Julie Banner Code 616 Naval Surface Warfare Center

Julie Banner Code 616 Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division System Safety Society WDC Chapter Mtg 16 March 2011

Background & Outline u Information included in this presentation is unclassified u The purpose of this presentation is to provide general information covering – – Basic introduction to lithium battery technology General hazards associated with lithium batteries Firefighting methods and lithium batteries Recent developments in the Navy’s Lithium Battery Safety Program u Some of the images shown in this presentation are the extreme results of aggressive and deliberate battery abuses 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 2

Lithium Batteries Used by the Navy u Battery Types – Primary u Battery Chemistries – Cathode • Active • Reserve – Liquid Reserve – Thermal – Secondary u Cell Designs – Bobbin – Spiral – Bipolar – Coin – Prismatic 3/15/11 • Manganese Dioxide • Carbon Monofluoride • Thionyl Chloride • Sulfur Dioxide • Sulfuryl Chloride • Vanadium Pentoxide • Cobalt Oxide – Anode • Lithium Metal • Lithium Alloy • Lithium Ion – Electrolyte • Organic Liquid • Polymer/Gel NSWC Carderock Code 616 u Cell Sizes – Button Cell (0. 01 Ah) – AA-Size Cell (2 Ah) – D-Size Cell (1020 Ah) – Specialty Design Cell (2, 200 Ah) – Air Force Design Cell (10, 000 Ah) 3

Table of Battery Characteristics From Handbook of Batteries, 3 rd Edition, by Linden and Reddy 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 4

Delivered Power & Energy Comparisons Lithium Ion Zn-air Specific Energy, Wh/kg 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 1375 Wh/kg = TNT 5

State-of-the-Art Lithium Cells 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 6

Batteries Are Stored Chemical Energy u Controlled Release of This Energy Provides Electrical Power in the Form of Current and Voltage u Uncontrolled Release of This Energy can Result in Venting, Fire, Release of Toxic Materials, Shrapnel, High Pressure Events, Deflagration (with or without Report) and Many Combinations Thereof 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 7

Lithium Battery Hazards u. Venting u. Leaking of hazardous materials – Noxious or acidic gases – Strong acids – Flammable gasses and liquids u. Fire Note: Other types of batteries may also respond to abusive conditions presenting similar (but not identical) hazards, so many of the handling and safety recommendations that follow can be considered to be appropriate for all battery types 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 8

Venting u Release of internal pressure from a cell by ejecting some or all of its internal components into the environment – These components may be flammable and may include noxious gasses – A venting of a lithium ion battery may release • • • Flammable organic electrolyte (e. g. PC-EC-DMC) Li. PF 6 -- this material is reactive with H 20 and forms HF Carbon either as carbon or water reactive lithiated graphites Li. Ni. Co. O 2 or other lithiated oxides and heavy/transition metals Metal foils and fragments (copper or aluminum) Methane, hydrogen, carbon monoxide (electrolyte decomposition products) u Ventings may be accompanied by smoke, sparks and or flames u Ventings may be high pressure events 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 9

Hazards Vary… u Release of internal pressure from a cell by ejecting some or all of its internal components into the environment – A venting of a Li/SOCl 2 battery may release • Lithium Metal (Li) - reactive in air & highly reactive in H 2 O • Thionyl Chloride (SOCl 2) - combines immediately with any moisture to create fumes of HCl and SO 2 • Carbon (C) • Aluminum Chloride (Al. Cl 3) • Lithium Chloride (Li. Cl) • PVC • PTFE (teflon) u Ventings may be accompanied by smoke, sparks and or flames u Ventings may be high pressure events 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 10

Likely Mistreatment Scenarios u Physical abuse, such as crushing, puncturing or burning u Overcharging a rechargeable lithium battery (due to electronics failure) u Charging of primary (non-rechargeable) batteries u Exposure of battery to inappropriate environment – High temperature abuse (140°C) – Water immersion of an unprotected or unsealed battery u Short circuit or abnormally high rate discharge of battery u Unanticipated latent manufacturer’s defect failure 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 11

