguards INFCIRC 153 (CORR) • INFCIRC 153(corrected) - full scope safeguards • Technical Aim - “. . . the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. . . ” • Safeguards under 153 known as: – Full Scope Safeguards – Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Definition of Safeguards INFCIRC 540 (CORR) - Additional Protocol • Additional Protocol Provides for more access and information to the IAEA • For LWR Safeguards – key points – IAEA can access auxiliary buildings on site – Integrated Safeguards Ø Because of “Broader Conclusion” can reduce some SG effort UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Basic Types of IAEA Inspections • Physical Inventory Verification – PIV – 1 x year at LWR • Design Information Verification – DIV – 1 x year at LWR with PIV • Interim Inspections – For timeliness - 4 x year at LWRs (for CF and SF) – For verification of domestic and international transfers • Additional Protocol – INFCIRC 540 – Complementary Access (CA) Activities • Special Inspections – INFCIRC 153 UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED “Timeliness” - Material Guidelines UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED “Significant Quantity” - Defined UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Timeliness Goal UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED LWR Safeguards – Fuel Cycle Relevance Nuclear Material Color Key Yellow – Indirect Use Orange – Irradiated Direct Use Red – Unirradiated Direct Use Pink – Waste + No U or Pu + OR SGs terminated Stored Reprocessed Pu and U Reprocessing path with stored U and Pu UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED LWR Categories • Type 1 - Reactor hall includes spent fuel pool – – VVER 440 (Loviisa 1 -2, Paks 1 -4, Bohunice 1 -4, Rovno 1 -2) VVER 1000 (Kozloduy 5 -6, Temelin 1 -2, Khmelnitsky 1, Rovno 3) BWRs with SF pool in containment (TVO-1, TVO-2) PWRs with SF pool in containment (Biblis 1 -2) • Type 2 - Spent fuel pool outside of reactor hall – PWRs with SF pool in separate building (Krško, Almaraz 1 -2) – BWRs with SF pool in separate building (Liebstadt) UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED LWR Layout - Type I Reactor Design Overhead Crane REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDING Fuel Spent Handling Fuel Flasks With Bridge Racks Damaged Fuel REACTOR CORE IAEA Canal Gate Flask Loading Area Flask Decontamination Area Spent Fuel Pool Fuel Dummies and Various Structures SG l ck ne rlo on Ai rs ss Pe cce A IAEA Seal UNCLASSIFIED Camera Eq Ha uipm tc h ent SG

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED LWR Layout - Type II Reactor Design Overhead Crane IAEA Overhead Crane Exit Hatch Canal Gate (IAEA seal) Transfer Channel Pit Transfer Channel SF Racks REACTOR CORE Temporary Reactor Rack Spent Fuel Pool (Temporary) Surveillance Unit #2 Railroad or Road Access to Reactor IAEA SG Equipment Hatch (IAEA seal) UNCLASSIFIED (Temporary) Surveillance Unit #3

