JRC Information Day and S&T Workshops Bucharest – 11 May 2006 Preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material Klaus Lützenkirchen Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Joint Research Centre, European Commission Karlsruhe, Germany JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Forensics • Traditional Safeguards and Physical Protection fail (operator accountancy versus verification) • Illicit trafficking of nuclear material • Seizure (border control, intelligence services) • Nuclear Forensic analysis JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Fight against Illicit Trafficking Threat by nuclear terrorism: • Theft of nuclear material to produce a nuclear explosive device • Theft of radioactive material ( Dirty Bomb) UO 2 Fuel • stolen in Lithuania, • seized in Poland, • produced in Russia, • analysed at JRC-ITU JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, (Source IAEA)
Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material Projects with Romania – Training sessions for law enforcement services and laboratory experts jointly with IAEA (2002, …): New EU and CC, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, … – Model Action Plan: RITNUM Handbook national Response to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material (developed jointly with ITWG) – Delivery of portable equipment for categorisation of material – Demonstration exercises inside countries and at borders : 07/2002 Bucharest, 10/2002 BG/TR, 09/2004 PL/BY, …. JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Illicit trafficking and radiation detection Handheld Gamma Spectrometers (Support to IAEA) Exploranium: GR-135 Na. I XRF: ICS-4000 Cd. Te target field. SPEC JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, SAIC: RADSMART
Demonstration Exercise Romania 18 July, 2002 JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
National Exercise on Combating Nuclear Terrorism Braşov County, Romania, 10 May 2006 Interception of illegal transport JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Joint Demonstration Exercise Border Bulgaria/Turkey - Kapikule, Oct. 2002 JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Future EU border: Romania with Ukraine and Moldova • Joint border exercises • TACIS projects with Ukraine and Moldova JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
The TACIS Multicountry Project to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States – training of personnel – installation equipment of hand-held and mobile – Improvement infrastructure Republic of Azerbaijan Ukraine Multicountry Project Russian Federation Republic of Georgia COOPERATION that counts of scientific/technical – implementation of the RITNUM handbook and creation of a Model Action Plan – demonstration exercises – workshop Republic of Moldova Republic of Kazakhstan Estimated duration: 60 months JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, to strengthen regional cooperation and co-ordination – Joint Analysis Agreement to analyze seized material
What is Nuclear Forensics ? Information on the nature of the seized material, its intended use and its origin Fingerprint ? Characteristic properties (isotopic composition, trace elements, macro- and microscopic structure) Origin, legal owner, intended use, … Examples JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Nuclear Forensics ? JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Nuclear Forensics Origin and intended use ? First observations/conclusions: • geometry 5 x 5 cm, unconventional application/reactor • elemental composition pure U metal • isotopic composition natural U D 2 O or graphite moderated reactor • main impurities Al, Ca, Fe, Mg, Mn, Na, Pb, Si (200 mg material) JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Nuclear Forensics 1. Origin • Nuclear Materials Database nuclear fuel data from western and Russian suppliers (UO 2, MOX) (based on World Nuclear Industry Handbook and bilateral contracts, various degrees of access) • Electronic literature archive on nonconventional fuels (Russian sources) • Open literature Geometry points at German origin JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Nuclear Forensics 2. Age determination • spiking with 228 Th (or 233 Pa) • chemical separation • measurement: alpha spectrometry or mass spectrometry Age via 234 U / 230 Th α-spec. : 59. 0 1. 5 years 5*107 2*104 After 20 years ICP-MS: 59. 3 2. 0 years => Date of production: second half of 1943 Age indicates German (or US) nuclear programme JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Case Study Illicit Trafficking - Case Study : Find 26 – Rotterdam On 16 th Dec. 2003 - 2 -3 kg radioactive material was detected in a scrap metal shipment in Rotterdam harbour. The shipment arrived from a dealer in Jordan. Materials sent to ITU on 10 th March 2004 and consisted of 2 bulk samples and 3 swipes. JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Results - bulk Gamma spectrometry • U-235 enrichment 0, 7 % TIMS and MC-ICP-MS • U-234 = 0, 0052 % • U-235 = 0, 712 % • U-238 = 99, 283 % natural uranium, no indication of an enriched or irradiated uranium Titration • U-content ~70 % JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Lead isotopics • Pb-204 = 1. 47 % • Pb-206 = 24. 83 % • Pb-207 = 21. 47 % • Pb-208 = 52. 24 % resembles natural lead, no radiogenic lead Anions (qualitative) • (NO 3)- and (CO 3)2 - ICP-MS • Main impurities (>1000 ppm): Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Na, Ni, P
200 m Results - bulk SEM/EDX • agglomerates of small crystals with an average length of 10 µm and diameter of 2 µm • uranium together with Fe, Ni and Cr • Al, Ca, Mg and Si were in the amorphous part around 20 m 11 W% A% Cr Ka 0. 71 2. 96 Fe Ka 1. 67 6. 45 Ni Ka 0. 75 2. 77 U Ma 96. 87 87. 82 100. 00 JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Line 100. 00
Find-26: Rotterdam Bulk material: • natural uranium oxides with ≈ 70% U • presence of (CO 3)2 • main impurities: Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Na, Ni, P • lead isotopic composition Swipes: • natural uranium, Cs-137, Eu-154 and Am-241 (evidence of nuclear activities) JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, What information did the analysis yield? • Intermediate product, possibly (NH 4)4(UO 2)(CO 3)3 • Impurities point to phosphate rich ores (North Africa, Middle East, USA, South Africa, Brazil) • Pb isotopic composition (natural) indicates low uranium content in the ore, which is the case for P-rich ores • evidence of nuclear activities • Origin of the material: combination of scientific results and information from other services
Radioactive Dispersion Devices (RDDs) or Dirty Bombs) What is a “dirty bomb”? A “dirty bomb, ” also known as a radiological weapon, is a conventional explosive such as dynamite packaged with radioactive material that scatters when the bomb goes off. A dirty bomb kills or injures through the initial blast of the conventional explosive and by airborne radiation and contamination—hence the term “dirty. ” JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
Radioactive Dispersion Devices The propagation of the radioactive cloud in a city Inhalation dose in the center of the explosion: 680 m. Sv RDD with 2000 Ci 60 Co (7. 4∙ 1013 Bq) 1. 5 kg conv. explosives Time after the Total for 2 detonation: hours 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 minutes effective dose scale (inhalation) scale 1: 10, 000 DMA IKONOS satellite map (wind with 0. 5 m/s from 290° north, weather conditions neutral/unstable) JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, In collaboration with the Bf. S, Germany No real explosion!
Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials Conclusions: The JRC… • has extensive experience in working with IAEA, EU member states, national and international organisations in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material • has the experience, dedicated facilities and extensive databases for nuclear forensic analyses • is developing tools for modelling / scenario assessment reports for and post event support following a Radioactive Dispersion Event JRC Info Day - Bucureşti,
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