INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATONS AND U S FOREIGN POLICY THE

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATONS AND U. S FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF THE BALKANS Bard College, US Foreign Policy Summer Institute June 22, 2015 Mark Baskin, Research Professor of Political Science, Rockefeller College, University at Albany; American University in Kosovo

Has International intervention in the Balkans Succeeded?

How Democratic? Freedom House 2014 Slovenia: 1. 93 Serbia: 3. 64 Croatia: 3. 68 Montenegro: 3. 86 Macedonia: 4. 0 Bosna-Hercegovina: 4. 43 • Kosovo 5. 14 • • Does this measure anything meaningful? • Is Slovenia that much better than the rest? How? • Bi. H v. Kosovo v. Macedonia? • Politics? Religion? • Do Best Performers Follow US/EU instructions? • • • http: //freedomhouse. org/report/charts-and-graphsnations-transitfindings#Detailed%20 Ratings%20 by%20 Country https: //freedomhouse. org/sites/default/files/Data%20 t ables. pdf https: //freedomhouse. org/report/nations-transit 2014/nations-transit-2014 -methodology#. VYg. E 2 ecw 8 fo

Freedom House 2014 Report • Slovenia is not “Balkan”: a Consolidated Democracy • Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro: Semi-Consolidated Democracies • Macedonia, Bi. H: Transitional Govs/Hybrid Regimes • Kosovo: semi-consolidated authoritarian Regime or Internationally Administered Territory • Ćim Južnije, Tim Tužnije: the further south it is, the sadder it becomes • What is a state? People? Territory? Can we code this? How political are ‘objective’ methods?

Freedom House Dimensions • Panel of Experts Evaluate – National Democratic Governance – Electoral Processes – Civil Society – Independent Media – Local Democratic Governance – Judicial Framework and Independence – Corruption • No Opinion Surveys, Nothing on Security or Effectiveness

RESOURCE FLOWS IN NEW WARS (Kaldor, 1999) Diaspora, including migrant workers Remittances Arms, money, Repatriated etc. profits Business, e. g. oil, diamonds drugs “Taxes” “Custom s duties” Ordinary people Loot Black market Loot Protection money Foreign governments, including neighbouring states, patron states, e. g. former colonial powers, superpowers, Islamic states Humanitarian assistance, NGOs and IGOs Governments Black market Self-defense units Black market Paramilitary groups Black market Regular armed forces Arms, money, etc.

Kosovo: Politics vs. Administration • • • Long Arm of American Policy and Politics UN and OSCE and EULEX Special Court – “why must Kosovo suffer? ” Opposition vs. Position: nothing in common Educational Reform in Kosovo – Out of Date Blueprint on Univ. Reform is Sacred – Disconnect between political and administrative – ‘Financing the Dream’ of visits abroad • Outmigration; High Unemployment, Inequality

Macedonia • • How Effective a State? Ethnic and Political Divisions Corruption and wire tapping ISIS in Kumanovo as a tail wagging the dog? Who are the Macedonians anyway? Greater Albania, Bulgaria and Greece? The state as a distributive good

Bi. H: Bosna-Hercegovina • • The Dayton Disaster Rewarding agile aggression: 3 “nations”, 2 entities IC rewards obedient Federation, not RS The Irony: – Federation is non-functional – disagreements among Bosniac Parties, between Croat and Bosniac Parties ; – RS works pretty well • High Unemployment, outmigration, Low Growth

ISIS Appeal to the Balkans • http: //www. longwarjournal. org/archives/2015/06/islamic-state-toutsjihadists-from-the-balkans. php

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY GOALS State and markets Low social cohesion, high conflict • Exclusion • Oppressive, authoritarian state • Inequity / inequality • Corrupt, inefficient bureaucracy • Closed society Vertical Social Capital Horizontal Social Capital Bonding Capital (kin, religious, and ethnic-based) Communities and individuals High social cohesion, low conflict • Inclusion • Rule of law; democratic state • Access and equality of opportunity • Efficient, noncorrupt bureaucracy • Open Society Civil Society Bridging Capital (cross-cutting ties) (Colletta and Cullen, 2000)

Explanatory Hypotheses • IC does not try hard enough – more money and effort? • International Penetration Hypothesis – the more IC involvement, the worse it is • Radical Political Economy Approach – follows from International Penetration, ISIS and M-L • Cultural Explanation – Developed/Underdeveloped; Donors/Hosts; Duelling Administrative Cultures

What is to be done? What went wrong? • Disconnect: Diplomacy vs. Politics vs. Administration • Contradictory Declarations: Democracy, Stability, Independence, Development, Efficiency • Foreign policy goals (US) vs. evolution of norms (UN)? • Universal or Particular Values and Goals? • Whose needs are take precedence: The People, National Govs, Donor Country Govs or IO Viability • Be like we say or be like we do?