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Examination of records and reports Accountancy Side of IAEA Safeguards • Nuclear Material Accountancy - Terms – – – PIV = physical inventory verification PIL = physical inventory listing LII = list of inventory items MBR = material balance report ICR = inventory change report • Check the movements of nuclear material – Receipts – Shipments – Transformation - calculate nuclear loss (U) and production (Pu) • Reactors – LWR, OLRs (On Load Reactors), Fast Reactors – Item Facilities – all nuclear material in unit form (Fuel Assemblies) – No Material Unaccounted For (MUF) expected – Shipper/receiver difference (SRD) from SF sent to reprocessing Ø Uncertainties on U and Pu inventories §Operator calculations § Reprocessing plant measurements UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Physical inventory verification (PIV) • PIV – yearly - the period between PIVs not to exceed 14 months – Performed when core is refueled or opened – If core not refueled or opened - PIV done with closed core – Multiple cores (VVER 440 - twin reactor per facility) Ø Do PIV during one of the core openings – Post PIV period does not exceed 3 months D. Calma - IAEA UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED PIV - Fresh Fuel Verification • FF assemblies and separate fuel pins are: ― Item counted ― Verified for gross defects or by serial number ID ( by random sampling) D. Calma - IAEA UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED MMCC - Portable Multi-channel Analyser + Cd. Te Detector • MMCC Detects 186 ke. V U-235 g peak in g spec – Cd. Te detector Ø inserted into fuel assembly Ø gamma spectrum measured – Definitive gross defect measurement of Ø Fresh LEU fuel Ø U-235 is or is not present UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED PIV - Core Fuel Verification • Open core – ―Assemblies item counted and ―Acceptable C/S maintained either on ØOpen core or on removal routes D. Calma - IAEA • Discharged core - core is discharged to SF Pool ―Verify along with SF ― Acceptable C/S maintained either on ØOpen core or on removal routes • Closed cores ― If under C/S - the C/S system is evaluated UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Surveillance • Surveillance Used in – Reactor LWRs Hall Ø Core Fuel During Refueling: Type 2 LWR Ø Core Fuel / Spent Fuel / Casks Core Fuel: Type 1 LWR – Separate SF Pool Ø Spent Fuel Pool and/or Exit Routes – Exits (Large enough to move SF cask through) Ø Containment Hatch (Westinghouse PWRs) Ø Containment Hatch (VVER 1000) Ø Loading Bay in SF Pool (Type 2 LWR) DCM-14 Digital Surveillance Camera UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED UWTV - Underwater TV • UWTV used to verify Core Fuel during refueling Monitor – The TV camera pans across the fuel Ø Serial numbers are verified Ø The total number of fuel assemblies counted Ø Compared to the operator’s declaration 12345 RPV Camera 12345 12346 CORE UNCLASSIFIED 12347 12348

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED PIV - Spent Fuel Verification. . . In practice • SF Pools verified 100% for Gross Defects – Easier to verify all items then to select specific items in pool – ICVD - SF and SF Pool conditions determine success of method Ø Water quality Ø Fuel assembly burn-up Ø Residence time in pool by SF D. Calma - IAEA – With failure of ICVD Ø Use of SFAT or similar method is attempted – IAEA has new intense interest in NON-FUEL items in SF pool UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED ICVD - Improved Cerenkov Viewing Device • ICVD Detects Cerenkov Glow From SF and Ve – Spent Fuel Ø Spent Fuel Pools Ø Spent Fuel in… § Baskets and/or § Casks prior to shipment – Core Fuel Ø Core Fuel during refueling § To recover from anomaly Ø EXAMPLE: Loss of “Cof. K” of Core § Recovered next PIV during refueling Sweden - CLAB UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED SFAT - Spent Fuel Attribute Tester • SFAT Properties – Detects Ø Cs-137 660 ke. V gamma peak Ø Characteristic of fission products – Used to verify Ø SF Pool fuel – ICVD not usable § Too old - Radiation decaying away § Fuel with low burn-up – Too few FPs Ø SF Pool items that may be § Dummy elements § Skeleton assemblies § Empty containers Ø ID by lack of a Cs-137 peak UNCLASSIFIED REF: VVER-1000 SFAT— SPECIFICATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL PROTOTYPE Interim report on Task FIN A 1073 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED SFAT Issues Attenuation of g Source in SF Pool by Castor Material and H 2 O • Castors with iron – • Water covering SF in castor – • Attenuates gammas If SFAT not close enough to SF – UNCLASSIFIED Inspector SFAT NDA of damaged SF castor Ø Difficult to distinguish between… § Empty irradiated castor § Castor containing SF

