Improving Governance in Developing Countries Presented to Governance

Improving Governance in Developing Countries Presented to: Governance & Anticorruption Core Course The World Bank Presented by: Sanjay Pradhan Director Public Sector Governance Board Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 1

Focus for Today: Outline Ø Importance of Good Governance & Anticorruption Ø Governance: Framework & Measurement Ø Priority Areas for Improving Governance Ø Operational Strategy on Anticorruption The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 2

Governance – Good and Bad Lessons from the last 50 years v Some governments have helped deliver substantial improvements in income, health and education outcomes (East Asia) v In other countries, governmental action has resulted in wasted resources, weak investment and growth, and entrenched corruption The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 3

Good Governance matters for investment and growth % Investment share in GDP 20% Income per capita Growth Rate 2% 1. 5% 1% 0. 5% 15% 0% -0. 5% -1. 0% 10% -1. 5% High Medium Low Governance Quality measured by perception of 4000 firms in 67 countries on: (i) protection of property rights; (ii) judicial reliability; (iii) predictability of rules; (iv) control of corruption. World Development Report Survey 1997 The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 4

The direction of causality … Growth causes governance to improve. . . v Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) found that while higher per capita incomes foster democracy, democracy in turn does not foster higher incomes v B. Friedman (2005) argues that higher living standards encourage more open, tolerant and democratic societies … and better governance causes growth v Using measures of rule of law, bureaucratic quality and corruption, Chong and Calderon (2000) found significant causality from good governance to growth and vice versa – i. e. “good governance” both contributes to and results from strong economic performance v Other studies have dealt with the potential for reverse causation by using exogenous instruments for the governance indicators and concluded that good governance has a significant and strong causal impact on economic performance … … but the debate on causality continues … The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 5

Bangladesh Governance – Growth Conundrum v Moderate growth rates and high corruption coexist v Need to unbundle governance – not all bad news § State allowed civil society to step in and deliver key services v Is Bangladesh’s governance ‘good enough’? § Bangladesh needs to move to a higher growth path of 6 -7% a year to achieve the PRSP’s poverty reduction objectives and related MDGs § Growth rates may not be sustainable – growth is driven largely by garment exports and phase out of the MFA quota system puts this growth at risk § Fiduciary and reputational risk to Bank significant v Improving governance is key to unlocking other sources of growth § According to the 2005 ICA, corruption is now the greatest obstacle to doing business, overtaking power § Bangladesh remains fairly isolated from the world economy and is unable to capitalize on the growth dividend that globalization might bring. Trade openness is very low (Bangladesh ranks 175 out of 182 countries), as is FDI (Bangladesh ranks 137 out of 141 countries). Attracting FDI would require significant improvements in the investment climate § Improving critical infrastructure, especially power and ports, requires solving fundamental governance problems in each sector Governance & The World Bank Anticorruption Core Course, page 6

Focus for Today: Outline Ø Importance of Good Governance & Anticorruption Ø Governance: Framework Ø Priority Areas for Improving Governance Ø Operational Strategy on Anticorruption The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 7

Governance & Corruption – Not the same thing! Governance Corruption The manner in which the State acquires and exercises its authority to provide public goods and services Using public office for private gain Corruption is an outcome – a consequence of the failure of accountability relationships in the governance system The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 8

Governance Systems: Supply and Demand v Supply-side: Capacities and organizational Supply-side arrangements – leadership, skills, human resource and financial management systems – embodied in state institutions to deliver public goods and services v Demand-side: Institutions and accountability Demand-side arrangements – elections, political parties, parliaments, judicial systems, free press, civil society organizations, accountable local governments – that enable citizens and firms to hold state institutions to account The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 9

Governance Systems: Actors, Capacities and Accountability Citizens/Firms Political Actors & Institutions • Political Parties • Competition, transparency Check & Balance Institutions • Parliament • Judiciary • Oversight institutions Cross-cutting Control Agencies (Finance, HR) Civil Society & Private Sector • Civil Society Watchdogs • Media • Business Associations Citizens/Firms Executive-Central Govt Service Delivery & Regulatory Agencies Subnational Govt & Communities Citizens/Firms The World Bank Outcomes: Services, Regulations, Corruption Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 10

Governance Systems: When Accountability Breaks Down Citizens/Firms Political Actors & Institutions State Capture • Political Parties • Competition, transparency Check & Balance Institutions • Parliament • Judiciary • Oversight institutions administrative corruption Cross-cutting Control Agencies (Finance, HR) • Media • Business Associations Service Delivery & Regulatory Agencies Subnational Govt & Communities Citizens/Firms The World Bank Civil Society Patronage Private & & Sector • Civil Society nepotism Watchdogs Citizens/Firms Executive-Central Govt Outcomes: Services, Regulations, Corruption Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 11