Physical Abuse u Puncturing and crushing result in massive internal short circuits that are not mitigated by external or internal safety devices and frequently result in thermal runaway and violent venting of lithium batteries with incandescent ejecta u Recommendation: Whenever possible, package lithium batteries in protective containers and be aware of potential physical hazards 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 12

Overcharging u Lithium ion batteries may be designed to be recharged either inside or outside their system housing u Redundant over-voltage and over-current electronics “should” prevent abuse due to overcharging u In abuse tests of high energy lithium ion cells and similar modules, cells vented with pressure and flame in response to extreme overcharging conditions u Recommendation: Always follow standard operating procedures and manufacturer recommendations for charging the battery 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 13

Short Circuit u Use of battery in circuit with very low (<50 milliohms or less) resistance u Short circuits can be caused by – Connecting positive and negative terminals of battery (External, i. e. “crowbar” or loose wires or screwdriver) – Breaching physical integrity of battery (Internal) u Fuses and other over-current electronics “should” prevent abuse due to external short circuits u Some lithium cells include internal safety devices to protect against overcurrent conditions u Precautions include – Do not handle battery modules on metal surfaces – Keep terminals insulated and separated – Never remove or bypass electrical fuses 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 14

Lithium Battery Firefighting Guidance u System-specific guidance included in system emergency documentation u General shipboard guidance given in S 9086 -S 3 -STM-010 “Naval Ships’ TM Chapter 555 - Volume 1 Surface Ship Firefighting” Vol 1 Rev 13 of 1 Jan 2010, section 8. 14 – Application of a narrow-angle fog of water or AFFF is the preferred method to cool the battery, suppress immediate ﬁre output, and reduce likelihood of propagation to remaining cells – Maintain an adequate distance for personnel safety from exposure to ﬁreballs and/or projected fragments – Personnel should wear SCBAs to protect from exposure to hazardous gases (acid gases, oxidizers and other toxic and irritating materials) – Continue to cool the battery for several minutes after the last cell event and do not approach until there is evidence that all reactions have stopped – Initiate active desmoking/ventilation of the area as soon as practicable during the casualty to remove heat, smoke and toxic gases 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 15

Documentation for the Navy’s Lithium Battery Safety Program u Instruction -- Defines the Process – – – NAVSEAINST 9310 Initial Release in 1979 NAVSEAINST 9310. 1 a of 11 March 1982 NAVSEANOTE 9310 of 11 June 1985 NAVSEAINST 9310. 1 b of 13 June 1991 NAVSEAINST 9310. 1 c revision in review at NOSSA & planned for an FY 11 release u Technical Manual -- Guidelines for Design, Review and Procedures for Testing – Technical Manual for Batteries, Navy Lithium Safety Program and Procedures, Rev 2 S 9310 -AQ-SAF-010 of 15 July 2010 u https: //nossa. nmci. navy. mil/nrws 2/tabid/232/ Default. aspx 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 16

“Just Gimme the Approved Battery List…” u Navy Lithium Battery Safety Authorizations are system specific u Authorizations for previously reviewed batteries: – Leverage data from previous programs (testing, analysis, design) when appropriate – Do not required duplicative testing – Are usually quicker u Contact NOSSA, Carderock or Crane to determine if a battery has previous safety reviews on file 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 17

Oversight Authority for the Navy’s Lithium Battery Safety Program u Originally granted to NAVSEA Safety Division (NAVSEA 665), and has followed the Explosive Safety Office through multiple reorganizations u Currently resides with Code N 84 of the Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity, under the auspices of the Explosive Safety Office for Navy Systems u Special Authority for specific platform use – NAVSEA Code 05 Z 34 for Surface Ship & Submarine Carriage – MSCHQ for Military Sealift Command platforms – NAVAIR 4. 4. 5. 2 for Aircraft Carriage u Primary testing and evaluation sites – Carderock Division, NSWC, Code 616 – Crane Division, NSWC, Code GXS 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 18