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED HSGM - High Sensitivity Gamma Monitor • HSGM Detects Gamma Radiation from SF – Gross defect measurement – HSGM and CPMU HSGM Ø Both very crude measurements Ø Not very definitive – Can give higher measurements from empty container for damaged SF as from full container – Dummy element Ø Can be irradiated Ø Gives off gammas Spent Fuel Pool Gamma Detector Head Spent Fuel Assemblies UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Verification of Domestic and Int’l Transfers Spent Fuel - To Difficult-to-Access • Transfers of SF into containers for long-term storage under SG but difficult-to-access – Item I. D. – NDA Ø High detection probability for gross and partial defects – Under dual C/S D. Calma - IAEA UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Verification of Domestic and Int’l Transfers Fresh LEU Fuel • Fresh LEU fuel since the last PIV – Verified at any inspection – Or at PIV UNCLASSIFIED D. Calma - IAEA

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Material Balance Evaluation • Evaluate non-zero SRD – (in LWRs normally zero) • Evaluate non- zero MUF – (in LWRs normally zero) • Evaluate on item count, I. D. , and defect test results UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Confirm Absence of Unreported Production of Plutonium • PERFORM – Analysis of reactor shows it could not produce 1 SQ of unrecorded Pu per year • OR – C/S on RPV to confirm RPV was closed AND – C/S on open RPV to confirm that 1 SQ was not removed from the core AND – Empty RPV - confirm CF is in SF and none removed • AND – C/S acceptable on SF pool OR – Verify SF Pool after refueling with NDA where appropriate UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Design Information Verification (DIV) • Design info provided to Agency by the State is… – Examined – Verified • Once a year re-examined • Periodic verification of design information – To confirm continued validity – DIV includes Ø Taking of environmental samples…. UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Typical Agency Yearly Schedule at LWR • 3 interim inspections and PIV scheduled • Special inspections for transfer of SF in casks – Verify SF as placed in cask – Follow with C/S to maintain Cof. K • Pre PIV – Verify FF – Detach seals on reactor or transfer paths – Install temporary surveillance to reactor • Post PIV – Attach seals on transfer paths (canal gate, etc, ) UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED IAEA Containment Sealing Systems • IAEA Metal Seal • COBRA Seal (In-Situ verification) • VACOSS Seal (Electronic Seal with fiber optic wire - can be opened and closed ONCE by operator) UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED LWR – Containment/Sealing • Surveillance Instruments (Cameras, Surveillance Cabinets) • Reactor Hall – Vessel Missile Shield (VVER 440) – Other means to immobilize Core Fuel • SF Pool – Spent Fuel Racks and Pool Covers Ø Immobilization of SF – Loaded SF casks ready for shipment to Ø Interim Storage Ø Dry Storage Ø Off-site – Re-fueling crane - temporary measure to avoid losing Cof. K • Exit pathways – SF Pool canal gate and Exit hatches UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED Operator/Inspector Measurement System Definitions UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED LWRs and RRCAs • Research Reactors with 25 MWth output have concerns with – Unreported Pu Production • Use of reactor power monitor to observe power output for RRCA – Estimate Pu production – Thermal-hydraulic and radiation power monitors • Reactor power monitor - not used in LWRs – Intrusive nature – Operator supplies thermal output info – Possible satellite photo analysis – expensive mode • Need for tool to give power output information – Operational information – Possible Pu Production calculations UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED LWR Safeguards Goal and Issues • Control of Spent Fuel - source of PU • Control of SF pool items - targets for Pu production • Control of LEU fuel – Source of LEU for enrichment – Pu production in reactor Ø Understanding of power history of reactor § Possible role of Antineutrino Detector • Control of MOX fuel - source of unirradiated Pu • Control of transfers - SF that may be reprocessed for Pu UNCLASSIFIED

LA-UR-06 -6500 UNCLASSIFIED LWR Safeguards Needs • SF Pool – Ability to insure no tampering with SF assembly – Assembly removal/substitution by dummy – Pin Diversion/substitution by dummy • Thermal Power of LWRs – Verify operator’s declaration Ø Possible role of Antineutrino Detector • SF assembly inventory (of interest for reprocessing) – Operator’s calculations – Verify operator’s declaration at reprocessing plant – Develop independent means to verify SF • Undeclared activities - Possible role of Antineutrino Detector UNCLASSIFIED