Governance Problems: Some Examples v Grand Corruption: State Capture Ø Leaders plundering state assets (Mobutu, Abacha) Ø Powerful “oligarchs” buying state officials (CIS) Ø Corrupt leaders colluding with corrupt investors: noncompetitive, non-transparent award of contracts (oil & gas) v Nepotism and Patronage in Public Service Ø Political pressure for award of contracts, appointments Ø Politicized transfers (South Asia) v Administrative (Petty) Corruption & Inefficiency: Ø Bribes for licenses, permits, government services Ø Diversion of funds for public programs Ø Inefficient and ineffective service delivery The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 12

Two Governance Patterns v Good (enough) governance: Developmental orientation of political leadership, functional check & balances, system not highest performing but mutually reinforcing and self-correcting v Clientelist: Political leaders use authority to maintain their power base or are captured by powerful private interests. Leaders bypass check and balance institutions and use bureaucracy for patronage. The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 13

Good Governance has many dimensions Citizens/Firms Checks & Balances • Independent, effective judiciary • Legislative oversight (PACs, PECs) • Independent oversight institutions (SAI) • Global initiatives: UN, OECD Convention, anti-money laundering Effective Public Sector Management • Ethical leadership: asset declaration, conflict of interest rules • Cross-cutting public management systems: meritocracy, public finance, procurement • Service delivery and regulatory agencies in sectors Civil Society & Media • Freedom of press, FOI • Civil society watchdogs • Report cards, client surveys Private Sector Interface • Streamlined regulation • Public-private dialogue • Extractive Industry Transparency • Corporate governance • Collective business associations Citizens/Firms Political Accountability • Political competition, broad-based political parties • Transparency & regulation of party financing • Disclosure of parliamentary votes Decentralization and Local Participation • • Decentralization with accountability Community Driven Development (CDD) Oversight by parent-teacher associations & user groups Beneficiary participation in projects Citizens/Firms The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 14

The Bank operations focus only on some Citizens/Firms Checks & Balances • Independent, effective judiciary • Legislative oversight (PACs, PECs) • Independent oversight institutions (SAI) • Global initiatives: UN, OECD Convention, anti-money laundering Effective Public Sector Management • Ethical leadership: asset declaration, conflict of interest rules • Cross-cutting public management systems: meritocracy, public finance, procurement • Service delivery and regulatory agencies in sectors • • • Civil Society & Media Freedom of press Freedom of information Civil society watchdogs Public hearings of draft laws Report cards, client surveys Participatory country diagnostic surveys Private Sector Interface Streamlined regulation Public-private dialogue Break-up of monopolies Extractive Industry Transparency • Corporate governance • Collective business associations Citizens/Firms Political Accountability • Political competition, broad-based political parties • Transparency & regulation of party financing • Disclosure of parliamentary votes Local Participation & Community Empowerment Primary focus of WB operations in governance The World Bank • • Decentralization with accountability Community Driven Development (CDD) Oversight by parent-teacher associations & user groups Beneficiary participation in projects Citizens/Firms Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 15

Operational Implication: Unpack Governance v What are the specific governance problems of concern? Ø Corruption? If so, where is it concentrated? Health? Education? Financial sector? Procurement? Ø Poor delivery of public services? If so, which one? Ø Weak credibility for private investment? v What are the specific drivers of poor outcomes? Ø Ø Powerful interests purchasing state policy for private interest Kick-backs in public procurement Lack of citizen voice to influence service delivery Weak checks and balances to constrain arbitrary action v What are the priorities for governance reform? Ø Ø Public regulation and financing of political parties Transparent, competitive procurement Strengthened legislative oversight, independent judiciary Meritocracy in public administration The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 16

Focus for Today: Outline Ø Importance of Good Governance & Anticorruption Ø Governance: Measurement Ø Priority Areas for Improving Governance Ø Operational Strategy on Anticorruption The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 17

Two Approaches to Measuring Governance v Broad and Aggregated: Broad measures to measure governance at more aggregated levels. Help reveal systematic patterns – and basis for monitoring trends over time. v Specific and Disaggregated: Specific measures of quality of key governance subsystems, including using “actionable indicators” to benchmark and track reforms. The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 18