Paris Principles (2005) – Accra, Busan • Ownership – Partnership Countries Leadership of Development Strategy • Alignment – Donors Base Support on Partner Countries Development Strategies, Institutions and Procedures • Harmonization – Donors actions Harmonized, Transparent and Effective • Managing for Results – Managing Resources and Improving Decision-Making • Mutual Accountability – Donors and Partners are Accountable for Results

Assumptions on Culture • Culture matters as in ‘How We Do Things’: Civilian vs Military vs NGO, Local vs International • Diverse “Administrative Communities” in UN US. • Principals and Agents: Good Cooperation in Field & Policy Differences in Capitals • Cooperation and Coordination: UK/Ukraine in Gorazde • Words and Deeds • Local Policy Making Cultures: Obedient, Radical, Rejectionist

Different Types of Mandates and Goals • UN: Varieties of Security Council Mandates: – Advise – Assist – Provide Administration • US: Diplomacy + Contract – Cooperative Agreements – Grants – Contracts with Outsourcing – Training

Thinking About the Work • Deliverables (US) vs Diffusion of Ideas and Practices (UN) vs Focus on socio-economic status • Projects (US) vs. Operations (UN): Work Plans vs. Showing the Flag • Which Metaphor: Teachers, Plumbers, Doctors, Lawyer/Mediators, Psychologists?

Operations: Do Like We Say or Like We Do? • Command Control: USG– Congres–Contractor- Client – Home Office: How much flexibility? • Mandate Creep: UN–TCNs, SC, Donors (Wld Bank), Members, Nat’l Government: Firm Commitment • Recruitment: UN, OSCE, USG, USAID, Bidding, Secondment, VIP? • Best Practices, Context or Idiosyncrasies? • What is in it for me?

Time Tables and Time Lines • US – tight time lines, reporting deliverables, the moving targets of work plans, M&E, Inability • UN – nothing happens quickly. “Immediate” means 6 months; logistics; TCNs; absence of authority

BALKAN OFFICIALS • ‘Hardliners’ • ‘Moderates’

Local-International Relationships

Who’s on First? Local-International Relationships • Relationships between “International” and “Local” Stakeholders on the ground • Among expats, phases of 1. astonished rapture; 2. disappointment; 3. contempt • Cooperation and Coordination? Who controls the agenda? • Biden in Beograd and Branding Policy – A gift from the American People

VALUES, OBJECTIVES, METHOD IC IMAGE OF GOVERNANCE ‘LOCAL’ IMAGE OF GOVERNANCE • Shared National. International Authority • Democratization From Above • Political Inclusion • Political Exclusion • Capacity-Building for National Elements • Maintain Parallel Systems • Transfer of Authority • Factional Identities and Bureaucratic Routines • International Exit-Strategy • Integration into 'International Society’ • No Exit - Occupation • Establish ‘Dual Society’

Exit Strategies and Sustainability Thinking about “exit strategies” UNSC agreement vs Project Termination vs. Sustainability Democracy vs. Stability; Democracy vs. Liberalism • Forest vs. Trees • Exit or Engagement • Who actually trains whom? • •

Questions • Who really drives the post-construction aid train? • How different is the US from the UN in reality? • Is it possible to remove narrow donor’s interests from aid? • Is it possible to engage ISIS?

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATONS AND U. S FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF THE BALKANS Bard College, US Foreign Policy Summer Institute June 22, 2015 Mark Baskin, Research Professor of Political Science, Rockefeller College, University at Albany; American University in Kosovo

? ? ? he Cold War: When Culture Was King • The Two Cultures (C. P. Snow) Culture of Poverty (Edward Banfield) • Norms, Values, Doctrines, and Unwritten Rules • Two Trajectories from Tradition to Modernity: Liberal Capitalist and Soviet Socialist • End of Ideology: The Modern World of Star Trek • Pre-Constructivist: Before the End of History and Imagined Communities

Overview of Presentation • Paris Principles of Aid Effectiveness • Clash of Development Cultures in Practice • Bi-Lateral (US) vs. Multi-Lateral (UN) vs. Parochial (? ) (Local) • Global and Local • Exit or Sustainability • Sovereignty vs Human Security

? ? ? Relationship with the Home Office • Relationship the Shareholders at home/in HQ – Should authority for the project lay in the home office or with the field office? Principle-Agent Problems – Can UN or UN Secretariat work with organizations or must it be with individuals?

? ? Measurement of Performance • Technical vs. diplomatic and qualitative: How do we know that we have succeeded? • Quasi Experimental Methods of evaluation – interrupted time series, randomization, “science” • Reporting – External evaluation • UN – the measurement of success is much different; no real-time, formative evaluations.