Status of SEA 05 Z Lithium Battery Ship Integration Process u Official documentation (signed) is the NOSSA Interim Letter of 2 April 09 u SEA 05 Z 34 proposed process is contained in draft TM “High-Energy Storage System Safety Manual” – Released 9 Jul 10 for review – Revised version has been in review by SEA 05 (Mr. Drakely and ADM Eccles) for past few months – Under a mandatory 15 day SEA 05 Z 34 official standards review u Staged implementation of SEA 05 TM is planned – New manual will be implemented on new system starts as of the issue date – Approvals currently in process will follow interim guidance except the MIL-STD 882 assessment will follow new manual guidance – Approval extensions are TBD 19

Draft High-Energy Storage System TM - Goal & Scope u Goal – Characterize the safety hazards and risks associated with integration and use of lithium batteries aboard Navy platforms – Determine if use of platform features (fire fighting, special stowage, charging capabilities) mitigates risks associated with batteries and identify unmitigated risks u Scope – “Includes all lithium batteries used, carried, or intended for use or carrying on Navy platforms, both as standalone batteries and as systems incorporating lithium batteries. Specifically included are manned Deep Submergence Systems (DSS). ” – Scope as written does not have universal acceptance at top levels in NAVSEA 20

Draft High-Energy Storage System TM - Documentation Requirements u Initial Data Submission – Top Level Requirements (TLR) List – Operational Requirements Document (ORD) – Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) – Concept of Operations (CONOPS) u Secondary Data Review due prior to PDR – Program Management Plan – Memorandum of Agreement with SEA 05, battery tech agent and program stake-holders – Hazard Log – Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) – Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) u Approved Documentation to Proceed to FDR/Fleet Release – Battery Test Plan – Test Report – Safety Hazard Analysis (Final) – Manufacturing Audit Report Note: For projects that are not formal acquisition projects SEA 05 will accept equivalent documents. For instance if there is not a formal TLR list or ORD, alternative formats would be accepted. 21

Draft High-Energy Storage System TM - Test Requirements u Require extensive customization of testing with in- depth input & direction from SEA-05 Z, SEA-05 P, and other cognizant platform warrants NOTE: This is an all inclusive matrix and many test can be combined into one test by proper design 22

Critical Design Attributes for Shipboard Carriage u Contain severe casualty output and limit consequences to personnel & platform – Target mitigations to Maximum Credible Event (MCE) – Review data from Worst Case Event (WCE) as part of the risk analysis u Proven battery management systems – Demonstrate reliability & redundancy or inherent fault tolerance – In some cases (platform dependent) software validation IAW Fly-by-wire criteria is mandatory and will be conducted by joint review u Automated and validated warning systems – Industrial standard systems preferred to those with limited access (proprietary) – Software validation may apply u Fire suppression and ventilation tactics and systems that are compatible with the platform capabilities & personnel – Focused on MCE level as demonstrated by test or simulation – Based on system and host platform safety precepts for operability 23

Conclusions © Within the group known as lithium batteries, there a wide variety of specific performance and safety characteristics u Specific lithium battery hazards depend on both battery and system- related variables u The major classes of hazards associated with most lithium batteries include – Venting of noxious and/or hazardous gases – Fire – High pressure events u When fighting a lithium battery fire, cooling (water) is key and smothering (heavy gas or chemical blanket) is not generally effective, therefore Navy safety guidance recommends the use of water or AFFF as the extinguishing media for lithium battery fires u The Navy’s Lithium Battery Safety Program strives to minimize risk to personnel and platforms while allowing the use of lithium batteries on our ships, aircraft and submarines to advance our military capabilities through the approval process managed by NOSSA 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 24

Got a Lithium Battery? u Who U Gonna Call? – Julie Banner – NSWC Carderock, Code 616 – Julie. Banner@navy. mil – (301) 227 -1853 desk/voicemail – (240) 751 -7862 – (301) 227 -5457 fax – (240) 597 -1394 alternate fax 3/15/11 NSWC Carderock Code 616 25