Control of Corruption: one Aggregate Indicator (selected countries from 204 worldwide, for illustration, based on 2004 research data) Good Governance Margins of Error Governance Level Poor Governance Source for data: : 'Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996 -2004’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, (http: //www. worldbank. org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10 th percentile rank; Light Red between 10 th and 25 th ; Orange, between 25 th and 50 th ; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th ; Dark Green above 90 th. The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 19

PEFA’s Performance Measurement Framework Budget Realism: Is the budget realistic, and implemented as intended in a predictable manner? Comprehensive, Policy-based, budget: Does the budget capture all relevant fiscal transactions, and is the process, giving regard to government policy? Comprehensive Fiscal oversight: Are the aggregate fiscal position and risks are monitored and managed? The World Bank Six PFM System Aspects Accountability and Transparency: Are effective external financial accountability and transparency arrangements in place? Control: Is effective control and stewardship exercised in the use of public funds? Information: Is adequate fiscal, revenue and expenditure information produced and disseminated to meet decision-making and management purposes? Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 20

The “Bribe Fee” List Unofficial payments by firms in Ukraine Enterprises Type of License/Service/”Favor” Average fee required admitting need to pay (1996) “unofficially” Enterprise registration $176 66% Each visit by fire/health inspector $42 81% Tax inspector (each regular visit) $87 51% Telephone line installation $894 78% Lease in state space (square ft. per month) $7 66% Export license/registration $123 61% Import license/registration $278 71% Border crossing (lump sum) $211 100% Border crossing (percent of value) 3% 57% Domestic currency loan from bank on 4% 81% preferential terms (percent of value) Hard currency loan on preferential 4% 85% terms (percent of value) The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 21

Citizen Report Card of Government Services: Latvia Post Office State Educational Institutions Office of Social Benefits Polyclinic/Health Services Agency of Immigration & Citizenship Prosecutor Customs Service Courts Local Housing Authority Police 0 The World Bank 10 20 Percent giving favorable rating 30 40 Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 22

The Challenge of State Capture Proportion of firms affected by capture of … 30 Parliamentary Votes Presidential Admin. Decrees 25 Civil Court Decrees 20 15 10 5 Hungary The World Bank Estonia Russia Ukraine Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 23

Focus for Today: Outline Ø Importance of Good Governance & Anticorruption Ø Governance: Framework & Measurement Ø Priority Areas for Improving Governance Ø Operational Strategy on Anticorruption The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 24

Priority Areas for Improving Governance v Strengthening Public Management Systems Ø Strengthening public finance management & accountability Ø E-procurement for greater transparency and competition v Improving front-line service provision Ø Instituting citizen report cards and monitoring Ø Strengthen community monitoring and oversight v Strengthening Leadership & Ethics for good governance v Strengthening global checks and balances: Ø Instituting transparency in extractive industries Ø Strengthening global initiatives to curb transnational corruption The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 25

Strengthening PFM Systems a key priority The new international aid architecture emphasizes the principle of mutual accountability Scaling up of donor assistance requires sound PFM systems and reduced corruption in partner countries The World Bank Important benefits from using country's own systems -- but need to strengthen capacity and accountability of PFM Increasing recognition that "ringfencing" projects will not work Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 26

Bank interventions to build capacity: multiple targets and tools (AFR) Budget realism Budget Comprehensiveness Information Control Oversight by CSOs & Professional groups Parliamentary Oversight The World Bank Tanzania MTEF AAA support merging planning and budgeting in Lesotho IFMIS in Sierra Leone, accounting training in Africa Internal control and audit support in HIPCs Civil society monitoring of Chad Oil Fund, Professional Accountancy Institutions in DRC, Mali, Guinea and Kenya Support for Parliamentary oversight in Ghana, Kenya and Zambia; Supreme Audit Institutions in Cape Verde, Sierra Leone and Senegal Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 27

‘Demand-side’ interventions to strengthen accountability in PFM Civil Society Oversight; transparent, competitive procurement Transparent, competitive eprocurement Strengthening Supreme Audit Institutions (Hungary) (Slovakia) (LAC) Strengthening Public Accounts Committees of Parliament (Kenya, Ghana, Zambia -AFR) Participatory Budgeting, Puerto Alegra (Brazil) Procurement oversight by CSOs (Philippines) Strengthening Public Accounts Committees of Parliament (India) Public Expenditure Tracking & Information Campaigns (Cambodia, Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia and on-going in Azerbaijan and Yemen) The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 28

Chile’s Internet-based Public Procurement: Transparency and Competition v All supplier companies register, indicating areas of business (e. g. , IT, construction, furniture) v Public agencies submit tenders through internet v Automatic e-mail to all companies in selected area v Online information on name, position of official in-charge v Online information on results: who participated, proposals made, scores received, who won bid, historical record of agency’s purchases and contracts The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 29

Civil Society Monitoring for Improved Service Provision: Bangalore The World Bank Source : Public Affairs Center, India Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 30

Transparency & Community Monitoring: Primary Education in Uganda US$ per Student 3. 5 Public info campaign 3. 0 2. 5 2. 0 1. 5 1. 0 0. 5 0. 0 1991 1993 Intended Grant Amount The World Bank 1994 1995 1999 Received by School (mean) Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 31

Media, Transparency, and Combating Corruption “BIR Officials Amass Unexplained Wealth” By Tess Bacalla , Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism Owner: Regional Director in the Bureau of Internal Revenue; forced to resign; currently facing corruption charges; other officials suspended, also facing charges BENEFICIAL OWNER Edwin Abella BIR Reg'l Director, Quezon City Ditto CAR MODEL Nissan Patrol Suzuki Grand Vitara Nissan Cefiro Ditto BMW Honda Accord Mitsubishi L 200 Honda CR -V BMW The World Bank Lucien E. Sayuno BIR Reg'l Director, Makati City Ditto Danilo A. Duncano BIR Reg'l Director, Quezon City Corazon P. Pangcog Asst. Reg'l Director, Valenzuela City Ditto REGISTERED OWNER Sulpicio S. Bulanon Jr. 1817 Jordan Plains Subd. , Quezon City (listed address of Abella in his SALs) Merrick Abella (son of Abella) 24 Xavierville, Loyola Heights, Q uezon City Elizabeth S. Buendia 152 Road 8, -asa, Quezon City Pag Limtra Dev. Corp. Zone 4, Dasmariñas, Cavite Marie Rachel D. ses Mene c/o Metrocor and Holdings, G&F, Makati City Daniel Anthony P. Duncano 2618 JP Rizal, New Capital Estate, Quezon City Alberto P. Pangcog (husband) B 2 L 23 Lagro Subd. , Quezon City Alberto P. Pangcog 9 Ricardo St. , Carmel 1 Subd. , Quezon City Ditto Flordeliza P. Villegas Charito P. Sico Revenue District Of’cer 8 Ma. Elena St. , Carmel 1 Subd. , Cabanatuan City Quezon City Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 32

Leadership & Ethics v Beyond accountability systems, leadership and ethics in public service shape standards of governance and anticorruption v Leaders set standards for integrity, catalyze politically difficult change v Way forward is to empower and develop critical mass of reform-minded leaders committed to integrity v Innovative pilots in transformational leadership to engender paradigm shift: Madagascar, Burundi, Kenya v Global Integrity Alliance: Peer support network of public officials committed to ethics in public service The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 33

Strengthening Public Service Ethics 5 Cs to Counter Corruption Connectedness Care & Compassion Creating a sense of belonging to society Strengthen Values & Ethics: Counter Corruption Creating a sense of Compassion to care for the more needy in society Cosmology Courage Overcoming insecurity & incessant quest for material acquisitions Commitment to Contribute Broaden vision by seeing life in the context of the huge universe Creating a commitment to public service – to give v/s take Source: H. H. Sri Ravishankar (Founder, IAHV) @ The International Anticorruption Conference, Korea & Governance The World Bank Anticorruption Core Course, page 34

Recent global initiatives to curb transnational corruption ü OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (1997) ü UN Convention Against Corruption Treaty (2003) – 94 countries join ü Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) (1989) -- 40 Recommendations (2003) ü Recovery of proceeds from corruption (Nigeria 2005) ü Publish What You Pay, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative ü World Bank blacklists corrupt firms ü Transparency International Principles for countering bribery ü Governance Network of OECD DAC (GOVNET) ü Norway’s ‘Doers’ Network on Anticorruption (2004) The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 35

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Key Principles v Independent review of payments made to the government by oil, gas and mining companies and of revenues received by government from those companies by a reputable third party (i. e. audit firm). v Publication in a readily accessible form of payments made by the companies and of revenues received by government. v Extension of all of the above to companies including state owned enterprises. v Active engagement of all stakeholders in the design, monitoring, and implementation process. v Commitment to a work plan and timelines for implementation. The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 36

Focus for Today: Outline Ø Importance of Good Governance & Anticorruption Ø Governance: Framework & Measurement Ø Priority Areas for Improving Governance Ø Operational Strategy on Anticorruption The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 37

Corruption pose three significant risks Development Effectiveness Risk That poor governancecorruption will undermine the impact of development efforts in general and in donorsupported projects Reputational Risk Fiduciary Risk That donor resources will not be used for the purposes intended The World Bank That large amounts of aid in countries with corrupt leaders will tarnish donors’ reputation Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 38

Challenges in Identifying High-Risk Countries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Afghanistan Angola Azerbaijan Bangladesh Belarus Cambodia Central African. Rep. Chad Comoros Congo, Dem. Rep. Cote D'Ivoire Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Gambia, The Guinea-Bissau Haiti Iraq Kazakhstan Korea, North 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Kyrgyz Rep. Lao, PDR Lebanon Liberia Libya Myanmar Nigeria Paraguay Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Swaziland Tajikistan Togo Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Venezuela Yemen, Rep. Zimbabwe (Countries in blue are inactive WB borrowers) Country Rank Country Source: TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2005 CPI Score 117 Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador Guatemala, Guyana, Libya Nepal, Philippines, Uganda 2. 5 126 Albania, Niger, Russia, Sierra Leone 2. 4 130 Burundi, Cambodia, Congo (Republic), Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea 2. 3 137 Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Liberia, Uzbekistan 2. 2 144 Congo (Democratic Republic), Kenya, Pakistan, Paraguay, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan 2. 1 152 Angola 2. 0 1. 9 155 158 Haiti, Myanmar, Turkmenistan Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria Bangladesh, Chad 1. 8 1. 7 Notes: Data on left: Countries listed in alphabetical order using 2004 data. These countries scored in the bottom quartile on the main corruption question in the World Bank’s 2004 CPIA which covered 135 countries AND scored in the bottom quartile on the 5 questions on broader governance issues in the 2004 CPIA OR scored in the bottom quartile on the 2004 Control of Corruption component of the WBI/DEC Kaufmann-Kraay Aggregate Governance Indicator. Countries not included in the 2004 CPIA but included in the WBI/DEC index are here if they fell in the bottom quartile of that index (Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, Liberia, Libya, Myanmar, and Somalia). This list includes inactive borrowers and ineligible countries. Inactive countries are defined as those with no lending/grants in SAP for FY 04 -06. The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 39

Anti-Corruption Strategy World Bank Anticorruption as key filter in design of country assistance strategies Support international efforts to reduce corruption Prevent fraud and corruption in donor-financed projects The World Bank Help countries that request support in their efforts to reduce corruption Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 40

Addressing Corruption in CAS’s Systematic diagnosis of the nature & drivers of corruption Aid amount linked to level of corruption Actions to address the most significant development risks posed by corruption: Reducing corruption in key sources of growth, service delivery Actions to mitigate reputational risk from grand corruption: Transparency in major procurement deals, asset declaration, Actions to mitigate fiduciary risk: Enhanced fiduciary safeguards in projects, PFM assessment for using budget support Political economy assessments to identify feasible actions Coordinated donor action for complementarities and collective impact The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 41

Major programs launched… …with some evidence of success Albania (public admin. ) Russia Latvia (customs/treasury) Ukraine (inspections) Kyrgyz Republic (tax admin) (governance reform) Jordan (civil society) Guatemala (diagnostic to action program) Colombia (diagnostics & civil society) The World Bank Ghana (PE accountability) Gabon (water/electricity) Uganda (education) Tanzania (PSR) Cambodia (PE; forestry) Philippines (procurement) Indonesia (local governance) Bangladesh Pakistan (NGOs in social sectors) (devolution) India – Andra Pradesh Ethiopia (power; e-gov); Karnataka (decentralization) (right to info) Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 42

Lessons learned: Deeper challenges in high-risk countries Strong on PFM diagnostics Good at technocratic solutions and design Emphasis on core public management reforms These appear to be working when the underlying environment is conducive: Ø Committed leadership Ø Coalition for reform Ø Capacity Deeper underlying challenges Ø Ø State capture and corrupt leadership in clientelistic states Powerful vested interests and political obstacles Weak ‘demand’ pressures for reform – limited voice, media freedoms, civil rights, etc. Political drivers of corruption (e. g. , lack of political competition, party financing) The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 43

Reducing corruption in high-risk countries: Priorities for action in the next stage Better understanding and management of political economy of reforms Develop operational strategies to engage with corrupt leadership in clientelist, captured states Tackle political drivers of governance challenges in sectors (e. g. , power, ports, EI) Tackling political corruption (e. g. party finance, electoral corruption, etc. ) with partners Partnerships and new instruments to support demand-side initiatives: working with civil society, media, parliamentarians The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 44

Q&A The World Bank Governance & Anticorruption Core Course, page 45